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ABSTRACT 
Developing a distinction between issues of anthropology and advocacy, 
an examination of John Rawls's theory of justice as Fairness argues that 
the formulations of both A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism 
(1993) are vulnerable to objections advanced by a range of commentators, 
notably including Michael J. Sandel. The so-called `communitarian 
critique' of which Sandel is a leading exponent is primarily 
anthropological (i. e. concerned with philosophical issues related to the 
concept of self) and does not contain or determine the advocacy of any 
particular set of political principles or arrangements. Liberal analysts of 
`communitarianism' typically confuse questions of anthropology and 
advocacy, and in consequence misunderstand the concerns of their critics. 
An exposition and defence of Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of 
justice (1982) introduces themes of identity, reflection and 
intersubjectivity which are more thoroughly explored in the works of 
Charles Taylor, whose philosophical anthropology offers a fully 
developed alternative to Rawls's `unencumbered self. ' Taylor's 
conception of the self as a situated, dialogical and self-interpreting agent 
employs a interpretive or hermeneutic methodology that is assessed and 
found preferable on grounds of philosophical coherence and explanatory 
adequacy to Rawls's analytic approach. Hermeneutics is a diverse 
tradition of thought, and Taylor's position is distinguished from 
formulations, including that of Heidegger, that are susceptible to 
criticisms involving subjectivism, relativism and anti-humanism. 
Taylor's philosophical anthropology supports a substantive advocacy 
position, emphasising the public recognition of identities and the 
deliberation of contested meanings. Outlined in the course of discussions 
of the concept of community, and of language and nationalism in 
Quebec, a substantive conception of politics is able to address issues 
involving identity, pluralism and multiculturalism more effectively than 
procedural and individualist alternatives, and also contributes 
significantly to debates in contemporary political philosophy concerning 
deliberation, democracy and difference. 
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THEORISING THE SELF 
[1] INTRODUCTION 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES BET\XWEEN PROPONENTS AND CRITICS of liberal political 
theory can be presented according to a range of schematic agendas, including but not 
limited to those of moral universalism and particularism, political individualism and 
collectivism, epistemological realism and anti-realism, and as developments of neo- 
Kantian and Hegelian philosophical positions. These areas of inquiry are not of course 
mutually exclusive, and are enframed by a more fundamental question central to virtually 
all social theory from Plato1 onwards concerning the theorisation of self and society, and 
of the relationship obtaining between the two. Explicitly or otherwise, the development 
of any theory involving principles, institutions and forms of association depends for its 
intelligibility upon an understanding of the self, that is of the needs, attributes, 
behaviours, ends, etc., of those conceived within a scheme of human relations. Whether 
presented as a limited, abstract ideal of rationality, a delineation of the structure or 
purpose of an `inner' or `true' self as revealed by philosophical investigation, or as part of 
a political vision intended to reshape the contours of the self according to a particular 
ideal, the relationship between self and society emerges from close analysis as a 
simultaneously symbiotic and paradoxical one. 
The dominant features of this paradox reside in the very idea of `the self' as an 
object of study and can be simply stated. The self - of the philosopher as much as any 
other agent of cognition - is always located and conditioned by the social, cultural, 
historical and experiential environments in which he is located. It follows that the 
1 Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford, Oxford Univcr'it}' Press, 1993), 368d-369a, 
'morality c ,m be a property of whole communities as well as indivicluals... why d{on't we start 
by trying to see 
wlldt morality is like in communities? And then wr can examine individuals too... '. The relationship of self 
and soclctV is explored most explicitly in the taxonomy of social forms described at 543,1-E76b. 
identification of fundamental truths in questions of ontology, ' mind, spirit, psyche, 
subjectivity, etc., - the range of terms which encompass issues relating to the `nature' of 
human experience and the category of the person - is constantly frustrated by the absence 
of adequate criteria of philosophical justification. Self and society are inextricably 
independent - each at least in part in part the creation of the other - and can be no more 
obviously separated and interrogated than, say, the abstract categories of `mind' and 
`body'. The question of self and society is in this sense parallel to that concerning the 
priority of `nature' and `nurture, ' itself a problem of philosophy as well as sociology, 
natural history and the biological sciences. Furthermore, in the prevailing philosophical 
climate the more elementary possibility of the individuation and representation of 
concepts in language is also called into question by the demise of the `epistemological 
tradition' insofar as that enquiry sought knowledge in the transparent linguistic 
representation of the world as an objective or independent order of concepts and 
entities. 3 
Without a plausible model of certitude and validation, hopes for the identification 
and justification of an undisputed method or model with which to address problems of 
the self are best considered (according to temperament) either forlorn or wildly 
optimistic. Even if such an advance did occur, given the absence of any remotely clear 
criteria according to which the `problem' might be considered `solved' it is far from 
obvious that it would be recognised as such. The ambiguity of the concept does not 
however diminish its significance; the self cannot be coherently eradicated from social 
theory because attempting to understand subjectivity is to a considerable extent what 
social theory, in all its diversity, is about. The question of the self so emerges as 
incorrigible but indispensable. 
Fortunately, the lack of a ready formula sufficiently ingenious to identify `the 
nature of the self' by no means leaves theory resourceless in the evaluation of possible 
conceptions and their presuppositions, strengths and vulnerabilities. It instead entails that 
these conjectures and interpretations should be regarded as provisional and incomplete 
contributions to a set of debates establishing and addressing the concept of self which are 
not susceptible to conclusive resolution or completion. In the course of these dialogues 
three overlapping areas of concern - engaging issues of methodology, context and 
language - are of particular importance in the evaluation of any particular conception. 
The concept of self is typically theorised within (and through the extension of) sets 
of philosophical judgements and commitments concerning amongst other things: the 
-' Some difficulties ins ýýlvin the term `ontology' are addressed in ý3 below. 
3 Richard Rorty, PLºilýý opI. r' end ýhe: lýlirrorof . 
ý'ztute (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1979). 
The gloss on Rorty's position here is consistent with abundant sound bites in 
his other works and interviews, 
niest rcccntl\' Is the truth out there? ', Times Higher Educ, ition 
Supplement', b jtuie 1997,18, where the 
hook is described by its author is 'just i tract s. i ing we don't iced the notion cºI representation. ' 
metaphysical status of concepts and categories; the sufficiency or otherwise of rationality 
and its implications for human conduct; the character, availability and justification of 
claims to knowledge; the subjectivity or objectivity of the same; and more generally on 
the appropriate form, structure and mechanisms of argument in political theory. 
Envisaged within and hence always dependent upon these positions, a thorough 
examination of the self requires the scrutiny of its supporting arguments and method as 
well as the eventuating conception. Indeed, in the case of a theorist such as John Rawls, 
whose `Original Position' is examined at length in chapter two, it is often the case that 
self and method are so intimately linked as to be inseparable. Methodological 
interrogation alone is unable to thoroughly validate or refute a theory, but is 
indispensable to any process of evaluation and critique from which a defensible 
assessment might emerge. Although the satisfaction of a criterion of noncontradiction, for 
example, does not make a theory necessary, true, or compelling, a measure of consistency 
can nevertheless be considered a prerequisite of any convincing argument. Examination 
of these issues in the methodological arguments of a theorist contributes to an 
understanding of the coherence and plausibility of his work, and of the conception of the 
self maintained within it. 
[2] CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS 
IN ADDITION TO MATTERS OF METHOD the process of evaluation involves consideration 
of the various contexts addressed by a theory. With very few exceptions` most works, 
however innovative they at first appear, draw upon and are defined against their 
predecessors and contemporaries in a manner which allows their location within larger 
canons or traditions of thought. These labels are a convenient shorthand which allow an 
author to quickly identify a theory as consequentialist, rationalist, Hobbesian, etc., and 
more importantly they appeal to the authority of history and to the conventions 
established in previous philosophical encounters. To characterise a theory as, say, 
`Humean', is to offer more than an innocuous label. It also distinguishes a theory from 
alternative positions, and might seek indemnity from engagement with bodies of thought 
deemed marginal or ineffectual within the domain of Hume scholarship. Finally, it 
implies a claim to justification or legitimacy insofar as an affinity is established with the 
extant corpus of Humean thought, and invites those who consider themselves the 
followers of Hume to identify with a theory and perhaps to support it on that basis. 
4 The originality of Wittgenstein is perhaps the most obvious counter to this f.; cneralisation, although 
the T-ict. ztu. ý can be rlearlý situated in the context of debates involving Russell, Frcgc, and the Vienna circle, 
and the Pin/osopiuc l Invcstigatio»5 as \\ ittgenstein's rcv-Olt against his own earlier thought. Ray Monk, 
Lug%,,:; " Tbc Duty n/'Gcrllu5 (Oxford, Macmillan, 1990). 
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Satisfactory elucidation of contexts of thought requires the detailed investigation of 
substantial episodes in the fiercely contested narratives that are the history of ideas. This 
task falls well outside the compass of this essay, which is not an exercise in historical 
retrieval and analysis. In the course of the discussion I have however attempted - 
primarily in the form of footnotes - to convey some sense of the philosophical 
backgrounds, debates and points of convergence which arise between the major figures 
discussed, their historical predecessors and latter-day contemporaries. The awareness of 
context thus fostered is not however intended to overwhelm the focus or direction of the 
essay, which is firmly addressed to the working out of issues relating to the self as they 
arise within recent political philosophy. 
An adequate consideration of context must also attend to the social and historical 
circumstances pertaining to a theory or debate. Philosophical claims upon the 
`perspective of eternity' are many and varied, but no text can entirely escape the 
conditions of its formulation, regardless of claims to the contrary. In the composition of a 
text cultural conventions relating to form and content, language (addressed below), 
production and distribution, etc., inevitably inform the shape of a text. Similarly, 
although works which achieve canonical status often address perennial problems of social 
theory, they do so as a product of and response to the times they inhabit. Hobbes's 
methodological innovations, for example, were part of a transformation in European 
thought precipitated by the new science of the seventeenth century. His application of 
materialism and nominalism in the formulation of the civil philosophy systematically 
presented in Leviathan was however explicitly `occasioned by the disorders of the 
present's - the civil war and its aftermath - in a manner which is indispensable to a 
balanced understanding of the work. 6 Similar comments on the importance of historical 
and intellectual contexts might be made with regard to any work, following a line of 
reasoning neatly encapsulated by Hegel's pronouncement that as `its own time 
apprehended in thought' the notion that philosophy might `transcend its contemporary 
world' is equal in absurdity to the notion that an individual might miraculously `overleap 
his own age. '7 
The apprehension performed by political theory rarely assumes the form of a pale 
reproduction. Always contestable and interpretive, successful political thought is perhaps 
above all a critique of the present, unpacking and problematising the meanings, practices, 
Hobbes, Thomis Leviathan, A Riehýird Turk (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 491. 
6 This does not of course contest the adoption of methods supposedly derived from Hobbes (or anyone 
else) in alternative contexts such as rational choice theory. It r. ither insists that an adequate interpretation of 
any text must take account of the contexts relevant to its composition. The definitive polemical statement of 
this position iý, that of Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning; and understanding in the history of ideas' History and 
Tbwr 8 (1969), 3-53. 
7 G. \\'. F. Hegel, P/ i/ocopby o. /'Riebt, trans. T. M. Knox (OxIoord. Clarendon Press, 195_'), 11. 
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identities, institutions and associations of social life in order to understand, criticise and - 
sometimes - reconstitute them in a more adequate form. Identification of the 
circumstances relevant to a theory or debate serves a range of purposes including the 
clarification of particular cultural and historical conditions, the investigation and 
questioning of central concepts and meanings, the articulation of implicit attitudes and 
unquestioned assumptions, and the establishment of a practical relation between theories 
and the concrete social environments which they must ultimately address. 
As indicated earlier, the philosophical contexts directly relevant to the discussion 
are, where necessary, elucidated in the course of the text. A similar level of detail is also 
provided in the treatment of particular cases of political conflict, such as that regarding 
identity and multiculturalism in Canada (Ch. 6). The more general climate of ideas and 
affairs in which recent controversies involving the concept of the self and their political 
implications occur is however not elucidated in depth, and some preliminary remarks 
concerning the wider contexts engaged by the discussion are therefore warranted. 
Socially, in the latter half of the twentieth century developments in technologies, 
infrastructures, institutions and relationships (involving - amongst other things - 
transport, mobility, communication, capital, employment and consumption)8 have 
challenged and exceeded the conventional structures, boundaries and meanings inherent 
in social institutions - i. e. of the homogenous nation-state and representative democracy 
- familiarly regarded as the `modern' norm in Western societies. The identification and 
analysis of these transformations are of course matters of considerable debate which defy 
precise summary, but three major areas of concern relevant to the theorisation of the self 
are readily discernible. 
Firstly, the internal cultural sophistication and diversity characteristic of late- 
modern capitalist societies entails that identities and processes of identity-formation are 
more complex, differentiated and unstable than at any previous time. Secondly, modern 
transportation makes the transient mobility of peoples between territories possible in a 
manner which feeds, consolidates and compounds this internal complexity. Patterns of 
migration and settlement entail that the territorial state is now fundamentally 
multinational or polyethnic in form, incorporating proliferating cultures and identities 
which do not originate from, and are not constrained by, the limits of experience and 
identification which circumscribed earlier understandings of modernity and identity in 
the nation state. 9 Thirdly, the mobility noted above is bound up with the increasingly 
individuated ordering of social and economic activity, where the focus on the `I' occurs at 
S Scow Lash and john Urry, Ecu nomic. ý 0. /'Signs and Space (London, S. igc, 1994), OI(cr a concise OVCrýVicw 
Of thcc phcnomrn, i Constituting 'IatC modcrnit\' , ii-id the , utcndant ýc 
icýlcý; ic, tl litcr. tture. 
9 For cx, tmple Will K\ uiick, i, : tlu/ttcu/lura/ Citizenship: A Li/sera/ Thcr, ry of Umor 1V Rights (Oxford, 
Cl, tren(ion Press, 1995), 1. estimites that the -world'` 184 independent st. ttc, ý contain ()vc'r 600 living language 
groups, . 'I'd 
5000 rthnir groups. ' 
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the expense of relationships and meanings dependent upon local and communal 
environments, an `emptying out of the `we' as the self comes up against an ever faster 
circulation of goods, images, money, ideas and other selves. '10 
This intensification of individual mobility in terms of location, status, relationships 
and social memberships 1 provoked a range of sociological and philosophical analyses. 
The `communitarian critique' of liberal political philosophy, introduced in §3 below, is 
the most enduring and substantial of these investigations. Its principle contention 
maintains that the excessive individuation or atomism inherent in the methodologies of 
contemporary liberalism is unable to adequately comprehend the location of the self in 
the plural and intersubjective concrete social contexts which are prerequisite cultural 
resources of clearly formulated individual and group identities. Insofar as modern 
societies uphold and advance an unattainable ideal of autonomy and individuation, they 
correspondingly undermine the social bases of identity and promote an unsettled culture 
of dissociation and anomie. 
It follows from this sketch that the controversy between liberals and 
communitarians is best viewed as part of the debates surrounding the assessment of 
`modernity' and the theorisation of its aftermath and not - as it might appear at first 
glance - as an isolated intellectual encounter. Although the essay does not offer a global 
interpretation, critique or justification of `modernity' as a social, political or cultural 
form, it does work within a general demarcation which accepts that we are presently 
situated in a period which can be intelligibly labelled `late-modern' or `post-industrial'. 
Given the scope of the issues involved it is doubtful that anything conclusive (or 
particularly sensible) can be said within a short work about the legitimacy or otherwise of 
`modernity' which is a contingently overlapping series of temporally proximate social 
processes, rather than a singular and readily available occurrence or objective. What can 
be claimed with some confidence is that the balloon of intellectual optimism - or hubris - 
which supported the universalising, emancipatory, individualist and rationalist aspirations 
of the eighteenth century has been significantly punctured by the practical experience of 
enlightenment as a perennially unfinished project, and by the corresponding array of 
philosophical analyses suggesting that the project was fatally flawed from the outset and 
thus, in the words of Alasdair Maclntyre, had to fail. 122 
Maclntyre's rather hasty judgement is vitiated by the continuing impact of social 
thought, including that of John Rawls, conducted after the fashion established by Kant 
and his contemporaries. The distinctly chastened aspirations of Rawls's recent `political 
10 Lash and Urrv, Econ mwc of'Swn5. zrtcl Space, 314. 
11 The c, ttc uric: follow Michael \\', tlicr's icdc'ntifir, ttio>n of 'the lOtlr mcýhilitics', in \\ , tlrcr, `The 
Ccýl»I»ýIlýit Irian Critiqui ýý1 Lihýr, llisni', Pýýlittc. zl Tl., crýr t 1S, ]]-]-'. The im )hIIII)' Of the I. tte-modern subject is 
c{isiu used 
by Luh and Urrv , Economics cif Siýýt rut Space, Ch. 7. 1- ALisd«tir Maclntyre A/2cr- Viii ae, 2nd. cd., (London, Duckworth, 1985), Ch. 5. 
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not metaphysical' characterisation of his doctrine13 are however not only an indication 
of the influence exerted by the `communitarian' critique, but point to the wider impact of 
deconstructive, postmodernist, poststructuralist, feminist, pyschoanalytic, 
phenomenological and other critical perspectives. None of these approaches fatally 
undermines the philosophical assumptions and social ideals which fall within the general 
rubric of `modernity', and they are rarely discussed explicitly by writers such as Rawls. 
Despite this their overall impact has been profound and enduring, a refashioning of the 
climate of ideas which confronts liberalism - as both a system of ideas and a system of 
social relations - with a set of questions regarding pluralism, identity, democracy and 
difference in late modern life. The difficulties thus engendered are distinguished by a 
philosophical depth and practical immediacy which suggest that the present crisis of 
liberalism will not be so easily resolved as those of earlier eras. The discussions of those 
questions in this essay concentrate on the interpretive or hermeneutic critique of liberal 
political theory, and also engage with significant postmodern and poststructuralist 
positions. It should consequently be emphasised from the outset that as part of a larger 
context of criticism the claims made for the arguments advanced are not totalising in 
form, and that pluralism is as relevant to social theory as it is to social practice. Although 
the interpretations advanced in the course of the essay are of course in my judgement the 
most convincing and plausible available in the areas they discuss, they do not claim to 
exhaust or resolve the issues addressed with any sense of finality, or deny the potential 
significance to the debates of contributions from other disciplines and approaches. 
Returning to more immediate concerns, the encounter with language is often 
decisive in the assessment of any text (or texts). Philosophical and historical aspects of 
context are closely conjoined with the linguistic resources which condition their 
formulation and interpretation. In an important sense the three elements are inseparable, 
feeding into each other and establishing conventions and boundaries of understanding to 
the extent that as Ball suggests - after Wittgenstein14 - `the limits of my moral and 
political language... mark the limits of my moral and political world. More often than not, 
these linguistically imposed limits are invisible to speakers, serving as something like 
absolute presuppositions of intelligible discourse. '15 Questions arising in the philosophy 
of language concerning presuppositions and pre-understandings are examined in some 
detail in chapter five. In a less technical mode, consideration of the self demands an 
awareness of forms of persuasion which attempt to elicit the identification or complicity 
of the reader with the viewpoints and ambitions of the author and text concerned. 
13 Discussed in Ch. 3 below. 
14 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world': Ludwig \k ittgenstein, Tractatus Logico- 
P/. hilosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 5.6 (italics 
original). 
15 Terencc Ball, TrAnc/i)rming Political Diccour: e (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988), 4. 
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Conceptions of the self are always to some extent inductive rather than deductive. 
As a product of reflection any theory will embody and express in its language - however 
covertly - the experience and sympathies of the author. Methodology can refine, 
elaborate and in part justify positions, but cannot constitute experience as theory and 
does not originate them. Rousseau offers probably the clearest example of the potential 
influence of personality and experience. According to the Confessions his entire 
philosophy - and much else besides - was grasped in a `vision' he experienced en route to 
Vinncennes in 1749.16 The example of Rawls is less obvious but equally relevant in this 
regard, a point noted in some early responses to A Theory of Justicel7 but largely 
overlooked since. `Contingencies' including Rawls's prejudices and inclinations are 
ostensibly removed from his impersonal `original position', but not from the arguments 
mounted in support of the decision situation. R. M. Hare criticised this strategy on a 
number of grounds, but most pertinently alleged that inhabitants of the original position 
are nothing but `replicas of Rawls himself with what altruism he has removed and a veil 
of ignorance clapped over his head. '18 More congenially, Thomas Nagel declared that 
despite the weakness of many of Rawls's arguments and the lack of distinction 
characteristic of their composition, reading A Theory of Justice is `a very powerful 
experience, because one is in direct contact at every point with a striking temperament 
and cast of mind. It is in that sense a very personal work'. 19 
The importance of authorial personality extends into considerations of style and 
expression which are beyond the grasp of philosophical and historical contextualisation. 
Again taking Rousseau as an example, the `cult of sensibility' which his works 
posthumously inspired amongst both the decadent aristocracies of the ancien regime and 
the revolutionaries of 178920 was an emotional and aesthetic response to the astonishing 
style and candour of his works as well as a philosophical one. In a different sense entirely, 
when reading Hegel one is also placed in contact with a distinctive sensibility, albeit a 
somewhat obtuse one with a literary style at some remove from Rousseau's romanticism. 
16 jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tbc Cori csstons trans. J. M. Cohen (London Pen gin, 1953), 327-8.1 am 
unconvinced that Rousseau's vision was anything more than a di// spell, but his depiction of it `I beheld 
another uniýcr: e and hec. tnie another man' and the st)'listic impact of his works, with all their calculated 
candour and emotive power, are probably the hest example (>f the extent to ývhich argument can remain 
philh)5( phical (i. e. irreducible to 'plhilosoph), as literature', etc. ) whilst exceeding the analytical scope of 
methodological critique. 
17 John Rawls, A T. icw-y of Ju iice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971). 
18 R. M. Hare, `Rawls' Theory of Justice' in Norman Daniels (cd. ) Reading Rawls (Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1975), 105. Some of Hare's criticisms of Rawls arc addressed in more detail in Ch. 2. 
19 Thomas Nagel, `Rawls on Justice, ' in Daniels, Reading R, zw.;; ls, 16. 
20 Simon Schaina Citirccný. A Chronicle of the French Revolution (London, Viking, 1990), 155-157. Tales 
of, e. g., Marat enthralling the crowds of Paris with readings from On Social Contract are probably 
apocryphal, but illustrate the perceived extent of Rousseatu's popularity and influence during the 
revoltit10n, trv period. 
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Hegel's attempt `to teach philosophy to speak German'21 resulted in dense, opaque and 
often frustrating prose which draws the reader into a process of translation and exegesis 
where he becomes so deeply implicated in the resulting interpretation that the attainment 
of meaningful critical distance becomes if not impossible then extremely problematic. 
Similar comments could be made of the aphoristic mode practised by Wittgenstein and 
Nietzsche, whilst the self-consciously arid style of much contemporary analytical 
philosophy can also obliquely reveal a great deal about the objectives and self-images of 
its practitioners. 
In these matters Rousseau, Hegel, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are somewhat 
obvious examples, and when dealing with less prominent or distinguished figures it is not 
predictable that points of intimate contact with the sensibility of an author can be 
reliably identified. Furthermore, texts can of course be profitably read against the grain of 
their original context or interpreted without reference to the preferences and sensibilities 
of a theorist. But even the most radical decentring of the writer as an authoritative 
presence22 leaves figures of rhetoric and strategies of persuasion undisturbed and in need 
of evaluation. Theories contain and are informed by claims to knowledge and 
justification which are not simply a matter of unconditioned logic, but are conveyed 
through the use of the literary imagination as well as the philosophical - invoking, for 
example, metaphors of vision and space, decision and construction, order and 
fragmentation, or recovery and loss. 23 The concept of self arises within and as a part of 
these epistemic and idiomatic strategies, and is saturated with figures of allusion and 
analogy which seek to elicit an evaluative response (typically of approval or agreement) 
from the reader. 
The task of persuasion emerges as a matter of imagination as well as argument. 
Literary devices are not only of philosophical interest, but are integral to the engagement 
of the reader with a text and to his appraisal of it. As Ball suggested, when metaphors and 
figures become established commonplaces within a discourse they can become naturalised 
and effectively invisible. In such cases metaphor can also function as a tool of criticism, 
interrogating a theory with an alternative vocabulary in order to reveal and undermine 
latent narrative strategies, meanings and presuppositions. The discussions of self and 
language contained in the essay are sensitive to these subtleties and hopefully avoid the 
dangers of normalisation and essentialism which are engendered by the uncritical 
='1 Letter to Voss, in Hegel: Tie Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christine Seiler (Bloomington, IN., 
Indiana University Press, 1984), 107. 
'" e. g. Michel Foucault, `What is an Author? ' in Paul Rýthino\V (cd. ) The Foucault Reader (London, 
Penguin, 1984), 101-120. The stature of Foucault as both authority and icon might he viewed as an ironic 
commentary on this text. 
23 Michael J. Shapiro 'Metaphor in the Philosophy of the Soci. fl Science: ', culture . 2nd 
Critique 2 (1985), 
191-? 14. 
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deployment of a settled or inadequately contested conceptual vocabulary. The success or 
otherwise of an interpretive enterprise cannot however be established prediscursively, 
and the aptness of any particular rhetorical approach must demonstrated rather than 
assumed by the critic. 24 This is not to say that the discussion eschews imaginative 
resources - language without metaphor being neither available nor desirable - rather that 
the imagery invoked, principally of space and reflection, is deployed explicitly, self- 
consciously and - hopefully - effectively in the course of the essay. That too, of course, is 
a judgement which cannot be redeemed in advance. 
[3] ANTHROPOLOGY AND ADVOCACY 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISSUES involving self and society proceeds using a modified form 
of the more sophisticated distinction, first employed by Charles Taylor, between 
ontology and advocacy. 25 All philosophical concepts are to some extent contested and in 
need of analysis and clarification - much philosophy is indeed nothing more than this 
process of elucidation - but the semantic range associated with `ontology' extends to the 
point where the term is more likely than not to be misleading. 26 In view of this chronic 
vagueness I have for the most part favoured the term anthropology, which is compatible 
with at least one plausible interpretation of ontology - as the study of (human) being - 
but is considerably less ambiguous whilst remaining consistent with Taylor's 
discrimination between issues of ontology (including that of the self) invoked in 
developing an explanation of social life, and those of advocacy, which engage a range of 
questions relating to the interpretation of moral and political principles, the manifestation 
of principles in institutional and policy related forms, and so on. 27 The major import of 
24 Pace Shapiro `Metaphor in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences', , -, "Iio concludes his survey with the 
claim (214) that because (Foucaultian) post-structuralism alone sufficiently disrupts `the old management 
metaphors which have recently guided the social sciences' it alone allows one to `learn the grammar, rhetoric 
and narrative structure of politicization, to learn to read and write politically. ' Unfortunately, Shapiro 
underestimates the resources of other approaches (particularly hermeneutics, 207-210), and betrays his own 
insight into the `orthodoxies of our social and political world' (214) as the metaphors of poststructuralism are 
themselves conventions of social science which need to he - like other approaches - continually interrogated, 
established and applied in discourse. 
2-5 Charles Taylor `Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate', in Nancy Rosenblum (ed. ) 
Liberalism anti the Moral Ltfc (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1989), 161. 
26 `Ontology' is derived from onto, the participle of the Greek verb civai , to 
he'. The OED (2nd. ed., 
1989) quotes from 48 texts dated between 1761 and 1884 in exemplification of a set of derivative English 
nouns (ranging from ontogencsis to onto (, gy itself) which invoke the vague idea 4 the list definition, `the 
science or the study of being... ' without exhibiting an)' other obvious commonality. Although a dictionary 
can never be the he all and end all, l reasonable sense of the extreme alllblgulty' of 'ontological discourse' is 
conveyed here. It is not clear that, without extremely careful bracketing, , ln\'tlling other than the notion that 
there is something which it is 'like to be' is conveyed by the terns. Given this indeterminacy I have wherever 
possible sought in the interests of clarity to avoid recourse to in 'ontological' vocabulary. The notable 
exception to this involves passages concerning Heidegger and his intellectual descendants where to displace 
the term it is likely to detract froh rather than clarify the discussion. 
27 Taylor, `Cross Purposes', 159-60. 
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the distinction is that although an anthropological position - involving not just a concept 
of self but also ideas regarding the location of subjectivity within particular social 
contexts, and the relations obtaining between selves in those environments - informs 
deliberations about advocacy and may predispose judgements on such issues, the 
connection between the two is not one of simple entailment. As with the more familiar 
concepts of self and society, the most reliable approximation of the relation obtaining 
between anthropology and advocacy is that of non-determining interdependence. 
The implications of this, which emerge in more detail in the course of the essay, are 
twofold. Firstly, once issues of anthropology and advocacy are separated out, it becomes 
clear that the commitments of theorists who are fiercely critical of the anthropological 
positions and attendant philosophical arguments of contemporary liberal philosophy do 
not determine or even necessarily imply the advocacy of a crude antiliberal political 
position. The assumption that communitarian, poststructuralist and other critical 
approaches are politically illiberal or intolerant is erroneous. Criticism of logical 
positivism or methodological individualism does not, for example, oblige a theorist to 
adopt a position supporting political collectivism. Secondly, the distinction is typically 
absent or undertheorised within liberal political theory, with the unfortunate 
consequence that insofar its defenders fail to observe or understand anthropology and 
advocacy they are likely to misinterpret their critics and, when attributing antiliberal 
political views on the basis of anthropological arguments, grossly misrepresent them in 
matters of advocacy. 
Development of this approach envisages the self as situated and intersubjective, 
rendering any temptation to postulate an atomist, monadic or transcendental entity 
untenable from the outset. Recognising that institutions, practices and social meanings are 
not reducible to the intentions and actions of self-sufficient individuals, it is entirely 
distinct from anthropocentric or subjectivist approaches which take processes of 
individuation or (in a romantic vein) aesthetic self-creation to be in some sense defining 
for the self at the expense of other considerations. This repudiation is equally opposed to 
the alternative extreme, an anti-humanism which overreacts to the sovereign, self-making 
subject of modernity by reducing subjectivity to a discursive function or determination of 
history and language. 28 
The explanatory range of an anthropological perspective negotiates the dualism of 
structure and agency (itself a sociologically oriented restatement of the self-society 
problematic) and avoids the philosophical excesses of subjectivism and anti-humanism. 
The position developed in the course of the essay is a deliberately modest one, which 
2S (\1 st in(lucnti, tlly prescntcd{ in the l. ttcr v rks cal Hci(Ic( gcr, discusscd in Ch. 4 and Ch. 5. Set also §4 
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does not claim to establish a definitive account of the conditions of experience or 
constitute a grounding for the social sciences in an account of human nature. It is rather 
offered as an interpretive approach to the self which theorises questions of self, situation 
and intersubjectivity in a coherent but non-foundational manner, prior to a discussion of 
advocacy issues involving pluralism, democracy and deliberation arising from the critique 
of contemporary liberalism. 
[4] `LIBERALS', `COMMUNITARIANS' AND OTHERS 
THE ESSAY EXAMINES ISSUES OF anthropology and advocacy in the works of two 
previously mentioned figures, John Rawls and Charles Taylor. In so doing it arguably 
marginalises many other worthy contributors to the debates at hand, but does so 
deliberately and justifiably. Authors such as Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz and Jeremy 
Waldron - who are acknowledged in footnotes and asides where their comments are 
judged to be of particular interest, but are not discussed at length in the main text - are 
participants in a resurgence of neo-Kantian liberal political philosophy which was 
precipitated, and remains dominated by, the ideas and methodological innovations 
introduced by John Rawls in the development of his theory of Justice as Fairness. 
`Liberalism' is of course a historically and conceptually diverse label, neither 
encapsulated nor exhausted by the works of any single author. Despite this, given the 
ambition claimed by Rawls for his project - which sought to generalise and supersede the 
entire tradition of social contract theory by carrying it to `a higher order of 
abstraction'29 - and the impact upon the discipline of A Theory of Justice, the synonymous 
relationship which obtains in the essay between Rawls and contemporary liberal theory 
is not unduly solipsistic; a significant area of the domain of political theory has been 
remade (albeit perhaps temporarily) in the image of ideas presented in Rawls's writings. 
The works of his liberal commentators are not devalued by this assessment, but are 
identified as occurring z thi)7 the parameters of a theoretical problematic broadly 
29 Rawls, A Theory cif Justice, Viii. A good deal Of the examination in Chs. ? and 3 be low concerns the 
nature of this abstraction and its effci is upon the philosophical coherence of justice as Fairness. Given this it 
is perhaps appropriate to note that the distinction between 'abstraction' and 'idealization' set out by Onora 
O'Neill, Tow. i)-cLc Justice and Virtue: A constructive account of prjctical reasoning (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) has no impact upon the discussion. O'Neill maintains that abstraction, `a matter of 
bracketing, but not denying, predicates that are true of the matter under discussion ... 
[is] theoretically and 
practically unav oidable', whereas 'Idealization' - the arrogation of enhanced or fictitious predicates, implying 
the denial of true or valid attributes - 'is another matter [which] can easily lead to 
falsehood. ' (40-41). Her 
. 1sýessmcnt o 
Rawls (44-8) suggests that he is susceptible to charges of 'idealization', hin is unclear is to 
whether he is regarded as a purveyor of falsehoods. If they are logically distinct, as claimed by O'Neill, 
abstraction and idealization are very closely related; the distinction between the unavoidable generalisation of 
social theory and the errors of what she terms 'idealization' - where excessive bracketing risks fundamental 
error - is more a matter of 
degree than of conceptual difference. Where Rawls is criticised for excessive 
abstraction in this essay the sense with which the term is used is intended to cover that understood by 
O'Neill is 'idealisation'. 
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enframed by justice as Fairness. In emphasising Rawls's contribution to contemporary 
liberal theory the essay attempts to stay as close as possible to the animating concerns of 
the debates which it interprets. 
In the case of `communitarianism' four authors - Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, 
Alasdair Maclntyre, and Michael Walzer-30 - are typically associated with the genre, 
although none of them clearly acknowledges the label, which is most closely identified at 
present with the American populist sociology and political coalition / civic movement 
led by Amitai Etzioni. 31 Although the four authors can be related in that they are all 
critics of excessive individualism, and of Rawlsian liberalism insofar as it manifests that 
philosophical error, `communitarianism' is not constituted as a distinct school of thought. 
The interests and theoretical positions maintained by its protagonists are sufficiently 
varied that the term `communitarian' - to a much greater extent than `liberal' - is best 
considered a contested and only partially adequate form of academic shorthand, rather 
than a reliable criterion of philosophical classification. For these reasons the label is only 
invoked in the essay in contexts where its meaning is either self-evident or easily made 
clear, and where the interests of grammatical clarity and consistency otherwise demand its 
use. 
Of these authors Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor are considered at length, the 
latter being the pivotal figure in the discussion. As with the theorists accorded a 
subsidiary role in the analysis of liberalism, Maclntyre, Walzer, Rorty et. al. figure in the 
essay when their relevance is of sufficient note, but have no privileged status within the 
unfolding interpretation. The attention accorded to Sandel is principally due to the 
forensic acuity of his critical reading of Rawls's theory in Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice. 32 Charles Taylor's writings are only incidentally addressed to Rawls, but are 
significant because they display a consistency and depth of understanding which extends 
beyond critique and across the conventional boundary - which still operates today, albeit 
in a less rigid form than in previous years - between `Anglo-American' (analytic) and 
`Continental' (hermeneutic) methods of philosophical enquiry. A major ambition of this 
essay is to develop a theoretical standpoint, drawing heavily upon Taylor's writings, 
which affords the possibility - briefly explored in chapter seven - of a methodologically 
coherent and politically compelling account of anthropology and advocacy which 
unsettles the presuppositions of liberal theory, and supports a more expansive and 
30 The vagueness of the `communitarian' Libel - explOred in greater depth at various points in the essay 
- is such that 
it has ein occasion been applied to a range of theorists also including Richard Rorty, William 
Galston, Roberto Unger, Christopher Lasch and sttnclry other. The unofficial roll-call imputed here is 
Consistent With the prevailing categorisation within political theory. See e. g. Stephen Malhall and Adam 
Swift, Liherz/s. irid Corrtntunilarri. zns (Oxfoýrci, Basil Blackwell, 1992). 
31 Etziooni'. work is briefly discussed in Ch. 6 `Political Theory and G+mmunit\ 
32 Michael J. Sandel, Lihera/i ni and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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democratic account of political institutions and practices than that possible within the 
constraints of those assumptions. 
The development of themes from Taylor's works here is a partial and, where 
necessary, a critical one. It is not my intention to offer a comprehensive exegesis, and the 
discussion passes over much of the historical detail contained in works such as Hegel and 
Sources of the Self. 33 More significantly, it largely ignores the aesthetic and religious 
concerns which Taylor articulated in Sources of the Self, but which fall outside the scope of 
this essay. Brief comments on these sections of the book and their somewhat 
controversial reception are contained in chapter four. In addition the critical account of 
Heidegger's conception of language and subjectivity34 is arguably incompatible with 
Taylor's slight but laudatory comments on Being and Time. 35 Fuller treatment of these 
figures and issues would be indispensable aspects of a complete, more biographical 
inclined account of Taylor's works, but in the present context their absence carries no 
detrimental implications. 
One further largely absent figure is worthy of note in the course of these 
introductory remarks. Although a significant proportion of the discussion engages topics 
involving language, interpretation and understanding in a manner indebted to 
hermeneutic and (to a lesser extent) poststructuralist thought, little attention is paid to the 
interventions of the Frankfurt School, dominated during the last two decades by the 
works of Jürgen Habermas on communicative action and discourse ethics. 36 This is the 
case for two major reasons, one general and the other particular. In general, the `classical' 
works of the Frankfurt School constitute a set of debates involving Marxism, 
psychoanalysis and existentialism which clearly fall outside the range of the discussion. In 
particular, although Habermas's reformulation of critical theory exhibits a significant 
neo-Kantian dimension, this development extends across a range of related but not 
necessarily reconcilable areas - including evolutionary and cognitive psychology, 
pragmatism, semantics and systems theory - which significantly fails to engage the 
principal concerns here. Most importantly, in advancing conceptions of communicative 
competence and general pragmatics37 which locate the normative commitments of 
33 Charles Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975); Taylor, Sources of the Self, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
34 See esp. Ch. 4,5 3, `Engaged agency'. 
35 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, SCM 
Press, 1962). 
36 Jiirgen Hahermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 Vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984 and 1987); Hahermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. 
Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Polity, 1987); Hahermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse 
Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Polity, 1993). 
37 Hahcrmas, `What is Universal Pragmatics? ', in Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. 
Thomas McCarthy (London, Heinemann, 1979), Ch. 1. Hahermas's 'pragmatics' are concisely outlined by 
Kenneth Baynes, The Normative Grounds Oj'Social Criticism (New York, SUNY Press, 1992), Ch. 3. 
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consensus-oriented speech acts intersubjectively (i. e. in the conditions and 
presuppositions of the act of communication rather than the identities and self- 
understandings of participants in a discourse) Habermas accords a priority to formalism 
in the theory of language which effectively screens out issues of philosophical 
anthropology. 38 A more wide ranging survey would undoubtedly make more room for 
the thought of Habermas, but to do so here in any depth would entail the production of a 
significantly different work. 
[5] INTERPRETING VOCABULARIES AND SUBJECTIVITIES... 
CHAPTER TWO INTRODUCES THE CONCEPTION OF SELF deployed by John Rawls, 
giving due consideration to his recent `political not metaphysical' writings but for the 
most part concentrating on A Theory of. justice, which offers the most detailed account of 
the original position, the methodological device common to both `early' and `late' 
formulations of his doctrine. Rawls's project is schematically outlined, and his ideas 
regarding justification in moral theory (reflective equilibrium), the Kantian credentials of 
Justice as Fairness, and the differences between contractarian and constructivist 
descriptions of his methodology are explored (§§1-2). The concept of rationality and the 
thin theory of the good which Rawls ascribes to the self (§3), are found to involve 
information constraints which do not allow the formulation of a situation from which 
principles of justice might be rationally determined. Furthermore, the information which 
is made available behind Rawls's `veil of ignorance' is ambiguous and inadequate to the 
extent that the characterisation of the original position as a meaningful decision situation 
is called into question. In a speculative manner some alternative suggestions concerning 
information provided `behind the veil' and possible outcomes of the original position are 
briefly discussed (S4). The difficulties with reason and information carry over into issues 
concerning representation and deliberation (§5), as the multiplicity of selves envisaged by 
Rawls are neither necessary nor conceivable due to the constraints and abstractions 
imposed. Given this absence of pluralism and difference the issue of precisely who or 
what is modelled behind the veil of ignorance arises, along with the troubling question of 
how Rawls's abstract, individuated self relates to concrete and situated persons outside the 
original position. 
These questions are explored in chapter three, `The Unencumbered Self' in the 
form of an assessment of Michael Sandel's critique of justice as Fairness. Defined in 
advance of any concrete and particular embodiment, the Rawlsian self is untouched - and 
hence unencumbered - by goods, beliefs, commitments etc. which, Sandel argues, are 
38 Axcl Honneth, `Critical Theory in Gcrmanv Today' in Peter Osborne (cd. ) A Critical Sense: 
lrtte . tc with intellectuals (London, Rout]cddge, 1996), 98-101. 
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constitutive for identity. Rawls's model is both philosophically flawed and, in treating the 
constitutive as the contingent, inadequate to experience. This emerges particularly clearly 
in Rawls's formal and superficial remarks on the morality of association, which fail to 
recognise the self as a socially embedded entity located - but not determined - by the 
particular contexts where reflection, decision, and agency occur (%%2). Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice has attracted a great deal of (mostly unfavourable) attention from liberal 
political theorists. An examination of (amongst others) Amy Gutmann, Charles Larmore, 
Kenneth Baynes and Will Kymlicka identifies oversights and misinterpretations in each 
case which render the objections tendered unsustainable (§3). In particular Sandel's critics 
consistently fail to distinguish issues of anthropology and advocacy, and in consequence 
erroneously assume the latter to be crudely determined by the former. Finally, some of 
the distinctions and clarifications introduced by Rawls in the course of his `political' 
restatement of justice as Fairness are investigated but found wanting (%4). Although it 
receives considerably less attention in the later works, the role of the original position 
remains central to Rawls's revised doctrine. The refinements and shifts of emphasis of 
Political Liberalism do not amount to a significant response to critics such as Sandel, 
because the fundamental dependence of the theory upon the framework articulated as the 
original position - and the concept of self therein, is undiminished. 
The reflexive, intersubjective conception of the self outlined in opposition to 
Rawls's antecedently individuated model is explored in chapter four, `The Hermeneutic 
Self', where the focus of the essay moves from Rawls's original position to the 
formulation of an anthropological position drawing upon the work of Charles Taylor. 
Introducing hermeneutics as a philosophical tradition (§1), the explanatory superiority of 
a substantive interpretive approach over `naturalist' approaches (including Rawls's 
proceduralism) in dealing with questions involving intuition and pluralism is expounded 
(S2). The situation of the self within physical and psychological contexts of engagement is 
developed in opposition to the Cartesian model of individual self-certainty, and Taylor's 
writings are located within a diverse body of thought opposed to the epistemological 
project of conventional analytic philosophy (S3). A brief exposition of the significance of 
goods for the self, and their interpretation and evaluation as a fundamental form of 
engagement and agency (§4) precedes the treatment of issues in the philosophy of 
language (§5) which advance Taylor's interpretive anthropology as a viable alternative, as 
noted earlier, to the philosophical extremes of subjectivism and anti-humanism. 
Chapter five addresses the problem of justification and hermeneutic methodology. 
The interdependence of text and context commonly referred to as the circle of 
hermeneutic explanation is examined and a pragmatic distinction established between the 
`ontological' hermeneutics of Heidegger and the `reflexive' alternative developed in 
chapter four. For Heidegger, understanding is predicated upon a transcendental and 
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historicised concept of the truth of Being. The attempt to postulate a grounding for truth 
is philosophically disastrous, involving unredeemable metaphysical claims which 
precipitate the collapse of hermeneutics into a vicious relativism. Reflexive hermeneutics 
avoids these philosophical dangers by eschewing transcendental truth claims, and 
remaining focused on the interpretation of language and human agency. This modest 
formulation is consistent with the main body of Taylor's work, although some 
unfortunate comments which might be taken to imply otherwise are accounted for 
towards the end of the first section. The remainder of the chapter (52) pursues the 
question of justification in some depth, comparing Taylor's `best account' argument with 
Rawls's superficially similar `reflective equilibrium'. Although unable to offer conclusive 
methodological proof, Taylor's approach is vindicated over Rawls's due to the 
consistency and explanatory depth of its anthropological framework. This is followed by 
an examination of Taylor's moral realism, and the chapter concludes with a defence of 
the role accorded to reflection in processes of understanding and interpretation against 
the criticisms of James Tully and Owen Flanagan. 
With the articulation and defence of the anthropological perspective complete 
chapter six, `Political Theory and Community' addresses the uncertain movement of 
political theory from anthropology to advocacy (Si) and through a discussion of 
multiculturalism in Quebec (§S2) highlights some of the resources and possibilities opened 
up by the adoption of a substantive, goods oriented approach, which is opposed to the 
Rawlsian standpoint adopted by Will Kymlicka. The Canadian example offers clear 
evidence that in terms of advocacy `liberal' and `communitarian' positions are not 
antithetical, although the haphazard advocacy positions adopted recently by Amitai 
Etzioni and Michael Sandel attest the need for careful formulation of political concepts 
consistent with an explicitly theorised anthropological perspective. A brief investigation 
of concept of community reveals some of the historical and conceptual issues surrounding 
the term (§§3-4), and clarifies both its political importance as a site of identification and 
context of deliberation for the self, and its philosophical significance to debates involving 
hermeneutic and post-structuralist theorists (notably Chantal Mouffe and William 
Connolly). Issues of power, essentialism and subjectivity which arise in these encounters 
are also relevant to the understanding of practical conflicts, particularly with regard to 
multiculturalism and identity politics. 
The concluding chapter, `Deliberation, Democracy and Subjectivity' presents in 
outline an account of the political dimension of agency involving evaluation, self- 
interpretation and intersubjectivity. These fundamentally significant modes of 
anthropological engagement extend into an understanding of politics as a series of 
overlapping encounters involving a contestation of meaning and value, manifested not 
only semantically but within social roles, institutions and forms of life. Discussions of 
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deliberation (51) public space (§2) and democracy (S3) offer an account of political agency 
where the self is continually reproduced and articulated through participation in public 
space. The exploration of these themes is a preoccupation of much recent political 
theory, and the discussion establishes the relevance of interpretive methods to the 
questions of identity, democracy and difference. The advantages of hermeneutics over 
normative individualism are reiterated in the light of this discussion (S4), and the essay 
concludes with an examination of the conceptual vocabularies variously invoked by 
`liberals', `communitarians' and `poststructuralists' (§5). In each case vocabularies and 
subjectivities are closely conjoined, and the strategies pursued constitute and illuminate 
differing - and sometimes incompatible - understandings of the subject and concepts of 
politics. The contestation of these perspectives is fundamental to a democratic political 
culture and the elimination or synthetic assimilation of any approach should be neither 
anticipated nor desired by theory. The account of anthropology and advocacy presented 
in the essay is however more consistent and compelling than the alternatives considered, 
contributing significantly to debates and criticisms which undermine the broad 
hegemony exercised by neo-Kantian political philosophy, and to the interpretation of the 
politics of identity and multiculturalism. 
[6] A NOTE ON PRONOUNS 
WITH SOME RESERVATIONS, and after an extended period of deliberation and vacillation, 
I decided to consistently employ the male pronoun throughout this essay in preference to 
either its female alternative or inelegant constructions such as `s/he, ' the alternating 
employment of `her' followed by `his, ' or the inappropriate use of `their' in cases where 
the singular pronoun is more accurate. To some extent this contradicts the tendency 
towards gender-aware language in academic writing, but does so for reasons which, 
although separately inadequate, when taken together qualify an approach which might 
otherwise seem at best insensitive and at worst misogynistic. 
Firstly, the essay draws attention to the socially embedded position of theory in 
general, and hence of the theorist in particular. The use of a vocabulary which is 
inconsistent in this regard by, for example, erroneously implying a perspective and 
experience which is only very imperfectly available to me (if at all) would call into 
question a central element of the discussion from the outset. Secondly, and more 
controversially, the male pronoun is technically not gender-specific, albeit according to 
grammatical conventions established and made customary by cultures notable 
for their 
marginalisation of women. This is not to suggest that it is in some sense `neutral' or 
`degendered', but that rather than being exclusive the consistent use of the male pronoun 
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here is intended to convey - although of course it may not manifest - the inclusion of 
both male and female. 39 Thirdly, the ill-considered deployment of the female pronoun 
by male authors has a distinct tendency to ring hollow; the disingenuous character of the 
prose leaps off the page. This is of course a matter of opinion, but I am aware from 
conversations with others that as a response it is not uncommon, and it is not one which I 
would like to provoke here. The combined force of these considerations is perhaps not 
overwhelming, but in my judgement is sufficient to warrant the use of the standard form. 
Intransitive and other derivative verb forms are spelt throughout following the 
British convention (-ise, -isation) in preference to the option generally favoured in 
American English (-ize, -ization), with the exception that when quoting directly from 
texts which use the American form I have retained the original spellings. The occasional 
infelicities resulting from the juxtaposition of different spellings of the same word are 
hopefully outweighed by the benefits of consistency achieved in the main body of the 
text. Finally, although the discussion aims throughout for a measure of readability, given 
the uncertain literary qualities of some of the material examined this ambition is not 
always easily realised. I have throughout the essay preferred clarity over formal 
correctness, guided in matters of style and grammar by the example of Raymond 
Chandler, who famously responded to the corrections of his editor by insisting that 
`When I split an infinitive, god damn it, I split it so it stays split. '40 
39 J. Dav ic1 Vcllen,, tn (1989) Prac'l1 -a/ Reflection (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press), 4 n. 1. 
Velleman also notes here that strategies such as alternating between 'he' and 'she' might he taken to imply 
that when using either pronoun 
its 'other' is heim; deliberately excludes{. 
40 Cited in The Bloom shun, Dicticma»1 of'Quotations (London, Bloomshurv, 1987), 96. 
19 
CHAP 'r I: RT \V 0 
THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
[1] INTRODUCTION 
UPON PUBLICATION A THEORY OF JUSTICE1 was rapidly acknowledged as the 
foundational text of modern liberal political theory, generating a massive critical 
reaction2 to which John Rawls responded in a series of essays and lectures which were 
integrated to form the revised doctrine presented as Political Liberalism. 3 Both works are 
offered as systematic developments` of themes which have dominated Rawls's thought 
over the past four decades. 5 The following examination will largely follow this 
classification, for the most part avoiding recourse to articles composed during the 
evolution of the theory. To do otherwise runs the risk of obscuring or distorting the 
internal coherence claimed by Rawls for his two major statements of justice as Fairness. 
In both accounts Rawls employs a contractarian apparatus, the original position, to 
expound and justify principles designed to regulate the operations of the `basic structure' 
of the well ordered society. The present examination proceeds by considering core 
elements of this methodology, and the coherence and viability of the conception of the 
self envisaged therein. 
The `original position' describes a hypothetical choice situation in which persons 
are to decide principles of justice, `the first virtue of social institutions'6 under conditions 
of uncertainty modelled by Rawls as the embodiment of `the moral point of view' where 
1 John Rawls, A Theo)y of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971). henceforth cited as The ))). 
Documented in J. H. Well bank, David T. Mason and Denis Snook (eds. ), John RazL; is and his Critics. An 
, -1 nnutateci 
(New York, Garland, 1982) and in J. Angelo Corlett (cd. ), Equality and Liberty: 
Ana/viin,,, Raw/s and Ai, zicl' (London, Macmillan, 1991), 330-396. 
3 Julen Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Pros:, 1993). 
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conditions of mutual impartiality, freedom and equality pertain between individuals and 
constrain their deliberations. Although Rawls's principles7 apply in the first instance to 
public institutions and practices, they are a product of and are affirmed by human reason 
and hence depend upon a conception of that reason as a faculty of the parties postulated 
within the choice situation. This is to say - as Rawls does - that his principles of justice 
are predicated upon an `an ideal of the person that provides an Archimedean point for 
judging the basic structure. '8 The ideal is constructed as the convergence point of the 
elements which make up the original position, mechanisms which constitute and support 
the Rawlsian self. Four main components - uncertainty, rationality, knowledge and 
justification - function both to establish the self as a theoretical concept (i) and to govern 
the role assigned to the self in the determination of the principles of justice (ii). The 
discussion here primarily addresses the first of these questions, concerning whether the 
self is theorised in such a way as to be plausible within and relevant beyond the 
immediate context of the original position. 
This focus is adopted because if the philosophical claims of the Rawlsian self are 
found to be weak or non-existent, the detailed working out of the processes entered into 
by it in the formation of the well-ordered society becomes equally irrelevant. Although 
Rawls's comments on constitutional democracy, utilitarianism, economic theory, civil 
disobedience, etc., 9 are not without interest in their own right, what defines principles of 
justice and makes them binding is their derivation from an appropriately defined original 
position of impartial choice between free and equal rational parties. Rawls formulated his 
favoured principles long before their exposition in Theory and rather than attempting to 
address the question of justice his work often seems more like a prediscursively validated 
answer in search of a befitting question. 10 As Brian Barry notes, this suggests that `in 
arguing for the appropriate characterisation of the original position it is necessary to 
develop definite ideas about the general characteristics of justice. But it should then be 
possible to get from these to principles of justice without ever going through the business 
of choice in the original position. 'l" However, the original position purports to 
demonstrate why principles are those of justice - rather than being, for example, nothing 
more than the outcome of a debatable experiment with decision theory, or an elaborate 
7 The final formulation of the principles of justice within Theory (p. 302) is as follows. 1) Each person is 
to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
system of Iihert\ for all ('The Lihert\' Principle'). 2) Social and economic inequalities are to he arranged so 
that the are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the leaist advantaged ('The Difference Principle')... and (b) 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditnnis of fair equality ()f opportunity. 
S R. iw"wls, Tbcc>>-v, 584. 
9 12-1 and § 30, and much of the material contained in Part T-, w"O of Tbcwy 31-59) deals with 
such matters. 
10 Rawls, The'orv, 141: '\Ve want to dehne the original positu n m) that we get the desired solution. ' 
11 Brian Barr, Tbcr, rrc_ o/_/uScrcc (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester \\ heatsheaf, 1989), 214-215. 
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statement of Rawls's preferences. The temptation to displace the detail of the original 
position must be resisted, because to do so overlooks the purpose and significance of the 
Rawls's method, and deprives justice as Fairness of the resources required to constitute 
and authenticate its status as a political theory. 
[2] THE ORIGINAL POSITION: CONTENT AND JUSTIFICATION 
THE IMPARTIAL STATUS OF THE PUTATIVE CONTRACTORS in Rawls's bargaining 
situation is secured by the imposition of a `veil of ignorance'12 which creates a wide 
ranging state of amnesia amongst the parties concerned. They are denied information 
about their social positions, natural assets, and psychological dispositions, etc., and are 
unaware of their particular `conception of the good' or life-plan, but do know that they 
will ordinarily form and pursue such schemes beyond the veil. 13 Detailed particularistic 
information along these lines is perceived by Rawls as arbitrary from the point of view of 
democratic equality14 where such `contingencies' have no bearing on the identical status 
of each person qua moral personality. The decision procedure must preserve this 
fundamental equality if it is to offer up an agreement which is both acceptable and 
binding upon the reason of all, and the information is excluded from the original position 
on the grounds that it could allow persons to argue from a position of advantage which 
would either render any outcome either illegitimate (it would not be arrived at under fair 
conditions of equality) or unattainable (a satisfactory result would be impossible were 
each party seeking to advance particular interests to the detriment of others). 
Furthermore, justice is an atemporal and ahistorical as well as an impartial concept on 
Rawls's account, and the veil also excludes knowledge of the political and economic 
circumstances of the society concerned, the nature of its development, its natural and 
social conditions, and so on. The parties are however aware of a nebulously defined range 
of `general facts'15 concerning political affairs, psychology, economics and so on, of 
indeterminate scope but supposedly provided in sufficient detail for an agreement to be 
secured. 
12 Rawls, Tbcmy, 524. 
13 'Conception of the good', is somewhat general term which covers a range of possibilities including 
(hut not limited to): the monistic affirmation of a particular philosophical idea or theological ordinance as 
properly determinant Of human ends, to such a conception as of particular but not c{eternlinistic. importance; 
to a particular goal or range of goals (such as wealth, Or success in a particular area of life) as the long term 
objective of action; or to a more general scheme encompassing the range of virtues, needs, 
dispositions and 
preferences which, taken together, ionstitutc a flexible standard according to which a qualitatively fulfilling 
or worthwhile life might he examined. This 
last definition is probably the most common one, but 
attributions and assumptions compatible with the others are also present 
in the current literature. 
14 Rawls, Theo)-v, 73. 
15 Rawls, 77x'»y, 137-138. 
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Related to these `general facts' is an awareness that `circumstances of justice'16 
obtain as background conditions relevant to the constitution of any society. The 
`objective' aspects of these circumstances state that given geographical proximity, rough 
equality of physical and mental powers, similar vulnerability to harm and a moderate 
scarcity of natural resources, individuals will experience an identity of interests (allowing 
for mutual benefit through co-operation), but also a conflict of interests (regarding 
distribution of the benefits generated by that co-operation). `Subjectively' circumstances 
of justice begin to describe internal factors related to the reasoning of parties in the choice 
situation. Although sharing similar basic needs and preferences, each represent bearers 
beyond the veil of independent (but undefined) conceptions of the good, interests `of a 
self that regards its conception... as worthy of recognition and that advances claims in its 
behalf. '17 This independence is manifested as mutual disinterest in the presocial scenario, 
where parties are solely concerned with the claims of individuality. Although Rawls 
concedes that beyond the veil parties may acquire ties of mutual interest or non- 
instrumental sociability, such `strong assumptions'18 are inadmissible in the original 
position, which purports to avoid dependence on either controversial moral assumptions 
or contingent social facts. 
Ostensibly embodying no substantive presumptions regarding the interests of 
persons beyond it, the veil of ignorance attempts to describe a position of neutrality or 
impartiality between potentially conflicting claims in order to establish conditions 
accommodating the presence of incompatible conceptions of the good within the well 
ordered society. It is so designed to model the self as a free, equal and independent entity, 
whose reason is undisturbed by specific psychological, cultural or social knowledge. 
These abstractions from experience are extended in Rawls's elaboration of the 
rationality of the parties, probably the most important single element of any decision 
problem. 19 Mutual disinterest is buttressed by the stipulations that contractors will not 
be prone to envy, and are to comprehend themselves as beings capable of a sense of 
justice, i. e. of recognising as binding a voluntary agreement with which they can in good 
16 Rawls, T. reory, § 22. The idea is drawn from David Hume and H. L. A. Hart, as noted by Rawls at 
Them-y, 126n. 3. In Theory circumstances of justice attempt to play a role similar to that of state of nature 
arguments in traditional contract theory. However, neither Hume nor Hart grasped the idea in such a 
manner. Hume regarded social contract theory is historical and logical absurdity, \\'hilst Hart posited his 
'º11inimal content of natural law' as a set of truisms relating; to human survival which are necessary but 
insufficient elements within a positivist conception of lXv c1)nreived is a set of 'primary' legal rules and 
'secondary' power conferring rules. See Hunle, `Of The Original Contract', Philosophical Works Vol. 3, ed. 
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London, 1882; repr. Srientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), 443-460. H. L. A. Hart, The 
Concept of L. r:;; (Oxfººrd, Oxford University Prc: '), 195. 
17 Rawls, Them-Y, 1-27. Emphasis added. 
18 Rawls, Thto()> 129. 
19 A. R. M. Hare Hates, these conditions constitute the substance of the theory, '... the rest being mere 
dramatisati()n, useltºI for expositor) purposes, but also potentially ºnisleading. ' Hare, `Rawls' Theory OI 
Justice', 87. 
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faith comply. With these `strict compliance' conditions established, the parties are to 
select principles designed to secure for each the maximum possible allocation of `primary 
goods', 20 the elements which make sense of Rawls's `thin theory of the good'. All that is 
known to the parties is that they will, in society, form and pursue life-plans which they 
presume to be `rational'. Supposedly a requirement of any such plan, primary goods are 
elements which Rawlsian selves desire more of in order to promote their life prospects, 
whatever they might turn out to be. Primary goods are defined as two sets of liberties and 
inequalities, the first assuming distributive superiority over the second wherever the 
circumstances of justice apply. `Basic liberties' comprise negative freedoms broadly 
commensurate with the U. S. Bill of Rights (relating to freedom of conscience, speech, 
action subject to law, political participation and private property), with the secondary set 
regulating inequalities inequalities of goods such as wealth, income, power and authority. 
Basic liberties are prior for Rawls because they are the prerequisites of individual self- 
determination, and hence necessary for the attainment of self-respect - considered by 
Rawls to be the most important primary good. 21 Primary goods are in turn presented as 
elementary properties `that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods 
normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life. '22 
Principles of justice govern the distribution of these goods and liberties, creating in 
the original position a superficially uncomplicated problem of maximisation to which a 
number of constraints are added in order to guarantee a result consistent with Rawls's 
presuppositions. -23 These conditions are implicitly entailed (as, for example, disinterest 
implies non-envy) by the established ignorance and equal situation of the contractors, 
but are nonetheless worth rehearsing. `Constraints of right' 24 describe the formal 
conditions with which admissible principles must comply. Firstly, they must be general 
in scope, applying unconditionally in any society where the circumstances of justice 
obtain. From this, and from the independence of the parties in the original position, they 
must also be universalisable, applicable in equal measure to all persons. Thirdly they must 
be public and not depend on information unavailable in the original position, and offer 
an ordering of priorities which is recognised by all as authoritative in the settling of 
conflicts between colliding interests and freedoms. 25 Finally, principles of justice are 
assigned the status of finality in practical reason. Overriding considerations of law, 
20 Rawls, Tbco>1', 9 15; also c>p. 61-62,440-442. 
21 Rawls, Theory, 440-445. As is clear from the page references, the implicit Iink, age between autonomy 
and self-respect Jics not assume prominence until i relatively late stage in Rawls's exposition. 
22 Ra vIs, TIu'w 1', 62. 
Including both the position on individuality state{ in Thcw , 3, 
Each person possesses an 
inviol; thilit\' founded on justice that even the wellarc of society as i whole cannot override', and the content 
of the principles as discussed in 91 ahO, Ve. 
24 
- Rawls, T eo>n-, 134. 
24 
custom, desire or consequence, `reasoning from these principles is conclusive'26 in all 
times and all places: `the original agreement is final and glade in perpetuity, there is no second 
chance. '27 
These requirements are consistent with Rawls's deontological conjunction of justice 
and individual inviolability. The ascription to the parties of a `maximin' strategy of 
reasoning is a less clearly derived element of the original position. 28 In seeking to 
maximise their life prospects, Rawls suggests they will look to the worst possible outcome 
in order to ensure that if that turns out to be their position beyond the veil, it is one from 
which they can happily affirm principles of justice as the result of a fair process with 
which they have natural duty to comply. This strategy is introduced as a heuristic device 
in order to defend Rawls's preferred outcome, rather than as a property of the parties 
themselves. The assumption that it does apply, however, introduces a strong dose of 
prudential caution to the Rawlsian self. In keeping with a desire to preserve their 
independence beyond the veil, parties to the original position are not prepared to expose 
themselves to any level of risk or probability regarding distributive principles, regardless 
of how small the risk or how high the potential gain: they are willing to be victims of 
justice, but not of circumstance. 
Following ignorance, knowledge, and reason the fourth major element of Rawls's 
methodological apparatus involves considerations beyond the immediate purview of the 
original position. Rawls offers an ingenious coherence theory of justification which 
attempts to render the hypothetical abstractions of his contractarian procedure both 
acceptable and relevant by establishing a connection between principles of justice and the 
ordinary (i. e. non-theoretical) moral judgements of the reader. 29 This connection 
assumes the form of a balance between the considered judgements and intuitions which 
for Rawls are the starting point of moral thought, and a coherent set of principles which 
can produce and account for these judgements. In the course of the establishment of this 
symmetry or `reflective equilibrium'30 between judgement and principle both are open 
to revision in the light of concerns raised by the other. For example, when stated as a 
principle a particular judgement might appear to be inconsistent and in need of revision, 
and vice versa. This flexibility is designed to commend principles of justice to reason by 
establishing that `the conditions embodied in the description of the original position are 
26 Rawls, Theory, 135. 
27 Rawls, Theo v, 176, emphasis . iddcoi. 
28 R, ºýý ls, TLºeuº-n-, 152-155. The maximin principle has been strongly 
debated b economists and decision 
theorists. Sec fur example John C. Harsanyi, 'Can the M, iximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A 
Critique cif , 
john Rawls' Theory', A ucric. zn Pn/t1rr. r/ Science Rolle:.; 69 (1975), 594-606. 
29 Rawls notes at page 50 of Tcoi that 'I()r the purpOý, c> Of this hook, the view of the reader and the 
, tuthOr are the only ones 
that 0Ui1t. ' Given this his tuc of 'we', 'our' and so tOrth in the text addresses a more 
narrow . ludicº"iC th. tn ºIlight Othew 
ise he supposed. 
30 Rawls, Thcoºn', §9. 
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ones that we do in fact accept. '31 The formulation of equilibrium occurs by following 
through and modulating the decision procedure, `going back and forth, sometimes 
altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our 
judgements and conforming them to principle, ' until after a series of revisions and trade- 
offs `we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable 
conditions and yield principles which match our considered judgements. '32 
Reflective equilibrium is offered by Rawls in two forms. The `narrow' conception 
seeks a simple correspondence between moral judgement and moral principles; the `wide' 
variant involves more complex considerations aimed at the evaluation of a range of 
philosophical theories and other assumptions affecting both `considered judgements' and 
the description of the original position (regarding rationality, the scope of justice, the 
nature of society and so forth) which must similarly be open to question in the 
formulation of an overall, consistent procedural theory. 33 Although wide equilibrium 
somewhat complicates the process, in both cases a similar balancing endeavour is 
undertaken. Putative principles are evaluated relative to considered judgements, 
background philosophical theories, and the bargaining conditions required to 
accommodate them. Each of these elements is open to change in order to conform with 
the demands of others, until the whole structure holds together appropriately. There are 
hence innumerable potentially viable interpretations of the original position, and that 
developed by Rawls is merely one, acquiring its favoured status on the basis that the 
assumptions it relies upon only involve `generally shared... preferably weak... equally 
reasonable'34 claims. Each aspect of the contractual procedure can so be defended by 
drawing upon `our' considered judgements which despite being open to amendment are 
inexplicably considered sufficiently reliable to constitute a `class of facts against which 
conjectured principles can be checked. '35 According to Rawls justification is therefore `a 
matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into 
one coherent view. '36 The consolidation of interdependent elements within equilibrium 
achieves this by spreading the burden of proof across the range of the argument, but 
leaves both judgements and their supporting arguments open to reformulation as and 
when required by convenience or necessity. 
31 Ra\vk, T. ýc r, ? 1, cºnph, I: is ad(1c {. 
'? R, IvVIS, TI, ýý>>> 20. 
The c{istinc'tion hctwwwccn 'n, ºrroºw' and '\\'idc' equilibrium is implicit in Theos , where 
Rawls refers 
(p. 49) to the cli(ficult of accounting for 'all possible (icscriptions an(i of all philosophically relevant 
arguments. ' The labels were coined by R, iwww1s in `The Independence of Moral Theory", Proceedings and 
A(! (/)-cclws of'1L1c Amcric-iu Pbi/osopbical Associ_rlion 48 (1974-5), 8(. 
3+ Ra", w1s, Theory, 20. 
3' R. 1vß ls, Theoº-)v, 51. 
3b R. iwls, Theo iv, 21. 
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This discussion of the original position is not overly concerned with whether or 
not Rawls's method can, as he supposes, find support within a state of equilibrium, since 
if the structure is found to be seriously wanting then the question of its place within a 
system of justification becomes largely irrelevant. It is nonetheless apposite at this point 
to note some of the issues raised by Rawls's proposals in order to forestall objections that 
the criticisms below might overlook the overall plausibility of Theory as an attempt to 
establish equilibrium, and because the doctrine has been seen independently of justice as 
Fairness as a theoretical advance. 37 The problem of justification in ethics is a notoriously 
difficult one which Rawls approaches by presenting his theory as an accommodation of 
judgement and principle, which sidelines issues concerning the epistemological status of 
moral concepts and other areas of philosophical controversy. 38 The major criteria of 
authentication are that the theory `hangs together' in a consistent manner, that each of its 
elements be pri7na facie acceptable rather than dependent on complex argumentation, and 
that its results be amenable upon due deliberation with the ordinary moral judgements of 
the individual concerned. 
The justificatory force of this extended coherence argument is unfortunately 
elusive. The most common and damning objection is that since principles of justice are 
reciprocally dependent upon background theories and pre-philosophical judgements, the 
methodology advocated appears to be explicitly devoid of the reasoned grounds which 
might allow it to be a justificatory procedure at all. If judgements and theories bear out 
principles, and principles are supported by these very elements, then all that the 
procedure of reflective equilibrium can offer is a rationalised account of a person's initial 
preferences and judgements. 39 Beyond the veil a wide range of such background theories 
37 In particular by Norman Daniels, 'Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points' Canadian 
Journal oJ' Philosophy X (1980), Kai Nielsen, `Grounding Rights and a Method of Reflective Equilibrium' 
Inquiºy 25 (1982), and Nielsen, `Relativism and Wide Reflective Equilibrium' The Monist 76 (1993). 
3S In this matter Rawls has gone so far as to suggest that as a means of clarifying the understanding of 
the concepts involved, Reflective Equilibrium is a necessary precursor to progress in moral epistemology. 
John Rawls, `The Independence of Moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 48 (1974/5), 6-7. Hoýwevver, as Joseph Raz, `The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium' Inquiry 25 
(1982), 313-4 points out, the connection between equilibrium and epistemology is a very opaque one, it being 
quite unclear how Rawls's formulation of the principle of consistency might contribute to a 
deeper 
understanding of moral concepts, or what the resulting philosophical advance might resemble. 
39 D. \V. Hallett, 'What is . prong with 
Reflective Equilibria? ' Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1987), 307. 
Haslett also (objects (310-11) that R, l\-,, 
Is offers no criteria regarding the adjustment of principle or judgement 
in equilibrium. In a c. ise of moral contradiction 
it may not he clear whether innocuous assumption x or 
principle y should be put aside. Indeed, the prima I, tcie assumption that morality must 
be determinate and 
entirely conSiotent is not Obv'iOtLsl)' warranted, as 
demonstrated h, the narr, iwe of tragic choice from The 
Theban Plays toi the Trolley Problem. See also R. ti, 'The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium', 309: `reflective 
equilibrium is then not I method 
in moral phil(,., )ph> at all. It simply advvOeates that our judgement be 
informed. -and e nsistent. ' Daniels, '... Archimctican Points' , tcknOwledgc-` the 
free of the objection, noting 
that 'the wwwIheLels of the contract spin 
freely, providing no justific. ºtorv traction' (84), before amending Rawls's 
prop ,:, als by the 
introduction of a 'deep the, )r, \' .i 
la Dworkin, 111d mn 'independence constraint', digressions 
which I alall not pursue 
there. Nielsen, 'Rcl, ºtivvism and Equilibrium', 318, ackiiowledee: this objection but 
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are likely to be prevalent, each producing a similarly consistent account of equilibrium. 
But Rawls's theory is unable to adjudicate between or validate any single conception as 
normatively binding. He thus suppresses the question of justification by relocating it in 
the realm of `provisional fixed points' - innocuous assumptions, moral intuitions and 
background theories. Reflective equilibrium might well refine or even transform a 
person's moral conceptions (e. g. as he sees that his assumptions were erroneous, or his 
reasoning from them inconsistent). It cannot however evaluate equilibria with reference 
to supporting reasons independent of the conception in question, 4° or explain why one 
particular equilibrium point should be accepted as normatively binding. The fact that a 
series of assumptions, judgements and principles can be fitted into a purportedly coherent 
view does not provide grounds for judging that view valid, and reflective equilibrium is 
thus not a justificatory device in the sense demanded of it by Rawls. 
Rawls's second attempt at justification is more aptly described as a strategy of 
persuasion rather than demonstration. The `Kantian Interpretation of justice as 
Fairness'41 claims that Theory offers a reconstruction of Kant's critical methodology 
which maintains core concepts (rationalism, autonomy and the categorical status of 
morality) without invoking the controversial nietaphýysical baggage42 which encases 
Kant's system. By presenting Theory in this light Rawls explicitly relates his work to `the 
high point of the contractarian tradition, "43 and claims the authority of historical 
association in order to appeal to the Kantian sympathies of the reader. 
Framing the original position in order to emphasise its underlying themes, section 
forty of Theory offers justice as Fairness as a `procedural interpretation of Kant's 
This rendition relies on three conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative. '44 
claims: that Kant viewed moral principles as the object of rational choice; that as 
c1, aims that it only applies to and not wide equilibrium, which he argues is potentially able to 
rationalise a range of appeals common in moral discourse (318). However, Nielsen ventures the possibility 
rather than the substance of such in equilibrium, hrncc somewhat begging the question. He does suggest that 
deliberation might take place under conditions seeking to emulate the undistorted conditions of discourse 
represented by Habermas's ideal speech situation (321) but this combination is somewhat baffling, since 
reflective equilibrium calls for the positing of a substantive thc(, rv manifesting the moral sense maintained by 
the individual, Whilst the ideal speech situation is a procedural fantasy modelling the circumstances under 
which acceptable moral agreement might he reached. Nielsen so appears to he confusing arguments of form 
and content. Alternatively, if he is suggesting that equilibrium might best be reached via an ideal speech 
situation (as Opposed to the original position), he appears to call upon himself the thankless task Of following 
Rawls and dcscribin ,, at least in outline, what might eventuate from such a dialogue. 
40 Although Nielsen, 'Relativism and Equilibrium' 327, denies that this IS the case: 'where there are 
two or more conditions of wide reflective equilibrium, only one can be the widest and thus the most 
adequate reflective equilibrium' The accuracy of this claim is difficult to evaluate in the absence of even one 
obviously successful account of aide reflective equilibrium, never mind two. 
41 Rawls, Tbcm-v, §40. 
4' Principally the transcendental deductions and the distinctions between noumenal/phenomenal 
realms, analytic/synthetic propositions and t priori/ I posteriori judgements. 
43 Rawls, Theory, 252 
44 Rawls, Theory, 256. 
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legislation for the kingdom of ends these principles must be mutually acceptable, hence 
public and universal; and that they must be formed under conditions which characterise 
men as free and equal rational beings. 45 According to Rawls the abstraction of the 
original position meets these requirements because the denial of particularistic knowledge 
precludes the encroachment of heteronomous impulse upon reasoning behind the veil, 
the constraints of which constitute conditions appropriate to the exercise of autonomous 
judgement. By acting outside the original position from principles of justice, understood 
as what would be chosen under such circumstances, `persons express their nature as free 
and equal rational beings. '46 Principles so assume the status of categorical imperatives, 
injunctions applicable to all persons in virtue of their status as free equal and rational 
beings. ` 7 In this light the original position is revealed as `the point of view from which 
noumenal selves see the world... [they] have complete freedom to choose whatever 
principles they wish; but they also have a desire to express their nature as rational and 
equal members of the intelligible realm. '` 8 
This `interpretation' assumes the form of a schematic outline rather than a detailed 
discussion of either Kant or the original position, but even taken superficially it is 
conspicuously problematic. Rawls's epistemological agnosticism necessitates the rejection 
of Kant's transcendental grounding of morality, and the original position therefore 
cannot be strictly justified or derived from a Kantian position. The procedural scheme of 
Theory instead purports to relate Kantian concepts to general conditions of human 
existence in order that they no longer appear as either purely formal49 or dependent on 
controversial metaphysical theses. The original position is deployed in order to establish 
this relationship, but in so doing, as Rawls notes, '° it departs from Kant's views in 
significant ways. 
The most serious doubt concerning the Kantian interpretation concerns the whole 
idea of introducing a bargaining game into moral philosophy. As Thomas Nagel noted in 
his early review of Theory, 51 principles are chosen from a desire on the part of the self to 
optimise its share of primary goods, and their relevance beyond the veil depends upon the 
sense of justice promoted by the successful execution of just institutions as much as the 
43 Ra-w]s, Tbcor 
, 
51-?. 
46 Rawls, Theory, 252. 
47 Rawls, Tbcorv, 253. 
48 Rawls, Themy, 255. 
49 The most ccommc, n objection to Karat's moral philosophy, e. g. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §135 R, or 
more recently Alasdair Mach t)Tc, Af cr Virtue, 
Ch. 4. Rawls appears to concur with this criticism in noting 
(Theor),, 233) that 'Kant did not show that acting from the moral law expresses our nature in identifiable 
w. ivvs than acting from cont, iry principles 
does not. ' By allowing that acting frn)m his principles allows 
persons to express their `true nature' as equal mid rational 
beings R iwhs claims to overcome this deficiency in 
Karat's mc, rA thcorv. 
50 Rawls, Tl'('(o t', 256. 
zý1 Thomas Nagel, 'Rawls on justi,, c. ' in Daniels, Rc. lding Ra^,.: 1s, 4. 
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belief that principles express human freedom and rationality. Motivation in both 
instances is conditional and hypothetical rather than categorical, and in consequence the 
Kantian status of principles of justice is compromised from the outset. Kant recognised 
that in the categorical imperative `no new principle of morality is set forth... but only a 
new formula, '52 the elementary structure of which53 is derived from the very nature of 
rationality, but Rawls attempts to define through a set of conditions, constraints and 
assumptions a decision situation from which a determinate result, i. e. his preferred 
principles, will eventuate. The claim that Rawls's principles constitute categorical 
injunctions is based on the assumption that primary goods refer to universal interests of 
any self, the desire for which being in part what makes persons rational. Even if this 
assumption (discussed in the following section) is borne out principles will be dependent 
on this generalised end - the desire to secure through prudential a posteriori judgement an 
optimal set of goods - and so hypothetical in their derivation. It has been argued that 
primary goods constitute `objective' rather than `subjecti`-e' ends, and are hence desires 
`constitutive of having an end valid for all rational beings''` but this claim, even if 
sustainable, remains dependent upon a set of secondary arguments specifying and 
justifying the `objective' status of primary goods. Without the unavailable grounding of 
Kant's moral epistemology the categorical claim made by Rawls on behalf of his 
principles is at best insecure and at worst spurious. The Kantian interpretation is 
insufficiently faithful to command the support of the tradition it invokes, and as with 
reflective equilibrium it carries no independent justificatory force. If Rawls's method is 
philosophically flawed, the Kantian interpretation will not be capable of rescuing it. 
A second obstacle facing Rawls's interpretation concerns the notion of the original 
position as a contractual situation. The scenario is defined as one of collective choice on 
the part of the self described within the determinate if highly abstract bargaining game. 
This causes significant problems regarding whether or not a meaningful choice is offered 
by the procedure (examined at greater length in §§5-6), and raises questions concerning 
the compatibility of the concept of contract maintained by Rawls with that of Kant. 
According to Kant, the social contract has a limited but significant role as: 
,... an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige 
every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by 
the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim 
52 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas K. Abhat, 6th ed. (London, Longman. 
1909), 93 n. 1. 
53 The two most iommonly Cited formulations of Kamt's categorical imperative are to be found at p. 
402 and 409 (Academy pagination) of the Groundwork of the MefaphVsic of i lor2ls, trans. H. J. Paton (London, 
Routledge, 1993). 
54 Stephen L. Darwall, Is there a Kantian Foundation for Rawisi, tn Justier', in H. Gene Blocker and 
Elizabeth E. Smith (eds. ) John Ra, Is's T>cwvofSocial Justice: An Introduction (Athens, OH., Ohio University 
pre::, 1980), 318. 
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citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will. This is 
every public 
is the test of rightfulness 
law. '55 
As an `idea of reason' the notion of contract reworks the formula of the categorical 
imperative for the purposes of civil law. It is a test of rightness rather than a theory of 
justice, and properly belongs within the sphere of jurisprudence (political right)56 rather 
than that of the moral law. 57 Rawls makes no mention of this moral - juridical 
distinction with the result that principles of justice ostensibly obtain without 
differentiation upon the institutions of the basic structure, their legislation and practices, 
and to individuals within the well ordered society. The issue of the range of application 
may appear to be a minor one for Rawls, but it serves to bring to light significant 
divergences between his theory and Kant's. Where for Kant the idea of contract concerns 
the evaluation of legal right and the enforcement of political authority, for Rawls it 
functions as a device of collective and binding irroral decision. Although as with Kant the 
contract is explicitly hypothetical, for Rawls the notion of contract is fundamental as 
without agreement the principles would lack force: 
`... the agreement in the original position is to be unanimous and yet everyone is situated 
so that all are willing to adopt the same principles. Why, then, the need for an agreement 
when there are no differences to negotiate? The answer is that reaching a unanimous 
agreement without a binding vote is not the same thing as everyone's arriving at the same 
choice, or forming the same intention. '58 
Ignoring for the present the fact that this statement makes no sense whatsoever given the 
identical status of the parties, it does call attention to fundamental differences between 
Rawls and Kant. Despite the constraints imposed in the original position - regarding 
publicity, `natural duties' to comply with just institutions, and the strains of commitment 
- moral principles for Rawls remain dependent upon agreement 
for their legitimacy. 
Even in a situation defined such that disagreement is a logical absurdity, a fictional 
`binding vote' is deemed necessary in order to secure principles of justice. This 
connection between contract and principle contrasts starkly with Kant's understanding of 
autonomous rationality. Although Kant emphasised the public use of reason as that 
which `alone can bring about enlightenment among men' this process, `man's emergence 
55 Immanuel Kant, 'Thcrýrv and Practice', in Political Writings, rd. H. Reiss, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 79. 
56 Kant, 'Theory and Practice', 73. 
57 Otfried HölIc, Is Rawls' Theory of Justice Really Kantian? ', Ratio 26,104-5 draws attention to this 
distinction between internal (moral-practical) and external (legal-practical) re. tso, n, emphasising that for Kant 
the theory of right ', onl. \ concerns external 
lcgi>htion. it does not concern that internal legislation which is 
the object I, the theory (d virtue or ethics 
in the narrow sense. ' 
58 John Rawk, 'Reel toi Alexander and Mus;; r. t%e', Qrr. rrtcýlý'ýurrrn. rl nl Ecunu))1ics S8 (1974), p. 651. 
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from his self-incurred immaturity'59 is a responsibility - described by Reiss as `a moral 
duty for men to learn to use their reason independently'60 - falling upon each person 
separately with regard to his own conduct. It in no way provides support for the 
impersonal abstractions advanced by Rawls. Although Kant's concern with liberty was 
moral rather than distributive there are broad compatibilities between his views and 
Rawls's on matters freedom and reason, but the collective choice of substantive principle 
presented by the original position is far removed from the independent and critical 
thought demanded of each individual by Kant. 
In developing Kantian concepts through the original position in order to overcome 
commonplace objections to his philosophical ascendant61 Rawls departs significantly 
from the source of his inspiration. His later writings continue to display the influence of 
Kant, but offer an amended account of the relation to Kant's work of justice as Fairness. 
Drawing on a suggestion made by Ronald Dworkin, 62 the contractarian procedure of 
Theory is redescribed as `constructivist' one, first presented as an explicitly Kantian63 
notion but later relabelled `political'64 as Rawls's own understanding of the methodology 
underpinning his doctrine evolved. 
The significance of Rawls's constructivist turn is not immediately fathomable, as 
the 1980 lectures in which the term was introduced failed to make clear what Rawls 
understood by constructivism and if or how it differs from the contractarianism of 
59 Kant, `What is Enlightenment', Political Writings, p. 54-5. Similar sentiments are expressed in `What 
is Orientation in Thinking', Political Writings, p. 249: `To think fii. r oneself means to look within oneself (i. e. 
in ones own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is 
enlightenment. ' (Emphases orig. ) 
60 Kant, Political Writings, 256. 
61 According to Kant human dignity is rooted in the capacities for freedom of will and rational thought 
possessed by the autonomous (nounmenal) subject. Morality so perceived is without foundation; rather in 
some sense it is the rational freedom of the individual, being a qualitative characteristic of motivation rather 
than a feature Of action itself - to be truly free is to act voluntarily according to 
duty apprehended through 
reason. The categorical imperative is a formal test of this motivational constraint, but in application the 
principle of pure practical reason encounters difficulties which primarily concern Kant's postulation of 
human reason and the moral law as universal properties of a transcendental subject, conditions of experience 
which are not susceptible to examination in its light. In practice a priori reasoning is unable to deal 
adequately with the complexities of pile noºnenal experience and sei stands in an uneasy relationship to it. 
Most notably, it is unclear where rational argument separates from empirical situation and how pure practical 
reason is possible. Kant's categorical formula can be given ludicrous content in a noncontradictory manner, 
the unconditional nature of categorical duty cannot account for situations where the violation of established 
social norms is warranted, and in formulating maxims we inevitably draw upon empirical 
data, personal and 
historical experience and social contexts and values, as Kant did in his own writings on history and politics. 
62 R. M. Dworkin. `The Original Position', in Daniels, Reading Rawls, pp. 1b-52. Dworkin suggests that 
the original position be seen as a construction predicated On a 
latent 'deep theory' presupposed by Rawls, 
namely that of the 'equal concern and respect' owing to all persons 
in view of their humanity. Rawls's 
construc: tivism does not 
follow that of Dworkin, being based can the moral powers ascribed to the self instead 
of a 'deep theory'. 
63 John Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', Journal of PhilvsOplryy 77 (1980), 512-572. 
64 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 89-125. Rawls suggests that his `political' constructivism `as far as it goes' 
is compatible with Kant's more thorough 
`moral' constructivism. 
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Theory. This obscurity is somewhat alleviated in later writings, 65 where four features of 
`political constructivism' are identified in contrast to rational intuitionism, a bete noire 
familiar from Tbeory. 66 These characteristics specify (1) that principles 'may be represented 
as the outcome of a procedure of construction', which (2) is based on practical reason, 
being concerned with the production of objects (in this case principles of justice) rather 
than theoretical knowledge of them. Political constructivism uses a `complex conception 
of person and society to give form and structure to its construction' (3), and finally 
`constructivism specifies an idea of the reasonable and applies [it] to various subjects: 
conceptions and principles, judgements and grounds, persons and institutions' (4). 67 
Rawls distinguishes his `constructivism' by drawing attention to the 
(comprehensive) regulative role which the ideal of autonomy plays in Kant's doctrine, as 
opposed to the limited (political) autonomy of his own theory, which supposedly does 
not encompass the entirety of the moral life. 68 Although the demarcation of political and 
comprehensive moral doctrines is not made with reference to Kant, it could be seen as a 
parallel distinction to that noted earlier between legal and moral spheres within the 
jurisprudential elements of Kant's practical philosophy. This movement away from the 
interpretation of Theory suggests that in its evolved form the principles of justice no longer 
constitute categorical imperatives and that although justice as Fairness can be supported 
from a comprehensive Kantian position, as an uncontroversial political conception its 
defence might also draw upon any number of other available comprehensive doctrines. 
To do so however overlooks Rawls's acknowledgement that `the roots of constructivism 
lie deep in Kant's transcendental idealism'69 and emphasises his developments at the 
expense of the more significant methodological continuities with Theory, particularly 
those involving Kant and the original position. 
65 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 93f., also `Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy', in Eckart Förster (ed. ) 
Kants Transcendental Deductions. The Three Critiques and the Opus Postuum (Stanford, CA., Stanford 
University Press, 1989), 81-113. 
66 Rawls, Tbewy, § 7, § 49-50. 
67 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 93-4, emphasis adder{. I am concerned here to identify structural 
differences between contract and construct as presented by Rawls, rather than changes affecting the 
conception of the self, etc., which are addressed in Ch. 3. 
68 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 99. 
69 Rawls, `Themes in Kant... ', 98. Rawls draws particular attention (98-9) to three features of Kant's 
constructivism: (1) the content of the moral doctrine consists in the tot. ility' of particular 
imperatives which 
pass the procedure of conformity toi the requirements of the categorical 
imperative; (2) which procedure is 
not itself constructed, but is rather laid out h`- the requirements of practical reason of which 
human 
understanding is implicitly aware; (3) although the procedure is not 
laid Out, it has its basis in the conception 
of the person as free, equal and rational. This concepti()n Of the pcrscin 
is neitlher constructed nor laid out, but 
is rather `elicited from our moral experience and prom what is in\' ilved 
in our being able to wirk through 
the [categoir %ll imperttiye procedure] and to act 
from the moral law.... ' To the extent that these ideas are 
I, ateent ()r implied in 
Rawls's ()wn undcrtlieorised constructi\ ism, the inchoate Kaiiti. tn dependencies of Justice 
as Fairies, irr is iron 1- 
if not stron-er - than ever. 
33 
Rawls's comments partially clarify his revisions but leave much unclear regarding 
the precise methodological relation of Theory and Political Liberalism. Rawls has however 
indicated his approval of Brian Barry's explanation of constructivism, 7° in the process 
shedding a little light on what remains a technically obscure theoretical conception. 
According to Barry, in its most general form constructivism is simply `the doctrine that 
what would be agreed on in some specified situation constitutes justice. '71 This 
underwhelming piece of information is fortunately supplemented by a set of useful 
stipulations. Since whatever emerges from and is traceable back to the initial situation is 
to count as just, 72 it would appear that Rawls is no longer tied ex ante to his particular 
principles; rather than defining the situation to arrive at the desired result, he (may) now 
perceive his task as one of arriving at the most satisfactory account of a decision situation 
in order to see what is constructed within it as justice. Secondly, Barry claims that as an 
instance of `pure procedural justice' constructivism is distinct in that `the constructing is 
to be done by a theorist and not by the people in the situation themselves. '73 Two 
accounts of procedural justice so emerge: `actual', where a procedure is implemented and 
the result labelled `just', and constructivist, `a matter of deducing (or speculating about) 
what rational actors would bring about. '74 
With the caveat that because Rawls's principles are prediscursively established the 
speculation concerns the characterisation of the procedure rather than the results of its 
enactment, Barry's account of constructivism appears to (roughly) correspond with 
Rawls's method in both Theory and Political Liberalism. In the process he offers a 
potential resolution to the problem of contract in justice as Fairness. As a speculative 
device which is hypothetical in a strong sense - it dispenses with the need for an 
imaginary conclave, and does not require that an accommodation be reached or a 
contract made - constructivism appears to revoke the need for a contract and its 
attendant difficulties. The abandonment of a binding vote is likely to revive concerns 
regarding the legitimacy of principles, but given that any form of hypothetical reasoning 
is necessarily problematic, a `constructivist' scheme might be preferred simply on grounds 
of parsimony. 
The general relation of contractarianism and constructivism is ultimately an opaque 
one, but this interpretation is at least consistent with Rawls's statement that justice 
`cannot be ascertained by pure procedural justice as realised by deliberations of the parties 
70 R awls, politic. 2l Lihcralisin, 90 n. 1, `only Scanlon and B. arr\ trncirrstand ccýnstructivism as I do, 
although their <<rnstructivisms arc different. ' My comments hcrc arc limited and der not consider differences 
betwccn Barr\ and Rawls on other matters. 
71 Barry, Theoriesciffusticv, 2bS. 
7-' B. arrv, Theor-ic: c öf justice, 26e. 
73 Barry, Theoru's of Justice, 6S. 
4 Barry, Theo>-ic's of Justice, 26S. 
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on some actual occasion .... [It] must 
be determined by reasoning analytically... by solving 
the agreement problem as posed by the original position. '75 Both theories rely on 
hypothecated decision under variously specified conditions of questionable adequacy, and 
Rawls's constructivist innovations do not make a decisive contribution to the problem of 
justification. Barry's comment here is much to the point: `[the] theories are what they are, 
and it would be a mistake to think... contractualism provides a key to understanding them 
in terms except their own. '76 In either case the defence of a view as either constructive or 
contractual can be no stronger than the particular arguments made in its favour. The 
ambiguities and presuppositions detailed above raise the suspicion that Rawls's own 
background theories, judgements and intuitions play a much stronger role in defining the 
structure and argument of justice as Fairness than the analytic pretensions of the 
methodological framework suggest. Evaluating the original position and the model of the 
self constructed within it must therefore proceed by determining whether the elements 
within it really are as uncontroversial as Rawls avows. 
[3] REASON, SELF-RESPECT AND PRIMARY GOODS 
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SELF in the original position is to secure optimal conditions in 
order that it may express its nature as a free, equal and rational being through the 
formation and pursuit of a life plan consistent with Rawls's primary goods. Superficially 
these generalities appear innocuous, as Rawls intends - given a choice between greater or 
lesser distributive shares of primary goods it would indeed seem irrational to answer in 
the negative. As abstract prerequisites of any life-plan, however, their status is more 
difficult to establish. The original position understands society as a `co-operative venture 
for mutual advantage'77 between individual bearers of potentially conflicting interests, 
and results in a general conception of justice which is deemed impartial insofar as it does 
not favour any particular life-plan or conception or the good. 78 Within this scheme, 
however, individual autonomy functions as an ordering principle which necessarily 
delimits the range of possible life plans between which principles of justice are impartial. 
When drawn in this manner, it is clear that the hierarchy of value imposed by Rawls is 
far more controversial than it initially appears. The `perspective of eternity'79 turns out 
to be inhabited by a sovereign liberal self, whose choice and' independence is defined by 
the possibilities afforded by Rawls's index of self-referential primary goods. Rawls's 
75 R. iwls, Political Liberalism, 273-4. A 
longer version of this statement, taken from Rawls's Dewey 
Lectures, is quoted by Barry, Theories ofJustice, 267. 
76 Barry, Theories o17usticr, 270. 
77 Rawls, Thcon-, 4. 
78 Rawls, Tbcor. v, 94. 
79 R, iwwwls, Thcon', 587. 
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method is not only biased against conceptions of the good which are not structured in 
this manner; they are inconceivable within its terms and so irrelevant to the original 
position. 
Commitments and conceptions of the good can, and often do, fail to coincide with 
Rawls's requirements in a fundamental way. A view emphasising desert as a criterion of 
distribution, or the establishment of particular relations of production, or an ethic of 
benevolence, or the importance of direct rather than representative political practices, or 
the fostering of a civic bond favouring virtually any alternative ethical priority is likely to 
find itself frustrated in a society regulated by principles of justice founded on 
independence and disinterest rather than, for example, mutual concern. Such ideals are 
regarded by Rawls as contingent preferences, knowledge of which would pollute the 
transparent universality of the original position with particular interests. But as Nagel 
suggests, `[i]f someone favours certain principles because of his conception of the good, he 
will not be seeking special advantages for himself... he will be opting for principles that 
advance the good for everyone as defined by that conception. '80 Given that the Rawlsian 
contractor has access to the `general facts' about society he is presumably aware of the 
prevalence of such views, information which potentially precludes agreement according 
to Rawls's model on the grounds that the regulative priority of liberty might structurally 
exclude the realisation of his conception of the good. 81 
This is not to claim that the original position models a simple egoistic psychology. 
As Rawls notes82 the abstraction of the choice situation and its resulting equality of 
application articulates a position where the rights and claims of others, as well as the 
choosing self, receive identical consideration. Self-interest under conditions of uncertainty 
is held to correspond to disinterested choice, i. e. what would be chosen by genuinely 
impartial persons in the absence of the veil of ignorance. This equation of ignorance and 
impartiality does not however address criticisms regarding the individualistic perspective 
forced by the knowledge constraints. Irrespective of Rawls's stated intention to secure 
equal concern for the parties, the self-interest modelled in the original position does not 
80 Nagel, 'Ra\vls on Justice', 8. 
81 Consider lHHr example Rawls's claim, Tbco ', 258, that the principles of justice are compatible with a 
range of basic structure: SO wide as to allow f()r either Capitalist or socialist economic systems to prevail. This 
is blatantly contradicted by his comments at 280-281 that `[s]ohle socialists have hoped to set up an economy 
in which men are moved largely by social and altruistic coýnccrns.... the theory of justice assumes a definite 
limit on the strength of social and altruistic motivation. ' From the original position the theory of justice 
assumes ignor. tncc Of such nloti\ations (assuming that socialist commitment constitutes a conception of the 
good) which, combined with the specification of disinterest and of property rights amongst the basic liberties, 
entails the ultimate adoption OI an economic System al()ng; the lines of a typical 'mixed' western model. Such 
a conception does allO\\, Ir a range of redistributions compatible with the difference principle, but precludes 
the adoption of an economic system grounded in a supposedly controversial ethical conception. Given that 
parties in the original position are , 1w, arc that their conception of the good might he social or altruistic in 
nature, it becomes a moot point whether an), agreement could he reached. 
82 Rawls, Theo? -l,, 147-148. 
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allow for the presence of options such as those mentioned above in either the choice 
situation or the basic structure of the eventuating well-ordered society. It is inaccurate to 
label Rawls a crude atomist, but the original position unmistakably defines a self whose 
concern for others is self-related rather than other-related, and identifies Rawls as a 
thinker who has more in common with the possessive individualism of Hobbes and 
Locke than he might care to acknowledge. 
Assuming that an agreement does take place, the fate of bearers of non-individualist 
views in the well-ordered society seems less than secure. The freedom of choice 
entrenched by Rawls's first principle and theory of primary goods privileges under the 
disguise of neutrality - where, as Nagel notes `there is no neutrality to be had' - an 
individualistic ideal `according to which the best that can be wished for someone is the 
unimpeded pursuit of his own path. '83 Towards the end of Theory, Rawls comments of 
those whose proclivities favour `unjust' actions that ultimately `their nature is their 
misfortune, '84 an assessment which might be held to apply in varying degrees to any 
conception of the good which is not fully congruent with Rawls's ideal. Bearers of life- 
plans demanding an alternative ordering of priorities might well find themselves 
tolerated, but where the final court of practical reason intractably embodies as a norm the 
individuated conception of the self depicted by Rawls, the ambitions of such persons 
would be consistently frustrated by the institutions, practices and public standards of 
society. Relative to the model inscribed within the original position such preferences 
would appear as either irrational or at best less rational departures from the archetype. 
As an example of irrationality in the well-ordered society Rawls offers the example 
of an idiosyncratic grasscounter. 85 He invites us to take pity on this unusual case as an 
antisocial neurotic, but eventually concedes the possibility that counting blades of grass 
might be considered rational if it makes that individual happy. This is, however, a head 
scratching concession in the face of the incomprehensible. The attempts of fellow citizens 
to find `a feasible way to alter his condition'86 would surely undermine the self-respect 
of the grass counter, whose way of life elicits a response of indifference or condescension, 
rather than the social recognition and affirmation of h. is individuality which might foster 
a sense of that most important of primary goods, self-respect. As Bonnie Honig 
comments, when confronted by such `irrationality' citizens of the Rawlsian polity are 
unable to demonstrate solidarity or toleration with their fellows, behaving instead `like a 
case worker... it seems likely that they would, at the very least, urge him to seek 
S' 
84 R. r. ls, Tbcory, 576. 
85 , 
86 Rawls. Thcory, 432 
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psychiatric counselling... although justice as fairness is supposed to support each 
individual's self-esteem, it does not do much for the grass counter's. '87 
The case of the grasscounter merely exemplifies the weakness of an approach which 
regards self-respect as a by-product of the public expression of principles88 which define 
distributions of abstract goods amongst morally, spatially and temporally undifferentiated 
agents. In less extreme instances individual self-respect is also called into question by 
Rawls's understanding of life-plans as arbitrary interests rather than values and 
commitments which embody meanings varying from the banal to the profound. Rawls 
assumes firstly that primary goods are suitable objects of distribution, and secondly that 
they are of nominally equal value to all, regardless of the value placed upon them by 
particular individuals. 
This strategy is indifferent to the fact that beyond the veil the value of liberties to 
those concerned will depend upon the various plans of life they maintain. Without 
knowledge of particular interests it is impossible to gauge whether or not a primary good 
is compatible a conception of the good, or how the exercise of a liberty by others might 
impact upon a person's ends or sense of self worth. Furthermore, Rawlsian selves are not 
prepared to sacrifice any of their basic liberties in exchange for a greater share of material 
resources despite the correlation between wealth, status and power in market economies, 
and the consequent fact that under capitalist conditions the value of `basic liberties' 
depends to a considerable extent on the possession of adequate economic means-89 Given 
this uncertainty and an awareness that in practice liberties often conflict in complex ways 
which offer no obvious, mutually acceptable resolution, 9° Rawls's argument from self 
interest in the original position assumes rather than demonstrates the priority of basic 
liberties and primary goods, and so describes a course which is not obviously rational or 
prudential for his contractors to follow. 91 
87 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, (Icatha and London, Cornell 
University Press, 1993) 152-155. 
88 Rawls, Theory, 179. 
89 Although Rawls can claim that the circumstances of justice and the redistributive effects of the 
difference principle justify the priority of liberty is `if the parties assume that their basic liberties can be 
effectively exercised, they will not exchange a lesser liberty, for all improvement in economic well-being' 
(Theory, 151-152). The determination of the appropriate threshold relative toi the conditions and development 
of any particular society, renders such considerations highly indeterminate, and d( c. nothing to address the 
problem of the possible adverse affects of various liberties on particular life plans. 
90 The extent and definition of the 'basic liberties' and their relations i: envisaged by Rawls as taking 
place subsequent to the framing of principles according; toi a ntajc)ritarian model of imperfect procedural 
justice (Theory, 224-228). However, such procedures come into play only after the basic principles and lexical 
ordering are considered settler{, alter which the original position turns into something 
like the Philadelphia 
convention, M1k. 2. 
91 As argued by H. L. A. Hart, 'Rawls on Liberty and its Priority', in Daniels, Reading Rawls, 230-252, 
and by Norman Daniels, 'Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty', 253-281 of the same volume. 
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The ignorance of the parties in the original position so renders them incapable of 
determinate choice given the possibility that their actual interests beyond the veil might 
conflict with their hypothetical interests as self-interested `maximinimizers' behind it. 
This does not force the conclusion that the conception of the self presented is inadequate, 
but does suggest that in the absence of sufficient information the thin theory of the good 
cannot uncontroversially support Rawls's principles of justice (or anyone else's). Aspects 
of Rawls's doctrine might well be included within an account of the conditions likely to 
engender a sense of self-respect, but only as part of a more complex conceptual model 
than that provided by Theory. The goods which supposedly constitute the bases of self 
respect are not susceptible to simple distribution. 9-2 
Rawls's appeal is to the formal interests of the self irrespective of their content, and 
his strident anti-perfectionism93 promotes a model of reason which is blind to the 
intricacies subsumed under the label `self respect'. Although it involves aspects of 
individuality, self-respect also engages identifications and meanings which are not 
reducible to the expression or outcome of behaviour regulated solely by Rawls's 
principles. The creation and consolidation of self-respect requires social process of 
recognition and affirmation which call for more sophisticated explanations than those 
couched in terms of individuation and mutual non-interference. In this wider sense, self- 
respect extends to the contexts within which choices are valued and supported as 
worthwhile, admirable and worthy of realisation rather than futile, pointless, degrading, 
and so on. Although the value of favoured goods for me rests on their being mny choices, 
their intelligibility and significance both for myself and for others cannot be dependent 
on that fact alone (witness the situation of Rawls's grasscounter), but also on the 
availability and social recognition of a range of goods, and the character of one's 
relationships to and with various social and institutional `others', within a particular 
social environment. As far as Rawls is concerned, such factors are extramoral 
contingencies which cannot impinge upon the bargaining game. The rarefied abstraction 
of the original position cannot account for such factors, and as a result places more 
weight on concepts of autonomy, neutrality, and non-interference than they can credibly 
bear. 
Rawls outlines social relations in the well-ordered society in the latter third of 
Theory, describing an ideal harmony of groups and individuals upholding natural duties of 
q2 A sinlil, lr arý; unlcnt to this is made 1)\ Iris Man on Yºýung, Justrc and the Politics of Difference 
(Priºlret0n, Princeton University f'rc: s, 1990), esp. Ch. 1. )'()Ling noºt, " th, lt dltlll)Ugh questions of distribution 
eiicct p\\ Cr, influence and Sell-respect, such concepts ire 'rel, ltiun, ll' rather than 
individualistic, and gOC can 
tcý ; ln, llý ýi i7q'u5l7CC 
in terms of rcl, tticºns 1)1 domination and ººpprkcý\icln. For the prescht purposes I am only 
attennptim, to ýu ge that the 
idea of sell re\ pcct is a more c iiiplex one than : ugge\tcd by Rawls's 
deseri )tiOýn of the original position. 
9- 
e. g. Rýlwl:, Tbco)- , 
§50. 
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civility and forming bonds of reciprocal sentiment in the course of associations where 
`[i]n all cases, the scope of this morality is governed by the principles of justice. '94 
Compounding his difficulties involving reason and primary goods, Rawls's `morality of 
association' is unable to comprehend that many indisputably rational conceptions of the 
good rely upon social meanings, human motivations and relationships, and orderings of 
rational interests which are incompatible with those privileged by justice as Fairness. 
Under examination the conceptions of reason and interest manifested behind the 
veil of ignorance cause it to be simultaneously too `thin' and too `thick'. It is too thin in 
that it does not, as intended, offer a perspective relevant to any and all persons, modelling 
instead an individualistic, instrumentally calculating subject, motivated by self-regard in a 
situation where autonomy is synonymous with an ambivalent estrangement from others. 
This does allow the possibility of a range of decisions and preferences, but only within a 
narrow field of potential plans of life which although prevalent are by no means 
predominant within late-modern society. On the other hand, the veil is too thick in that 
the level of abstraction from particularity required by Rawls's initial situation distances 
the self from its interests and motivations in a form which is sufficiently extreme to make 
any decision on regulative principles impossible. The prospect that one's fundamental 
interests would not coincide with Rawls's ideal beyond the veil prevents the determinate 
choice of principles which might systematically undermine conditions needed to sustain a 
meaningful sense of self-respect, conceived in the wider context suggested above. 
[4] CIRCUMSTANCES OF JUSTICE AND `GENERAL FACTS' 
FROM THE ABOVE IT APPEARS THAT THE SELF constructed by the original position is, 
prima facie, an implausible conception in an almost inconceivably abstract situation. But 
for Rawls this is obviously not the case: the original position presents conditions which 
`awe' actually do accept as in some sense `our' own. The fairly common criticisms detailed 
in the previous sections pay insufficient heed, it might be argued, to either the 
information which the parties do have regarding the facts and circumstances of human 
society, or to the careful formulation of the original position as a procedure producing 
94 Rawls, Theory, 467. Although `this morality' regards the proper ý- pe Of authority and command, 
the quotation indicates the tone Of R. twls's 
discussion throughout the final sections of Thcorv. In the 
follhmwing section, lOr cx. tnlple, )IC notes that the Content OI the ino r, tlity of . 15 (wiation 
is given by the ºnººral 
standards appropriate to the inc{ividu, tl'` role 
in the \. ari(m, ý . tssoci. Itic, n' to which 
he belongs' (467). This 
painful t, ttltcIOg. \ nlit; ht \ceil) in n( M)ii , 
but given that R. twvk takes ass )cwtions to cnsist of anything from 
the f, anlily toi the n ýtioil, it 
illustrates the inability (ýI principles of justice toi account for motivations and 
sentinlents which surpass considerations of the rights and 
duties pertaining between individuals. Although 
not in principle opposed to the 
interesting class of supererogatory a ts' (116) i. e. those not motivated by pure 
self-interest or obligation, 
he regards such motivations as unusual and contr(, \vcrsial, finds them difficult to 
deal with Within a ºllorality of p1rsimo pious obedience of principle, and ar; u, lhlY 
ignore: the prevalence of 
such motiv. itions and actions within 
'ordinary' soi. al life. 
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principles which exert a claim of reason upon our actions. To concentrate on a single 
issue - such as the importance of particularity- - results in a overly- literal reading of the 
original position, which is merely an attempt to `generalize and carry to a higher order of 
abstraction'95 social contract theory in order to provide a systematic account of 
considered moral judgements. 
This defensive interpretation of Rawls's method suggests that the original position 
allows the formulation of principles in a manner which precludes the distortion of 
deliberation by biased or irrelevant interests, conflicts between which are fundamental to 
the issues which justice seeks to resolve. To arrive at an account able to transcend and 
resolve these contingent but incorrigible antagonisms requires the attainment of a `level 
of abstraction to which we must ascend to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots. '96 
Sufficient knowledge is therefore provided regarding freedom and equality, co-operation 
and conflict, economic and social goods, etc., for a procedure to be envisaged using 
abstract conceptions which, although necessarily idealised, are consistent with ordinary 
non-philosophical judgement and commendable to reason as the basis of a theory of 
justice. An exposition along these lines sounds, as Rawls might say, both reasonable and 
uncontroversial. But as with the notion of primary goods, beneath the theoretical surface 
this is not the case. Choosing between a range of possible theories drawn from `the 
canon', the Rawlsian self has available whatever `general facts' are required in order to 
arrive at a determinate, unanimously acceptable decision congruent with the boundaries 
of argument erected by the original position. But the form of this `knowledge' and its role 
within this underdetermined decision problem is at best obscure. 
Circumstances of justice are held by Rawls to obtain in any society and `set the 
stage for questions of justice. '97 The parties are to assume from that social relations 
beyond it will be dominated by the competing claims of self-interested agents. 
Supererogatory motivations and altruistic sentiments between persons are contingent 
rather than normative factors in a life where co-operation seeks, in the first instance at 
least, to secure self-referential advantage. As a condition applying in Rawls's estimation to 
any society, this assumption - which previously caused problems for the Kantian 
interpretation - suggests that justice is itself contingent upon the prevalence of these 
circumstances and is not in fact the unconditional first virtue proclaimed from the outset 
of Theory. A great deal of weight thus hangs upon the empirical existence of the 
circumstances of justice, because to the extent that they do not obtain - for example 
where a strong consensus exists regarding In b alternative 
`first virtues' which subordinate 
95 viii. 
96 R, 1"l., Political Liher. aIz ii, 46. 
97 R. i\v"Is, T'c"r>iv, 130. The following rcm. irks are 
largely ddr, iwn from Michael J. Sandei, Liberalism and 
the Limits <o//ostreg. 
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Rawls's ordering -a deontological conception need not prevail and the central 
presupposition underlying justice as Fairness collapses. 
This indeed appears to be the case upon a cursory examination of even modern 
capitalist societies, 98 where value conflict is often present within but not wholly 
determinant of social and institutional relationships. As Sandel notes, conflict which does 
pertain is likely to coexist with a range of competing principles and motivations within 
institutions embodying `common identities and shared purposes... whose presence signifies 
the relative absence of the circumstances of justice. Although [they] might well exist in all 
of these cases, they would not likely predominate. '99 The `objective' characteristics of 
modern society do not uncontroversially warrant the emphasis in the original position of 
the `subjective' conflict of the parties potential interests. This occurs at the expense of a 
possible mutuality which might well outweigh, or mediate the resolution of, persistent 
disagreements. Rawls's assumption that justice be considered the first virtue lacks 
warrant, and even where correct must be demonstrated rather than presupposed. 
Granting the possibility that relations within any potential society might be 
characterised by endemic conflict, 100 a second difficulty emerges regarding circumstances 
of justice. Theory consists of Rawls's articulation and defence of his favoured 
interpretation of the original position, but as he makes clear `I shall not, of course, 
actually work through this process'101 (from deliberation in the original position to 
arrival at a state of equilibrium). The text is full of comments, asides, references, 
comparisons with competing theories and so on, often resulting in confusion as to 
whether arguments are directed towards: (1) the construction and defence of Rawls's 
methodological apparatus; (2) the reasoning of the parties in the original position; (3) to 
why a particular part of that reasoning is acceptable given the construction of the original 
98 For a plausible sociological argument suggesting that turn within structurally individuating capitalist 
5 )defies self-interest is not the predominant im)tivation within social or economic relations, sec Amitai 
Etzioni, The t1oral Dimension. - To:; iicl a Economics (New York, Free Press, 1988), esp. 36-67. 
99 Sandei, Liberalism and the Limits..., 31. Sandcl's examples cover a continuum of possible associations 
including neighbourhoods, cities, universities, trade unions, ethnic, religious and cultural groups, established 
nationalisms and so on. Although it is oversimplistic to suggest that conflict and dissensus within groups does 
not take place, the examples do suggest that such disagreements its do take place are mediated (or are 
amenable to mediation in the light of) common purposes and beliefs xlilch are prior to, but not necessarily 
111C( All }p, ttible With, principles Oi justice. 
100 \\'liich is argu. ihl\ all that Rawls strictly need` u, c'\taahlish, rather than the strong empirical claim 
made in the text. Given that prudence in fite original positi, ýn leads partic> to reason (nlaximininlally) as if 
the were to assume <t position 
in the least advantageous social there is no reason why they should 
not jlso assume that circumstances o, ( justice may apply, and treat such an eventualit, \ similarly as a `worst 
case scc'n, trio'. Such might entail tli, tt 
if heyý)nd the veil c()iditioýns are more advantage)U5 then the status Of 
principles chosen alight he attenuated, perhaps even rendered 
irrelevant in a manner which Rawls wants to 
tvoid given the strong claims made 
for justice in T. ºeory, but an explanation along these lines would avoid the 
unsustainable claim that all 
human society is irrevocably conditioned by circumstances of justice. 
101 Rawls, Theory, 21. This comment is explicitly directed towards reflective equilibrium, but falls 
within the introductory exposition of 
Theo>-y, and is wholly consistent with the course of the argument 
developed in the remainder of Rawls's text. 
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position; (4) against alternative methods of reasoning which might challenge the results 
which Rawls is seeking to defend; or (5) to the implications of these results within a 
description of the formation and realisation of the well ordered society. 1'02 
Although related, these areas of argument (and further categories could certainly be 
determined) are distinct, with the latter three drawing on information which would be 
denied to parties in the original position. Moreover, details of the information available 
to the bargaining game and the uses to which it is put in the course of the deliberations 
are not explicitly set out by Rawls. Much of the argument supporting his principles relies 
on the prediscursive assumption identifying justice with inviolability, and the technical 
argument for the Pareto-optimality of the difference principle as a maximin compatible 
solution to the question of distribution under uncertainty. 103 Neither discussion attempts 
to model what might possibly transpire within a situation attempting to actually produce 
principles by carefully observing the procedures set out in Theory. 
Identification of the precise information available and hoRw it might be applied in 
the original position is therefore largely a matter of conjecture. Assuming that a wide 
range of suitably ubiquitous information can be identified, the non-specific `facts' and 
`theories' allowed by Rawls into the bargaining game are open to question on at least 
three levels. Firstly, there are few if any uncontroversially established facts and theories 
from even the most general viewpoint. 104 Secondly, even when presented in a purely 
abstract form, theoretical arguments are typically not simply comprehensible in 
themselves, requiring a general awareness of the issues and contexts involved in order to 
be adequately understood. The original position screens out the narratives of the history 
of ideas and it is unlikely that the concepts employed therein could have concrete 
meaning for parties denied awareness of the social, historical and intellectual backgrounds 
relevant to the facts and theories admitted into the decision process. Without such 
knowledge, the basis upon which the reasoned formation, comparison and evaluation of 
sets of principles might occur is not clear. Finally, as with the reason and interests of the 
parties, without knowledge regarding one's own conception of the good a vacuum of 
uncertainty remains at the centre of original position. Providing information about 
theory and society does not address the problem that the Rawisian self, ignorant of how 
`general facts' might apply in particular cases, lacks criteria upon which to base the 
decisions which determines its life chances beyond the veil. 
102 A personal but not unusual reaction. See for example Hare, `Rawls' Thheý)rv of justice', esp. 84-87, 
97-102, and Brian B. arrY, Tbc Lihcral 
Tbcwrr ofJustice (Oxford, Oxford Univvcrsit)' Press, 1973), 1-4. 
103 Rawls, Theory, §ý 12-14. 
104 For example, do the parties get the 'general thcories' of Bentham, Marx or Keynes on political 
econoomy? Hegel and Nietesche as well as 
Kant on ethics ? Freud, Jung Or Lac, tn on psychology, and so on 
through the relevant disciplines...? A great 
deal of general theory might be ruled cut of the original position 
due to the limited rat locinatIHin permissible under the constraints of right, and the test of reflective 
equilibrium is similarly aºnhi uou\. 
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One means of accounting for the presence of general information within the 
original position is by emphasising the bargaining game as a guide to intuition. 105 Such 
an explanation could allow intuitive conceptual understanding to be ascribed to the 
parties consistent with a set of established pre-philosophical judgements. It could only do 
so, however, by undermining the stated structure and purpose of the original position. As 
the outcome of the decision process, according to Rawls justice is not innate, self-evident 
or a transcendental property of reason. It is hence neither a direct product of nor is 
available to deduction from intuition alone. 106 
Rawls does refer to the contractarianism of the original position as an intuitive idea 
suitable for the clarification of justice because its abstraction `enables us to envision our 
objective from afar. '107 But he is referring here to the idea of the scheme rather than its 
detailed implementation, and the extent to which intuitions are admissible within the 
decision situation must be limited by its constraints. For example, intuitions favouring 
forms of teleology, perfectionism or utilitarianism would fall foul of the preinscribed 
deontology of the original position, or would, if allowed into the bargaining process, be 
ruled out of any agreement at an early stage. For such information to play a significant 
role in the process a far more relaxed set of constraints would be required, but as noted 
earlier, the definition of the original position is expressly designed to produce the 
required answer - Rawls's two principles. Given that a wider range of intuitions would 
challenge and contradict Rawls's own assumptions, it is likely that an alternative version 
of either the original position, principles of justice or both would be required. The 
admission of a spectrum of viewpoints would otherwise amplify differences in viewpoint 
rather than affording a means for their resolution. 
The status as well as the content of intuition is important to the integrity of the 
original position, as Rawls's treatment of them as unproblematic judgements overlooks 
considerable uncertainty regarding their origin and significance. Given Rawls's 
repudiation of controversial metaphysical sources, it is clear that justice as Fairness 
should regard intuitions as part and product of the contingent experience of subjects 
beyond rather than behind the veil of ignorance. Inherently varied and particularistic, 
intuitive knowledge is of a type which is not open to `distribution' behind the veil of 
ignorance, and moreover is unintelligible without reference to the conditions under 
which it was acquired by agents in the world. In a Wittgensteinian formulation, Rorty 
captures this position concisely when he explains intuitions as manifestations of the 
language games in which an agent participates. 108 Against this understanding P. F. 
105 This interpretation of the original position is suggested by RawIs in bum-y, 20-22. The extent of 
Rawls's reliance on intuitionism is criticised by Hare, 'Rawls' Thcoýrv Of Justiic', 83-84. 
106 7/)(o>- ', §7, §§49-50. See also p. 56. 'Nor ire these notions purely transcendent.... ' 
107 R, 1\ß lS, Tllco)-V,  




Strawson claims the existence of `a massive central core of human thinking which has no 
history', 109 and Jürgen Habermas upholds the notion of `a universal core of moral 
intuition in all times and in all societies. '11° Rawls',,, position on the niiesrinn is 
predictably equivocal: on one hand the anti-realism of his constructivism appears to align 
him with Rorty's perspective; on the other his appeal to a recognisably Kantian 
conception of autonomy, and his presentation of principles of justice as final and 
conclusive - `there is no second chance'111 - imply an interpretation consistent with that of 
Strawson and Habermas. This could allow Rawls to import information and judgements 
into the process, but given the radically unclear epistemic status of intuition he could 
only do so extremely controversially, transgressing the limitations of the original position 
and compromising its purported role as a device of abstraction and clarification. 
Because Theory lacks a clear account of the origin and status of intuition, it fails to 
consider the potential fallibility - extending to absurdity and idiocy - of unexamined 
judgements and assumptions. Although the requirement of `due consideration' might be 
taken to rule out obviously nonsensical examples there is no prima facie reason to assign 
credibility to intuitions, and Rawls does not provide arguments to the contrary. If 
intuition is to be regarded as an authoritative source of information then the excruciating 
detail and supposed rigour of the original position becomes irrelevant. Although Rawls is 
correct in maintaining that a tenable account of justice must comply on some level with 
commonly held judgements, the appeal to intuition can only be a minor premise in 
justification, not a major component of the decision process itself. Recourse to intuition 
thus cannot render the vague idea of `general facts' intelligible within the original 
position, and any attempt to achieve this end compounds rather than resolves the 
indeterminacies of Rawls's approach. 
A weaker interpretation of the decision process is, however, arguably available to 
Rawls. Trading on the `intuitive' appeal of the contract112 at the expense of the detail of 
its development, it suggests that the components of the original position outline a way of 
thinking about justice which is essential to any equable discussion of the subject. Setting 
aside the detailed objections, an approximation of the decision procedure can be 
conceived which is intentionally vague regarding the detail of the knowledge available to 
the contractors. Such a construal sacrifices much of the analytical rigour Rawls claims for 
his effort to `strive for a kind of moral geometry'113 but may allow for the formulation 
109 P. F. Strawson, InrliVidr-ral5. An Essay in Descriptive Maiplipics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1959), p. 10. 
110 Jiirgen Hahcrnl, ts, A utour m and Solis zrity: Intcfýýýicý (London, Vern), 1986), 206. 
111 Rawls, T/ýºý>> , 176. 
112 All tppc, ll \\'h1ch tilge \\ ittgcnstcinian , recount slºggcsted h\ Rort\ might account for by elucidating 
the pcnetr, ttiOn of o>cial relationships 
Nv legal and commercial tcrºnineýl(ww . 
I1 R. lwl:, T/u-on, 121. 
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of his principles, and lend credence to the claim that `[a]t any time we can enter the 
original position... by arguing... in accordance with these restrictions. '114 
If this weak interpretation of the original position is in any way convincing, it is 
because under the rubric of `general' or `intuitive' facts it allows particularistic 
information to be covertly imported into the bargaining game. It becomes plausible by 
ignoring the detail of Rawls's development in order to plug the most obvious lacunae 
highlighted in the preceding discussion. The very need for this departure from the text 
suggests, however, that an alternative conception of the original position to that favoured 
by Rawls is called for from the outset. Although there are innumerable possible 
permutations of the decision scenario, for the present purposes the fundamental areas of 
contention concern the personal knowledge and the motivations ascribed by Rawls to the 
contractors. Helpfully, in describing the features of the original position he provides a 
brief taxonomy of alternative possibilities] 15 which effectively maps out the road not 
taken at various major points in the development of Theory. As alternatives to the veil of 
ignorance Rawls acknowledges the possibility of either `full' or `partial' knowledge being 
allowed in the original position, and rather than mutual disinterest suggests that either 
`elements of social solidarity and good will' or a state of `perfect altruism' might prevail in 
the relations between the contractors. 116 Discounting the likelihood of `perfect altruism' 
between the parties (which would obviate any need of justice), and the usefulness of 
`partial knowledge' (which, without detailed elaboration, is all but meaningless), we are 
left with a collection of parties aware of their mutual interdependence and shared 
interests (expressed as solidarity), deliberating with good will from a position of adequate 
knowledge (regarding themselves, their interests and the condition of their society). 117 
Such a scenario could overcome some problems of knowledge and deliberation 
which Rawls creates, perhaps involving the imposition of milder constraints to secure a 
less abstract impartiality. For example, the implementation of requirements for publicity 
and universality might be deemed sufficient, as impartiality does not obviously demand 
ignorance on the level demanded by Theory. Given that participants are identified in a 
climate of goodwill, with equal and public bargaining resources, recognising the `strains 
of commitment' and the need to arrive at a mutually acceptable resolution of their 
conflicts, it is not clear that the higher level of abstraction created by Rawls's flight from 
contingency and particularity is either helpful or attainable. There is no compelling cause 
114 Rawls, 19. 
115 R tIs, Theo y, 146-147. 
116 R, i vls, TLheor-ty, 140. 
117 The list provided by Rawls could of course he , upplcmemcd and irgued about at great length, as 
alternative interpretations of 'full 
knowledge' can c, iily he construed as variations on the theme. For 
example, Nagel, 'Rawls on 
justiic', 8, sugge is that `One might think it would he an improvement to allow 
the parties full information ahutit cver\ one's preferences, mercy 
depriving them ( knowledge of who thcv 
were. 
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to assume that persons are incapable of calm argumentation within an appropriately 
defined full information situation with the ambition of either bringing into focus the 
common ground shared by persons with ostensibly disparate interests, or determining an 
acceptable trade off between the demands of those interests. 118 
The original position can supposedly be entered into whenever the need arises, by 
whoever so desires, in order to determine or confirm the fairness and rightness of Rawls's 
principles. Parties in the bargaining game do not know who or where they are, and so 
could turn out to be anyone, anywhere. The original position is so formulated in order 
that we might view the world sub specie aeternitatis. 119 Rawls's resistance to the 
introduction of specific information is grounded in his understandable but overweening 
ambition to describe conditions which support his own favoured principles. With this 
objective in mind, he notes that `we would not be able to work out any definite theory of 
justice. 
.. [w]ithout these 
limitations on knowledge... the original position would be 
hopelessly complicated, '] 20 claiming that all that could be agreed in a more wide-ranging 
scenario is `a vague formula stating that justice is what would be agreed to without being 
able to say much, if anything about the substance of the agreement. 'I=I This claim does 
not however bear scrutiny. The problem which the veil of ignorance addresses is that of 
arriving at Rawls's principles and it is not the case that without the veil agreement is 
impossible, because what is at stake is not agreement as such, but agreement on the 
finality of Rawls's ahistorical and universal norms. 122 
118 An agent's awareness of certain facts about himself, his status and talents etc.... does not prevent the 
assumption of an impersonal perspective when thinking about general arrangements. One can adopt personal 
and impersonal perspectives when looking at such issues, but the two will necessarily be related in that 
making sense of one view will inevitably draw on the insights of the other (i. e. to recognise a motive as 
impersonal might require one to identify and make distinct personal interests, and vice versa). Contra Rawls, 
it is not the case that thinking impersonally requires the imposition of stringent information constraints; 
rather, such constraints make thinking impossible. 
119 This Latinism occurs in the final paragraph of Theory, (p. 587). Quite what Rawls means by the use 
of `sub specie aeternitatis' is something of a mystery given that the phrase, `perspective of eternity' resonates 
with metaphysical implications and antecedents. Sandel, Liheralisni and the Limits..., ' 132, sees the passage as a 
radical reinterpretation of the original position, as the language Of choosing and willing is displaced by the 
language of seeing and perceiving, as the voluntarist image of Kant gives wad to the cognitive image of 
Spinoza' (in whose Ethics the phrase occurs). The ambiguity of Rawls's final paragraph, his constant emphasis 
on the voluntaristic nature of the origin, dl position as I choice procedure and his denial ABI a metaphysical 
conception of reason or subjectivity entail that this IS 11 so mewwwhat overoptimistic and under-demonstrated 
interpretation. lt might also be suggested, for instance, that Rawls's attempt to provide a 'moral geometry' 
mirrors Spinoza's attempt to show that explanation must proceed 
deductively from fundamental axioms - 
although `uch an interpretation would obviously move Rawls away 
from Kant and towards Hobbes as well as 
Spinoza. Rawls's almost casual use of 5uh specie acten-iitati< lends itself to such readings, but without further 
textual elaboration attempts to recover 
his intentions here are speculative in the extreme. 
120 Rawls, Then iv, 140. 
121 Rawls, Theory, 140. 
122 AlthoughTheoºY leaves the establishment of equilibrium as an open-ended process, given the fixing 
of principles under conditions of unanimity and strict compliance 
in the original position, the fundamental 
principles (rather thin the practical 





It is the ambition of the agreement demanded, rather than the demand that an 
agreement be made, which leads to the imposition of ignorance in the form specified by 
Rawls, whose insistence on the validity of his favoured principles leads him to 
unjustifiably discount the possibility that an alternative construction might produce an 
equally if not more acceptable agreement under different conditions. In particular, the 
claim that alternative characterisations of the original position would result in a vague 
and less useful formula fails to consider that a less specific but more effective and 
justifiable account of justice might be produced. 
For example, what Rawls would reject as a `vague formula' might take the form of a 
procedural method of doing justice, rather than the theory offered by Rawls which 
circumscribes the terms of debate regarding justice by fixing principles prior to their 
application in concrete social contexts. Indeed, as Stuart Hampshire's account of `basic 
procedural justice'123 indicates, such a result need not be a vague formula at all. 
Hampshire offers an interpretation of justice as a procedure of argument, deliberation and 
adjudication between conflicting claims. Drawing upon the history of ideas rather the 
abstraction of the original position but writing at a similarly general level, Hampshire's 
deliberative injunction is more narrowly procedural than Rawls's principles. Underlying 
substantive conceptions of justice which are inherently variable `because of their 
derivation from different conceptions of the good, and because they have their roles in 
different ways if life flourishing at different times'124 Hampshire's approach declines the 
burdens of assumption which undermine justice as Fairness. In consequence the 
ahistorical, universal and impartial claims advanced on behalf of his minimal procedure 
are far more plausible than Rawls's, benefits which clearly outweigh the costs of 
generality incurred by his approach, which at no point succumbs to vagueness. This 
proceduralism is not the only alternative available125 but is the most elegant, and 
effectively demonstrates how Rawls's insistence on conditions uniquely conducive with 
his own preferred principles leads to the premature rejection of potentially viable 
alternatives. The formation of an agreement on principles other than Rawls's is a likely 
outcome, perhaps explaining his unfortunate reluctance to explore some of these 
possibilities, which could complicate the decision process but need not do so inordinately. 
[5] REPRESENTATION AND DELIBERATION IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
RAWLS'S DEPICTION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES of justice is no less vulnerable than the 
other elements of the original position. They are open to rather obvious historical and 
I-)-) Stuart Hampshire, Innocertceartd Experie'uc"c (Lo nd(m, Allen Lane, 1989), 72-8,142-6. 
124 Hampshire, /rtnýýrc'ricc I(I ExP(')"1('ýIC"c' , 187. 
1225 The most prýýminc nt being Brian Barry' 't naruitiýýn 01 /uSttrc ai Inzparti. Ality (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1995), Ch. 3-4. 
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sociological objections, and the notion that `general facts' might be either identified or 
rendered conceptually intelligible to the subject behind the veil is predictably suspect. 
Making sense of the original position entails recourse to a weaker `intuitionist' 
interpretation of the bargaining game, but to do so necessarily undermines the rigour of 
the limitations it seeks to comprehend. Alternative characterisations of the bargaining 
game are more plausible than Rawls allows, but call into question the aims of Theory, as 
convergence upon the required outcome would be, if not impossible, considerably less 
likely. 
Returning from speculative digressions to the detail of Rawls's method, it is notable 
that although the original position partially defines the self through the limitations of its 
reason and understanding, it does little to describe it, its role in the original position, or its 
relation to the world where the veil is an esoteric philosophical device rather than an 
everyday tool of reason and judgement. This brings into view the question of precisely 
who or what is in the position of choice behind the veil of ignorance, and how reasoning 
undertaken behind it can have force for those not subject to its conditions who are quite 
reasonably unmoved by appeals to either Kant or reflective equilibrium. Rawls claims 
that persons might enter the original position at any time simply by imposing the 
required conditions on their reasoning. This implies a straightforward correlation 
between parties behind the veil of ignorance and people outside it, but despite the 
complexity and sophistication of the original position this relationship is never explicitly 
established. 
Rawls's terminology - which this discussion has for the most part followed - refers 
to the bargaining game as a meeting of hypothetical `parties' or `persons'. The notion that 
original position thinking can be undertaken by actual people reasoning in accordance 
with its limitations suggests a plurality of individuals bearing potentially differing 
interests and preferences, as well as the shared objective of agreement regarding justice. 
Rawls's comment that `persons in the original position know that they already hold a 
place in some particular society'126 strongly suggests that they represent the interests of a 
correspondent plurality of actual individuals in order that by inference the results 
produced are deemed applicable beyond the veil. Simply stated, in the original position 
reasoning proceeds as if each person in an underdetermined but nevertheless presumably 
existent society was `represented' within the decision process. 
Elsewhere, however, it is equally clear that this is not the case, and nor is it obvious 
precisely what is being represented, or how the original position represents it. Rather 
than presenting simple individuals, Rawls also depicts the self in the original position as 
I-'() Rawls, Tbeo>n,, 166. 
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being the representative of a genetic line, or the head of a hypothetical family. '27 At 
another point in the text he writes about evaluating the application of principles to the 
basic structure from the viewpoint of a representative from the least advantaged social 
position or class. '28 Compounding this confusion still further, in an essay published 
contemporaneously with Theory 129 he states that participants might assume the status of 
a range of: 
`nations, provinces, business firms, churches, teams and so on. The principles of justice 
apply to conflicting claims made by persons of all these separate kinds. There is, perhaps, 
a certain logical priority to the case of human individuals. Nevertheless ... 
[a]s I shall use 
the term `person, ' then, it will be ambiguous in the manner indicated. '130 
This astonishing quotation illuminates the uncertainty of the `parties' described by Rawls, 
an ambiguity of some importance given the Archimedean status accorded the self which 
supposedly inhabits the original position. The failure of Theory to distinguish pertinent 
differences between representatives of social positions, genetic lines, or simple individuals, 
indicates that as far as the bargaining game is concerned, there are none. Although this 
can be taken as confirmation that the most logical - and charitable - interpretation 
envisages a conclave of individuals131 it also attests the uncertainty regarding precisely 
what is being represented which is manifest throughout Theory. Furthermore, the list 
from `nations' to `teams' above refers to such entities as persons of all these separate 
127 Rawls, Theory, 128-9. This is in order that in order that they he concerned with the welfare of their 
descendants, ultimately expressed in the form of the just savings principle (5 44). Given the ahistoricity of the 
original position, however, this approach towards justice between generations is unnecessary: as they are 
framing ideal principles which are supposedly valid irrespective of circumstance, `strict compliance' entails 
that they recognise the need to provide for their descendants irrespective Of the contingencies of genealogy, 
and assume that those preceding and following them will recognise principles Of justice, and act similarly. 
128 Rawls, Thewy, 96-9. Although this section is not an argument directed to the workings of the 
original position its sense, and the language deployed within it, render the arguments compatible with it. For 
example, `relevant representative men, therefore, are the representative citizen and those who stand for the 
various levels of well being' (p. 96), `persons in the original position understand the difference principle to he 
defined in one of these ways' (p. 98, regarding the definition of classes and social positions), suggesting that 
the original position can somehow he seen as populated by a range Of representatives of various social 
groupings in society. 
129 John Rawls, `Justice as Reciprocity', in Samuel Gorovitz (cd. ) Utililariani<rn (New York, Bobs- 
Merrill, 1971), 242-268. An editorial now refers to this article, presumably without sarcasm, as `the previously 
Unpublished underground classic' (p X). Although not strictly coextensive with Theory, the proximity of the 
two texts and the relevance of the article to the present discussion legitimates the emphasis placed upon it 
here. 
130 Rawls, `Justice is Reciprocity', 245. 
131 Following Theory, 130, where Rawls claims that the original position models `relations of 
individuals to one another which set the stage for questions of justice' (p. 130, emphasis added), and the most 
obvious and textually consistent understanding of the agent in the original position is to see it as an 
ahistorically individuated thin self. As tile alternatives merely illustrate how the original position can be 
interpreted from the standpoint Of the family, or from class interests and so on, for purposes of elucidation 
without at all altering the rationality of the self in seeking to maximise its life chances in terms of primary 
goods Regardless of its 
hypothetical constituency of representation, the self's primary interest is that of 
securing the conditions 
for its own self-determination. 
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kinds', a generalisation which is, to say the least, question begging. Were Rawls to claim 
that institutions might be represented by specific, clearly defined persons then his 
terminology might be more acceptable, but no such discrimination is advanced. Rawls's 
remarks suggest that as far as the original position is concerned, institutions, nations and 
so forth can be considered `persons' or `parties' independent of any further 
elaboration. 132 
This indeterminacy can arguably be overcome by recalling the individual 
inviolability which entails that `the worth of institutions is derived solely from the 
benefits they bring to human individuals. '133 Given this guarantee what is presumed to 
constitute a `party' in the original position is unimportant. Defenders of Rawls have 
suggested, for example, that the parties might proceed by examining the question of 
choice from the perspective of every possible social position which they might find 
themselves inhabiting. 134 Alternatively, they `can be thought of as representing distinct 
communities. '135 It seems to be the case that it doesn't matter what we presume to insert 
into the bargaining game, so long as `it' is deemed capable of recognising the correctness 
of the resulting principles. The outcome of the original position is dependent on the 
definition of the appropriate circumstances, which produce the desired principles, which 
are in turn defined to order to protect the non-negotiable status of the individual. 
Ambiguities regarding the precise definition of `person', `party' or `self' are therefore 
superfluous - what counts is that whatever `it' is occupies the suitably defined 
Archimedean point. The most obvious and elegant description of the original position 
places the individual at this privileged site, but if for some exegetical purpose an 
alternative is preferred then for Rawls it will be equally acceptable, as the same result 
must necessarily emerge. The self in the original position appears to be an extremely 
`thin' figure indeed. 
This convenient interpretation is open to objection on at least two counts. Firstly, 
Rawls states that his conception of the person provides the Archimedean point, rather 
than that the Archimedean point exists separately from and is merely occupied by the 
self. 136 Secondly, although it is conceivable that family heads, representative men and 
self-interested individuals night agree on the same principles in the original position, it is 
not clear that they would do so on the same basis. Opting for principles because they 
132 Rawls uses 'person' and 'party' interchangeably throughout 71)eofy (or appears to do so). The 
motivation for the use of the word `party' is not explicit, but the term does reinforce the idea of the original 
position as a contractual scheme. 
133 Rawls, `Justice as Rec'iprocity', 245. 
134 Susan Miller Okiii, `Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Ethics', Ethics 99 (1989), 247-9. This 
position is, however, practically equivalent to an 
`ideal ohscrvvcr' theory, which R. iwls attempts to render 
distinct from the original position at T ew- , 186-188 on anti-utilitarian grounds. 
135 Allen E. Buchanan. `Assessing the Commwnitarian Critique of Liberalism', Ethics 99 (1989), 864. 
1% Rawls, Tºeo y, 584. 
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maximise the prospects of a family line, a particular group, or an abstracted individual 
concerned solely with its own finite welfare need not proceed in the same manner or for 
the same reasons. The original position would, however, deny the self in the original 
position (whatever its presumed status) the resources to understand and make distinct 
possible differences between these interests. The assumption that what is good for the 
individual is obviously good for families and classes of individuals, regardless of their 
particular interests, at best demands further explanation and at worst is simply 
unwarranted. Although institutions of various types can be characterised by their internal 
norms, purposes, structures and practices, which in turn constitute the standards of 
rationality according to which they operate, without a detailed examination of such 
elements it makes no sense whatsoever to suggest that they can simply be dropped into an 
original position at the level of abstraction posited by Rawls. 
The indeterminacy of Rawls's method carries one final consequence to be examined 
here. As the self cannot be related specifically to any actual or presumed `person', and it 
makes no sense to speak of there being a plurality of them engaged in debate, `they' are 
identical representations of a single normative entity. Rawls is aware of this incongruity 
and notes the one advantage which it entails, but only some of the concomitant 
difficulties. The gain which the uniform identity of the `persons' secures for Rawls is that 
when the various conditions which constitute the original position are rigidly enforced, 
the possibility of non-agreement is eradicated. The decision situation is simplified in that 
all is convinced by the same arguments, and it happily follows that as the choice one is 
necessarily unanimous `we can view the choice in the original position from the 
standpoint of one person selected at random. '137 Less happily, Rawls's choice of 
expression here is to say the least misleading. Given the precise equality of the parties it is 
more accurate to say that there is only one choosing agent in the original position, the 
choice of which is binding (or, if one is determined to maintain the fiction of pluralism 
within the bargaining game, that a potentially infinite number of perfect clones are 
present). It is not the case that this self might be selected `at random', as there are no 
meaningful pluralities to be negotiated, conflicts adjudicated or differences recognised. 
There is in fact no debate to be had. The original position delineates a chain of reasoning 
to be followed - all that the self can 
do is confirm that Rawls's principles are produced by 
the various mechanisms of the original position, which as well as being a `hypothetical' 
choice situation is an entirely redundant one. 
This observation makes apparent a significant perplexity present throughout 
Rawls's prose. He notes, albeit in a less than forthright manner, that the uniformity of the 
alleged parties projected into the original position effectively entails that he is 
1'ý Ra,, Nýl:, T11c(, > ", 139. 
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constructing a single agent as the self within the choice scenario, and acknowledges that 
since no meaningful debate can take place within the scheme so defined, `there follows 
the very important consequence that the parties have no basis for bargaining in the usual 
sense. '138 But the text then proceeds as if a plurality of distinct selves inhabit the original 
position, and as if `they' actually were engaged in a constructive debate. Rawls even 
suggests that a referee might be imagined, overseeing proceedings in the original position 
in order to arbitrate, enforce constraints, prevent the formation of coalitions, and so on. 
The postulation of such a figure is allegedly `to make the circumstances more vivid', 
although he concedes that the referee `is actually superfluous. '] 39 Rather than being 
merely superfluous, however, the notion, along with much of the language employed in 1; 1.7 
the elaboration of the original position, is disingenuous. Invoking a plural vocabulary 
throughout, Rawls goes to great lengths to sustain the fiction that a genuine multiplicity 
of interests inhabit the original position, where this is simply not the case. To do 
otherwise would not only be grammatically cumbersome; it would render fully apparent 
the incomprehensible nature of his continued insistence that the original position depicts 
a meaningful choice situation, in however unusual a sense. 
Incidentally, given that one of Rawls's objectives in Theory is to decisively supplant 
utilitarianism as a political creed, the fate of the Rawlsian self is of ironic significance. In 
Rawls's own estimation `the most natural way... of arriving at utilitarianism... is to adopt 
for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man. '140 The original 
position comes perilously close to this formula, albeit in the form of a single, highly 
abstracted chooser rather than a benevolently impartial ideal observer. As Hare 
witheringly notes, `We can indeed easily sympathise with [Rawls] who, having been 
working for the best part of his career on the construction of `a viable alternative to the 
utilitarian tradition' discovered that the type of theory he had embraced... led direct to a 
kind of utilitarianism. '141 Rawls's principal objection to utilitarianism is that it `does not 
take seriously the distinction between persons. '142 The original position contentiously 
(on the `clone interpretation') does secure this distinctness through the level of its 
abstraction, but does so not just by bracketing, but by sacrificing the particularity of the 
individual. This strategy undermines the credibility of the original position at every turn, 
and prevents it from modelling an intelligible account of the difference and antagonism 
which pluralism - between groups, cultures or individuals - involves, an omission which 
carries decisive and recurring consequences for justice as Fairness. As it is through 
138 Rawls, Th' r v, 139. Emph«tsis added. 
139 Rawl:, T. rcorv, 139. 
140 Rawls, 26-7. 
141 Hare, 'Rawls Tlhc&)rv oI f usti«', 91. 
142 Rawls, Theory, 27, passim. This ambition also further warrants the strategy of ignoring confusions 
regarding the identity of the sell and assuming that 
by `person' Rawls is referring to discrete individuals. 
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difference and particularity that individuality acquires meaning, to the extent that Rawls 
succeeds in establishing the separateness of the self in the original position his victory is a 
Pyrrhic one. 
THE RAWLSIAN SELF IS CONCEIVED through a series of unsustainable devices and 
assumptions which make a rigid application of the original position all but impossible; 
the parties are not allocated sufficient knowledge, understanding or grounds upon which 
to base the decisive agreement envisaged by Rawls. Familiarity with the contractual 
metaphor obscures the incoherence of the original position as developed by Rawls, but 
when the composite elements of the methodology are examined in turn the absurdity of 
the overall scheme becomes apparent. As Susan Hurley suggests, when strictly interpreted 
the original position is `a case in which language carries us along into mistakenly 
assuming we can make sense of a construction, because there is, so to speak, grammatical 
space for it, which in fact does not make sense. '143 This discussion has traced difficulties 
surrounding the original position in considerable detail in order to revisit criticisms and 
questions asked of A Theory of Justice that are no longer prominent in current 
philosophical debates, but which, as the impact of his constructivism is not decisive, 
remain urgently relevant to the assessment of Rawls's theory, and also to the wider 
discourses of `the Rawls industry' engaged in the project of refining and justifying a 
modern philosophy of liberalism, be it `political' or neo-Kantian in form. The following 
chapter explores the consequences of Rawls's methodological inadequacies through 
Michael Sandel's interrogation of the `unencumbered self', and assesses prominent 
attempts by supporters of Rawls's to defend justice as Fairness against its `communitarian' 
critics. 
1 43 S. L. Hurir), Alatur. i/ Rea. nns (Oxiu, r(1, Oxford Univcr\ity Press, 1989), 381. 
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c 1-1 n 11 is li i II ii r I: 
THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 
[1] INTRODUCTION 
WITH THE OVERLAPPING AMBIGUITIES and weaknesses of Rawls's methodology 
established, for purposes of intelligibility this discussion will proceed as if it were 
unproblematically the case that an individual is referred to by Rawls's use of `person', 
`party' and so on throughout Theory. At an abstract level the depiction of this discrete 
entity is not unduly difficult to grasp, but under close examination the assumptions about 
the self manifested in the original position provoke a troubling set of questions 
concerning the viability of both Rawls's project and the approach to liberal political 
philosophy for which justice as Fairness is paradigmatic. 
Rawls constantly draws attention to the `free and equal' status accorded to the self 
in order to legitimate the agreement he produces as a `fair' and hence commendable one. 
Reasoning in the original position is `free' in being neither constrained nor determined by 
controversial, contingent or arbitrary doctrines or forces, and `equality' is similarly 
defined in terms of absence rather than presence, as ignorance prevents the directing of 
reason in favour of any particular interests or conceptions of the human goods and 
purposes. A quite profound state of insensibility is so taken by Rawls to `represent 
equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of 
their good and capable of a sense of justice. '1 Whilst it makes no sense to consider this 
scenario a meaningfully plural one, to the extent that it represents a universal subjectivity, 
equality of application is notionally preserved by Rawls's conditions. 
The freedom and equality of the original position is that of a(ny) subject 
conditioned by circumstances of justice, whose reason is limited by the constraints of 
right. Circumstances of justice operate as a background conditions, but the constraints of 
right play a more significant role within justice as Fairness as a whole and on the self 
1 R, j%%'1k, Thy>v, 19. 
which inhabits the original position. In particular the difficulties raised in chapter two 
have profound implications beyond the veil of ignorance, involving issues and 
assumptions illuminated by the detail of Rawls's proceduralism which are perhaps only 
implicit, or go unnoticed, in less fastidious formulations of philosophical liberalism. 
These questions have been most fully explored by Michael Sandel, whose Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice marked something of a turning point in the field of `Rawlsian 
studies'. Although the critical response to Theory was a massive one little of it could be 
said to have fundamentally undermined the status of Rawls's work. 2 Sandel's 
investigation is clearly animated by concerns shared with `communitarian' authors such 
as Charles Taylor and Alasdair Maclntyre, but presents an analysis of considerable 
originality and clarity which cannot be simply assimilated with their works, or ignored 
on the grounds of this presumed association. - His critique is narrowly focused upon 
Rawls's Archimedean point4 and does not attempt to usurp Theory externally by, for 
example, advocating an alternative set of principles. His exploration of the original 
position and its assumptions instead documents the origin and extent of the difficulties 
which Rawls must address if the two principles of justice - particularly the difference 
principle - are to be rendered theoretically consistent and practically relevant to `us' as 
situated agents within a social world rather than hypothetical agents confined within a 
thought experiment. The following discussion offers a largely sympathetic account of 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (a task undertaken by few of Sandel's contemporaries), 
before considering the responses elicited by his work from a number of writers 
2 Although Robert Noýiick, , -lnarch , 
Statc and Utopia (Nev York, Basic Books, 1974), Ch. 7 fiercely 
And influentially criticised Rawls's second principle (albeit Iroi» distinctly shaky grounds) his discussion is 
mediated by the acknowledgement Of Theory as `a fountain Of illuminating; ideas, integrated together into a 
lovely whole' (p. 183), the reader \vill not know how whole a theory can be until he has read all of Rawls' 
book' (p. 230). 
3 For example, john R. Wallach, `Liberals, Communitarians, and the Tasks of Political Theory', 
Political Theory 15,609 n. 35 describes Sandel's argument as `a dehistoricized, analytical distillation and 
application of Maclntyre's views'. The textual similarities he notes in justification of this claim (Sandel 179, 
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 220) overlook the use of an almost identical phrase by F. H. Bradley, over a century 
earlier in his Ethical Studies (2nd. ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1927), 173. In a similar vein, Kenneth 
Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism (Albany, NY., SUNY Press 1992), 214 n. 16 claims that 
Sandel's critique of Rawls `is virtually the same as Maclntyre's critique of the rmotivist self' - despite the fact 
that Maclntyre's analysis is part of a sweeping chastisement of the results of the so called `enlightenment 
project', whilst Sandel's work, as noted below, is a philosophical analysis very much centred on Rawls which 
makes no mention of Stevenson or ordinary language philosophies. Although Maclntyre, Sandel and Bradley 
undoubtedly exhibit a similar outlook regarding the claims of individualist philosophy, it is a mistake to 
emphasise overlapping concerns or occasional textual similarities at the expense Of a more detailed 
examination of the relevant authors. 
4A point that tends to be obscured by Sanciel's s)'nonvvnious use Of `dcoýntology' and `Liberalism' in e. g. 
Ch. 1 of Liberalism and the Lirrtits... where the Liberalism envisaged could be more accurately 
identified its the 
contemporary neo-Kantian 
forma indebted to R, iwls, rather than Liberalism pc)-sc. Although in this respect a 
more nu. tnccci presentation might enhance 
S, andel's analysis, it should be noted that he explores the 
relationship between 
Ra\wwl:, K, int and Hume with at least i: much care as any ()I his fell()W commentators. 
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sympathetic to justice as Fairness, and finally turning to Rawls's own modified version of 
his doctrine. 
[2] THE UNENCUMBERED SELF 
PROCEEDING FROM RAWLS'S ELEVATION of the right over the good, Sandel's analysis 
works in detail from the text of Theory5 in order to reveal and interrogate the character- 
type envisaged by justice as Fairness. Because the structure of the original position 
precludes it from being a conceivable contractual situation - be it hypothetical or 
otherwise - principles of justice are not objects of will or choice, as Rawls's voluntarist 
vocabulary implies. 6 They are instead contrived in procedural conformity with the 
standard of rightness that is designed into the original position as part of the rationality 
attributed to the parties and buttressed by the other elements of Rawls's methodological 
apparatus. The priority of right is hence a decisive characteristic of the Rawlsian self, and 
understanding it entails, according to Sandel, establishing what it means to be a self for 
which the right is prior to the good, which is prior to the goods it affirms, and whose 
interests are of the self rather than in the self, since `[for justice to be the first virtue... we 
must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. '7 
Sandel acknowledges that the theories expounded by Rawls and his contemporaries 
exhibit a powerful philosophical appeal. Freed from the dictates of nature and 
circumstance, the autonomous subject superficially appears to be a distinctively modern, 
liberated figure. Equipped with the facilities to determine and follow regulative 
principles, and to devise and pursue a unique plan of life within the ideal social 
framework thereby created, this liberal self seems to epitomise the liberal ideal of the self- 
legislating individual. But in making explicit the pre-eminence of right at an 
unprecedented level of detail - which it must be conceded is greatly to Rawls's credit - 
it 
emerges that his configuration of the subject involves the projection of an extremely 
problematic relationship between the self, its `contingent' set of attributes and its `chosen' 
system of ends or conception of the good. The metaphorical raising of the veil of 
ignorance is not an occasion meriting either applause or an encore; it instead marks the 
onset of further difficulties for the Rawlsian self. 
As the independence of the self is secured in the original position and carried over 
beyond it, the autonomy of the individual is invulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
contingency and circumstance. The maintenance of this independence and security 
5 S. unc{cl il. o draws upon R. iwk's john Dc\vc\ Lcc'turc , 
first published Is john Rawls, `Kantian 
Constructiv'iým in Mor. il TIlcory', Journal of Plrilocnp/)y 77 (1980), 515-572, and revised in Poll ticaI Liberalism, 
L«. 3, as dIsCIt`scd in §4 below. 
6 Sandel, Liberalism and the Lli)llf ..., p. 
130. 
7 S. ancicl, Liberalism and the 175. 
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involves a level of abstraction which defines the self in advance of, and as sovereign over, 
its ends and attributes. This position involves a set of a priori judgements which are not 
explicitly discussed in Theory, an unsurprising evasion given that one of Rawls's aims is to 
construct a recognisably Kantian theory which is not susceptible to metaphysical critique. 
The deferment of these issues by Rawls does not however lessen their pertinence to the 
evaluation of his theory. 
Sandel's analysis of justice as Fairness contends that the abstraction of the original 
position constitutes the self as an `antecedently individuated'8 and `unencumbered'9 
entity, defined without regard to the embodied agents to which it is supposedly related 
outside the veil of ignorance. Identity is therefore bounded prior to, and irrespective of, 
the engagement of the subject in social processes of thought and action. These constraints 
are significant because insofar as the self and its conduct are regulated outside the veil by 
the reasoning and principles envisaged within it, Rawls's constraints delimit three sets of 
relations, obtaining: between the self and its various attributes (i); between the self and 
others within the compass of its social environment (ii); and regarding the self - relation 
of the agent, i. e. its cognitive and reflexive capacities of self-understanding, evaluation and 
transformation (iii). In each instance Rawls's normative ideal is revealed to be deeply 
flawed. The sociological and empirical difficulties attendant upon the positions developed 
in the original position are symptomatic of rather than causal to the problems facing 
Rawls, which ultimately arise from the conception of self demanded by his deontological 
commitments. This unencumbered self is, Sandel argues, both incoherent and manifestly 
false to the complex phenomenology of moral agency as variously understood and 
experienced in the course of ordinary life. 
Firstly, the a priori bounding of the self describes a metaphysical substrate `standing 
behind' an agent's particular characteristics, which as the locus of moral worth assumes `a 
dignity beyond the roles which he inhabits and the ends he may pursue. '10 Prefigured in 
the original position as distinct from and empowered over its various ends and 
attachments, Rawls's unencumbered `subject of possession' is related to its attributes by a 
distance consistent with their arbitrary status. Discounted as interests of rather than in 
the self - `mine rather than we' ->> and a matter of willing rather than 
being, the 
freedom, reason and equality of the self is affirmed by right in advance of any particular 
embodiment and irrespective of `contingencies' such as action, belief, ends and 
circumstances. This even-handedness might be welcomed as a laudable manifestation of 
Rawls's egalitarian sensibilities, but it carries significant philosophical consequences. The 
s S. undcl, Lihcr. l1i5m and 1/. ßc Limits..., 53-59, passii». 
9 S, indcl, 'The Procedural Republic... 
', 86-87. 
10 SandeI, Lihcrali i and tl. )c Lint its..., 19-20. 
11 S anci 1, 
Li/CTalisni 
. 1nd 
tbc Limits-, 55, cniph, isis cri final. 
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autonomy secured by Rawls's procedure is so thoroughgoing that the self, qua subject of 
justice, is both unchanging and unchangeable. As Sandel notes, for Rawls `the continuity 
of our identity is unproblematically assured. No transformation of my aims and 
attachments could call into question the person I am, for no such allegiances, however 
deeply held, could possibly engage my identity to begin with. '12 
This distancing of the self causes severe problems for Rawls's conception. In 
particular, it implies that the ends of the self are not only arbitrary for justice, but are also 
irrelevant to the subject. Always critically separated, no attachment can be sufficiently 
thoroughgoing to, or inalienable from, the self to either define or call into question his 
identity, or to impinge upon the regulative status of the two principles of justice. 
Although the capacity for autonomy of the putative agent is preserved by Rawls's 
construction, the purported impartiality of the original position severely underestimates 
the importance for identity of reflection, decision and action. Within justice as Fairness 
poetry and pushpin are not only equal, but equally insignificant to the identity of their 
enthusiasts. Rawls's concern with the formal powers of the self does not discriminate 
between trivial and fundamental aspects of identity, and the distance established between 
the self and its ends indicates a presumption in favour of the former rather than the latter 
which undermines both the individual inviolability supposedly vouchsafed by the 
priority of right, and the credentials of justice as Fairness - already identified as perilously 
close to a form of `ideal observer' theory - as a systematic alternative to utilitarianism. 
Understood as an unencumbered entity, the fragility of the Rawlsian self arises in 
more than one guise. Always isolated by the relation of possession, the attributes of the 
self are at least as susceptible to incursion as under utilitarian alternatives. Given that 
Rawls's understanding of the moral point of view sees all such elements as arbitrary for 
identity, the `possessions' of the self are extraneous in terms of justice and distribution - 
hence no harm is necessarily caused by their appropriation within the framework 
delineated by constraints and principles of right. On one hand this can be seen as an 
affirmation of the morally equal status of each individual irrespective of his or her 
uncontrollable and undeserved luck or misfortune. Less charitably, Sandel claims that it 
articulates the less pleasing view that `strictly speaking, no one can be said to deserve 
anything.. . on 
Rawls' view, people have no intrinsic worth.. '13 The question of the grounds 
of desert is a vexed one, and Rawls's position generated a detailed but rather inconclusive 
debate14 which is not a major concern of this discussion. On a general level it is however 
1-ý Sandcl, Liberalism and t/, ( 179. 
13 Sin dcl, Liberalism and thc 
L1Y1111ý..., 88. 
14 The n1o)5t iºnport, tnt ct)ntrihution to which is Noýi. ick, Allarcl>>ý, Statc a)'ttl Utnpia, especially pp. 213- 
227. Sane{el c{r, i\, \"s upon his arguments throughout Liberalism and the Limits..., e. g. 77-103. The related issue of 
R, 1\ Is's dcni. a1 . +I moral 
desert in questions OI distributive justice, and contr. uiicto r. \ inv"oc, atio n of it in order 
to justif\' the punislli»cnt ABI reprehensible acts 
is discussed h\ Honig, Political Tiuo>)" and the Displacement of 
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of note that although committed to the protection of the individual, the priority assigned 
to the right pushes Rawls to defend a structure which alienates the self from its attributes 
and denies the importance of that which it initially seems designed to protect. 
The impact of the fissure posited by Rawls between the self and its attributes is 
twofold: it undermines the identity of the self and the bases of desert and self ownership, 
and precludes the engagement of the self with various goods, attributes, etc., in what 
Sandel terms a constitutive15 sense. As the name suggests, constitutive goods refer to 
aspects of personality which are intimately bound up with identity. Rather than being 
held at a distance through a mediating relation of possession, constitutive attachments 
fundamentally structure the self-conception of situated, embodied agents. Implicated in 
the ensemble of circumstances, commitments, abilities, ideas of the good and so forth 
through which the self interprets and comprehends both himself and the world, 
constitutive factors penetrate the self in a thorough manner, as characteristics without 
which the subject would be at a loss if challenged to offer a self-description. 
Describing a deeper relation between the self and its faculties than that permitted by 
Rawls's methodology, constitutive goods comprehend aspects of personality and 
character in a fairly uncomplicated way. Being irre rather than urine they are theorised as 
fundamental aspects of identity rather than arbitrary manifestations of moral fortune, and 
are not susceptible to philosophical doubts concerning justification, ownership or 
desert. 16 Furthermore, by invoking a conception of the self as a substantive, embodied 
being, constitutive goods call attention to the location of the self within contexts which 
inform (but do not determine) the understandings maintained by the self of himself, the 
world and the relations obtaining between the two. The formation of these 
understandings is irreducibly reflexive, as the self is always a part of and active within the 
world which is interpreted. Reflexivity does not diminish the importance of contexts, 
which exist before the self as part of an unfolding social and cultural environment in 
which he is a participant but over which he is never wholly sovereign. The recognition 
that meanings and values are neither originated nor wholly controlled by the self implies 
acknowledgement that the exercise of autonomy is necessarily circumscribed, but also 
made possible, by the contexts within which identity is located and developed over time. 
Amenable to interpretation and revision in the course of reflection and agency, the 
adoption and internalisation of meanings, values and goods by the self emerges from 
Politics, 137-145. See also George Sher, Desert (New Jersey,, Princeton University Press, 1987), esp. chapters 2, 
7, and 9. 
15 
e. g. Sandel, Lihcralis»r and the Limits..., 59-62,148-151. 
16 S, indel, Liheralisrn and the Limits..., 82-5. Here 
Sandei concurs xith Nozick, Anarchy State and 
Utopia, 224-7, who argues that persons ui legitimately 
hive attributes without d{cscrving them `all the way 
, {(, "Vii'. Sandei 
further comr»ent, ý th, it the whole idea of an im cede11t basis for desert is an incoherent one, 
since N\, ithin such a\ 
hence desert must be i scribed to a (m et, iphysical) subject existing; prior to possession, 
ýý high mint 
itself lick the basis for such an attribution. 
60 
Sandel's critique as a cognitive process of exploration, reflection and discovery, rather 
than the voluntarist exercise of an unconditioned will. Accounting for the formation of 
identity within social, cultural and historical contexts does not deny the importance of 
will, or of freedom of belief; that a sincerely held conviction must be affirmed `from the 
inside' of consciousness is not in dispute. The theory of constitutive goods does suggest, 
however, that neither the form nor content of a person's self-conception can be 
prefigured without reference to the situations in which they are engaged. Reflection upon 
one's identity (and relation to justice) is a process of evaluation where moral and 
cognitive imagination does allow for the adoption of a critical perspective, but where `the 
distance is always precarious and provisional, the point of reflection never finally 
secured'17 outside the self. Rawls's strategy of individuation can contentiously be held to 
respect the separateness of persons, but in so doing he eradicates differences which, rather 
than being arbitrary and contingent, are coextensive with the distinction between persons 
which he seeks to preserve. 18 
Processes of identification and individuation emerge from this analysis as ongoing 
projects within complex and fluid but nevertheless discernible contexts of meaning and 
intelligibility. In the absence of an Archimedean point, the range of values available to the 
self might be compatible with Rawls's principles of justice, or contradict them, or go 
beyond them (for example in expressing benevolent or altruistic motivations. ) But their 
importance to the subject will be as the product of conditioned evaluation in concrete 
situations, without which the bare capacity of choice functions as a purely formal device. 
Reflection might well involve consideration of Rawls's principles and some of the 
supporting arguments offered for them, but their acceptance (or otherwise) will involve 
concerns exceeding the limits of the original position. Similarly the outcome of 
deliberation is unlikely to be conditional on either the identification of the subject with 
the model presented by Rawls, or on the conformity of decisions with the constraints on 
reasoning imposed by the methodology of his bewilderingly abstract decision situation. 
This failure to take goods and contexts seriously also permeates the second set of 
relations listed earlier, that between the self and others. Antecedent individuation imposes 
limits upon the sociality of the self, its receptiveness to others, and its range of possible 
understanding concerning both its own conceptions of value and those of others. Just as 
no possession (a particular disposition or commitment, for example), can engage the 
identity of the self such that it would be morally diminished by the absence, loss or 
forfeiture of that characteristic, no understanding can obtain between individuals or 
17 Sande], Lihcra/l nl and the Limil, ý..., 179. 
IS These concerns are by no means limited to `c'ommunitarians'. See e. g. Bernard Williams, `Persons, 
Ch. iracter and Morality', Anulie 0 Rorty (cd. ) The Identities of Persons (Berkeley and LA, UCLA Press, 1976) 
210-211. 
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within groups which might assume constitutive significance for the interpretation of 
justice maintained by the self both separately, and in his relations with and conduct 
towards others 
Rawls does not deny either the existence or the importance of associative 
relationships to the moral development of members of his ideally ordered society, at one 
point even admitting that Justice as Fairness, `however individualistic it might 
seem... must eventually explain the value of community. Otherwise the theory of justice 
cannot succeed. '19 Unfortunately, community and the associated virtues of civic 
friendship and co-operation arise as part of the `morality of association', and are 
therefore unable to correct the deficiencies revealed in the original position. By entering 
into co-operative associations it is possible for each individual to `participate in the total 
sum of the realised natural assets of the others, '20 enjoying public goods, `those 
instrumentalities and conditions maintained by the state for everyone to use for his own 
purposes. '21 Although he allows for the existence of `common activities valued for 
themselves''' the second quotation in particular suggests that community has value for 
Rawls primarily as a means of advancing interests of individuals, whose doubts regarding 
justice have been `dispelled by seeing that their convictions match the principles which 
would be chosen in the original position or, if they do not, by revising their judgements 
so that they do. '23 
This account of `community' resolves into an explanation of how complementary 
interests might mutually advance ends and projects held by individuals whose association 
is a side-effect of their `shared final end ... the successful carrying out of 
just 
institutions. '24 The social relation here is contingent, the motivation prudential and self- 
interested. Rawls's descriptions of coinciding interest and complementary social unions 
seem innocuous, but manifest and extend the inadequacies of a self conceived without 
constitutive features. Rawls allows that co-operative virtues might prevail within a social 
union,? ') but they can only do so between individuals regulated in their relations by his 
two principles, a requirement which separates individuals from defining characteristics 
and from one another in advance of their self-knowledge. The original position does not 
19 Rawls, T. bco>-t', 264-265, cillph. lsis , lc. 
idrd. 
-0 Rawls, T. emy, 523. 
.1 Rawls, Thrmui. ý-)1. 
-- Rawls, Tlrco> :ý5. Rawls somcwh, ýt m\'strrimisl\ suggest: 111,11 science and art 'provide ready to 
hand illustrations' of these cm, "llm, . lrtivitics. 
--- ) R, iwIs, Thcýý, 520. 
24 RdwI:, Thcrýn. 52 27. 
For exdlllple, R. tw\, lk stºggc: i at Tow , 
476-S, that the dc\cloopmcnt of civic friendship requires the 
existenrc of .t cOI11 llcln ýý Of 
justice, consensus regarding which might cvcn assume a form described as `the 
Iov of 111,111kllld'. Such a regard 
f(, r others is ho\\-c%-er discounted as ) 'supererot; awr\" State of affairs, as arc 
other forms cif solidarity 
(i. e. altruism) which are not immediately reducible to mc0ti\ atiOns of uncomplicated 
seif-interest. 
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isolate individuals from one another beyond the veil of ignorance - Rawls is not a crude 
`atomist' in that sense - but it does limit the character of the bonds which emerge 
between them in society. Justice individuates, and does so immutably. The commitment 
to `community' promised by Rawls is rhetorical and entirely without substance: Justice as 
Fairness is inadequate to his own criterion of success. 
The conditions of the original position have already been found empirically 
dubious, there being no obvious reason not to assume that non-instrumental motivations 
might obtain between persons in a commonly defined position of freedom and equality. 
The identification of the unencumbered subject allows the question of disinterest to be 
addressed on a more fundamental level. As Sandel's analysis reveals, the self is 
disinterested because it is an antecedently individuated entity, not vice versa. 26 The a 
priori bounding of the self does not rule out the existence of a aide range of 
characteristics beyond the veil, but does entail that they are always subordinate to the 
normative identity rendered inviolate by the original position, and as such considered to 
be secondary features of the self. For Sandel this distinction is paramount - the self, and 
the idea of justice which is internal to it, are irrevocably entrenched in advance of its 
social embodiment and consequently restrict the character of relationships pertaining 
between persons, which are unable to engage identity in a way which challenges or 
exceeds the limits inscribed by Rawls's principles. 
This analysis, initially as abstract and removed from any social or political situation 
as the theory it seeks to challenge, has consequences that are both immediate and 
practical. Denied the experience of its own attributes in a thoroughgoing manner, the self 
must be similarly debilitated with regard to others; in no relationship can identity be put 
into question, undergo transformation or overcome its rigid individuation. Just as the self 
is distinct from its own attributes, so it is always distinct from others. The priority of 
right excludes the possibility that conceptions of value might assume constitutive 
significance for identity, or might be strongly dependent for their intelligibility upon the 
contexts inhabited by the self. For example, models of reasoning and understandings of 
goods might develop over time in the course of civil association, rather than being 
prediscursive formulations that determine the shape of the well-ordered society. As 
Sandel puts it, Rawls `rules out the possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, the 
identity as well as the [contingent] interests of the participants could be at stake.. . that 
common purposes or ends could inspire more or less expansive self-understandings and so 
define a community in the constitutive sense. ''? 
26 S. tndicl, Li/ , z/u'i .; rid the 
Limits..., 60. 
27 Sandcl, Liher. ilis»r awl the Limits..., 62. 
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Quite what such a `public life' might resemble is obviously open to question, and is 
considered in more detail in the course of this essay. The critical force of the statement is, 
however, clear; that between individuated selves the possibility of a good which is 
genuinely held in common - rather than being an outcome of convergent individual 
interests - is foreclosed in advance by the conditions imposed by Rawls, whose `shared 
final end' is the realisation of institutions ordered to facilitate the pursuit by each 
individual of his own life-plan. Where and how the interests of the self match those of 
others in the course of Rawls's co-operative venture for mutual advantage is for the 
purposes of justice a matter of coincidence. No identification with moral ideals or ethical 
perspectives can question the primacy of right, and no such commitments can define the 
individual's understanding of herself, or her relation to others, in a sense which might 
undermine the principles of justice and the model of the self which it enshrines: `Not 
egoists but strangers, sometimes benevolent, make for citizens of the deontological 
republ1c., 28 
Sandel's analysis exposes in full the practical implications of Rawls's theoretical 
weaknesses by making clear the gulf between the unencumbered self and the identities of 
situated agents bearing commitments, solidarities and conceptions of value in tension 
with Rawls's enterprise. Contra Theory, Sandel's critique recognises the dependence of the 
self upon the on the contexts against which the `brute data' of the social world becomes 
intelligible, emphasising that the beliefs and commitments to which this comprehension 
gives rise are neither arbitrary from the moral point of view, and nor are they limited to 
the potential interests of the individuated subject. This is not a claim against individuality, 
but does suggest that a more nuanced conception of the self is required than that provided 
by Rawls. Sandel moves in this direction by emphasising that as conscious beings human 
self-understandings, although not (for the most part) pathologically unstable, are 
continuously open to revision in the light of experience and reflection. 
Sandel's second major claim is that the antecedently individuated self is 
philosophically incapable of supporting Raawls's difference principle. Given the extreme 
rift described between the self and its attributes, Sandel contends that Robert Nozick's 
objection (that patterned redistribution involves the use of some persons as a means to the 
welfare of others) can only be met by the acknowledgement that the difference principle 
appeals to a wider subject than the antecedently individuated self. -'9 By correlating the 
conception of common assets with a common (i. e. social) subject of possession in order to 
reflect a stronger moral bond obtaining between persons, `the subject of possession' 
Sandel claims becomes, `a `we' rather than an `I' which circumstances imply in turn the 
2S S, indel, LiIi r. t/t<m and t/ºe Ltntit ..., 
183. 
29 Nozic: k, , -1 na)-c-b1', 
Statc and 26-'2S, S. indel, Lihcraltmt and te Limits..., 79-81. 
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existence of community in a constitutive sense. '30 The transitions in this argument from 
an individuated to an intersubjective conception of the self are (as Sandel concedes) only 
contentiously present in Rawls's text. The subtle shifts of terminology in the closing 
chapters of Theory, which move from the individuated subject towards the notion of a 
collectivity `realizing their common nature' in `the activities of many selves, '31 are 
undeniably suggestive but cannot conclusively bear out this intersubjective interpretation. 
It is perhaps the case that Sandel reads into fragmentary comments what he wishes to find 
there. Regardless of this indeterminacy the main thrust of the argument, that we `cannot 
be persons for whom justice is primary and also be persons for whom the difference 
principle is a principle of justice' is clearly borne out. 32 
As the bearer of an independent and unchanging identity, it appears to be the case 
that as well as precluding the possibility of the engagement of the self within a larger 
context such as the `community' invoked by Sandel, Rawls also calls into question the 
third relation noted at the outset of this section, concerning the cognitive and reflexive 
capacities of the self. Antecedent individuation, Sandel argues, enervates the degree of self- 
knowledge and the capacities of agency available to the citizen of the well-ordered 
society. The autonomy central to Rawls's project entails that `each person is free to plan 
his life as he pleases'33 in conformity with the rationality set out in the original position 
and the principles of justice supposedly derived from it, with which all permissible life- 
plans must comply. 34 
The exercise of this autonomy by the Rawlsian self thus occurs strictly under the 
auspices of right, but Rawls does additionally provide a `purely formal'35 account of the 
good, charting the extension of the instrumental rationality of the original position into 
the deliberative rationality of the subject engaged in the framing of this life plan. This 
brief digression takes the form of an elaboration rather than a transformation of the 
subject beyond the veil. Consisting of a series of guidelines towards an acceptable 
outcome, Rawls's `counting principles'36 suggest that in determining a plan of life the 
individual will attempt to realise his preferences in the most effective, inclusive and 
efficient manner possible. Secondly, any plan of life should be feasible given the abilities 
of the person concerned, and the conditions in which he happens to find himself. 37 The 
30 S: indcl, -Liherali5'n and the 80. 
31 Rawls, Tuna, 527; 565. 
32 S. indcl, Liberalism and t/'. 
Limits-, 178. 
3; Raw Is, Tlr(r)n`1-, 447. 
34 Tl. 'cnry, 31. 
Ra vvIs, T/ýemv, 424. 
36 Ri ls, Theo 7- v, 415-6. 
37 Ra\ Is, Tbcor-v, 424-3. 
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final element is what Rawls somewhat dubiously dubs his `Aristotelian principle'. 38 This 
proposes that since persons tend to draw satisfaction from the realisation of their various 
aptitudes in a complex manner (e. g. by honing a limited range of abilities and enjoying 
the subtleties involved in their practice) a life plan will be limited and ordered in the light 
of the preferences and opportunities open to the person, and designed to promote such a 
successful outcome. These claims are highly abstract, and arguably even platitudinous, 
but Rawls nevertheless regards them as significant, particularly the final instance which is 
presented as `a principle of motivation [accounting for] many of our major desires... it 
expresses a psychological law governing changes in the pattern of our desires'39 and 
moreover relates how the successful execution of a life plan `allows a person to 
flourish. '40 
The Aristotelian principle is arguably related to motivation insofar as it ensures that 
a given set of ends will be ordered and pursued with regard to the preferences, aptitudes 
and circumstances pertaining, but its explanatory emptiness illustrates the impoverished 
deliberative faculties of the Rawlsian self. The expressly formal notion of the good cannot 
refer, even on the most general level, to the content of the good, the types of activities 
which might be favoured and discouraged, or the considerations which might lead an 
individual to favour particular goods and practices over others. 41 Devoid of all 
substantive content it thus has little purpose as a principle of motivation, at best making 
clear that a rational plan will be one hierarchically ordered in a manner favouring the 
strongest preferences of the agent. It cannot account for the origin of these preferences, 
explain their significance for the self, or exert any determinate influence on the will or 
action of the individual as ordinarily implied by the word `motivate', which suggests 
notions of e. g. causing motion and stimulating action. 
38 RawIs, T/cor)ý, §65, pp. 426-431, although Rawls doe. s hedge his bets regarding both the Hellenic 
origin end psychological accuracy Of the `Aristotelian principle. ' At 426 n. 20 he acknowledges that the 
principle is only implicit in Aristotle's works, inferring that otherwise he would have identified it as 
`Aristotle's Principle. ' Although connections such as those identified can certainly be made from Aristotle 
(e. g. Nicorn zche, in Eilaie. (trans. David Ross, rev. J. L. Ackrill , and J. O. Urms(n (Oxford, 
Oxford University 
Press, 1980), Bk. X. v, 1175a), the generality of Rawls's remarks makes their attribution to Aristotle 
somewhat superfluous. 
Although describing it as i law which 'states a deep psychological fact' (432) Rawls acknowledges 
that 'it nmv' have the ring of a philosopher's principle with nothing to support it' (431) but also refers to it as 
.i tell dencv' 'borne out 
by man)' facts of life'. He finally claims that his formal description of the good `is 
satisfactor\'... even if this principle should prove inaccurate or fail altogether' (433), leaving the reader in some 
confusion as to whether this deep psychological fact actually is a necessary one within 
his account of the 
person, and the persons' good (references to it are scattered throughout the 
final sections of Theory ), or 
whether it is simply another more or less useful but potentially misleading assumption. 
39 R, twls, T en>-n', 427. 
40 Rawls, T coi y, 429. The use of `flourish' here (other than at p. 529, the only occurrence that I have 
noted) is presumably intended toi 
introduce res mances of cudz'»tnnia into Ra ls's account of the good, but 
this tone Is distinctly at odds with the sense mid vocabulary employed 
in the rest of the \v )rk. 
41 Rawls, Then)-vv, 429. 
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Rawls's account of deliberation thus fails to consider a range of questions which one 
might expect to find addressed within an account of how a person might arrive at an 
understanding of their `good'. Reflection takes place as the application of the ordering 
procedure by the subject on the range of desires and preferences to which he happens to 
relate at a given time. It involves a balancing of two sets of evaluations, regarding the 
likely outcome of a chosen course in terms of the successful attainment of the agent's 
desires, and the perceived intensity of desire associated with the relevant range of 
preferences. But as Sandel points out, `[i]n neither case does reflection take as its object 
the self qua subject of desires ... 
[it] is scarcely a form of se/f-reflection at all... It does not 
extend its lights to the self standing behind the wants and desires it surveys. '42 
It is not only the case that Rawls's account of deliberation does not extend to the self 
as an object of concern; it cannot do so without compromising the model of the self 
elaborated in the construction of the original position. Epistemologically prior to any 
empirical manifestation, the Rawlsian self is secured against the possibilities of experience 
precisely in order that principles of justice constitute, under the perspective of eternity, 
indubitable points of moral reference and guidance. Although notionally empowered to 
determine a unique conception of the good, the freedom accorded to the unencumbered 
self is an empty liberation. `Choice' refers only to the arrangement of preferences without 
reference to the self in possession of them, and however complex this process might be, 
an agent's identity, self-understanding and presence for others can never be subject to 
meaningful change. 
Rawls's conceptions of reflection and agency are, it predictably follows, highly 
questionable. When engaged in reflection we do not simply evaluate the strength of our 
existing desires. The identification of relevant preferences can be a preliminary aspect of 
deliberation, but Rawls's approach screens out evaluative questions likely to arise in the 
course of deliberation: Is a particular attribute intrinsic or extrinsic to one's self- 
conception? To adopt Sandel's terminology, is it wine or arte? Does it accord well or badly 
with that self-understanding ? Is it compatible with the subject's ideal of the person he 
either is or wishes to become ? Or is it an impediment in relation to that ideal? These 
fairly obvious but obviously nontrivial questions engage the identity of the self, not 
merely the identification of attributes and preferences, and are so of a form which the 
Rawlsian self is unable to address. 43 
Such considerations, involving for example the relation between self and attribute, 
the positive and negative valences associated with that relation, and the implications of 
that relation for identity are prima facie inseparable from any adequate understanding of 
4 21 Sande], Li/, eralt5rn and the Limits, 159, cmphascs +riýin. tl. 
43 Although R, i'. vls t; noimc, 111\ stitj c: is it Tyco,. )-, 410, th; tt `[c]onvictionc shout what sort of person to 
be ire... invol\cd in the ic cpt. mir ( principles of 
justice. ' 
67 
what goes on when a person is thinking about the goods, identifications, and activities 
which he understands as significant to his sense of self. As Rawls's scheme only concerns 
the weighing of previously given preferences and expectations, it ultimates in a reductive 
statement of the ordered array of elements possessed by the self, reproducing the 
arbitrariness with which Theory treats such supposed contingencies. 
The inadequacy of this account of deliberation is predictably repeated in what 
passes for Rawls's theories of decision and action. When choosing we do not simply 
`adopt that plan which maximizes the expected net balance of satisfaction. '`` As the 
factors noted above broadly indicate, it makes little sense to say that we `choose' a 
rationally ordered life-plan at all, and similarly when acting we do not simply engage in 
the pursuit of a set of preferences established without reference to experience or action. 
The vocabulary of voluntarism and personal autonomy prevalent throughout Theory is 
undermined by the constraints imposed upon the self to which it refers. Finally, Rawls 
claims, `[t]he person himself must take this decision [on the content of his `good'], taking 
into account the full range of his inclinations and desires. '`' But because a life-plan takes 
the form of a rationally ordered scheme designed to maximise the satisfaction of a 
similarly organised set of desires and competences, the quality of this decision is elusive. 
In any given situation, the self who has determined (but not chosen) the requisite 
ordering of preferences goes on to identify (but not choose) `that plan belonging to the 
maximal class [of optimal life plans] which he would chose with full deliberative 
rationality. '46 A degree of latitude might be involved in determining which particular 
plan best fulfils these criteria, but the scope for decision is likely to be very narrow 
indeed: to the extent that a choice is made it will be, for example, between schemes x, y 
and z, each of which will be directed towards the realisation of the same set of ends, and 
in consequence likely to be very similar in form. The content of the plan is never placed 
in question by this process, and all that is `chosen' is the most effective means. Rawlsian 
deliberation is not meaningfully a procedure of choice at all, whether it is applied to the 
category of right or to that of the good: the right is determined unconditionally through 
the application of a delimited reason under the conditions of the original position; and 
each person's particular good is determined through the application of deliberative 
rationality upon the set of contingent features related to the person at any particular time. 
Genuine reflective choice is not an option for the citizens of the well-ordered society. 
}+ R, pvlý, Theory, 416. 
45R, ýýý'l., TLºcý>>ý', ýý7 Although this quºt, itioýn ()hors within I 
discussion of the irr<ition, ility of 
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40 Raww'l., T eori, 409. 
68 
It is of some interest that Theory's highly detailed index, 47 a nineteen page 
concordance of exemplary meticulousness, contains no entry under the headings of either 
`action' or `agency. ' According to Rawls moral personality is characterised by two moral 
powers: a regulative desire to act from principles of justice, and the ability to formulate a 
conception of the good expressed in the form of a rational life-plan. 48 However, the 
presentation of these faculties makes clear how unconcerned justice as Fairness is with the 
actual deeds and situations of agents beyond the veil: `It is not our aims that primarily 
reveal our nature, ' claims Rawls `but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to 
govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be formed 
and... pursued. '49 Dealing with the abstract theorisation of deliberative concepts rather 
than their concrete realisation, 50 Rawls's ideal simply envisages a plurality of persons 
pursuing complementary life plans derived within a regulatory framework of right, `a 
scheme of activity that all can appreciate and enjoy. '51 Although Rawls claims that the 
stability after which he strives does not entail the institution of a static social and 
52 a spectacularly undynamic model of the self is unarguably offered institutional model- 
by Theory, where the prefiguring of the subject denies the possibility of the 
transformation of identity through action. Given this inflexibility it is by no means 
obvious that the case will be otherwise regarding the responsiveness of the basic structure. 
It is important to realise that Sandel's critique is precisely that; a work of 
anthropological criticism, not political advocacy. Although the outline of an alternative 
conception is evident at key points of the analysis of Rawls's unencumbered self, Sandel 
offers a character sketch rather than a rigorously developed proposal. In so doing, 
however, he highlights issues and distinctions which are of general significance to the 
normative and descriptive'3 theorisation of the self, and of particular relevance to the 
reception and interpretation of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 
47 Rawls, Them), 589-607. 
48 Rawls, Theoi v, 561, Political Lihcr. iIism, 29-35. The Libel 'moral powers' receives emphasis in Rawls's 
later writings as noted in 94 belowww. 
19 Rawls, Tlxo>y, 561. Emphasis added. 
50 Rawls, T eo; y, 509. 
51 Rawls, Theory, 441. 
52 Rawls, Theory, 457-S. 
53 Gerald Doppelt, Is Raw ls's Kantian Liberalism Coherent and Defensible? ' Ethics 99 (1989), 816 
claims that Sandel's critique of the unencumbered self 
is ambiguous as `[i]t remains unclear whether he reads 
this conception to offer i normative ideal or a theoretically 
descriptive account of persons' identity', and 
wonders if 'perhaps he means to advance 
both claims. ' This query is itself highhly ambig uous, as often is the 
more general theoretical demarcation of normative and 
descriptive categories. The conception of the person 
represented in Theory is clearly intender{ to 
be taken as normative, i. e. an ide, tlly free and rational agent;. But 
its status as such is depend nt on 
descriptive coinmensurahilit\ with 'mir' sell-understandings, i. e. to be a 
convincing representation 
it must (e. g. in reflective equilibrium) lundan'ientally accord with our 
IprephilosophicaI' understandings and experiences of subjectivity. 
The claim of ink- conception to `coherence' 
, 111(i 'c{efcnsihilit\' 
is thus dependent upon both normative and descriptive f, ictors. Sandel's work aims to 
demonstrate the \veaklne's of the R, iwvIsian sell and the resulting 
incoherence of Theon' as a whole on both 
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The boundaries erected by Rawls between the self, its attributes and other selves 
precludes the recognition of their significance for the self other than on a superficial level. 
The antithesis of this conception, labelled by Sandel the `radically situated''` subject, errs 
to the opposite philosophical extreme, erasing the distance between self and circumstance. 
This approach envisages the self as empirically conditioned and determined in totality, in 
a state of perpetual reaction to impulses beyond its command and just as incapable of 
meaningful reflective choice as its disembodied counterpart. Neither extreme is 
sufficiently nuanced to understand the self as a socially embedded entity which is 
conditioned (but not simply determined) by the array of environments and relationships 
within which it moves, thinks and acts. The intersubjective model tentatively advanced by 
Sandel55 avoids the excesses of both situation and dislocation. It recognises the 
individuation of the individual as a social process where the possibility of identity arises 
only within concrete social environments, within which the reflexively conscious self is 
neither radically autonomous nor simply determined in his choices and actions. 
[3] RESPONSES TO SANDEL 
IN THE FIFTEEN YEARS SINCE its publication a view of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
has become conventional amongst political theorists of a broadly liberal outlook. Taken 
together, the following recent examples offer a fair summary of this (mis)understanding. 
According to Jeremy Waldron, Sandel 'calls ... 
for a conception of the person that is 
capable of being identified completely and essentially with some communal history or 
commitment', 56 and in a similar vein John Charvet informs his readers - without direct 
reference to any relevant sources - that 'communitarians must be understood to be 
rejecting the possibility of deriving from the abstract theoretical standpoint on human 
powers and interests any substantive conclusions... [they] affirm one general principle: 
each is to follow the norms of his society.. . this principle enjoins us to 
be blindly 
conservative and unreflective. ''? Jean L. Cohen indicts Sandel on the grounds that he 
grounds, by shcº\\'ing i) th<11 despite Rawls's claims to the contrary, Justice as Fairness is dependent on a 
metaphvsic", ºI conception of the (norm itive) subject analogous to K, ant's nouillen, tl self; ii) that this conception 
is (descriptively, ) incapable of comprehending the 'ordinary' moral experience of phenomenal agents and is 
hence epistemologically Ila\ved, resulting 
in t severely flawed conception of the subject and his social 
environment; iii) which is most clearly manilested 
in the difficulties surrounding the second principle of 
justice, as antecedent individuation precludes the t\°pr of prior commitment necessary toi generate support 
for 
the difference principle. 
D4 S, tndel, Liberalism .1 l(/ t/u- 
Limits..., 
S, tntlel, Liher'. -1/islll _Mud the 
Lunits..., 63- 3,79-82. 
ý)6 Jeremy \V , tldnm, 
Li/c)-. r/ R? J l; Cu//cclcl/ Papers 111.1991 (C. lillhrid c, C, tnnhri, i, c University Press, 
1993), 390. 
57 John CIý, ºrýýt, 7i c /l((". r cº/'. 1f1 Eibic. ll 
C! /»7)11lfýlllj (Itll lc, t, CIMrneII University Pre», 1995), p. 4. 
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`insists that everyone is radically situated'58 and finally, Stephen Kautz rather hysterically 
claims that advocates of community - including Sandel - `invite an immoderate or slavish 
politics... where human beings are compelled either to embrace that community 
thoughtlessly or to rebel against it thoughtlessly.. . 
identification with one's community 
deprives one of moral freedom'. 59 
At least two significant errors are at work in these readings. Firstly, Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice is misunderstood as a work of developed political advocacy rather than 
(or as well as) a more limited but penetrating anthropological investigation of Rawls's 
assumptions and methodology. 60 Political positions which lack textual support are 
thereby attributed to Sandel on the basis of his suggestive but undeveloped comments 
regarding community and public life. Secondly, and inexcusably, Sandel's critics 
consistently ignore or overlook the explicit distinction made in Liberalism and the 
Limits... between `radically situated' and `intersubjective' conceptions of self. This 
desperate failure of comprehension leads them to treat Sandel as a proponent of the 
former and not, as clearly is the case, of the latter `intersubjective' formulation. 
If the persistence of this misinterpretation is unaccountable, its origin and 
entrenchment are more readily explained. Although it has received considerable critical 
attention, Liberalism and the Limits is typically incorporated within a synthetic 
`communitarianism' and discussed in contexts which are either overtly polemical, 61 or 
aimed at the analysis of this general position at the expense of detailed consideration of 
the works which allegedly comprise it. The following discussion examines one early and 
influential formulation and critique of this artificial `communitarian' construction, and 
goes on to consider some later, more carefully advanced objections to Sandel's work. 
58 Jean L. Cohen 'Democracy, Difference and the Right cal Privacy' in Scyla Bcnhahih (ed. ) Democracy 
and Dif/'rence: Contc"StinL the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1996), 
197. On the same page Cohen moderates her misreading (hut does not clarify her interpretation) when she 
suggests that Sane el sees us as 'able toi revise to some extent our identities but situated nonetheless. ' 
59 Steven Kautz, Liberalism and Community (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995), 215. 
60 Sandel's recent, overtly political Democracy's Discontent has no impact upon the present discussion, 
and is examined in Chapter Six below. 
61 The paradigmatic instance of which is Stephen Holmes, `The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal 
Thought', in Rosenblum (ed. ) Liberalism and the Moral Life, pp. 227-253. Holmes constructs and then dissects 
what he calls an `ideal type' (229) of `antiliheralism', but confusingly goes on to claim that although `No 
single theorist... is a perfect antiliberal' that he is able to identify an 'identical set of mistakes... in almost every 
antiliberal work. ' At a later point he does acknowledge `importaant differences' (285n. 8), before restating that 
`antiliberals share enough to justify a unified treatment. ' This patently contradictory nonsense seems 
motivated by the assumption that any theorist 
intent on critically examining liberal philosophy and/or 
society must be implacably' opposed to 
it. Holmes some\\vhat hysteric, illy, and without any subtlety 
whatsoever, identifies the so called antiliberals with the entirety of counter-enlightenment thought and 
European fascism, sind condcinns them 
for failing to differentiate themselves I*rom these `brilliant but 
retrospect ivclý discredited theorists. 
' (227 2? 8). lt does noýt appear tcý have occurred to Holmes that the 
modern ccýmmunitarians might 
have a completely different conception of their ý. wwork to his understanding of 
it, or that a less inflammatory reading might prove 
less absurd than the suggestion that Sandel, Taylor and 
\X'alicr arc pursuing a cryptO-fascist tradition of thought. 
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Amy Gutmann's survey article62 follows the pattern of response identified above 
by confusing issues of anthropology and advocacy. Despite correctly noting that Sandei 
`say[s] almost nothing... to defend communitarian politics directly' it is nevertheless 
claimed that communitarians, being reactionary and/or conservative supporters of 
tradition and patriarchy `want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in Witches. Or 
human rights. '63 Gutmann does separate Sandel's critique of the Rawlsian self from 
Alasdair Maclntyre's critique of the enlightenment project tout court, but does so in an 
insufficiently thorough manner which leads to a political characterisation of Sandei 
which is indistinguishable from that attributed to Maclntyre. This erroneous view in turn 
supports her contention that Sandel offers a `tyranny of dualisms' where `either our 
identities are independent of our ends ... or they are constituted by community, leaving us 
totally encumbered by socially given ends. '64 Sandel, of course, rejects both the situated 
and unencumbered poles of this duality. 6' The judgement that `neither his interpretation 
nor his critique is accurate'66 is relevant to Gutmann rather than Sandel, and her 
criticism that Sandel's proposed intersubjective model is open to criticism67 on the 
grounds of contradiction identified in Theory is simply not applicable. 
Gutmann also mounts a defence of Rawls which is for the most part68 independent 
of this inaccurate analysis of Sandel. Rejecting his critique of the unencumbered self, she 
argues that Sandel's concentration on the original position and the conditions imposed 
therein leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of Rawls's theory. Allowing that 
principles of justice `clearly rely on certain contingent facts, '69 that reflective equilibrium 
justifiably introduces prephilosophical judgements and convictions into the decision 
procedure, and citing Rawls's belief that `given our history and traditions... [Justice as 
Fairness] is the most reasonable doctrine for us'7° Gutmann claims that the position 
attributed to him by Sandel involves `a metaphysics that Rawls explicitly and consistently 
denies. '71 This `refutation' is only superficially relevant to Sandel's analysis, because it 
62 Amy Gutm. inn, `Coinmunit<man Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), 309- 
322. 
63 Guunann, 'Communit. man Critics... ', 309,318-19. 
64 Gutmann, 'Coýntmunitarian Critics... ', 316-7. 
65 As established in the preceding discussion and reitcr, itcd by S«tndel, Liberalism and the Limits..., 20-21: 
`Without some distinctWn between the subject and the abject of p(, s\Csslon, it becomes impossible to 
distinguish what is me from %%-hat is mine, and we ire left with what might be called ,t radically situated 
subject... [which is] inadcyuale to for nation of the pc)-son'. (Clc, sing emphasis added). 
66 Gutmann, 'Communitaman Critics... ', 317. 
67 Gutmann, 'Coýmmunitari. an Critics... ', 317. 
68 Page 311 n. 14 being the obvious exception, where Sandcl's argument is erroneously reconstructed 
according to the radically situated conception of 
identity discussed above. See also p. 313, where Gutmann 
claims that 'Sandel seems to mea1n that communally given ends can so totally constitute peoples 
identities that 
they einnot appreciate the value of 
justice. ' 
69 Gutmann, 'Comnmunitarian Critics... ' 312. 
70 Rawls, `Kantian Constructivism... ', 519. 
71 Gtttni ann, 'Communitarian Critics... '. 313. 
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unthinkingly accepts the very elements which Liberalism and the Limits... examines in 
detail and finds problematic. Gutmann appears to believe that once principles of justice 
are acknowledged as contingently dependent upon the prevalence of conditions described 
within the original position then issues concerning the nature of the self within it and the 
question of justification by equilibrium dissolve. 72 
Gutmann's criticisms are extremely insecure. She rather strangely claims73 that 
Rawls's assumptions concerning the priority of right, inviolable individuality, and the 
embedded ideal which provides the Archimedean74 point of judgement do not involve a 
metaphysical conception of the self. Although Rawls presents Theory as independent of 
Kant's epistemology and metaphysics, Sandel's analysis explicitly details just how 
dependent justice as Fairness is on a view of the self that is analogous, if not identical, to 
that of Kant. Gutmann's arguments against Sandei are however based upon a wholesale 
acceptance of Rawls's method and doctrine. Such an interpretation might be based on a 
basic agreement with the entirety of Rawls's argument, on a weak interpretation of the 
original position, 75 or on the claim that Rawls's vague recognition of history and 
tradition within the justification process amounts to successful renunciation of the 
foundational and metaphysical ambitions of Theor v. The first of these options can be 
ruled out with some plausibility, since even the most docile of critics should be capable of 
identifying areas of difficulty in Rawls's works. The second approach is equally 
indefensible, paradoxically failing to do justice to either Rawls's enterprise or to Sandel's 
analysis. With or without appeal to `our' convictions and history, justice as Fairness is 
fundamentally reliant upon its supporting methodology. Taking Rawls seriously - as we 
are surely intended to do - entails paying close attention to the abstraction and 
individuation modelled by the original position, as well as to the arguments and 
assumptions behind it. In failing to do so adequately Gutmann's discussion lacks the 
exegetical and critical resources necessary for a convincing defence of Rawls, or a 
sustainable refutation of Sandel. 
Charles Larmore7 follows Gutmann in castigating Sandel's undeveloped advocacy 
position, locating Liberalism and the Limits... within the tradition of German Counter- 
72 Thus she claims (312 n. 18) that although invalid in either c. isc, Sanclcl's critique is more effective 
against A Thewy of Justice- alone than Rawls's later work. 
73 Gutmann, `Communitarian Critics.... 311. 
74 Variously depicted as the position from which nounicnal selves view the wcºrld; the perspective of 
eternity; sub specie -zeternitatis, m(i so on. 
The imagery of the Archimedean point in ethical argument, a 
refutation of scepticism and relativism grounded 
(for Rawls, and for K. tnt) in pure practical reason, is 
explicitly universalist, , historical m(i metaphysical. 
Sec e. g. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosopl. ºy (London, Fontana, 19S5), Ch. 2. 
75 As considered and rejected in chapter two. 
76 Charles Larimºre, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 
121 -129- 
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Enlightenment thought77 and claiming that Sandei `seems to prefer the fantasy that 
society as a whole once was or might become a family or a club of friends. '78 In addition 
he does however provide a more reasoned evaluation of Rawls and Sandel, conceding 
much of the latter's position, but arguing that a limited reconstruction of justice as 
Fairness is possible which is not susceptible to metaphysical critique. Although he pays 
little attention to the explicit detail of the texts in question, Larmore's revision of Theory 
separates two strands of argument - Kantian and Humean - which Rawls attempts to 
unify, and argues that an appropriate resolution of their relationship involves dispensing 
entirely with the Kantian dimension of Rawls's project. Liberalism and the Limits... does 
not undermine either liberalism or individualism as such, he argues, but does make clear 
the problems of a liberalism reliant on what he labels an expressivist conception of the 
self. 79 
The `fundamental approach' of Theory, writes Larmore, `is to focus on the Humean 
circumstances of justice, to determine what principles of co-operation can be accepted by 
rational agents. '80 The expressivist elements of Rawls's doctrine - the ideal of the self, its 
role within the original position, and its status and moral powers - are presented as 
secondary aspects which detract from the core objective of a political liberalism, which 
takes as its limited task the problem of defining a neutral standard of justice which 
functions as a `modus vivendi' regulative of `our role as citizens, without its having to be 
our dominant ideal in other areas of social life. '81 
The simplicity of Larmore's suggestions-' is superficially appealing, and is in some 
respects similar to Rawls's own development of his theory. 83 However, the emphasis on 
the `Humean' components of Theory at the expense of their `Kantian' counterpart takes 
us some way from justice as Fairness and creates explanatory difficulties for Larmore. 
Rather than being secondary, the concept of the person is indispensable to Rawls's 
project, of (at least) equal significance to the circumstances of justice. As Rawls makes 
clear the two strands of thought are heavily interdependent. Applied to the structure of 
Theory, Larmore's reformulation is question begging rather than problem solving - 
inviting questions regarding the nature of the rational agents whose decision is being 
constructed, the standard of neutrality to which they aspire, the nature of the vivendi 
guiding their decision on a modus , 
how political principles relate to `nonpolitical' values 
77 Larmore, P, ztler-ni..., 122. 
78 Larmorc, P. jticmns..., 126. 
79 L. irmoýrc, PrllOru<..., 129. 
80 Larmorc, P. rttcwi..., 1? 1-?. 
81 L. irmorc, P.. rllcrrtý..., 121. 
82 Further developed in Charles Larii n)rC, 'P(1itii, il Lilwalisin' Politic il A( my 1S (1990), 339-360. 
83 Although t nu dW Vl--V Il formulation, heim; .t purdv contingent and pr, igi», itii resolution of 
<(Onflict, hicks the moral 
h, +. is or h rcc required h\ Rawls I()r his political ý, )ncepti(), i Of Justier as Fairness. 
R, iwls, Polttrc.. rl Li! rd/ Lfrr, 147. 
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and beliefs, and so on. By placing these issues to one side Larmore merely causes them to 
re-emerge elsewhere. The judgement that by ignoring the 'Modus vivendi" interpretation 
`Sandel can suggest that liberalism is in far greater trouble than it actually is'84 can be 
neatly inverted and applied to Larmore himself. When he claims that we should accept 
liberalism `not as a philosophy of man, but as a philosophy of politics'85 he forgets that 
when asked why political principles apply in particular to us, the liberal explanation will, 
either implicitly or explicitly, invoke an image of the person which we are invited to 
recognise as our own. 
Kenneth Baynes86 acknowledges the force of Liberalism and the Limits..., but 
dissents both from Sandel's attribution to Rawls of an unencumbered self, and from his 
identification within Theory of an intersubjective self within a arider (social) subject of 
possession, upon which Rawls allegedly relies in order to support the difference principle. 
As noted earlier this second objection is a plausible one, 87 but Baynes's rejection of 
Sandel's critique of Rawls's covert metaphysics doctrine is not convincing. Focusing on 
Rawls's later writings (and so perhaps tacitly acknowledging the accuracy of Sandel's 
examination of Theory) Baynes identifies an equivalence between Rawls's attribution to 
the self of `moral powers' and Harry Frankfurt's concept of the person, defined according 
to `the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second 
order desires. '88 Frankfurt's influential thesis - that the self is unique in not only 
experiencing a range of sensations and desires, but also in being capable of `second order' 
reflection and judgement on the content of desires - does appear to conform with Rawls's 
account insofar as the `power' to revise one's conception of the good is analogous with 
second order judgement. If successful, such an interpretation of deliberative rationality 
might redeem the Rawlsian self, allowing it more thoroughly conceived capacities of 
reflection self-interpretation than those associated with the antecedently individuated 
model. 
This possibility is in fact considered by Sandel in a passage of Liberalism and the 
Limits... which Baynes overlooks. Since the Rawlsian self is denied experience of 
constitutive goods, he argues, it cannot be delivered from its unencumbered fate by appeal 
to Frankfurt's conception. Within Rawls's methodological scheme, the attribution of 
84 Larmore, Paucrn. ý..., 124. 
85 Larmore, Pallcms..., 129. 
86 Kenneth Baynes, The. h`orrnaliveGrounds o/Soctal Crilici5rn (New York, SUNY Press, 1992) 129-34. 
87 See ý2 above. Baynes's objection here differs in claiming that since the veil of ign(wance only applies 
during the procedure of principle construction, there is no re, tscm not to suppose that beyond the veil notions 
of merit or desert might have .t place in the well ordered :, )iiety, and 
heneC nog rea'onn to presume a common 
subject of possession (Bayne:, Norma l-r Grounds..., 132). The 
force OI this interpretation is unclear, 
however, since it hogs the question OI the relations pertaining hem-ecn the \cll 
behind and beyond the veil, 
and that between the original position and the \\"ell ordered society. 
88 Harry G. Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person' Journal of Philosophy 68 
(1971), 7. 
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second order evaluation to the abstract conception of the self has little effect. Because 
deliberation for Rawls takes the form of an estimation and ordering of exogenously given 
desires in order of their intensity for the self, `agency would not in any meaningful sense 
be restored... he would still have no grounds, apart from the mere fact of his second-order 
desire, on which to justify or defend the desirability of one sort of desire over another. '89 
Without a more substantive self for deliberative agency to a faculty of, any similarity 
claimed between Rawls and Frankfurt can only be formal, where a more thorough 
correspondence is required to deliver the Rawlsian self from Sandel's critique. Baynes 
accepts Rawls's development of a `morality of association' within the well-ordered 
society9° as sufficient evidence that identity is a socially constituted process, and would 
presumably disagree with this assessment. To do so, however, misses Sandel's 
fundamental point: that as an elaboration of the self conceived in the original position, 
Rawls cannot coherently account for the constitutive significance of commitments and 
identifications, and so fails to understand from the outset that which he seeks to represent 
within justice as Fairness. 
John Rawls has never directly responded to Sandel's critique, although certain of 
his writings have been interpreted in such a way. 91 He has however acknowledged as `on 
the whole satisfactory, 92 Will Kymlicka's discussion of Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice. 93 In a short and dense analysis Kymlicka covers much of the ground addressed 
above, 94 but also advances an objection that at first glance appears to be devastating for 
Sandel's case: 
`There are apparent differences here... [which] hide a more fundamental identity: 
both [Rawls and Sandel] accept that the person is prior to her ends. They disagree over 
where, within the person, to draw the boundaries of the `self'; but this question, if it is 
89 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits..., 163-4 
90 Baynes, Normnative Grounds, 130. 
91 Most notably `Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical' Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), 
223-251. Rawls's denial of this interpretation in Political Liberalism, (xvii n. 6) `changes In the later essays are 
sometimes said to he replies raised by communitarians and others. I don't believe there is a basis 
for saying 
this', is suitably equivocal on the point, as it is noted that `It is certainly not settled by my say so. ' 
92 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 27 n. 29. 
93 Will Kynllickal, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxfcord, Clarendon Press, 1989) esp. Ch 4. 
94 In the process repeating GUtlllaann's nlisintcrpretati()n Of Sandet, albeit in t qualified manner. 
Thus 
while claiming; that Sandel `argues that the self is not prior to, but rather constituted 
by, its ends' (Kymlicka, 
Libe)-alism, Community and Culture, 31) he does acknowledge Sandcl's view of identity as the 'product rather 
than the premise of its agency' (55). In a similar form to that of Baynes (although without reference to 
Frankfurt's concept of the person) Kynilicka believes that at this paint 'it's not clear whether the whole 
distinction between the twwwco views collapses. As with his fellow critics, however, Kvvmlicka's discussion does 
not relate Sandel's critique in any detail to R, iwls's original pclsiticln, 
instead defending a generalised liberal 
position Which maintains that wie understand our selves to be prior to our ends, 
in the sense that no end or 
goal is exempt f om possible re-examination' 
(52, original emphasis). This is a fair but underspecified 
representation of Rawls's position, and as 
is hopefully by now clear, the difficulties revealed by Sandel 
concern the underlying assumptions 
behind such a view, which are revealed as untenable in Liberalism and the 
Limits..., but which are assumed by liberals such as Kvvnllicka to be prima facie unproblematic. 
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indeed a meaningful question, is one for the philosophy of mind, with no direct relevance 
to political philosophy. '95 
The argument here - that Sandel's critique is compromised by a deeper congruence 
with Rawls - suggests that notwithstanding the detail of his examination Sandel is unable 
to undermine either Rawls's theory or liberal practice, as he has failed to demonstrate 
why the self cannot invoke this distance in order to examine and transform (any of) her 
ends. Kymlicka's analysis involves three related but distinct claims: he acknowledges the 
differences between Rawls and Sandel (i); but argues that a more basic agreement between 
them marginalises Sandel's critique (ii) in such a way that it can be safely banished to the 
domain of `mind', which is seen as irrelevant to political philosophy (iii). 
The first stage of this is unproblematic; there clearly are issues at stake here and 
Kymlicka's arguments concern their depth and significance. The second proposition is 
the most substantial. That Rawls and Sandel both invoke the idea of the person in the 
same manner is a striking observation which only appears self-evident retrospectively, but 
its significance as a criticism of Sandel is opaque. Kymlicka's claim appears to be that a 
philosophical correspondence is consequent upon the fact that both authors address the 
concept of the self as a grammatical subject following the same linguistic convention. But 
because distinct conceptions of the self do receive articulation the importance of the 
indexical correspondence noted by Kymlicka requires clarification. Given that both 
Rawls and Sandel are engaged (albeit from different methodological standpoints) in 
discussion of the concept of self, in this regard an alternative idiom is neither obviously 
available nor necessary in order to differentiate their respective approaches. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine an alternative mode of expression in which either Sandel or Rawls 
could proceed whilst remaining intelligible to their readership. 
Because the grammatical congruity pointed out by Kymlicka does not lead to the 
`fundamental identity' which he claims, the differences between the Rawisian self and the 
intersubjective conception outlined by Sandel retain their prominence. The potential 
relevance of Kymlicka's third claim is undiminished by this failure, because if the 
question of the boundaries of the self is properly part of the philosophy of mind and 
firmly insulated from moral and political aspects of the discipline, the impact of Sandel's 
critique might be nullified. Kymlicka does not make explicit his understanding of either 
the difference or the relation between these two branches of philosophy, 
96 entailing that 
his claim is difficult to evaluate but prima facie unlikely to prevail. Although the political 
implications of issues in the philosophy of mind can be irrelevant or indirect, the notion 
95 Kvmlicka, Lrlu iali5)ft, CU)11))1tOlltl'. 2)td Cr(/ýrrrc , 
55 (origin, il emphasis). 
96 Thc most IikcI c sc heim; that Kvnmlicka foIlmVs the intcrpretatiOn of moral thcOrv as a 
discipline 
separ. Ht- fron» epiStrnlulOg; v and the philosophy of mind . t: set out 
in Rawls, 'Thc Indcpcndcnre of Moral 
Tlicon ', ; _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that a political philosophy can be coherently unrelated97 to other areas of the discipline 
is ultimately untenable. In the absence of an explanation concerning the relation of and 
boundaries between issues concerning the concept of the self, philosophy of mind and 
political philosophy the claim of irrelevance directed at Sandel by Kymlicka is impossible 
to assess, and with regard to Rawls's theory, which self-consciously models an ideal 
conception of the subject, it is not clear how it can succeed. When submitted to close 
scrutiny, Kymlicka's direct charges against Sandel are not borne out. 
The attribution to Sandel of a naive political conservatism and/or determinism 
primarily rests upon serious errors of interpretation, but an additional relevant factor is 
that of the relation between the concepts `right' and `good' in the works of Rawls and 
Sandel. Where Rawls maintains the priority of right throughout his scheme of persons, 
procedures, principles and institutions, Liberalism and the Limits... is held to articulate a 
crudely antithetical political position, an elementary teleological or perfectionist view 
where a conception of the good (and concomitant identity) is determined by community, 
history, tradition, etc., and imposed upon the members of a society. This reading of the 
role accorded to the good in Sandel's text is not sustainable. Comments regarding the 
possibility of a wider subject of possession, the claim that liberalism `forgets the 
possibility that when politics goes well we can know a good in common that we cannot 
know alone, '98 and remarks implying the superiority of `substantive'99 over neutral 
political arrangements certainly point towards a conception of the politics of community, 
but do little to either develop or oppose it to Rawls's well-ordered society. 
The question of priority regarding the right and the good does involve significant 
political dimensions - in crude terms between a politics of neutral concern and a politics 
of value - but in itself says nothing in detail about the form and application of a particular 
97 The claim that an indirect relation obtains between areas and instances of inquiry (i. e. between 
anthropology and advocacy) is entirely different to the much stronger claim that moral philosophy, 
epistemology and philosophy of mind are not r"elzted. 
98 Liberalism and the Lirrtits..., 183. This piece of rhetoric is regularly noted as evidence of Sandel's 
alleged lack of realism: see e. g. Gutmann, `Communitarian Critics... ', 322; Larmore, Patterns..,, 175n. 71, 
Wallach, `Liberals, Communitarians and the Tasks of Political Theory', 597-8. In the context of the 
paragraph of which it is a part the phrase seems less significance than imagined by Sandcl's critics: 'justice 
finds its occasion because we cannot know each ether, or our ends, well enough to govern by the common 
good alone. This condition is not unlikehy to fide altogetl. )crr, and so long as it does not, justice will be 
necessary.... Liberalism teaches respect for the distance of self and ends... [blut by seeking to secure this distance 
too completely, Liberalism undermines its own insight... ' (183, emphasis added). 
99 The label `substantive' is introduced in place of Sandel's previous use cif 'communitarian' in Sandel, 
`Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuatlity", California Law Re-, )iew 77 (1989), 
521-538. For example, at 534 he argues that `the connection between heterosexual and homosexual unions is 
not that both result from individual choice but that both realize important human goods. Rather than rely 
on autonomy alone, this... articulates the virtues homosexual intimacy may share with 
heterosexual intimacy, 
along with any distinctive virtues of 
its own. ' In in earlier article (`Morality and the Liberal Ideal' The New 
Republic 7 May 1984) Sandel used the generalised label `communitarian' politically in a suggestive but highly 
insubstantial manner, inadvertently providing a clear example of the difficulties concerning the term and 
potentially providing grist 
for the mills of his critics. 
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political vision or programme. As Charles Taylor puts the point, anthropological 
discussions of subjectivity `structure the field of possibilities in a more perspicuous way. 
But this precisely leaves us with choices, which we need some normative, deliberative 
arguments to resolve. '100 The question of priority is, so to speak, logically prior to these 
deliberative processes. Kymlicka appears to accept this distinction in Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, where he argues that Rawls's characterisation of utilitarianism as 
a teleological theory creates a false dichotomy which ignores utilitarian theories which do 
recognise the separate status of each individual. 101 Because individual inviolability is, for 
Rawls, founded on right (and its priority) Kymlicka goes on to claim that `our 
disagreements with Rawls, however deep great they may be, will not be disagreements 
over the priority of the right and the good. '102 
From this interpretation Kymlicka argues that Rawls's concerns regarding the equal 
weight due to each person's good and the independence of legitimate distributive 
entitlements from any particular conception of the good do not involve the question of 
priority. Since an appropriately defined utilitarian perspective concurs with Rawls in 
treating the right as a requirement that, from `the moral point of view' each person's 
good be accorded equal consideration, 103 the priority of right is not at issue - what is at 
issue is the formulation of distributive principles commensurate with this shared 
interpretation of political morality, and the responsibility of the person to tailor his or 
her chosen ends in a manner compatible with these principles. 
Precisely how this point undermines Sandel's critique, as Kymlicka insists it 
does, 104 is at best obscure. Kymlicka's central point seems to be that in characterising 
John Stuart Mill as a teleological utilitarian Rawls confuses the issue of maximising the 
interests of the self, which does not concern the priority question, with that concerning 
the definition of those interests, which does but on which Rawls and Mill agree in 
assigning lexical priority to a principle of liberty. '05 Whilst it is correct that Sandel 
follows Rawls in this reading, even if it is erroneous106 it does not follow that Sandel 
100 Taylor `Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate', 161. 
101 Kymlic: ka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 25-26. 
102 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 40. 
103 Kynilicka, Liberalism, community and Culture, 40. Although consistent with Rawls, this is 
Kymlicka's own formulation and recalls Dworkin's `deep theory' specifying `equal concern and respect' due 
each individual. Kymlicka acknowledges (19 11.1) that he is `indebted to Dworkin's writings in ways that are 
substantial but sometimes difficult to specify. ' One Of the Virtues Of Kymlicka's 
hook - its relatively brief but 
substantial argumentative style - poses problems in this respect, as the theoretical detail and antecedent 
formulations of the liberal positions which he critically' supports are often implicit ur tacit rather than 
trans parent w 
idiitl the text. 10`1 
Kvmlicka, Liberalism, Clnlrilhlnil) and Clr/lurc, 36 
107 Kvnilicka, Liberalism, Communit and Culture, 42 11. "1. 
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79 
misunderstands Rawls in consequence. Rawls's self-understanding as a theorist deeply 
indebted to Kant is unambiguous, and Liberalism and the Limits... investigates the attempt 
of Theory to establish a liberalism without metaphysics, and does not seek to isolate and 
distinguish perfectionist and antiperfectionist varieties of utilitarianism. Moreover, the 
notion that `we can derive principles of justice without any idea of people's essential 
interests' attacked by Kymlicka refers in Sandel's text to Kant, not to Rawls. 107 Although 
comparable to Kant's noumenal subject, the Raawlsian self which Sandel examines in 
detail is not simply reducible to it. Whether or not Kymlicka's argument collapses here is 
difficult to assess, because in taking issue with the characterisation of utilitarianism in 
Theory it is not clear that there is an argument to begin with against Sandel. 
Where the theorisation of the right and the good relates to criteria of distribution, 
the satisfaction of interests, legitimate expectations, etc., it is not - as Kymlicka recognises 
- an argument regarding priority, but rather one concerning how we should deal with the 
already established priority politically. This tells us what the question of priority isn't 
about, but is of little help in addressing the more basic issue of the relationship between 
the two concepts for the self. Perhaps surprisingly, this question is ultimately an 
uncomplicated one. Even for Kant the pre-eminent moral good for man was the good 
will, 108 the realisation of which depended on the right action of the rational subject 
determined in conformity with the formal requirements of the moral law. The good will 
as an end in itself, the end of rational moral beings, is achieved through the determining 
ground of the moral law, understood and enacted in the application of the categorical 
imperative. The indisputable supremacy of the moral law over hypothetical (e. g. utility 
optimising) injunctions rests upon this account of moral goodness, which the rational will 
is alone held to manifest. There is therefore no simple opposition between right and good 
even within Kant's supposedly austere doctrine of categorical duty. 
The ostensible impartiality of Rawls's attempt to determine principles of justice 
independent of any particular conception of human value or good affirms the priority of 
right through procedural mechanisms which are similarly dependent upon an underlying 
abstract conception, or thin theory, of the good. As we have seen, the individuated self 
conceived as prior to its ends in the original position is deeply problematic. Without the 
thin theory, which rather than being neutral or impartial manifests assumptions and 
implications equivalent to an underlabouring individualistic conception of the good, the 
invookcs notions cal priV, ttc Irccdoni tnc{ public ood. So whilst it might he correct to ý, tr that Mill should not 
be classed .t tclc(ýh+; 
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moral status and powers of the Rawlsian self would be even more severely compromised. 
Hence for both Rawls and Sandel, `the good is what, in its articulation, gives the point of 
the rules which define the right. '109 The question of priority emerges as one concerning 
the status and function of conceptions of the good in the development of a concept of 
self. The original position submerges this role through mechanisms of abstraction and 
disinformation, but the good is latently and often ambiguously present throughout its 
workings. 
According to Taylor the adoption of a procedural methodology renders justice as 
Fairness (and other neo-Kantian theories) inarticulate concerning the goods - such as 
autonomy, solidarity, and equality - which are their motivating ideals. Arguing that 
`[t]heir thought is inescapably cramped' he claims that `they utterly mystify the priority 
of the moral by identifying it not with substance but with a form of reasoning. '110 An 
adequate response to this charge would however involve a radical transformation of the 
mechanisms which make up the original position, effectively abandoning Rawls's 
methodological dependencies in order to `come clean' about the values tacitly underlying 
the formulation, justification and application of principles of justice and the self to which 
they apply. 
Despite the failure of his adherents to significantly undermine Sandel's critique, 
Rawls is understandably reluctant to undertake such drastic revisions. In his post-Theory 
writings he has however introduced a range of refinements and shifts of emphasis, some 
of which arose in the course of this examination. The repositioning of justice as Fairness 
as a constructivist doctrine made little impact on the problem of justification encountered 
by Rawls, but other issues - in particular the identification of political and comprehensive 
moral theories, and the effects of this demarcation on the conception of the self within 
Political Liberalism - remain in need of closer scrutiny. The following discussion 
selectively examines prominent aspects of these innovations in order to establish the 
extent to which they form an adequate response to the objections advanced against the 
antecedent individuation of the Rawisian self. 
[4] LIBERALISM WITHOUT METAPHYSICS? 
THE STATED AIMS OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM are to adjust justice as Fairness in order to 
accommodate the `fact of reasonable pluralism'111 and in so doing to set out a stable 
constitutional basis for an enduring liberal regime. In the course of this reworking of 
Justice as Fairness Rawls has commented on the question of priority, but in a manner 
109 Charlcs T. i Ior, Snurrc: ý nf'lbbc Sclf, (Camhridgc, Cambridge Univcr`ity Press, 1989), 89. 
110 Taylor, Sour c. ý..., 88-9. 
111 Rawls, Political Llbcr., r/ts»1, xVii. 
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directed to the impartiality of institutions rather than the conception of the self, where 
the philosophically significant aspects of priority are located. Therefore although Rawls 
appears to agree with Taylor's position when he states that `the right and the good are 
complementary-while justice draws the limit, and the good shows the point', 112 this 
concession is not understood to undermine the aims and methods of procedural justice. 
The principal flaw of Theory, according to Rawls, does not reside in the assumptions 
and limitations documented in the development of the original position, but in the 
general strategy of the work as a whole. Theory is now regarded by Rawls as presenting a 
comprehensive philosophical doctrine113 which is general both in scope, applying `in the 
limit to all subjects universally' and in content, including `all recognized values and 
virtues within one rather precisely articulated system. '114 Justice as Fairness is supposedly 
affirmed on identical grounds by all members of the well-ordered society as an expression 
of their nature as free, equal and rational persons. Despite its formality, this scheme is 
understood by Rawls to be unrealistic because it fails to appreciate the diversity of moral 
doctrines prevalent in modern societies. Underlining the absence of pluralism noted 
earlier with regard to the original position, this omission on Rawls's own account unfits 
the doctrine of Theory, but not the viability of his two principles, which emerge almost 
unscathed115 as a less expansive focus of agreement or overlapping consensus116 between 
members of the well-ordered society. 
Rawls assumes that all of his hypothecated citizens will affirm a comprehensive 
doctrine (i. e. a religious, philosophical or moral outlook) which is reasonable insofar as it 
offers various grounds of support for justice as Fairness conceived as a `political 
conception', distinguished by its narrow scope: the political conception applies only to 
the basic structure of institutions, principles and standards of a constitutional democratic 
regime; is presented as a 'freestanding view' supported by various reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines present within that regime, but dependent on none in 
particular; 117 and is expressed in terms of abstract conceptions which are `familiar and 
basic ideas implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society. '118 This re- 
112 Rawls, Political Lihcrrlisnt, 173-4. 
113 Rawls, Political Liherr.. rlisrrr, xvi. As R, 1vß Ik notes, the term 'co>mprchcnsive' does not occur in the text 
of Theo ry. 
114 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13. 
113 Almost, hrc. iu. c the social and economic egalit, trianisni of second principle is now regarded as a 
matter of `basic justice' (where the conditions for the satisfaction of the principle are a matter of uncertainty 
and debate) rather than a self-evident `constitutional essential' 
(which include the freedoms guaranteed by the 
first principle), Rawls, Political Lihcralimi, 227-230. Rawls 
denies (7 n. 6) that anvv, change is introduced to the 
`egalit, irian conception of Theo iv, but given the questionable status of 
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constitutional essentials this is at 
hest a 11WOt point. 
116 R, a\-,. 1`, Political Liheralis»>, 15,144f. 
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orientation of justice as Fairness involves changes which, although often obliquely, 
clearly aim to address major criticisms advanced in the course of this discussion. Most 
notably, Rawls continually draws attention to the independence of Political Liberalism 
from metaphysical claims or dependencies. 119 Unfortunately he does not pronounce on 
the accuracy or otherwise of foundational and/or transcendental interpretations of 
Theory, instead being content to deny, rather than establish in argument, their relevance 
to his revised account. This non-metaphysical status is reinforced by the application of 
the political conception to modern constitutional democracies alone, and the open 
invocation of a fund of - predictably underdeveloped - `familiar and basic ideas' 
supposedly available within such systems of authority. These modifications explicitly 
revoke the universal and ahistorical claims advanced in Theory, as the derivation of the 
political conception from modern and western ideals is acknowledged. 1220 Despite their 
ostensive significance, however, the impact of the changes on the well-ordered society 
envisaged by Political Liberalism and upon the overall plausibility of Rawls's 
methodological approach stand in need of clarification. 
Rawls concedes that associations, corporations and other bodies within civil society 
and the background culture of the well-ordered society need not be determined by the 
standard of `public reason' which applies within the basic structure. It thus appears that as 
part of the political conception Rawls's norms and principles are no longer conceived as 
regulative for reason and conduct outwith the political domain. `Nonpublic' reason must 
be consistent with `common human reason' and respect the freedom of conscience and 
association guaranteed by the liberty principle, but Political Liberalism does allow that 
consistent with the `nature of each association... and the conditions under which it 
pursues its ends'121 alternative, less rigid forms of deliberation, decision and social 
relations might legitimately obtain. Upon closer scrutiny, however, the extent to which 
this marks a genuine amendment is extremely unclear. Rawls's brief and rather vague 
discussion of nonpublic reason makes it difficult to precisely specify or assess the 
significance of either the public/nonpublic distinction, or the role of the latter for 
identity. No sense is conveyed, for example, that nonpublic relationships and 
identifications might assume a constitutive quality, or that a tension or incoherence might 
ensue between political and nonpublic elements of a general doctrine which might favour 
the latter component over the former. Rawls is instead content to stipulate that `citizens 
119 
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must adjust and reconcile'122 their comprehensive beliefs in such a way as to support the 
`very great values 1-23 governing the domain of the political. 
The easy congruence between public and nonpublic domains characteristic of 
Rawls's comments parallels his remarks on the relationship between the political 
conception of justice and the reasonable comprehensive doctrines 'which support it. The 
political conception is not tightly bound up with any particular comprehensive doctrine, 
but is contained as a `module' or `essential constituent part'] 24 by all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. This suggests that although a relation of strict entailment might 
not obtain between the two, a very strong degree of compatibility with the political 
conception is a prerequisite of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. Despite being 
downplayed by Rawls as part of the background culture of modern democratic societies, 
the class of doctrines that include or support his political conception - along with the 
metaphysical assumptions and arguments they contain - are both indispensable to and 
omnipresent within the revised doctrine. Rather than being independent, the `political' 
and `comprehensive' conceptions are co-extensive. Although the detail and apparent 
sophistication of Political Liberalism tends to obscure the continuity of the later work 
with Theory, Rawls's political conception is for the most part a redescription of his 
previously established doctrine, not the fully-fledged recasting proclaimed. 
The extent of this continuity - and the spurious nature of the distinction between 
political and comprehensive doctrines - is most obviously displayed in Rawls's treatment 
of the capacity for a conception of the good, attributed to the Rawlsian citizen as a moral 
power by Political Liberalism in a similar way to the definition in Theory of the ability to 
form, revise and pursue a rational life-plan. 125 Rawls indicates that a conception of the 
good `connects with'126 a comprehensive doctrine, but the detail of this relation is not 
explored in detail. It can however be surmised without prejudice that in the case of a 
thorough connection the two will be identical or synonymous, and that in less clear cut 
instances a permissible conception of the good must be either part of, or compliant with, 
a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. As previously established, all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines must contain or support the political conception of justice (the 
norms, standards and principles which apply to the basic structure). Permissible 
conceptions of the good must therefore contain (or be compliant with) principles of 
justice, and with regard to the role and status of justice as Fairness the distinction 
-) -) R, iw\'I:, 
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between political and comprehensive conceptions collapses; the significant differences 
between Theory and Political Liberalism are a matter of presentation, not content. 127 
Rawls's distinction could be retrieved, and a less restricted range of conceptions of 
the good permitted within the well-ordered society, by the introduction of a more 
decisive boundary between political and comprehensive conceptions. If, for example, the 
political conception were presented as a wholly prudential or pragmatic agreement 
entirely separate from (rather than ambiguously reliant upon) comprehensive moral 
doctrines, the independence of the political sought by Rawls might be established, with 
any convergence or similarity arising in particular instances between the two regarded as 
a matter of arbitrary coincidence. Rather than attempting to unsustainably bracket 
comprehensive concerns from the political domain, a full dissociation of the conceptions 
would exclude them entirely in advance. A demarcation along these lines would however 
cause problems elsewhere in Rawls's revised presentation. The deep bifurcation of public 
(political) and nonpublic (comprehensive) concerns is likely to compromise the 
coherence and stability of the well-ordered society and the psychological integrity of the 
citizen, as the unity128 required by Rawls between principles of justice, conceptions of 
the good and moral personality is rendered suspect by the presence of dual, potentially 
conflicting, standards of judgement and conduct. Furthermore, the introduction of a 
radical separation would also sever the tie between justice and morality, and without the 
support garnered from comprehensive doctrines the political conception would lack the 
moral standing through which Rawls distinguishes his understanding of political 
liberalism from Charles Larmore's account of a modus vivendi. 129 
The implications of this unsuccessful attempt to establish the independence of the 
political conception reverberate throughout Political Liberalism. In addition to the 
difficulties already noted, the collapse of the political/comprehensive distinction renders 
Rawls's claim that his constructivism is political where Kant's is comprehensive simply 
irrelevant. 130 It also invites investigation of the significance of the associated criterion of 
127 Brian Barr 
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`reasonableness' required of persons and doctrines by Political Liberalism in preference to 
the more stringent and straightforward standard of rationality familiar from Theory. 
The substitution of the rational by the reasonable in Political Liberalism is 
characteristic of a relaxed style and tone which raises the possibility that Rawls's 
application of the principle of toleration to philosophy131 might carry over into other 
areas of the theory. Unfortunately, Rawls claims that `political constructivism specifies an 
idea of the reasonable and applies it to various subjects'132 but that specification never 
occurs satisfactorily. Instead the reader is offered the empty tautology that `the content of 
the reasonable is specified by the content of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. '133 
Indeed, although aspects of reasonableness are discussed in relation to the actions and 
dispositions of persons qua citizens, Rawls notes elsewhere that Political Liberalism 
deliberately chooses not to define the reasonable directly. The detail provided merely 
suggests that the reasonable connotes ideas of fairness, co-operation and reciprocity in the 
political domain, and that although the reasonable is complementary to the rational it is 
neither subordinate to nor derived from any particular conception of rationality. Rawls's 
account of the non-derivative status of the reasonable is however strangely concluded by 
the admission that he is unable to offer arguments supporting his analysis. 134 
As a `particular form of moral sensibility'1j' reasonableness constitutes the grounds 
of toleration in the well ordered society, as it is `by the reasonable that we enter as equals 
the public world'. 136 The substance and implications of this grounding are however 
unclear, as fair co-operation for mutual advantage remains the basis of association in the 
well-ordered society, 137 and (as with the political/comprehensive distinction) the 
separation of reasonable and rational does not obviously improve or significantly alter 
the position of Theor-v. Although for the most part directed to matters supposedly public 
and political, the idea of the reasonable is neither non-metaphysical nor freestanding in 
the independence-conferring manner required by Rawls, who openly acknowledges the 
Kantian basis of his own understanding of the rational/reasonable distinction. 138 As with 
the definition of political and comprehensive doctrines to which it ambiguously relates, 
within his methodological scheme Rawls's identification of the standard of the reasonable 
131 P(JIzti aI 154. 
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is no less metaphysical than either the rationality it displaces or any other grounding that 
he might care to determine. 139 
The conceptions of the political and the reasonable fail to effect the philosophical 
transformation envisaged by Rawls, but the belated recognition of the fact of pluralism 
and misconceived attempt to reconcile that fact with the structure of the well-ordered 
society at the very least registers his intention to offer a more satisfactory account of 
politics and identity than the model of universality and assimilation presented in Theory. 
The hope that this is the case is further encouraged by Rawls's comments on the exercise 
of public reason in the well-ordered society. 
Public Reason is outlined by Rawls as `the reason of equal citizens who, as a 
collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another'140 in a 
manner that links an ideal of democratic citizenship to participation in procedures of 
debate and electoral decision, and maintains that voting preferences are not solely a 
matter of individual preference or conscience: `the duty of civility involves a willingness 
to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views 
should reasonably be made. '141 When combined with Rawls's avowal that for political 
constructivism `the struggle for reflective equilibrium continues indefinitely'1`t'- a model 
of democratic deliberation, opinion-formation and legitimation becomes discernible 
where the content of the political conception and the form of the basic structure it 
regulates are put into question, rather than simply affirmed by the enactment of the 
procedures set out in Theory. Unfortunately, Rawls immediately recoils from the 
potentially radical implications of this model. Public Reason is narrowly limited to the 
domain of the political, dealing with the application of constitutional essentials and basic 
justice but not the status or boundaries of the political itself. Arguments, principles, 
beliefs and justifications drawn from or dependent upon comprehensive and/or 
controversial sources are thereby excluded from politics at the very point where they 
become most relevant to it. 143 The deliberative impulse present in the initial formulation 
139 As argued by Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis, 'Liberal Justice: 
Political and Metaphysical', The 
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of Public Reason is consistently frustrated thereafter, and Rawls consequently fails to 
realise `public reason' as a form of democratic politics. 
The extent of this failure is not just revealed by the effective exclusion of the 
`nonpublic associations' civil society from the political process. According to Rawls, 
Public Reason finds its exemplary location in the Supreme Court rather than the electoral 
process. 144 That a principle of public justification applies to the court is uncontroversial, 
that the Supreme Court be seen as the exemplar of Public Reason another matter entirely. 
The notion that the Court might plausibly exemplify the reason of free and equal citizens 
acting as a collective body demonstrates just how removed from everyday practices of 
discursive opinion formation, solidarity and legitimation Rawls's model is, and also shows 
the extent to which justice as Fairness sees its task as the construction of an ideal 
conceived in terms of institutional structures, procedures and principles rather than 
citizenship, deliberation and agency. To adopt his own idiom, Rawls's model of 
democracy can be accurately depicted as juridical not Political. 
Although his conceptions of the political, the comprehensive and the reasonable are 
ambiguous and do not obviously improve or fundamentally adjust the doctrine of Theory, 
the restrictions which govern public reason indicate a recognition of difference on 
Rawls's part which might lend some substance to his attempt to address the fact of 
pluralism. As noted earlier, the class of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and 
connected conceptions of the good are expected to contain - or at least be consistent with 
- his political conception. Where conflict arises they must, in other words, be 
domesticated or silenced in order to conform with the requirements of political 
constructivism. Toleration is therefore a carefully rationed commodity within Political 
Liberalism, but it is at least conceivable that comprehensive doctrines containing ideals 
including grasscounting, radical socialism, non-Western religions, etc., might find a niche 
in the discursive space outside the political and within the boundaries of the reasonable as 
defined by Rawls. As with Theory, the viewpoints of bearers of such views have no place 
within the political structure of the well-ordered society, but the misfortune attendant 
upon their natures145 is perhaps less pronounced in the later work given that 
comprehensive doctrines can be a legitimate basis of association in the nonpublic realm. 
In this regard at least Rawls's presentation of reasonable pluralism can be seen to 
advance - rather than merely complicate - Justice as 
Fairness. The extent of this gain 
should not however be overestimated, because the exclusion of `non-liberal but not 
necessarily illiberal'146 beliefs and forms of life from the political domain draws attention 
144 R, a,,,. wls, Political Lihcr-alic»r, 211-240. 
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to the culturally and historically constrained liberal understanding of toleration. Rawls 
claims that toleration is at the heart of liberalism, 147 but what he has in mind is the 
peaceful coexistence of Catholicism with a range of Protestant (and later secular) 
affirmations which arose during the period of the Reformation, and are fundamentally 
European and individualistic in form. When ways of life exceed this structure Political 
Liberalism finds itself resourceless, displacing them to the margins of nonpublic life rather 
than adjusting its own compromised framework. The political conception manifests 
values that directly support doctrines and identities which partake of a rather 
unimaginative liberal convention in matters such as individuation and autonomy. Unlike 
holders of a comprehensive doctrine based on the views of Kant, Hume or Rawls, those 
whose beliefs are less congruent with, or based on alternative interpretations of, the 
concepts invoked by liberalism148 are likely to find that `the basic thrust of the social 
structure is against them. Enjoying neither public recognition nor public support, they 
are on the defensive and at a disadvantage compared to the officially institutionalized 
liberal ways of life. '149 
Echoing Isaiah Berlin, Rawls notes that there is `no social world without loss', 150 
claiming that so long as a basic structure is established `within which permissible forms of 
life have a fair opportunity to maintain themselves and to gain adherents; 151 the theory 
cannot be held to arbitrarily favour some forms of life over others. The examples 
advanced by Parekh reveal the complacency of Rawls's comments here. The holder of a 
minority view need not be in direct conflict with the political conception, and neither 
Islam or Socialism are likely to wither away due to a lack of support, 152 but under the 
147 Rawls, Political Lihcralism, xxv. 
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food or shelter to a hungry man or 
to a stranger. The latter does not have a riebt to food º>r shelter, but the host has t most stringent 
duty to 
provide these. No one talks of rights, yet everyone's needs irr met. ' In `Superior People: The narrowness of 
liberalism from Mill to Rawls', TLS February 25 1994,12, he offers the example of a Hindu who `enjoys the 
incredible freedom to choose his gods, to borrow without a sense of guilt the practices and imageries of other 
religious traditions, and to make up his wwn religion without ceasing to 
he a Hindu. ' The depth and 
significance of this autonomy is lost on liberals 
(here Parekh addresses Joseph Raz, but could just as easily be 
writing of Rawls) who are more 
likely to focus on aspects of Hinduism which do not favour individual right. 
However, as Parekh notes, even though `[t]he average 
Hindu is not at liberty to choose his spouse' if he were 
to do so `more often than not it would eventually 
be endorsed by his community ... 
Those involved know 
how to play the game and exploit the available space' 
in a manner which neither version of justice as Fairness 
can comprehend. 
149 Parekh, `Superior People', 12). 
150 Rawls, Political Liber-alis»t, 197. 
151 Rawls, Political Liberalismn, 198. 
152 The two reasons which Rawls suggest 
discourage comprehensive doctrines. Political Liberalism, 196. 
As Rawls argues, few would mourn the pissing of 
forms of life dependent on hatred, discrimination, etc., but 
this ignores the wide range of views which are not 
strictly compliant -with the political conception but 
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political conception identities and forms of life informed by such views would inevitably 
receive less support and recognition from the basic structure and the public culture it 
engenders than the adherents of directly compliant liberal views. Intentionally or 
otherwise, by favouring such liberal views a process of assimilation is likely to ensue 
where the favoured status acquired by comprehensive liberalisms undermines forms of 
life which are substantially denied expression and recognition in the public realm. 
Rawls's acknowledgement of the fact of pluralism is thus incomplete, and his 
implementation of toleration similarly limited. Political Liberalism develops the model of 
toleration as indifference set out in Theory153 at greater length, extending it to encompass 
the reasonable pluralism omitted from the earlier work without fundamentally altering 
either the interpretation or application of the concept. 
Finally, Rawls's treatment of the self in Political Liberalism predictably parallels his 
strategy elsewhere in the book. The self is redescribed as the `political conception of the 
person']-54 and thereby supposedly rendered immune to criticisms such as those advanced 
by Sandel. Similarly, the original position is retained in its familiar form, but is specified 
as a `device of representation... [with] no metaphysical implications concerning the nature 
of the self'. )55 As we have seen, however, Rawls's confidence in the integrity of his 
political/comprehensive distinction is misplaced, and the basis of his denial is highly 
questionable. Despite the strong metaphysical associations of the very idea of 
representation Rawls insists that justice as Fairness `is badly misunderstood if the 
deliberations of the parties.. . are mistaken 
for an account of the moral psychology, either 
of actual persons or of citizens in a well ordered society', 156 but he does not adequately 
explore either the content or the mechanism of the representation involved. 
Furthermore, Rawls claims that three viewpoints are constructed in the 
development of justice as Fairness - of parties in the original position `inhabiting our 
device of representation', of citizens of the well-ordered society `which might 
conceivably be realized in our social world', and of `us' assessing the political conception 
in reflective equilibrium157 - but does not elucidate the relationships obtaining between 
the three positions, an explanation of which is as necessary to the justification of Political 
cannot be accurately described i-ý anti-liberal in a pejorative sense. The second cause of decline, the failure to 
gain adherents, involves a reversion to the voluntarism of Tewyy which pays insufficient heed to the cultural 
contexts of belief and decision, and which underestimates the conditioning effect of the basic structure on the 
background conditions of society. The notion that marginalised cultures and ways of life are not 
discriminated against by the political conception is hence unsustainable on both counts. 
153 See Ch. 2 53 above. 
154 e. g. Rawls, Political Lihcralis n, 29-35. It is noticeable that Rawls seems to consciously avoid using 
the pronoun `self' in Political Liberalism, perh. ips 
in order to avoid raising suspicions of a covert metaphysics 
on grammatical grounds. 
155 R. t. vls, Political Lihcrah'sni, 27. 
156 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 28. 
157 Rawls, Political Lnccralisnu, 28. 
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Liberalism as it was for Theory. The need for such an account is compounded by the fact 
that although Rawls no longer associates the moral powers of the self with Kant, they 
remain explicitly expressive158 for his political conception of the person. It follows that 
until an explicit and satisfactory defence of the non-metaphysical credentials of the 
theory is provided, the suspicion that Political Liberalism is dependent upon an 
unacknowledged foundational subject remains unanswered. 
The absence of a fuller account of these matters on Rawls's part makes a definitive 
assessment of the political conception of the person all but impossible. What is clear is 
that although he believes the effect of his revisions to be extensive, the attempt to move 
away from the abstraction, universalism and ahistoricism of Theory is constantly 
undermined by the dependence of Political Liberalism on the concepts and methods of the 
earlier, more substantial work. In retaining the fundamental structure and content of the 
original position and the self represented therein, the possibility that the impact of the 
political conception might be other than superficial is lost. Political constructivism, with 
its reliance on supposedly general and familiar ideas, is similar in conception to the `weak 
interpretation' of the original position which was considered and rejected in chapter two. 
Such a view gains its credibility at the expense of rigour and plausibility. It fails to attend 
to the detail of the arguments set out in Theory and in so doing ceases to take justice as 
Fairness seriously, resulting in an ambiguous, ad hoc deontology rather than the clear and 
distinct alternative to utilitarianism originally and rightly sought by Rawls. 
IN 1961, WHEN RAWLS WAS IN THE EARLY STAGES of the project which evolved into 
Justice as Fairness, Iris Murdoch claimed that `[w]hat we have never had, of course, is a 
satisfactory Liberal theory of personality, a theory of man as free and separate and related 
to a rich and complicated world from which, as a moral being, he has much to learn. '159 
The accomplishment of A Theory of Justice160 should not be underestimated: Rawls 
presents a vivid and detailed account of the features of the self required by a deontic, neo- 
Kantian liberalism. At a time when such conceptions - not least that of Rawls himself - 
have attained a measure of predominance in both the theory and practices of late-modern 
societies, he perhaps unwittingly portrays a deep and important aspect of the self-image of 
the age. In so doing, however, Rawls makes evident the incomplete nature of the liberal 
158 Rawis, Political Liheri/i in, 87. 
159 Iris Murdoch, `Ag. iin: t Dryness: A Polemical Skrtih', EncwIOntcr 16 (1961) 16-20, repr. in Stanley 
Haurwas and Ala lair Maclntyyre (eds. ), 
Revisions: Chan, in,; Pc)spc-cti 'cs In . 
1'h. ir. il Philosophy (Notre Dame, 
IN., Notre Dame University Press, 1983), 46. Murdoch here echoes a similar criticism of Hannah Arendt, The 
Human Condition (Clhic. tgo, University of Chicago Press, 195S), 52-3: '\Vh. tt makes mass society so 
difficult 
to bear is not the number oI people 
involveci... hut the fact that the world between them has lost its power to 
gather them together, to relate and to separate them. 
' 
160 lt is perhaps too early to conclusively assess the impart of 
Political Liherali rn, but as the discion 
in 54 indicates, I suspect that it will come to he regarded as something 
less than the sum of its parts, and of 
fairly minor significance when compared with 
77mo '. 
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ideal, how it emphasises freedom and separation at the expense of the second set of 
relations mentioned by Murdoch, concerning the relation of the self to others and to a 
world laden with meaning and value. 
At various points in this discussion options and possibilities overlooked or rejected 
by Rawls have been pursued in order to assess the resources available to him against the 
criticisms of Sandel and others in as full a manner as possible. The failure of these 
strategies, as well as that of the positions maintained by Rawls and his contemporaries, 
suggests that a less formal and non-procedural approach is required to overcome the 
problems and limitations of the antecedently individuated self. Turning from Rawls and 
Sandel to the works of Charles Taylor, the following chapters explore one such 
alternative approach to the question of the self. 
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c 1-1 A 11 TFRr: C) UK 
THE HERMENEUTIC SELF 
[1] INTRODUCTION 
ALTHOUGH KENNETH BAYNES'S ATTEMPT to redeem the Rawlsian subject from 
Sandel's critique by aligning it with Frankfurt's definition of the person was found to be 
unsuccessful, 1 as an approach to the problems created by Rawls's construction it is 
revealing in an unintended manner. Acknowledging the resources of the Frankfurtian 
model, Baynes's interpretation further undermines Rawls's theory insofar as he highlights 
the availability of a more thorough and reflexive account of the self. The conception of 
evaluation advanced by Frankfurt was paralleled by the more decisively political work of 
Charles Taylor, whose model of the self as a `strong evaluator' significantly underlies 
Sandel's outline of an alternative to Rawls's individuated subject. " A central figure in the 
`New Left' movement of the nineteen-fifties, Taylor also has the unusual distinction 
amongst philosophers of being a publicly active participant in the political life of Canada 
over a considerable period of time. 3 His work extends the themes introduced in the 
preceding chapter by Sandel with a depth and coherence lacking in Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice, and in so doing addresses issues of method and interpretation across a 
range of philosophical areas including the history of ideas, epistemology, psychology, 
See Ch. 3 93 ik) c. 
2 H. trr\ G. Frank, furt, 'Freedom of Ilk' \\ 
ill 111(i the Co ticept ()I Ilk' Person', Journal of P/. uilosoplry 68 
(1971), 3-20; T, tvlor, 'Interpret, 1tiOn and the Science: OI' N1, tn', Tbc Rc Ir: uJ: ilrt. rrl. >>: ic_ 23 (1971), 3-51, repr. 
in Taylor, Philosophical Pdpc"rs I/, (C, mil)ridge, Cambridge University Press 1985); T, t) Ioor, is Human 
Agency? ' in T. Niischel (cd. ), The Self (Oxfo rd, B, isil Bl, tckwell, 1977), 103-33, repr. in T, t) l, )r, Philosophical 
Papers 1, (Cambridge, C, tl»hridg University Press 1985). 
T, i\lor \\,. is .1 founding editor OI 
1l, lr (rslui(: . 111(1 
L(J1 Rc": 'r( , which t)diy persists is the Acw Left 
Reviez.,;. For an evaluation of the New Left llioývennent 
by some of its principal , tctiviýtu `cc Robin Archer et. 
al. (eis. ), Out uý , 1/ýa11ýý: 
I'mcc: s of the Le/ _33C 
)'cans On (London, A'er'o, Some of T, ivlor's 
contributions tu 
del"MC' (M n, ttiOýn, ilkm and multictiltur, ilikm in Can, tci, i irr di, (u". cd in Ch. 6 below. 
linguistics, aesthetics, behaviourism and, of course, political theory. 4 Disciplinary 
boundaries are always ambiguous and often arbitrary, entailing that although the 
following discussion focuses upon Taylor's `philosophical anthropology'' at various 
points issues more directly related to other areas will inevitably arise. 
The structure of the discussion loosely follows that of part one. This chapter offers 
an account of four major themes within Taylor's work (moral frameworks, engaged 
agency, self-interpretation, and language), outlining a philosophical position which is 
assessed in the light of objections advanced by various critics and commentators in 
chapter five. In addition, the discussion introduces Taylor's work in a wider 
philosophical context. Simple typologies are inevitably inaccurate, but the division 
between `Anglo-American' and `Continental' philosophical approaches is a commonly 
understood if highly contested one. During (roughly) the past two decades ideas from a 
range of `Continental' sources - including phenomenology, critical theory, 
psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, deconstruction and, most importantly in the present 
instance, hermeneutic or interpretive studies - have noticeably encroached upon the 
debates of `Anglo-American' analytic philosophy `in the mainstream tradition of the 
Enlightenment. '6 The following reconstruction draws attention to the fundamentally 
interpretive character of Taylor's work, and in so doing is not limited to his thought and 
that of Rawls, but concerns divergent methodological approaches which are contrasted in 
a manner which constitutes, at least provisionally, a vindication of the hermeneutic 
enterprise. 
Originating in ancient Greece, the task of the Hermeneutics was to decipher the 
myths and signs accepted by the Hellenics as messages from the gods.? In the seventeenth 
century the term was revived in Germany in reformation and pietist interpretations of 
biblical scriptures, and was again transformed in the eighteenth century by the twin 
forces of Romanticism and Historicism. This movement did not determine the 
development of hermeneutics in a teleological sense, but did prepare the way for modern 
theories of interpretation. Most notably formulated by figures including Heidegger, 
Gadamer and Ricoeur, philosophical hermeneutics comprises an array of attempts to 
4 e. g. Taylor, Hege/ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1975); Taylor, The Explanation of 
Behaviour, (London, Rotºtledge and Kcgan Paul, 1964); Taylor, Philosoplhical Papers I& I/ inter a/ia. 
5 Taylor, `Introduction', Philosophical Papers I c`- II. Follr>\ving the discussion of Ch. 1, the term 
'philosophical anthropology' will be used in preference to the synonymous moral ontolo'gy' which Taylor 
occasionally invokes. See e. g. T. ty-lor, Sources of the Self, Pt 1. 
6A convenient definition appropriated from Phillip Pettit, 'The contribution of analytical philosophy', 
in Robert E. Goodin and Phillip Pettit (reis. ) A 'ornpaM'Wl to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1993), 7. 
7 Hermes was attributed with the delivernv of the messages Of tlk' gods to the ancient Greeks, and the 
hermeneutics' task was that of understanding and relating the . opposed order of the cosmos to the 
imperfection Of the material world. See Judith Shkl, ºr, 'Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle', Social Research 53 
(1986), 450. 
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address questions of knowledge, meaning and understanding outwith the perspective 
bequeathed to philosophy during the Enlightenment of the natural sciences. 8 Rather 
than pursuing the project of pure reason in any of its guises, it is defined in broad terms 
by a concern with the production and interpretation of meanings and texts within texts 
and practices. 
Hermeneutics is not amenable to statement in a definitive philosophical form, being 
better seen as a direction or tendency in theory identified by a conception of 
interpretation as a perennially unfinished process. The potential excesses available to the 
two most historically recent movements within hermeneutics - that is of eighteenth 
century romantic subjectivism and twentieth century anti-humanism - define limits 
applicable to any possible theory of interpretation. Taylor's philosophical anthropology 
offers a via media between these possible extremes. As such it is an approach which is 
subject-centred but not subjectivist, which locates subjectivity in the world without 
subordinating the self to its environment, and which recognises the linguistic and 
historical character of meaning without reducing the subject to a function of language or 
history. 
[2] `INESCAPABLE FRAMEWORKS' 
THE AGENDA UNDERLYING TAYLOR'S writings, although rather general, involves a 
long-standing and deep-seated attempt to disrupt the disengaged world-view 
characteristic of modern epistemology. Taylor's account maintains that models of social 
explanation which seek to reproduce a scientific ideal of deduction and validity - 
including logical positivism and behaviourism as well as constructivist and procedural 
approaches - are inherently unable to deal adequately with questions of meaning, 
understanding and intention which form the basis of any attempt to successfully 
understand situated human agency. 
Unfashionably maintaining the need for a clear distinction between the Natural and 
Social sciences, Taylor claims that the proliferation of `naturalist' theories predicated on 
an ultimately insupportable value neutrality and on an `atomistic' or `punctual'9 model 
of the self is ultimately traceable to the reification of the former at the expense of the 
latter that is typical of modern thought. Although the historiographical accuracy of this 
polemical characterisation is difficult to validate in depth, its central philosophical claim 
8A 
concise history is offered by Jean 
Gronciin, Int)-oduciwn to Philosophical Hermrncutics, trans. Joel 
Weinsheimcr, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994). 
9 Taylor, Pbilcºcopl cal P. 1pcrc Il, Ch 7, passim; Sr, urccs n/' the Se/j, ' 160 ff. Althcntgh the charge of 
`atomism' is principally directed against libertarian individualists such as Robert Nozick, in the philosophical 
context of the present discussion 
it is also relevant to Raw l''' individuated subject. Although Rawls's attempt 
to describe personal bonds within the narrative of moral 
devcloopment in Part 3 of Theo)), renders him 
immune to charges of social atomism, at a more 
basic philu«or/, ica/ level the label is not inappropriate. 
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is a resonant one which is typically overlooked within narrow discourses which 
(explicitly or otherwise) uncritically assume from the outset a distinction between subject 
and object - manifested in Rawls's case by the distance established between the self and its 
ends - which conditions the content as well as the form of that which follows. 
In developing a contrast between Taylor and Rawls the obvious place to begin is 
not with the original position, but with the material which Rawls brings to it. Justice as 
Fairness draws upon a range of supposedly commonsensical intuitions and familiar ideas 
in order to support arguments within the original position, and to justify the agreement 
to which it gives rise in reflective equilibrium. In both cases his approach begs the 
question of the origin and validity of these presupposed points of moral agreement. Like 
Rawls, Taylor considers the question of intuition, but rather than assuming their content 
and validity seeks to investigate and explain the assumptions and beliefs which underlie 
them. 
Taylor initially observes that intuitions exhibit two dimensions. Firstly, they are 
experienced as ostensibly instinctual and/or natural reactions, whether one chooses to 
explain them as manifestations of acculturation within language games, as aspects of a 
universalised rationality, or as hard neural wiring. The variant cultural determinations of 
the meaning of these apparently common moral reactions indicates however that their 
status as simple universals holds only at this level of surface appearance. The second 
dimension of intuition emerges when one attempts to explain these seemingly intrinsic 
values. Intuitions are dependent upon underlying accounts of human value and respect, in 
terms of which they attain their claim upon our judgement. In Taylor's terminology the 
explanation of this background involves an account of the values which articulate the 
intuitions concerned. For example, gut reactions proscribing the infringement of the 
Lockean trinity of life, liberty and property are not unconditional. They depend on an 
understanding of human beings as equal creations of a god to whom persons are 
ultimately answerable, or as bearers of a unique capacity of reason, intellect, etc. This 
entails that the category of those defined within any particular account can be variously 
inclusive or exclusive, as the status of complete humanity is limited to followers of a 
particular faith, or holders of a requisite amount of property, of a certain colour or 
ideological persuasion, and so on-10 These determinations of human value describe the 
boundaries of meaning within which the intuitions to which they give rise have 
significance, fulfilling a structural role in both the grounding and explanation of that 
which is typically experienced intuitively, and perhaps even unthinkingly, as ordinary 
moral judgement. Making a moral claim so involves either implicitly or 
(less often) 
10 T, i vIor, Sm icc. ý of t/u 
Scl, % 4 1. 
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explicitly invoking and assenting toll an account of human value. Without such 
preunderstandings the possibility of a meaningful moral vocabulary would be 
unimaginable. They so describe what Taylor refers to as inescapable framneworks. 122 
The argument that the explanation of intuitions requires the airing of more 
complex theories of value seems barely controversial but is a core component of Taylor's 
opposition to `naturalistic' approaches which unreflectively accept the veracity of 
intuition as the premise rather than the product of argument. The tendency to `rest 
content with the fact that we have such reactions, '13 manifest in analytical political 
philosophy reflects a widespread distrust of explanations which are at best partial and 
contestable interpretations of value and belief, and at worst metaphysical verbiage. This 
wariness is complemented by a desire amongst ostensibly analytical schools of thought to 
expunge the question of value from social theory in favour of argumentation pursued 
according to transparent models of explanation and validity, a tendency evidenced for 
example in the Anglo-American enthusiasms for logical positivism, behaviourism, 
rational choice theory and abstract theories of meaning. 14 
This basic point undermines the initial presumption of individual inviolability 
which Rawls attributes to the subject of justice. It does not invalidate that judgement, but 
does challenge Rawls to explain and justify the values and beliefs which underlie it, a 
process which is clearly necessary once the `natural' or `intuitive' status of his claim is 
revealed to be chimerical. Methodologies of procedure and construction proceed by 
validating an outcome in terms of the manner of its production, where `the rationality of 
an agent.. . 
is judged by how he thinks, not in the first instance by whether the outcome is 
substantively correct. '15 Supplanting phronesis with a conception of practical reason based 
upon norms of calculation, interest or prudence results in a theory which is problematic 
from the outset in being unable to account for the resulting command morality - 
obligatory injunctions determining right action - other than in the terms in which they 
are elicited. Applying this general objection in the particular case of Rawls's theory, the 
11 Taylor, SÖurcLs o/ the Sel/, 5. 
12 Taylor, Sources of the Se//, Ch. 1. Although Taylor's references of Gay{anncr are fairly sparse, the 
`inescapable' status of 'frameworks' is undoubtedly analogous to the 'prejudices' Or prejudgements which 
Gadamer presents as a transcendental Condition of understanding and `effective-historical consciousness'. 
Hans-Georg Gadainer, Truth and Method (2nd. ed., London, Sliced and Ward, 1979), esp. ? 23-267. Similarly, 
Taylor's discussion of `horizons' denoting the boundaries of significance described by frameworks concerns 
themes paralleled in Gadamer's discussion of language. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 27-29,35-40, Philosophical 
Papers 1,277 ff. Gau{amer, Truth and Method, 345 If., 397-414. 
13 Taylor, Sources of the Self 5 
14 For example, on behaviourism see Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour; on rational choice, Donald 
Green and lan Shapiro, Patl.; olo res ofRation. 
l choice Theo, ' (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994); on 
language and Anglo-American methodologies see Michael 
Dummett, Can Analytical Philosophy Be 
Systematic, and Ought It To Be? ', in Kenneth Baynes, panics Bushman and Thomas McCarthy (eds. ), After 
Philosophy: End or Trara/i)rrrtation? (Cambridge, MA., MIT Press, 1987), 215 f. 
15 Taylor, Sources of the Self S6-90. 
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`well ordered society' is not susceptible to substantive justification other than as an ideal 
institutional framework offering impartiality of application between persons accepting 
and conforming to a normative conception of moral personality and legitimate 
(reasonable) interests. The emphasis on principles of right pushes to one side issues of 
value - concerning the nature of the good - but as Rawls indirectly conceded, it is 
precisely these elements which support the concept of right and in terms of which the 
right demands justification. 
This is not to say that strongly valued goods16 are missing from the proceduralist 
agenda, rather that they persist within them in an undertheorised form. Although 
theories such as justice as Fairness `are motivated by the strongest moral ideals, such as 
freedom, altruism, and universalism. . . 
[t]hey are caught in a strange pragmatic 
contradiction, whereby the very goods which move them push them to deny or denature 
all such goods... [t]heir thought is inescapably cramped. '17 A reluctance to engage with 
the frameworks which make moral understanding possible leads Rawls to postulate 
individual inviolability as an assumption on a par with a `natural fact', whilst the desire to 
construct an account of political morality free from contingency and partiality underpins 
the entirely irreal18 conceptions of subjectivity and practical reason modelled in the 
original position. 19 A deliberate myopia distorts this conception of the theoretical 
endeavour and serves to `narrow our focus to the determinants of action, and then restrict 
our understanding of these determinants still further by defining practical reasoning as 
exclusively procedural. They utterly mystify the priority of the moral by identifying it 
not with substance but with a form of reasoning. '-'° 
These remarks are offered by Taylor against a range of approaches and philosophers 
upon which a `naturalistic' status is conferred in virtue of their insufficiently interpretive 
character, within a general critique emerging from a survey of the history of ideas rather 
than from detailed examinations of contemporary theorists. 21 A perceived lack of detail 
16 Taylor refers to higher order values as 'Hvpergcods', an appalling neologism \vhich I will avoid 
using in so far as clarity of present. ition all(>ws. T, a\'lor, Sourct$ ref the Self, 63, passirre. 
17 Taylor, Sources ö/ the Sell, 88. 
18 The term `irreal' is borrowed from \X', ill. ich, 'Liberals, Communitarians and the Tasks of Political 
Theory585. 
19 This myopia is by no means confined to Rawls, wwwho sc 
demarcation of political and comprehensive 
conceptions is paralleled in jiirgen Haherm, ts's 
distinction between the procedural, universal moral-legal 
realm and the untouchable 
doiimatin Of `ethical-existential questions. See e. g. Hahermas, 'On the Pragmatic, 
the Ethical, and the Moral Employments Of 
Practical Reason' in Justtfication and Application, 1-19. 
20 Taylor, Sources of the Sc#, 89. 
21 Although Taylor does (occasionally discuss particular authors at some length, such as Foucault 
(Al)ilosoplbical Papers l/, Ch 6) and Novick (Philosopl; ical Papers ll, Ch. 7) for the most part comments on his 
contemporaries are brief and related to the 
development of his wider agenda. see e. g. the comments on Rawls, 
Habermas, Mackie, Hare, \X'illiams and others in Sources cif the Self Pt 1. 
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has concerned some commentators, 22 but such criticisms are insufficiently attentive to 
the contexts of Taylor's work. His cosmopolitan project is comparable to that of Rawls, 
who offered Theory as an alternative to a similarly general presentation of utilitarianism, 
and the themes to which Taylor has consistently drawn attention have been pressed in 
detail against contemporary interpretations of liberal individualism by a range of authors, 
in the case of John Rawls by Michael Sandel in particular. As the previous chapter 
discussed at some length there clearly is a case to answer here, and in addressing the 
methods and assumptions of Anglo-American philosophy Taylor brings upon himself 
the requirement not to rehearse and refine established arguments against individuation, 
but to expound a clear and defensible alternative. The success or otherwise of this 
endeavour can be reasonably judged against Rawls, because despite the difficulties 
surrounding Justice as Fairness it is indisputably the most influential statement of liberal 
individualism of the post-war era, if not the entire twentieth century. 
Instead of relying upon intuitionist assumptions, Taylor advances a 
phenomenological realism which locates the bases of moral concepts within socially and 
historically explicable accounts of values, ideas and practices which shape the 
environment within which interdependent agents think, judge and act in a process which 
exhibits both individual and collective aspects. The rejection of Archimedean judgement 
admits into the moral equation a range of possibilities which certainly complicate the 
explanatory process, but which do so in a manner directly addressing substantive 
questions of value, and of value conflict, which procedural theories elide rather than 
confront. One clear advantage of Taylor's interpretive approach is its ability to take 
moral pluralism seriously on a theoretical level. Although Political Liberalism proclaims 
itself a response to `the fact of pluralism', by narrowing the domain of the political and 
unreasonably imposing restrictions of reasonableness upon permissible conceptions and 
doctrines, 'problems of heterogeneity are dissolved within a vision of rational negotiation 
which is artificial in both conception and execution. Differences in moral value which are 
ultimately manifested in society as competing political claims are denied expression in the 
political domain of the well ordered society. Rather than attempting to delimit moral 
diversity through the procedural application of normative standards (e. g. autonomy, 
liberty, universality, toleration) Taylor begins by recognising the multiplicity of 
potentially incompatible values and judgements which constitute and sustain complex 
22 As argues{ by e. g. Annette Baier, 'Re), vicww" of 
T. t. \-]()r, Philosophical Papers IF, Canadian Journal of 
Pbt/osopl. ýy 1S (198S), 590-591. In a related vein, 
Clifford Geerti has suggested that Taylor's polemical 
characteri: m ion cal srientilir ciýcthcýcicýlcý ;ý pays 
insufficient herd to its culturally conditioned character and to 
the resources which 
innovative methods in natural science might oller to their 'social counterparts - an 
analysis ý\, ith which 
Taylor in large part concurs. Geertz, The strange estrangenment: Taylor and the natural 
sciences', in Tully 
(ed. ), Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 83-95; Taylor `Reply and Re-articulation', 233-236. 
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social and political structures, without resorting to the artificial construction of an 
overlapping consensus or self-contained political domain. 23 
This openness to pluralism is a point which is often missed. Much of the critical 
response to Sources of the Self focused on Taylor's hedged personal advocacy of theistic 
accounts of the good. 24 This rather vague discussion of `the spiritual possibilities of 
today's culture'25 has been seen as objectionable by advocates of secularism in a manner 
which neatly illustrates Taylor's critique of the dogmatism of the `world-picture' 
established by `naturalist' epistemologies. The notion that `only a god can save us' 
attributed by such interpretations entirely misses the point that a diversity of 
understandings shape moral responses, even when a surface appearance of homogeneity 
leads us to assume a common source of meaning. -'6 In response to such criticisms Taylor 
has repeatedly pointed out that an appreciation of heterogeneity facilitates the 
development of deeper perceptions of the basis of commonalty and difference. 27 The 
cultivation of an openness towards difference allows for the recognition of the other in 
ourselves, and vice versa, in order that rather than assuming an unbridgeable 
incommensurability of value persons are enabled to understand themselves and others as 
more fully engaged within a shared fate than the Rawlsian construction can envisage. 
Accepting the location of theory within Plato's cave, -'s an approach which is 
substantive rather than procedural takes goods and values as the starting points of the 
deliberative process. Where Rawls is driven to deny the legitimacy of interests falling 
outside the boundaries of justice as Fairness, a substantive approach identifies and seeks to 
interpret the moral understandings maintained by individuals, groups, and the linguistic 
and cultural environments within which they find themselves. Pluralism and relativism 
do not crudely coincide in this formulation. Acknowledging that moral diversity finds its 
grounding in varied conceptions of value does not entail the further claim that differences 
between frameworks, and the concepts and values they sustain, are necessarily 
incorrigible. 29 Instead the opposite is the case, since an awareness of the sources of 
23 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 6.1, `Hypergoods are generally a source of conflict. ' 
24 
e. g. Taylor, Sources of the Sel/, 317,718. See especially Quentin Skinner, '\\'ho Are `We'? Ambiguities 
of the Modern Self', inquiry 34 (1991), 146-150; revised in Tully, Philocoplry in an Age of Pluralism, as 
`Modernity and Disenchantment', 37-48. 
25 Taylor, Sources, 490. 
26 This is perhaps most clearly stated in Taylor, `Reply and re-artic'ulation', _251: '... why go on trying to 
squeeze blood from a stone, trying to torture everything we 
hold dear out of the single canonical principle? 
Why don't they just relax and admit that goods are plural, and save themselves all these strained arguments? 
' 
27 
e. g. Taylor, 'Comments and replies', 
Inquiry 34 (1991), 240-242; `Reply and re-articulation', 224-6; 
and Taylor, 'Reply to Braybrooke and 
dc Sousa', Dialogrcr 33 (1994), 125: `... the book's title is, after all, 
`Sources... ,. 
28 Rather than . lt the 
1-11: C Stlll mit of the Archimedean point. The Platonic image is borrowed from 
Michael Walzer, Spheres oJfustice (New York, Basic Book, 1983), xv. 
29 For example Hartnut Rosa, 'Goods and 
life-I()rnls: Relativism in Charles Taylor's political 
philosophy', Radical 
Philosophy 71 (1995), 20-26, errcýneusl\ clainis that '. t" m)0, n as we allow for a plurality 
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diversity is a condition of the possibility of evaluative discourse and negotiation between 
potentially incompatible identities, interests and moral perspectives. 
A substantive understanding of pluralism involves recognition of the undecided 
character of moral theory as well as political practice. Rather than imposing a model 
which resolves conflicts of interest and belief by definitional fiat, by approaching 
pluralism head on, space is maintained for dialogue and debate between different 
frameworks, the values they uphold and the practices which manifest them. This is 
perhaps less philosophically satisfying from a procedural perspective as a secure outcome 
is no longer guaranteed in advance, but given the unconvincing character of Rawls's 
methodology the sacrifice of analytic certainty represents a theoretical advance. Where 
Rawlsian constructivism closes the domain of the political by reducing it to a function of 
the underspecified norm of reasonableness, a substantive approach reiterates the 
practicality of practical reason and moral complexity in order to confront and relate 
theory to the world which it inhabits. 
The issue of pluralism and relativism inevitably raises the question of universality. 
The notion that a universally compelling standpoint is indispensable to the coherent 
formulation of effective social criticism - something of an article of faith amongst 
prominent neo-Kantian theorists30 - ignores the possibilities afforded by a less 
circumscribed conception of rationality. Where Rawls accepts the apparent unanimity of 
intuitive moral reactions as an uncontroversial starting point (which falls apart rather 
quickly) Taylor's more deep seated investigation of the beliefs underlying this appearance 
should not be construed as a blanket rejection of universal concepts. As stated at the 
outset of Sources of the Self, `[w]e are dealing here with moral intuitions which are 
uncommonly deep, powerful and universal... The roots of respect for life and integrity do 
seem to go as deep as this... '. 31 A pluralistic approach which seeks to uncover the basis of 
belief does not preclude the identification of universals. It does, however, preclude the a 
priori prescription of universality as a requirement of moral legitimacy or rational 
thought. The notion that a valid moral claim might not be universalisable may well 
trouble the sensitivities of normative theorists, but the tendency to balk at the mere 
of ethical frameworks and hypcrgood conceptions, the problem of 
incommensurability and hence of 
relativism reappears' (24). This conclusion 
depends upon the misinterpretation of frameworks as `solid 
backgrounds' (21) and of goods is `ontologically given' (23). Neither Of these phrases occurs to my 
knowledge 
anywhere in Taylor's writings, and Rosa's reading pays 111S1tfIicient 
heed to the reflexive and intersubjective 
aspects of Taylor's philosophical anthropology. 
30 Evidenced for example by R. iwls's Archimedean rhewrlc and H. ahermas's insistence on 
his principle 
`U' as the grounding norm prest ppo,: cd 
h\ "tll 
(i. e. not 'ýthiýal-existential') disc arse. Hahermas, Moral 
Consc'u)usncsý and C1MM1 11c: 1fl: r A1'lzon, trans. 
Christian Lenliardt and Shierry Weher Nicholson, 
(Cambridge, Polity, 1990), 65 f. For a brief statement of the objective and universal ambitions of analytic 
philosophy in general . cc 
Thomas Nagel, The 1"u w From (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), 
Ch. 1. 
31 Taylor, Sauire., +-?. 
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possibility of incommensurability again misses the point that understanding is a 
prerequisite of deliberation. Taylor's interpretive project does not require or proscribe 
universality, but does make possible a more thorough explanation of the common moral 
intuitions treated by Rawls as unproblematic properties available to reason in a universal 
form. This explanatory engagement is likely to quickly undermine spurious claims to 
universality, but need not do so in all cases and where a strong case is available the 
outcome of interpretation might be an increased understanding and entrenching of the 
universality claimed for a concept such as liberty, tolerance, altruism or solidarity. 
Charges that a substantive approach is either inherently relativistic or devoid of 
critical leverage are thus misplaced. The interpretive enterprise seeks to open up a space 
for deliberation between interpretations of the moral point of view, rather than to 
legislate that perspective from the outset. It is able to address universality at a deeper level 
than alternative approaches which presume it, and far from lacking a critical perspective, 
a hermeneutic approach demands that the theorist no less than and, other person must 
adopt a critical approach from a perspective of value. It further insists that this 
perspective can only be one situated within and related to the world, rather than being 
either Archimedean or Herculean32 in nature. 
[3] ENGAGED AGENCY 
THE DISCUSSION OF INTUITION as a manifestation of underlying value has been 
developed in some detail because as well as being relevant to the critique of Rawls it is a 
central aspect of the conception of the self at the centre of Taylor's work, extending the 
distinction between substantive and procedural approaches towards an interpretation of 
the self as a situated, engaged and self-interpreting agent. Situating the subject proceeds by 
locating the self both physically and psychologically. Within a metatheoretical account 
this necessarily assumes a rather general form, but one which is nonetheless significant in 
establishing concepts and categories which make more particular analysis and application 
possible, and which must not be confused with the wilful abstraction of the original 
position. The significance of the identification of the subject as an agent engaged within 
physical space is at once as basic and elusive as the claim is trivial. The recognition of the 
materiality of human experience within the world, and of human perception and 
cognition of these basic relations - that we can be near, 
far, up, down, left, right and so 
on from other objects - appears innocuous. It marks, 
however, a break with the 
32 On Riwls, scc Ch. 2 aho c. `Hrrcules' is Ronald Dworkin's alter Cg() an imaginary judge of 
superhuman intellectual power' \. "h(. ) 
fulfil. the Archimede. tn role whilst cutting .t faintly ridiculous swathe 
through Dworkin's jurisprudential tllcoýr\'. 
Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (London, Harper-Collins, 1986), 
239 ff. 
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`Cartesian anxiety'33 which defined the dominant ambition of modern philosophy as the 
achievement of epistemological certainty, and made plausible a disengaged and 
individuated conception of subjectivity. Once it is appreciated that even simple actions 
(e. g., as I sit in front of a screen pressing a sequence of letters on a keyboard) require a 
`context conferring intelligibility'34 without which the concept of experience would be 
unimaginable, dualist and mechanist epistemologies become untenable and the situated 
nature of thought and action clearly emerges. Without some awareness of this context the 
possibility of meaningful action would be severely diminished, as evidenced by the 
original position, in which the Rawlsian self is located at a point where the decision of 
principle is all but incomprehensible. 
Rawls's belated and incomplete introduction of aspects of culture and context (in 
part three of Theory, and more explicitly in Political Liberalism) is qualitatively unrelated 
to Taylor's discussion of engagement, and as discussed in the previous chapter is not an 
adequate response to the critique of the individuated subject. The claim that agency can 
only be understood within the context in which it takes place is neither causal nor 
epistemological. It describes neither the determinants of any particular action, nor a state 
of affairs which is transparently available to the individuated subject (or to normative 
theory). Engaged agency is not amenable to discussion in voluntaristic terms which view 
the agent as an isolated observer of an independent reality, and because it does not invoke 
the conceptual schemes routinely supposed in the discourses of analytic philosophy, the 
clarification of the concept of engagement against those discourses is problematic. Rather 
than a set of objects or discrete categories, conceived in a Kantian fashion, 35 the notion of 
a context conferring intelligibility involves a less technical and demanding `prethematized 
understanding'36 which allows us to cope with the world in an ordered manner. The idea 
33 Richard. J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Rclativlsm (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983), 16 ff. 
Charles Taylor, `Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger' in Charles B. Guignon (ed. ) The Cambridge 
Companion to Heidemeter (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 319-322. 
34 i. e. My perception of the range Of objects surrounding me, understanding of my relation to them, 
and of the results of my action upon them. Taylor, 'Engaged Agency and Background... ', 325. 
35 Kant took the question `how is it possible to have knowledge of objects"' to he one of identifying 
discrete modes of cognition that make a priori synthetic judgement possible. The categories of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, Macmillan, 1929), are so taken to constitute the 
conceptual structure of all thought and experience. However, 
because the first critique takes the categories to 
be metaphysical in form `... W C suppose that objects must conform to our 
knowledge' (?? ) in order to explain 
their basis Kant is required to make ultimate appeal to a groundless grounding: `I 
have therefore found it 
necessary to deny knowledge 
in order to make room for faith' (29). Although the system of transcendental 
idealism is not sustainable (it being unclear 
how pure reason can give rise to any such categories, how 
`knowledge' of such `objects' IS possible, etc'. 
) as an attempt to i: cOate the assumption.. and presuppositions of 
cognition and experience 
it can be seen as i precursor of later, less ambitious expl. ail, ýtiý, n. (i. e. which do not 
seek to present categories as nietaphysical entities) Stich is that c )ilsidcred 
in the prc. ent discussion. Taylor 
points towards such an 
interpretation in 'Engaged Agency and Background... ', 30-3?, where Kant is 
described as the 'pioneer... 
in whose steps all deconstructr\ find themselves treading. ' See also Taylor, `The 
Validity of Transcendental 
Arguiiients', Proccedzii; (/'ti)('/1 Ascots/ian Societ 79 (1978-9), 151 165. 
36 Taylor, `Engaged Agency' and Background... ', 329. 
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is analogous to that of a moral framework, i. e. as an inescapable and often inarticulate 
part of the background against which human action becomes possible. It is not a feature 
of the subject which is susceptible to neutral or objective description, as the situated 
character of subjectivity - including that of the analytic philosopher - is already 
enmeshed within and dependent upon it. 
From the viewpoint of Anglo-American theory this does not, to say the least, 
appear to be a promising philosophical approach to either the self or any other area of 
inquiry. The rejection of a hermeneutic approach on analytic grounds misses the point, 
however, that this is not an attempt to relocate the search for founding principles from 
human reason to, for example, psychology, neuroscience or linguistics. An interpretive 
approach instead aims to effect an overcoming of the epistemological problematic which 
is achieved positively rather than negatively. 37 Establishing the connection between 
engagement, agency and human value, hermeneutics attempts to redefine the questions 
surrounding cognition and subjectivity, not to provide a resolution to the search for 
stable foundations. Indeed, the primary distinction at work between `analytic' and 
`hermeneutic' approaches is a very basic one: where analytic philosophy presumes or 
establishes points of uncontroversial fixity as the basis of a critical explanation of moral 
and political phenomena (anhat justice really is), interpretive theories dispute the 
possibility of such grounds. Rather than providing, for example, an alternative model of 
impartiality, hermeneutics invokes a distinction between the objectivist description of an 
event or concept (e. g. in terms of sense data or mental states), and the interpretation of 
that event or concept by an agent. 
This insistence that meaning and understanding are inseparable from context and 
interpretation, in terms of which the significance of an event/concept is alone available to 
the subject, departs radically from the observational stance adopted by ostensibly neutral 
or abstract theories. The claim of Rawls and his contemporaries that their theories can 
`account for' or `are compatible with' the idea of `community'38 overlooks the fact that 
subjectivity is social in the first instance. The impossibility of an Archimedean point from 
which moral and political phenomena might be scrutinised, clarified and projected back 
upon human reason demands that the theory of the subject begins from a point of 
interpretive engagement. 
Taylor's critique elegantly exposes the limits of the epistemological tradition by 
demonstrating that since human understanding of the world can only be based on our 
experience within it, a methodology which proceeds by isolating the self from the context 
that makes its persistence possible is ineluctably flawed. The very idea of independently 
37 Taylor, 'Overcoming Epistemology', in ý. iý nc:, , iltc r PluloSop v: Endo Tranýfiý, »taliurt?, 459-488. 
38 R. twwwI\, TIx'o r', _'64-2b5. 
Sec Ch. ? §3 ahovc. 
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representing objects of knowledge, of abstracting and articulating a universal core of 
human reason, or of identifying the foundational bedrock from which incontrovertible 
truth must derive, arose as a dominant philosophical model within the intellectual climate 
of scientific enlightenment. 39 That context made possible - and plausible - the 
rationalism of Descartes and those following his agenda in various forms to the present 
day, but that programme is predicated upon a paradoxical ahistoricism which denies the 
significance of the intellectual climate that makes it intelligible. Once the dependence of 
the epistemological problematic and the questions it inspires upon those cultural 
conditions is recognised, the temporality of that `regional achievement, 40 is brought to 
the fore and the dominance exerted by its agenda palls. In the case of this essay, for 
example, the conception of the self as an individuated neo-Kantian substrate ceases to 
appear axiomatic when confronted by an explanatory scheme which exposes its 
weaknesses and contradictions, accounts for the provenance of its implicit assumptions, 
and offers to furnish a more complete account of the theoretical issues at stake. 
The application of a hermeneutic approach to the cluster of issues which comprise 
political theory brings to bear resources which are obscured by a narrowly foundational 
approach. Although a major strand of twentieth century thought has concerned the 
overturning of that paradigm, 41 the impact of theories of interpretation within political 
philosophy has been inconsistent. Pioneering works of `Continental' philosophy were 
primarily directed towards aesthetics and literary studies, and as noted earlier are resistant 
to definitive philosophical formulation. The significance for political theory of such ideas 
is only now becoming fully apparent, as antagonistic methodological debates mature in a 
process of intellectual cross-fertilisation. 42 `Continental' philosophy is as varied as its 
Anglo-Saxon counterpart, but a concern with understanding and interpreting what 
Taylor labels `frameworks, ' and which appear elsewhere as language games, 43 inherited 
39 Taylor, `Overcoming Epistemology', 470,476; 'Engaged Agency and Background... ', 330-33. 
40 Taylor, `Engaged Agency and Background... ', 330. 
41 As noted for example by Bernstein in a passage from one of his earlier works (Praxis and Action, 
1971) cited at the outset of Beyond Ohjcctivism and Relativist, ix. That an author as perspicacious as Bernstein 
is still engaged in the preliminary working out of the hernleneutical enterprise within social theory bears out 
the comment above regarding the sporadic impact of interpretive approaches on the discipline. See e. g. 
Bernstein, The Ne;,,; Constellation, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991). 
42 The obvious figures here being Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Merleau-P(nitV and Gadamer. Although the 
later Wittgenstein is typically treated as either 'analytical' or unquantifiable, the prominence of `language 
games and `life-forms' in the Philosophical Investigations, along with 
his disdain for philosophy as theory and 
discipline places him clearly within the group of those who turned , i\v, i\' from 'traditional' approaches. The 
influence of these figures, although underlabouring rather than overt, 
is present tun ugh()ut Taylor's work. 
In a sense the idea of philosophy which the' cumulatively 
describe e nupriscs the background within which 
Taylor's writings operate and gain their coherence. 
Thi', background i, most clearly elicited in Sources Of the 
Self, Pt. 1 and Pt. in the t\\'oo essays 
O; 'erc'onlin. Eptstcin /n<vv and Eri, 'a, tcd Agency and Background..., 
although its presence 
is discernible throughout his writings. 
43 Ludwig \\ ittgenstein, /n . 'csttgatinnc, 
(trans. G. E. M. Anscomhe, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1968), 1, ¶ 7ff. lt is perhaps worth noting that 'language-games' are neither narrowly linguistic nor 
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backgrounds, 44 prejudice, 45 fore-having46 and tacit knowledge47 is a recurring theme. 
Instead of regarding cultural values, meanings and practices as arbitrary or contingent 
factors with which theory claims retrospective commensuration, the critical 
understanding of social phenomena is the focal point of interpretive theory. Hermeneutic 
philosophy is not necessarily anti-liberal in outcome, but methodologically its resistance 
to abstraction is from the outset intransigent towards the presupposition and imposition 
of normative standards of reason, interest and duty upon the self. 
[4] SELF-INTERPRETATION AND STRONG EVALUATION 
THE SPECIFICATION OF moral frameworks and engaged agency establishes the 
philosophical background against which the hermeneutic self is developed, but says little 
about how the self negotiates that conceptual space in order to arrive at an identity or 
subject position within it. Extending the metaphor of space introduced with the idea of 
frameworks, Taylor goes on to offer an account of the orientation of the self, emphasising 
the importance of interpretive and evaluative agency in the formation of identity. 
As `self interpreting animals', 48 human selfhood is distinguished, according to 
Taylor, by reflexive understanding. In answer to the question `who am I' most people are 
able to offer a set of descriptions, values, ambitions and so forth which (although possibly 
inaccurate) comprise their self-interpretation. Rather than being neutrally descriptive, 
this involves an articulation of the sense of self maintained by an agent regarding, e. g., 
roles and positions in society, beliefs and values maintained, relations with (individual 
and supra-individual) others, and more wide ranging understandings of the contexts 
within which agency is embodied. As a part of identity this web of articulations is 
inseparable from the self. It does not describe preferences or represent attributes, but 
rather simply is part of identity. In this sense context and interpretation are constitutive 
for identity, as they are inseparable from the processes of reflection through which the 
monologic'atl. A language is not in itself a 'g. tme', rather it is constituted by t moltipliCity' 4 'games', where 
the word `is meant to bring into prolºilinCnce the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or of 
a form of life' 1,23 (emphasis orig. ). The connection between use and ºnealllilg entails that the positions of 
Wittgenstein and, for example, G, tclamer are closer than might be expected given their radically 
different 
approaches to the activity Of PillIOsºýphy. See al. c, 'f 130, 'laºlgu. age lames . Ire.... Set up is objects of comparison 
which are meant to throw light on the 
facts of our language. ' 
44 Ludwig \'ittgenstein, On Certainty, (ed. G. E. M. Anscomhe and G. H. von Wright, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1974), ¶ 94. 
45 Hans-Georg Gadamer, T-uil., and Method, esp. 235-153. 
46 Martin Heidegger, Being ans! Time, (trans. John Macquarric and Edward Robinson, London, SCM 
Press, 1962), 190 If. A reasonably strong rise could he made in favour of the argument that Heidegger is the 
significant point of departure regarding these arguments, as 
discussed in chapter five below. 
47 Michael PoýI. in\vi, The Tacit Dimension; (London, Ro utle(lge and Kegan 
Paul, 1967); Knowing and 
Boing (e(i` Marjorie Grene, London, Routledge and Kegami P, tul, 191,9), 
Pt. . Ind Pt. 4. 
4£ý e. g. Tai or, Phil,, jbical Taper:; I. Ch: 1 8:?: Pape)-. i //, Ch. 1; Sources f the Self, Pt. 1. 
106 
subject comprehends both himself and the world. The removal or denial of these 
resources - Rawls's original position being an obvious example - necessarily undermines 
this process as the subject is left without the means to identify himself intelligibly as an 
agent engaged within determinate contexts. 
Rather than being simply determined by contextual frameworks (and the goods, 
meanings and practices they support) the process of self-interpretation is one of 
qualitative discrimination on the part of the self conceived as a `strong evaluator. '49 The 
content of identity is not a simple catalogue of properties and desires; such attributes have 
a significance for the self far greater than that allowed by Rawls's ordering of pregiven 
interests and preferences. 50 `Strong evaluation' involves the discrimination of goods and 
their significance to and implications for identity, in a manner analogous to Frankfurt's 
theory of second order desires. A person's self-interpretation might include for example 
characteristics (for example intolerance) experienced as undesirable. Once recognised as 
such it might become a person's ambition to actively overcome or repudiate such traits in 
order to realise alternative, more significant ideals, and in so doing become to some extent 
a different person. 51 The process of evaluation is therefore also, at least in potential, one 
of clarification and self-transformation, where in an ongoing and always incomplete 
process - which over the course of a life exhibits a complex narrative structure52 - the 
self is constantly put into question and reformulated in the course of reflection on the 
content of identity. 
Two orders of explanation are invoked in the comprehension of decision, action 
and transformation. Selfhood is always a process of becoming as well as being, and the 
temporal structure of interpretation engages the future as well as the present identity 
desired or envisaged by the self. 53 The interpretation of `desiribilia'54 invokes 
discriminations between activities and sensibilities evaluated by the self as valid 
components of a worthwhile life. These `life goods'" do not define `the good', but draw 
upon, and direct the self towards the realisation of, `constitutive' goods which motivate 
and ideally lend coherence to the range of elements involved in any complex identity. 
Constitutive goods are of fundamental significance to identity, evoking overarching 
49 Taylor, Sources of t/'c Sc//, 20 If. 
50 As discussed in Ch. 2 §3 thvc. 
51 For example in t manncr more closely attuned to the underlying values maintained by the subject. 
The examples offered by T<aylror, of a person struggling to overcome an addiction to cream cakes 
(Pl. )ilosopl. )i(-al Parcr, 1,21 3) or cigarettes (Phz/osr, pl, cal 
Pdpcr: s //, ? 24-5) illustrate the point clearly enough but 
are strangely non-political. 
T, t\, lor. Sources cýý the Se/I1 52. IOIIowiui 
Maclnm-re, /icy Virtuc, ? 
04 220. 
53 Although as \\'it11 the role of goods, this tempor<tl structure need nc, t 
he fully explicit; unreflective 
followers of hedonism cor utilit, iri, lnism, 
for example, might well reproduce the in, irtictcl, icv claimed by 
T, i\'lor for such doctrines 
in their own self-uiiderstaiidm,,,, Sorc>cc: <o/'1/; e Sel/, 21-4,332-b. 
0. D4 T, iv lor, Sources o. 1'111(, 
S//. 
_ 
Taylor, Sources o/ the Sc ll. 93. 
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values in the light of which otherwise less important commitments assume an order and 
meaning for the self. In a formulation sufficiently candid to make a Kantian blush, Taylor 
claims that `[t]he constitutive good does more than just define the content of... moral 
theory. Love of it is what empowers us to be good ... 
[and is] part of what it is to be a good 
human being. '56 This might be viewed as an example of the verbiage from which 
naturalist epistemology sought to liberate philosophy, but to treat it as such is to mistake 
the form of Taylor's formulation for its content. The idea of the good as constitutive has 
assumed several forms in the history of ideas. Where earlier standards of the Good - at 
the apex of Plato's theory of knowledge, '7 or as the `activity of the soul in conformity 
with excellence'58 within Aristotle's conception of the best and most complete life - 
were conceived as wholly external of man, the inward character of modern thought - in 
the instance of Kant, for example, as the pre-eminent object of the will - locates the good 
within the subject59 but does not alter its philosophical significance. Similarly, Rawls's 
reluctance to explicitly theorise as goods the autonomy and individuality that he 
privileges within justice as Fairness obscures but does not undermine their status as 
ordering ideals. 
A substantive theorisation thus establishes a situated, self-interpreting agent whose 
identity is formulated in evaluative practices involving the discrimination and realisation 
of constitutive or strongly valued goods. The pluralistic social and political development 
of this metatheoretical sketch occurs through the identification of three axes of moral 
concern which inevitably arise for the self in the course of this evaluative engagement 
with the world. 60 The first involves the background determinations of human value in 
terms of which our sense of obligation or respect due to others is grounded, which 
contributes to the second axis, involving the formulation of a more concrete and 
particular account of what makes a way of life meaningful and worthwhile, rather than 
arbitrary or trivial. The third and final element of moral thinking introduces the idea of 
personal dignity, drawing attention to the importance of self-respect and the extent to 
which it is dependent upon the character of one's relationships to others - involving, for 
example, the fulfilling of a range of social roles or the public recognition of particular 
talents or actions - rather than being a primary- good susceptible to distributive 
manipulation. Both facets of this conception of dignity (the subject's sense of self-worth, 
56 T, ºv Ic>r, Sources of the Sc! /, 93. 
57 Plato, Repuh/tc 555-92. 
58 Aristotlc, : \', cOm-, clhc. rrr Elhtc. <, 1098,1. 
59 The 'turn' loci sting the gý ßc1 within m, in, rather than as an external source reflecting all objective 
`cosmic care er is t\ Eýi(-, IllV seen is 
inaugurating in St. Augu'tine. Sec, e. g. T, º\-]()r, Sources of the Self, Ch. 7; 
Taylor, inwardness and the Culture of Modernity', Axel Hoýnneth et. ciI. (ccds. ), Z 'l5chenhetrachtungen Irn 
Prcýic/. ý'ýer. 1 rt/kl zrtrnýt 
(Frankfurt, Suhrkamp \'erl. t;;, 1989), 601-623, Al, isdair N1, irlntyre, lt'/ u<c Juctice? Which 
R. ationdlit(London, 
Duckworth, 1988). 
60 T, i\'I()r, Souicc: s o/the Scl/, 15 IT. 
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and the affirmation of that sense by others) draw upon and fill out the more general ideas 
of human value, and of conceptions of the good, which provide the grounds of their 
intelligibility. Moral thought is not exhausted by the ascription and application of a 
procedure or criterion of universal respect. 61 The respect we extend to and receive from 
others is not simply a matter of universal right; beyond such formalities it involves a 
complex social processes where persons recognise, relate to and value the goods, choices 
and identities of others in various ways. Taylor's specification of the significance of goods 
for identity thus transforms an abstract respect for choice into a practical and concrete 
moral concern with its contexts and content. 
The elements of method outlined in the course of the discussion permeate 
subjectivity in a complex manner. Although each person's self-interpretation is their 
own, it is not a possession in an individuated sense. The formation and reformation of 
identity is an ongoing and crucially intersubjective process. No less than textual 
interpretation, self-interpretation is a linguistic activity, entailing that `[h]uman beings 
are constituted in conversation... what gets internalised in the mature subject is... the 
whole conversation with the interanimation of its voices. '62 
The dialogical, relational constitution of subjectivity is irreducibly multifaceted. 
Participation in intersubjective, evaluative activities pervasively contributes to the 
understanding of self and world in ways that are not always easy to specify, 63 but which 
function to affirm identity in the social practices of everyday life. Were I suddenly to 
develop the conviction that I am, in fact, Napoleon Bonaparte, or that my true vocation 
lies in becoming an astronaut then my present self-interpretation would be put into 
question. In these extreme cases I would hopefully be reminded that I am manifestly not 
Napoleon and lacking in the skills required of an astronaut. The above examples are 
obviously rather facile, but hopefully indicate how less extreme instances, perhaps 
concerning the choice of a career, the affirmation of political or theological values, 
personal commitments and relationships and so forth, are no less questions of self- 
interpretation. When considering these and other issues of value and commitment we 
offer an account of ourselves both as individuals and in relation to others, and when these 
interpretations become areas of uncertainty reflection and deliberation upon those 
61 As Suggested by Haherm, ts, Justification and Application, 128: `... the fact that moral theory does not 
aspire to anything over and above the task of reconstructing the moral point of view and justifying its general 
validity does not amount tee t deficiency. ' Taylor responds to this potential objection 
by noting that `... if we 
adopt this definition [of morality] then we 
lt, tvc to allow that there ire other queStiOns hevond the moral 
which are cif central cmi ern. ' T, t\ 
lor, Sources cif the Sell, 14. 
62 Taylor, The Dialogic-il Sell', in )aittrs F. Boýhin, tn, D, t\ Id R. Hile mid R. Sltusterman (eds. ), The 
Interpretive Turn: Philusopbv, Science, Cultun-e (lc, ttha, Cornell Liniversit. \ Press, 1991), 314. 
63 Evidenced Ior ex. tittplc by unclerst. tnclim;, ul 1; o, )d mo. 1 h. k1 taste, ippro priate . tied inappropriate 
behaviour and so opt. These icic. v, are pro)bdbly a nt, ttter 4I 
It, thitu. ithm more thin mything else, but they 
describe conhlttolt codes \\'Itüh would 
he clillicult to . trtiiul, tte mid justify, being p. trt of the normally 
uncthtrusive backgroutttl: against which ageneý 
take pla e. 
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understandings and relationships (involving social institutions, meanings and practices as 
well as groups and individuals) makes possible a revision or transformation of the axes of 
thought defined by Taylor, and hence of the identities to which they contribute. Such 
processes involve negotiation between the self and others, and are inevitably plural and 
dialogical. In a more subtle manner than the examples above imply, interpretation and 
evaluation are thus ever present in the unfolding course of a reflexive life. 
[5] DEFINING CONTEXTS: LANGUAGE 
, 
`COMMUNITY', POLITICS 
THE AXES OF MORAL THINKING identified by Taylor insinuate identity within the social 
world, relating interpretations and understandings of both self and good to the contexts 
in which they arise. Presented in an extremely strong manner, practices involving 
evaluation and interpretation are associated by Taylor with `undamaged human 
personhood. '64 Their lack would be experienced by, the self as an identity crisis; unable 
to locate himself upon the conceptual map of moral space, the world would be 
experienced in a disorienting fashion characterised by uncertainty regarding, for example, 
which activities and commitments are good and bad, worthwhile or futile, significant or 
trivial to his identity. This argument - broadly paralleled in areas of contemporary 
sociological and psychological research65 - raises questions concerning the inescapable 
status which Taylor attributes to moral frameworks, self-interpretation and strong 
evaluation. 
As the importance accorded to evaluation and interpretation suggests, language is 
`anthropologically strategic'66 for Taylor's account of identity in a wide sense implicating 
the range of communicative and symbolic media through which people experience and 
interpret the world. The recognition of the self as a linguistic being challenges 
epistemologies which view language as an inert medium of description with a more 
complex understanding of symbolic and linguistic communication. Although a range of 
everyday linguistic acts can be unproblematically treated as designative in form (i. e. 
referring transparently to states in the world - `the bowl is on the table', `the train has left 
the station'... ) the attempt to theorise language in terms of correspondence and 
64 Taylor, Sources n/. the Sel/, 27. 
65 See e. g. Harry Frankfurt, 'On the Necessity of Ideals', 
in Thomas E. Wren and Gil G. Noan-i (eds. ), 
The Moral Self (Cambridge, MA., MIT Press 1993), 16-27, and Robert Bell, ih rt. al. , 
Habits of the Heart 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995), 287-292. The sense of anomie and lack of meaning chronicled 
by Bellah and his co-authors is interpreted 
by Taylor as part of a shift in the 'dominant patterns of 
psychopathology' from the 
Freudian model of hysteria, plhchia and neurosis to the present state of affairs 
self-esteem. ' Taylor, where `complaints centre around 
-c,,, () loss", or i sense of emptiness, flaatness... or lo id' 
Sources of the Self, 19. 
66 Taylor, Philosophical Pipcr. i 1,216. 
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representation67 overlooks the significance of language as medium of expression and 
realisation as well as description. 
The philosophy of language which Taylor labels `expressivism' is more a general 
methodological perspective than a singular doctrine. The `central notion, ' that the 
realisation of the subject takes place through the formulation and expression of human 
meanings in language, is presented as a dominant concern of the cultural transformation 
wrought by the Sturm und Drang in late eighteenth century Germany. The satisfactory 
identification and classification of diffuse intellectual movements is always problematic, if 
not impossible, but setting to one side the historical detail of this interpretation a clear set 
of philosophical themes emerge from Taylor's discussions of (amongst others) Fichte, 
Schelling, Hölderin, Herder and Hegel. 68 
The designative stance towards language advanced by rationalists and empiricists 
alike was intimately bound up with the advancement of natural science in the 
seventeenth century. The period of Enlightenment was above all one of methodological 
transformation as the metaphysics of ancient Greece and medieval Christendom gave way 
to a scientific (but no less metaphysical)69 world view. Earlier approaches to language 
viewed the world as an intrinsically meaningful place, dimly perceived but nevertheless 
accessible through the interpretation of texts and symbols. 70 The notion that human 
67 Taylor, Pb1'10. nopl)ical Papers /, 252. 
68 References t( Hegel and Herder ah()llnd thr, )ugh, )ut T, tvl()r's writings, but in particular see Taylor, 
Hegel, pp. 17-46; Philosophical Papperl //, Pt. ///; Sources u/the Se/f, Ch. 21, Chs. 24-25; The importance of 
Herder', in Edna Marg. tlit and Avishai M, trg, tlit (Cis. ) Isaiah) Berlin: A celebration (London, The Hogarth 
Press, 1991), 40-64. 
Perhaps due to the dominance in Germany of Goethe the Sturm und Drang is Often characterised as a 
romantic movement. The relationship between expressivism and literary romanticism is however as complex 
and ambiguous as the two terms themselves. Both movements looked upon nature as a source of meaning 
rather than t neutral, contingent set of facts and relations to be explored and dominated. Where the 
Romantic poets saw the realisation of nature in man as the achievement of the spontaneous, inspired or 
emotional individual (a travesty of Rousseau's comparison of nature and human sympathy with the artifice 
and vacuity of enlightenment and encyclopaedia), cxpressivism appeals to both reason and nature, as e. g. 
Kant, Schelling and Hegel each viewed reality (albeit in different ways) is ultimately spiritual in nature, but 
as a reality which was to he realised in the world through the exercise of rationality rather than the 
subjectivism of unconstrained imagination. This distinction between 'aesthetic' romanticism and 
`philosophical' expressivism is not always a clear one, however, given the broad Idealism common to both 
movements. Taylor's usage of the terms is not always is crystalline is one might hope. See e. g. Sources of the 
Self, Chs. 21-25, where the discussions of rom. tnticism, expressivism and `post-romantic' modernism use 
terminology such as 'romantic expressivism' in a manner suggesting that whilst romanticism and modernism 
are typically expressivist, expressivism is not synunýynious with either romanticism or modernisnm. Although 
the label is useful in the present instance for the 
denmrcatimn of themes, the categories are not amenable to 
hard and last definition, and within a 
detailed exaininati, m O1 the eighteenth or nineteenth century 
(involving e. g. visual and musical as well as 
Iiterarv c(i npo): itio)n) night well emerge as inadequate or even 
misleading. 
69 In that ph, sics and mathematics were (and often are) are taken to Oller, Or pi tentially offer, a correct 
and final account of underlying >Lructtire OI tli \\-url(l, etc. 
70 eg the Platonic model c, inceived the task ,I pliilw. , pli\ i: that ()i ncc\\. int questi, )ning 
in dialectical 
pursuit Of ,t timeless order Of 
Ideas and iu: ntii purpose ([cloy) underlying the chaotic appearance presented by 
the phenomenal ýý ý)rle1. 
Theological ideas of the world as a web of interrelated signs manifesting the 
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meaning might originate outside of the individual subject lacked credibility within an 
intellectual climate organised around the principle of deductive clarity. Nominalism 
identified meaning as a property of language possessed by individuals, and the conception 
of language as symbolic was replaced by a model which viewed it as an `instrument of 
control in gaining knowledge of the world as an objective process. '71 The avoidance of 
metaphysical error demanded an obsession with definition, clarity and consistency of use 
in order that an unambiguous relation be established between the subject and object of 
language, between the individual mind and the world which it inhabits. In Rorty's 
memorable metaphor72 this dualism produces a conception of mind as a `mirror of 
nature' from which the individual receives distinct impressions of the world as atomic 
data to be reassembled and ordered as concepts, represented to the subject transparently 
by the names associated with them. 
German philosophy in the late eighteenth century was a reaction to, as well as a 
continuation of, the ideas introduced by earlier movements in Scotland and France. 73 
Enlightenment, `man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity'74 ruled out the 
possibility of a return to ancient or medieval paradigms of thought. As imposed upon the 
concept of self, however, the objectifying epistemology of the new science supported 
reductive theories of instrumental rationality, mechanistic psychology and utilitarian 
morality. These modes of rationality estranged the `punctual' self from the world by 
representing society to the subject as an aggregation of dissociated individuals bound by 
relations of competition and struggle, rather than engaged upon the realisation of a 
common life. 
Expressivism addresses the limitations of radical enlightenment by theorising the 
reflexivity involved in the most simple use of language. The relation between word and 
object is not a simple identification and association of mental content and designative 
label, as reflective awareness is involved in the production and recognition of the most 
elementary communicative act. Rather than being `merely the external clothing of 
thought, '75 through which meaning can be verified by comparison with observable states 
in a distinct and independently available world, language operates across the range of 
human activity76 as the ever changing medium and capacity in which thought and 
omnipresence pof god similarly emph<tsiseiI the 
interpretation 4 texts (he they Christian, Talmudic or 
Cabalistic) its part oI the search for i meaningful order wv, titing akvaý s 
deferred scriptural revelation. 
71 Taylor, Philompbic. zl Paper /, 226. 
72 Rorty, Phi/o ö/'/ý trrd the ilirruý'rý%, \ rtr+rc. 
73 Particularly concerning the new mciliml0k)g)' OI science advanced in particular by Bacon and 
Galileo, and demonstrated in the works of 
Descartes, Leihair, SpinOi. a and Hý, hhes. 
74 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment', Hans Reiss (ed. ) Kant: 
Political Writinlgi (CanmbridL; e. Cambridge University Press. 1991). 54. 
75 Taylor, Pbtluiophical Papers 1,2135. 
76 Language does (unarguably) describe and cl. t:: il\, but (1(, c . ') in .t ýim»plex waý hound up with 
nmeaning, hierarchy, subtext, etc. 
Since our understanding , 11111 interpretation of concepts and events in the 
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meaning are constituted and expressed. Indeed, the obsession with language characteristic 
of twentieth century philosophy might well be viewed panoramically as a series of 
attempts to come to terms with the indeterminacy of meaning inherent in the activity of 
language conceived as a reflective process. 
The premise underlying expressivism on Taylor's account is that `[w]hat is crucial 
to language is what is realised in speech, the expression/realisation of reflection'. 77 The 
recognition that meaning is dependent upon language and linguistic practices, involving 
arrays of structurally unstable contrasts and differences between words, idioms, contexts, 
etc., enlarges the subject of speech from individual words to language as a whole. Such 
holism is neither arbitrary nor question begging given that the understanding of any 
particular use of language requires an appreciation of the context within which it is 
situated. Rather than a resource with which we can summon and command, language 
both precedes and exceeds our experience and use, being the medium within which 
subjectivity is `plunged' and can never fully master. 78 
Three claims emerge from the themes outlined above. Firstly, language is the 
medium of reflection in which human meanings are formulated and expressed; they are 
not `described' or `represented' in language, but are constituted by it. Secondly, language 
must be viewed as a whole which is always provisional and in transition through use, a 
network of overlapping meanings, ambiguities, regularities and differences where, 
however implicitly, `[i]n touching one part of language (a word) the whole is present. '79 
Thirdly, understanding is linguistic and so contextual. Language surrounds the self, a 
historical and collective resource outside which the individual cannot be placed. 
This analysis inevitably raises questions. What exactly is it that receives expression 
and realisation in the ever-present medium of language? Once the subject of speech 
becomes the language rather than the word or sentence, in what terms are the boundaries 
of language and idiom to be drawn given that the predication of meaning upon difference 
demands the identification of boundaries and the naming of differences? And what is the 
character of the relation between subjectivity and language, other than the established but 
vastly general `within'? Although ostensibly apolitical, the pursuit of these questions 
draws aspects of this discussion concerning frameworks, pluralism and embodied agency 
towards a convergence which situates and politicises language and subjectivity in order to 
make an explicitly interpretive political theory possible. 
The first, concerning the actual content of expression, can be initially if crudely 
answered by `all human understanding and experience'. This ambitious claim is of course 
world is dependent on I. i11gu. U4C, the reýnstrual of action as 
being (at le, ist in part) linguistic does not involve 
the im osition of .ý limiting class of relevant 
`speech-arts' ýýr 
7TTaylor, Philosophical Papers /, _'? 
1. 
78 Taylor, Philosophical Piper; 1,238- 
79 T. i\-Ior. Plrtl(); Oplric. ll P. ipcr 1, 
? 3l. 
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question begging, but underlines the extent of the transformation which occurs in the 
theory of language after arguments against representation attain prominence. As the 
picture of language as a descriptive entity between the subject and the material world fades 
away, it takes with it notions concerning the separateness of the subject from the body, 
from the world, from language, and from others. The epistemological problem of the 
independent subject of cognition is replaced by a concern with the production and 
interpretation of meaning, experienced in language by the situated agent with an 
immediacy which reveals the attempt to establish an interpretation-free (i. e. 
Archimedean) standpoint to be linguistically unattainable as well as philosophically 
undesirable. 
Justice is neither a metaphysical object awaiting procedural revelation, nor an 
antirealist conception to be constructed using a (perhaps ironically) similar 
methodological apparatus. Narrowing the grammatical distance between subject and 
object does not invite the reintroduction of invalid criticisms concerning the 
abandonment of a critical perspective, as the situated conception of subjectivity is 
explicitly reflexive from the outset, and is not prey to the excesses of radical 
disengagement or encumberment. 80 The embodied, interpretive character of subjectivity 
instead draws attention to the production and reproduction of meanings and goods in 
practices of speech, reflection and action. The universality of hermeneutics81 
incorporates justice, no more or less than any other human phenomena, within the field 
of interpretation. 
A slightly more nuanced approach distinguishes two historical accounts which help 
to clarify the range of possible meanings available to realisation in language. 82 The 
`Romantic expressivists' of the Sturm und Drang espoused an ideal of aesthetic self- 
creation, an individualist vision of `self-unfolding spirit'83 which effected a synthesis 
between imaginative individual freedom and spiritual unity with an idealised concept of 
nature. The twentieth century antithesis of this extreme subjectivism84 occurs in the 
tautological assertion that it is the power of expression itself which is made manifest in 
80 
e. g. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits..., 179. 
81 Gad{, tmer, Truth and Method, 432: 'The hermeneutii. al pheiionien n.. draws into its own universality 
the nature of what is understood, by c{etermining it in .1 universal sense is 
langu, rge, and its own relation to 
beings, as interpretation. Thus we speak not only clf ,tI, tngu, tge of art, 
but also of t language Of - nature, in 
short, of an language that thins have. ' 
82 Taylor, Philou, plhtral Papers 1,238. The e::. 1v c, mcernedd 'Tlre)ric: pof nie, rning' identifies the two 
accounts without using IIIenl in order to outline the houndl, irie: (di expre:: ive potential. 
83 Taylor, Hegel, 36 - 51. The 'strong p()ets 
idealised by Richard Rorty may well he a modern 
equivalent of this conception 
((. Iespite Rortv's much , tvowe(1 anti-essentialism). 
Ro rte , 
Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Prey<, 1989), Ch. 4. 
84 It is perhaps worth noting that this Strain of 
idealism is pre-Hegelian. Hegel's logic and metaphysics, 
although idealist, are obsessed with the concrete manifestation of 
Idea in the world, and Ls such are neither 
aesthetici. t (although 
Hegel treats Of the aesthetic a part of hi: overall : ý: tcm) nor subjectivist in the 
Romantic manner of his near-contemporaries. 
114 
language, rather than (or, possibly, as well as) particular meanings in determinate 
contexts. A popular Heideggerian sound bite proclaims, for example, that `it is language 
which speaks. Man speaks insofar as he replies to language by listening'. 85 Taylor notes 
the `radical anti-subjectivism' involved here and offers the explanation that `in this kind 
of expression we are responding to the way things are, rather than just exteriorizing our 
feelings'. 86 This may be plausible within delimited spheres addressing the literary and 
`epiphanic' arts, but as part of a wider account of language and the basic character of 
human existence - in which context it is identified by both Heidegger and Taylor - the 
claim is best seen as either facile or disingenuous. 
The erasure of the subject from the analysis of language reduces that study to a 
spurious metaphysical or possibly theological search for `Being', rather than an attempt to 
further the project of philosophical anthropology as indicated at the outset of this 
discussion. In failing to recognise language as `master of man', Heidegger claims, language 
is somehow reduced to a level of expression where it `can decay into a mere medium for 
the printed word. '87 Exceeding Socrates' privileging of the spoken word over its written 
counterpart, 88 the idea that language discloses `Being' independently of human reflection 
and action is blatantly incoherent insofar as it is itself an act of interpretation expressed in 
language. Furthermore the idea that language precedes `man' in an ontological (rather 
than merely temporal) manner is anti-humanist rather than anti-subjectivist. 89 This 
movement subordinates the human to the linguistic, and so dissociates the theory of 
language from questions of human ethics, morality and politics. 90 
85 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Tbout; bt, trans. Albert Hc, fstadtcr (New York, Harper and Row, 
1971), 215-216. The phrase occurs in the course of an cssay examining a line from Hiildcris, "... Poetically 
Man Dwells... ". 'Dwelling' is taken to he the 'basic character of human existence'; in turn 'poetic creation, 
which lets us dwell, is a kind of building'; and we 'rcccive' our information about the nature of dwelling and 
poetry from, you guessed it, language. Unfortunately, 'Hirn acts is if he were the shaper and master of 
language, while in fact language remain: the master Of man. \\'lien this relatI(n of dominance gets inverted, 
m, tn hits upon strange manýýýuvres. ' It is difficult to judge whether this barely intelligible 'insight' is 
profound or preposterous, but in the absence of thk' 'measure 4 the gc, clhe, td' (229) it is prudent to accept the 
latter explanation. 
86 Taylor, Pbi/ocophica/ Papers /, 239. 
87 Heidegger, '... Poetically... ', 215. The extent of Heidegger's writings makes this statement difficult to 
take seriously, and although this seems like a facile objection I am not sure that it really is. 
88 Plato, Phaedrus and Letters V//and V/I/, trans. Walter Hamilton (London, Penguin, 1973), 275 ff. 
89 This is of course a rather hasty assessment. A more charitable interpretation suggests that Heidegger 
is hoping that the 'truth of Being' will he 'disclosed' or 'unconcealed' to 'beings' in the 'clearing' or 'lighting' 
of language. Such 'disclosure' apparently makes possible relationships of appropriate coexistence 
between 
Being, beings, technology and the "Vorld. In these terms the approach is not subject - centred, but is perhaps 
of fundamental anthropological importance. 
Hei({egger s failure to concretely specify Being in any sense, 
other than in terms Of mystical comparison and sub-Platnic metaphor, Of 
light, ni, tkr\ such a position 
difficult to maintain with t straight 
face. 
90 AItlý,, tit; h Groýnýiin, /ýttruclrrctirt tu Pl, rl«, /, 
hic. r/ Hcrm ncutic. i, 102-5, argues that the effective 
disappearance of the term 'hermeneutic' from Heidegger'. work alter 1927 
i: large]. incidental, given that 
'language' and 'interpretation' are s\ nonvmc, us. 
Hoýww"evver, Grondin agrees that 'Dasein is no longer 
considered the potential agent of 
its interpretive project\... r, tther, it receives them beforehand from the 
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The approaches offered here as eighteenth century romanticism and twentieth 
century anti-humanism are to a certain extent caricatures. In marking out historical 
extremes, however, they help to define the concerns of a properly political and 
anthropological theory, `a contemporary expressivism which tries to go beyond 
subjectivism in discovering and articulating what is expressed'91 without erring in the 
opposite direction by reducing subjectivity to a function of language and removing it 
from the purview of theory. The demarcation of the boundaries of expression proceeds 
by noting that language makes possible the range of human ideas, concepts, emotions, 
sensibilities, etc. Any understanding of these aspects of identity is only available to the 
self through the possession and use of language. This usage can be either external and 
performative - such as an utterance or non-vocal act, or internal - self-related inward 
reflection and interpretation. 92 Both `internal' and `external' activities have a common 
basis in language, being part of ongoing discursive processes. 93 In the absence of an 
Archimedean starting point the identification and analysis of distinctly political elements 
within the proliferating domain of language is problematic, but by outlining a series of 
relations between language and subjectivity a range of clearly significant political aspects 
emerge. 
The romantic sensibility predictably located the possibility of aesthetic fulfilment, 
that is to say of human perfection, within language. Although overstated, the notion that 
through reflective insight, or perhaps by epiphanic revelation, the individual might find 
mostly subliminal history of being. ' (103) It is difficult to sec how this is good news for the hermeneutics of 
the self. 
91 Taylor, Philosophical Papers 1,247. 
9- Such as ... the 
internal speech we rarely cease addressing to ourselves silently, or to absent others. ' 
Taylor, Philosophical Papers 1,248. 
The self-relation constituted by this speech' is in important condition of identity. Writing in a different 
context Hilary Putnam invites us to 'consider the perfectly possible man who does not have any `interior 
monologue' at all. He speaks perfectly good English, and if asked what his opinions are on a given subject, he 
will give them at length. But lie never thinks (in words, images, etc. ) When he is not speaking out loud; nor 
does anything `go through his head', except that (of course) he hears his own voice speaking and has the usual 
sense impressions from his surroundings... This man seems perfectly imaginable. No one would hesitate to say 
that lie was conscious... ' Ignoring the question of whether this man is indeed perfectly 
imaginable or possible, 
if he did or does exist then he might be considered conscious but nm sei/-conscious. Putnatm's 
description is 
more that of a stimulus-response mechanism than a 
human being (although in the <()ntext of Putnailm's essay 
its role is not I behavioursist une). The 
lack of in internal v nee iinplie: an absence of reflexivity in the man, 
which puts into questitnn the 
hi: capacity for cre, tti\ee language use, self-scrutiny, evaluation and other 
linguistic talents con native t, I : ell-. tw, trcness. To, the extent t11,11 'elf C1)nsci(1usne 
i,, ac )nclition of identity, 
the m, 1n would lack, or have an 
incomplete, `enge of identity,. War)' Puitnam, Reason, Truth and History, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), 20. 
Note also that `performative' is used 
here without controversial intent, that is without reference to the 
notion of `performativity' employed 
by e. g. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Sulr ersz'on of 
Identity (London, Routledgc, 1990). 
93 'Internal' language usage is not the same gis private action. Insofar as languages are public phenomena 
no action or interpretation can 
be private in the sense that 'private' means separate from, and not dependent 
upon, the availability of a common 
space of language and meaning. 
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completion or absolute realisation exposes a less dramatic but more important quality of 
language. The ability to express human goods and related aspects of identity in language 
confers upon them a reflective dimension94 which is unavailable to a static theorisation 
of the self such as that presented by Rawls. 
The self attains realisation through interpretation in the sense that the absence of 
reflection is suggestive of an (at best) occluded sense of identity. In attempting to answer 
the questions posed by embodiment within and experience of the world a level of 
reflexive clarity is attained which would otherwise be neither available nor imaginable. 
Seeking appropriate terms of understanding furthers the development of a consciousness 
where `we can bring to explicit awareness what we formerly had only an implicit sense 
of. '95 It is language which allows this formulation and refinement, and in so doing the 
process itself is inseparable from identity insofar as the act of interpretation is integral to 
the understanding produced. These activities cannot occur in the epistemological vacuum 
of the isolated mind, as the public recognition of introspective reflection requires the 
external manifestation of the resulting interpretation. Thus one basic sense, or perhaps 
definition, suggests that languages are intersubjective activity (sets of activities) in which 
identity attains realisation through articulation. Language so comes into focus as the 
element in which the components of this discussion - moral frameworks, engagement, 
evaluation and self-interpretation - coalesce within a complex theorisation of 
subjectivity. 
The range of possible contexts available to the hermeneutic self involves depths of 
particularity beyond the metatheoretical grasp of this or any comparable discussion, but 
their very identification indicates the presence of circumstantial and linguistic regularities 
which are in some measure consistent over time. The observation that these sites occur 
wherever language does, although banal, illustrates that the sharing of a language involves 
the sharing of a context. Dialogue is only possible because, and to the extent that, we 
have in common languages through which collective deliberation, decision and action can 
occur. Moral and political concerns are formulated in the course of discussions where 
interpretations and conflicts over goods, meanings etc., and their political consequences, 
attain clarification and disclosure96 in the world. Public spaces are thereby produced by 
interlocutors creating in dialogue what Taylor labels `the life of the speech 
community. '97 Although sometimes implicit or of minor import, politics is always 
present within these conversations, which constitute and publicly manifest the range of 
94 Taylor, Pbi/o. pl'ical P. zpc. r_5 1,233. 
95 T, ivlor, Philo o/'I) al / ipc i 1,256-7. 
96 T, ivlor, Philwopbical Papers /, 
269. 
97 Taylor, Pbi/ m/ /rival Papers I, 234. 
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social categories and subject positions, and the associations and antagonisms to which 
they give rise, both within and across linguistic contexts. 
As relations of hierarchy, authority, freedom, domination etc., are realised and 
embodied in language, effective participation in the political life of a `speech community' 
requires an understanding of the conventions and practices through which such 
phenomena are constituted. 98 Public dialogue necessarily concerns the values established 
from the outset as being of fundamental significance to the self, for which speech 
communities function as the `context conferring intelligibility'. 99 The deliberations of 
both individual and collective actors depends upon the availability of a mutually held 
vocabulary of goods and concepts, because in the absence of a more or less stable set of 
preunderstandings of and agreements about the world the possibility of discourse and all 
that follows from it is greatly diminished, if not destroyed. The omnipresence of language 
suggests that without such agreements we cannot exist for one another as human beings 
in a full sense; i. e. as equal agents, with identities demanding recognition, affirmation, 
respect, etc. But simultaneously the complexity and contingency of language precludes 
the establishment of a final or complete vocabulary, making politics - conceivedloo as 
debate regarding the formulation of meanings and identities, and the relations thereby 
manifested in the world - one of the `facts of our language, '101 and hence of the contexts 
constituted by it. 
The formulation and articulation of identity within this array of conversations is an 
achievement of the self, and by no means an inevitable or automatically available process. 
For example, although dissonant voices will be present at the margins of discourse, 102 in 
any given situation a range of possible interlocutors may be excluded, be unwilling or 
unable to participate, seek to undermine a discourse, attempt to withdraw from one 
dialogue in order to inaugurate another, and so on. Furthermore, conceptual disputes 
98 In order to take part in ýI discý'urse one needs to understand the language, and that understanding 
implies access to the range of social relations articulated by it where `the degree and manner of the 
articulation is an essential determinant of the relation. ' Taylor, Philosophical P. pens 1,271-3 
99 See 53 above. 
100 Alternative conceptions A politics (of empiricism, as rational choice, of ideological models, etc. ) are 
of course always available and even necessary within an approach claiming .1 pluralistic status. 
Such 
methodologies are also constituted in 
language and are hence never neutral or impartial, but suppress (or are 
simply unaware) of the interpretive 
dimension of their own comtitutive terms. They are no less `political 
theories' for that, but an explicitly 
hermeneutic approach generates a level pof philosophical awareness which 
is simply unavailable to 
Tess reflexive methodologies, and is in turn ahlc to support .1 more subtle and 
illuminating thcorisation cif -)()III anthropo]ogical and ldvocational 
issues. 
101 V'ittgenstein, PhiloSn//)ical lnvcc1l. dlinrt5, ' 130. Debate about political concepts, their meaning and 
use, are part of the practices Of reflection, comparison, 
criticism etc., in which 'language games' operate. See 
also X11-'. '... It is what 
htºi». tn beings san" that is true and false; and they agree in the larr; ýrraýc that they use. 
That is not agreement in OPI niýýn5 
but in t form of Iifc.... If language is to he t means of c )mmunic. ttion there 
must he agreement not o, nl\ 
in deliniticmns but also (queer ts this ma sound) in juclgeinh"nts. ' 
10_' Although them i' ,i poiiu er, tdicatiom 
from iiictmr\e, in the hisri rro , raphv of I language the 
silence of ,1 previously pr 
c ent v ()ice can itsell speak \ oIun»e". 
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within ostensibly `fully shared systems'103 are inevitable as `speech communities' are not 
hermetic discursive units and any site of communication is likely to be experienced by its 
members in different ways. The interpretation of commonly maintained concepts across a 
context is necessarily varied (in however subtle a manner) due to the range of contingent 
factors constantly impacting upon those engaged within it, and the activity of any group 
so includes ongoing debate about the use and meaning of its vocabulary. 104 
This conceptual uncertainty is compounded by the plural and intersubjective 
constitution of vocabularies in the diffuse activities of overlapping speech communities, 
relating to and affecting each other unpredictably in the formulation of agreements and 
disagreements over commonly held but divergently interpreted meanings. In addition, 
individuals rarely (if ever) find themselves within the limits of a single context. In 
complex societies the subject commonly occupies a range of roles and positions, 105 
simultaneously participating in a range of linguistic contexts and social practices. 
These roles evolve and change as the significance of identifications fade, shift, are 
transformed and are superseded by others in the course of a life. The sheer complexity of 
identity compounded by the indeterminacy of language established by this still abstract 
discussion is daunting. The range of everyday social relations and the dialogues in which 
they are constituted and negotiated are not, however, in permanent flux. Although 
identity is always incomplete and open to (potentially extreme) revision, being open to 
question is different from being permanently in question. That a state of affairs is 
contingent rather than necessary does not entail that changes in that state are arbitrary or 
inexplicable. Indeed, the opposite is more likely since although radical transformation of 
a person or context is always imaginable it is rarely the norm. Although it is formulated 
through participation in a range of potentially inchoate contexts, personal identity is 
ordinarily experienced as physically and psychologically continuous over time, within a 
series of environments and social roles which are similarly impermanent but intelligible 
in their evolution. Self-interpretation and strong evaluation function to relate and cohere 
the diversity of experience in the form of an articulated identity. As with the temporal 
structure of personal identity, environments of publicly debated and articulated meaning 
develop more or less coherently over time. The persistence of society and identity - that 
103 The term 'fully shared system of concepts' is adapted from William E. Connolly, The Terms of 
Political Discourse, 3rd. cd., (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1993), 10 ll. 
104 This COifineºnt about vc>i, ºhul, tries recalls Alascl, tir Mac"Intyre's 
definition of a practice based 
tradition of thought as 'an historically extended, socially embodied argument... iii part About the goods which 
constitute that tradition'. Alasc{, tic 
Mýýclntyre, After Virtue, 222. Although Taylor and MacIntyre have 
common concerns about the efficacy of 
liberalism, MacIntvre's iontr(+vc"rsial and apocalyptic diagnosis of 
`modernity', repudiation of politics, advocacy of 
St. Thomas and other v iews extend far beyond the scope of 
the present essay. See 
Taylor, 'Justice Alter Virtue', in M. Benedikt and R. Berger (ed.. ) Kritische Methode und 
Zunkunft deºrAntl. ºropolº,, 0(" (Vienna, 1985), pp, 23-48. 
10D I. C. In nations and Other territorial 
demarr, lti()ns, . \5Oci, 1tions, 
institutions, families, groups etc., as 
parent, sibling, partner, fellow member, eºnplO. \ cc,,, 
-, -ww-,, rker, , Inc{ .o on... 
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we are ordinarily able to communicate despite the lack of ideal conditions, and are able to 
articulate a intelligible identity in both language and action despite its contingency and 
incompleteness - indicates that discursive and psychological continuity outweighs the 
semantic disorder suggested by a picture of language as a fragile set of arbitrary symbols in 
danger of imminent collapse into meaningless. 
Debates about the meaning, use and significance of ethical and political concepts 
arise both within and between speech communities. Identity is formed through the 
participation of the subject in a range of discourses, where the vocabularies of politics are 
stated, embodied, enacted, debated and reproduced in the many and varied structures, 
conventions and institutions which make up the public life of a complex society. 
Practices of interpretation and action are constituted (however implicitly or 
unconsciously) by concepts and beliefs about the meaning and significance of those 
concepts to identity. Politics organises itself around these concepts and is simultaneously 
about their meaning and realisation. It thus concerns the interpretation of essentially 
contested concepts. 106 
Identity and language emerge from this analysis as interdependent and 
indeterminate, but sufficiently robust and temporally consistent to constitute as politics a 
set of debates concerned with the meaning and interpretation of shared concepts, and 
with the expression of those concepts as political action in the formation of identity. 
Although politics is implied or is potentially present in all intersubjective activity, the 
expressive theory of language only prepares the way for political theory, and cannot 
establish that theorisation in itself. By remaining silent about particular cases of conflict 
and advocacy, the manner of their deliberation, its location, institutionalisation and so 
forth, all that the present discussion establishes is an anthropological outline, the 
elaboration of which as political theory will be the task of part three of this essay. 
Before that elaboration takes place the consideration of principal objections to 
Taylor's project, and to hermeneutics as a philosophical discipline, will establish and 
106 Although today more often associated with William Connolly, the term was first advanced by W. B. 
Gallic, 'Essentially <<mtcstcc{ <<>nccpts', P? rccdin,. s ref theAristutc/1. zn Society ý6 
(19» 6), 167-198. Gallic offers 
`a single explanatory hypothesis calling for some fairly rigid srhematism' (168) in (order to combat the 
relativism and irrationalism of 'what Mr. Hampshire 
has so aptly called the new obscurantism". ' (196) 
Although Gallic does not argue, that his scheme 'ran he l tic{ on to eliminate conceptual confusions wherever 
they arise' he does claim that it Can give us enlightenment of a much needed 
kind. ' (168, emphasis. orig. ) 
Such optimism abtaut the possibility of philosophical resolution of conceptual 
disputes, along with Gallie's 
fairly rigid scheme (171-3) is 
difficult to sustain given the decline of conceptual mnalysis in the period 
following the composition of his paper. 
Despite this his identification and discussion of essentially contested 
`appraiive' concepts is of undoubted aloe. 
It is also worth noting that Gal lie offers his criteria (VI and VII) 
in part as a means of 
distinguishing a class of essentially contested concepts from a supposedly insensible set of 
which are effectively meaningless. The very Identification of a disputed `radically confused' ones (180) 
concept within a 
language suggests, howevver, that although contested and perhaps indeterminate, it cannot be 
radically confused, 
incoherent, nýýanin less etc., otherwise \\'c 'mild nm be able t() :, i), anyt/. ging about it all, 
never mind 
have discussions a[Nout itne. tning and use. 
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defend the position developed thus far. In addition, the justification of Taylor's 
methodology involves further comparisons with Rawls's work, the elaboration and 
defence of Taylor's formulation of realism, and a response to critical assessments of the 
role of reflection within contemporary political philosophy. Although somewhat 
technical, these issues underlie the more obvious differences of methodology and 
advocacy which are at stake between hermeneutic, analytic and other schools of thought. 
As such they are indispensable concerns of a thorough evaluation and comparison of 
situated and individuated conceptions of the self. 
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C I-I A 1' 'I' IRIIVE 
INTERPRETATION AND JUSTIFICATION 
[1] THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE 
THE SHEER VOLUME OF THE LITERATURE addressing the `liberal-communitarian debate' 
is unfortunately not a measure of the depth of consideration which Taylor's work has 
been accorded. In particular, discussions - such as those mentioned earlier] - which treat 
`communitarianism' as an established political standpoint consistently overlook the 
distinction between anthropology and advocacy. The failure to differentiate these two 
related but distinct philosophical moments is perhaps at the root of common 
misunderstandings of `communitarianism' firstly as a distinct `school of thought', and 
secondly as a `school' supportive of a conservative or uncritical political position. A 
corollary of this oversight is that the hermeneutic character of philosophical 
anthropology, and the expressive role of language within it, are also typically 
unexamined. Indeed, despite the prominence of language in other areas of philosophy, 
questions of meaning, interpretation, and understanding are larger- ignored by Anglo- 
American normative political theorists. This omission is perhaps unsurprising given that 
the availability of an unproblematic stock of intuitions, concepts and meanings is 
presupposed in both major statements of justice as Fairness. The limited impression made 
by the linguistic turn on Rawls and his supporters means that the methodological 
assessment of Taylor's position cannot take the form of a direct confrontation between 
substantive and procedural approaches. The examination will instead begin by 
considering the defining component of all explicitly 
hermeneutic philosophies. 
The universality claimed for interpretive understanding towards the end of the 
previous chapter, which underpins 
Taylor's account of the intersubjective production of 
1 S,, c Ch. 3 93 " hw, c. 
meaning, is a version of the explanatory argument known as the hermeneutic circle. 2 
Predictably enough, however, the hermeneutic circle does not command universal assent, 
and it has been suggested that the interdependency of part and whole, text and context, 
general and particular, although ostensibly innocuous, entails that the relationship 
between the `arcs' which make up the figure of the `circle' is a viciously self-referential 
one. If the context of an examination also constitutes the terms of its validation then 
interpretation ceases to be critical, functioning rather to support and affirm prevailing 
conditions rather than to interrogate and challenge parochial customs and practices. 3 
This objection is however a superficial one. Although explanatory circularity is 
unavoidable it is only viciously self-referential from a standpoint that seeks to impose 
`objective' or `universal' standards of reason, or which requires the justificatory leverage 
promised (but not provided) by the context-free illusion of Archimedean judgement. The 
reflexivity inherent in language, and the depth of analysis underlying the theory of 
interpretation, offers ample evidence that the circle is far from being a `simple' one where 
language uncritically constitutes and validates social meanings, conventions, practices, and 
so on. 
More careful scrutiny of the hermeneutic circle predictably leads to a more 
pertinent critique, maintaining that the universality claimed for hermeneutics can have 
disastrous philosophical consequences which include but extend far beyond superficial 
relativism. These issues emerge in the course of a discussion of Heidegger's influential 
account of the hermeneutic circle, 4 and although the criticisms considered below5 are 
not directly addressed to Taylor, if relativism is to be offered as a serious objection to his 
approach then similar arguments must be brought to bear upon his philosophical 
anthropology. That they have not been so advanced suggests that Taylor's critics are 
either content to mount their objections at a superficial but unsuccessful level, or are 
unaware of the methodological complexity (as opposed to the appearance) of hermeneutic 
2 Described by Gadamer, T"uth and Method, 258, as `the hermencutical rule that we must understand the 
whole in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole. ' This principle stems from ancient rhetoric, 
and modern hermeneutics has taken it and applied it to the art Of understanding. ' In another influential 
formulation, Hegel viewed philosophy, `the science of reason', as `a circle of totality containing itself within 
itself, but the philosophical idea is also within each particular determinacy or clenment... [t]he whole presents 
itself then as a circle of circles. ' G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, 1st. 
(1817) 
edition, ed. Ernst Bchler (New )"ork, 
Continuum, 1990), 61 (R06). 
3 In this vein Ronald Dwo)rkin's criticism of Michael \\'. l/er, that '\Vc cannot 
leave justice to 
convention and anecdote' might well 
have been directed at T, º\-I()r. Dworkin, A 1lat1cr of Principle, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 220, might also have been advanced against T. i\ l()r. 
4 Heidegger, Being . 2nd 
Tinic", 192, 'In every understanding Of the world, existence is understood with it, 
and vice versa. All interpretation, morecover, operates 
in the lore-structure... Ans' interpretation which is to 
contribute understanding, must already 
have understood what is to be interpreted. ' 
5 Following the analysis of Stanley Rosen, 'Squaring the Hermeneutical 
Circle', Rcvic::; of Metaphysics 
44 (1991), 707-28, which is developed primarily against 
Heidegger, but involves a general argument against 
theories (including those Of 
Plato and Kant) which precede Or determine practices Of interpretation. 
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approaches. More charitably, it is plausible that commentators are concerned with the 
minutiae of their own arguments rather than those of others. Whatever the case may be, 
the conclusive repudiation or demonstration of relativism within Taylor's work is to be 
found in the evaluation of its vulnerability to Stanley Rosen's critique. 
Rosen's analysis proceeds by exposing and then interrogating the `depth structure' 
of the hermeneutic circle. It begins with an observation: that because hermeneutics 
precedes, and hence is a condition of the possibility of, any particular act of 
interpretation, 6 the `preunderstanding' or `fore-structure' invoked must contain or 
comprise an explanation of why that is the case; i. e. it must include an account of its own 
universality. That being the case the second phase of the argument (upon which the 
discussion here concentrates) examines the scope and plausibility of this proclaimed 
universality, because as an aspect or component of any interpretation, hermeneutic 
preunderstanding must be expected to be rather different in form and status to the 
cognitive awareness ordinarily associated with the verb `understand'. 
Heidegger's development of the hermeneutic circle reveals in detail the extent to 
which philosophical explanations of interpretive universality are liable to fall into error 
by attempting to address phenomena beyond their range. For Heidegger the theory of 
interpretation is more than mere philosophical method; interpretation constitutes and 
characterises our `access to' and mode of `being in' the world. The structure of 
hermeneutic preunderstanding is attributed to a more fundamental universal, specifically 
`Being and the structure of Being [which] lie beyond every entity and every possible 
character which an entity may possess. '? Interpretation undertaken by human agents is 
thus made possible by the always concealed presence of `Being', and as well as accounting 
for and explaining ordinary reflective processes, philosophical hermeneutics depends 
upon and concerns itself with `Being' and in so doing purports to derive from existence as 
such. 
In so doing (as interpretation) it must provide an account of the conditions of its 
own existence, that is of `Being' as revealed by interpretation. This is accomplished by the 
transcendental shift (to that which `lies beyond') inaugurated in the above quotation. 
Because `Being' underlies (is concealed within) every entity, the preunderstanding which 
6A 
vivid, if perhaps slightly' crass, example, ()I the()ry- c{epelldcllc ' taken to excess 
is offered by Tom 
Wolfe, Tbc Painted Vord (London, Bantam, 1976), 4-5. \\'ýýlle cites a 1974 exhihitio n rcvirw: 
`... given the 
nature of our intcllectual commerce with works of art, 
to lack a persuasive theory is to lack something 
crucial - the means 
by which our experience of individual works 
is pined to our understanding of the values 
they signify', and responds to 
it as '... the words in passing that give the game , tw, t\'... 
\\'hat I saw before the 
was the critic-in-chief of 
The Ac::, - York Tinic5 s, tyin ;... frankly, these c{, ty s, without a theory to go with 
it, I 
can't see a painting. 
Then and there... the buried life of io, ntenipt, r. trv art was revealed to me 
for the first 
time. ' 
7 Heic{et;;; er. Bctýr; and Tim e. 62. 
\\'h, tt unc{crst, tncliiý I poý: cs' ()I this passage i" derived from David 
Couiens Hoy, The C'ittc.. rl Circle (Berkeley, 
University Of Calif rnia Press, 1978), viii ff. 
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makes interpretation possible necessarily has `Being' as its structure, and what is decisive 
to the act of understanding is `not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right 
way... In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing. '8 This `knowing' is not understanding in itself, but concerns the postulated 
originary source underlying all temporally and historically situated acts of understanding. 
The elements of human experience (agency in all of its forms) so `receive their form, 
nature, sense or being from the world-constituting activity of the structure... of 
agency... secreted by Dasein. ' 
The modest interpretive claim that an appreciation of or insight into the whole (a 
language or context) is required for the interpretation of the particular (text or practice) is 
expanded in a form where the circle is, in Rosen's terminology, `bloated and 
transformed. '10 In attempting to address the question of Being - whatever that might 
actually bell - from within the circle, Heidegger's interpretive method not only explains 
the relation of part and whole, but identifies the latter `as part of a world that draws its 
structural significance from a transcendental or ontological source. '12 This 
transformation bifurcates hermeneutics into empirical and transcendental parts, and 
instead of explaining the circle doubles its complexity. 
The significance of this expansion of the circle is profound. If preunderstanding is 
held to be derivative of a concealed, primordial knowing, then it follows that `the world 
in which we currently live has been constituted as a historically contingent world. '13 
Interpretation (of anything) is made possible by preunderstandings, but these are 
temporary; preceded by and to be succeeded by alternate conceptions which are similarly 
derivative. We can only articulate our own (world-constituting) preunderstandings in 
relation to other transient descriptions which, Rosen argues, `leads to disaster... the circle 
has been replaced by an infinite regression. '14 Any attempt to offer an account of the 
circle (rather than merely invoke its image) by e. g. specifying the content of 
preunderstanding, collapses into descriptive relativism. Compounded by the 
indeterminacy and multiplicity of language and linguistic practices, this derivative status 
renders all claims to meaning and knowledge parasitic upon perspectives which are 
8 Heid ggcr, Bein j? U/ 71nic, 195, cºnpI1 r iý , iddcd. 
9 Roýscn, 'Squ, iring, tlit Hcrmcnetºtic, il Cirilc', 70S-9. 
10 Rosen, `Squaring thy' Hcrineneutic, il Circle', 709. 
11 Sec Gcc, r; c Stoner, Hrirlc; c', 2nd. cd. (t_cmdcºn, Fc, nt, tn, t 
Press, 1990,35 if. It i' not clear precisely 
what the problem cal predication. 
Iý ýý thin` 04 mC to 'hr', in their `i: nr"ý', iý. or vvhethrr it is `prohlcmaatir' 
at all for those able to reist the 
'niet, 1phV\ic, 1l itch'. 
1-' Ros n, 'Squaring the I-Icni neutii. tl 
Circle', 709. 
1' Rosen. 'Squaring the Hernieneutical Circle', 71 2. 
14 Rosen, 'Squaring the Herº»eneutir, tl Circle', 71 ). 
125 
temporally limited and undermined in advance even of their formulation. 15 The 
memorable consequence of this is that `[t]he transcendental ego, having first been diluted 
into ontological historicity, is now stalking the hermeneutical boulevards in the persona 
of differance. ' 16 
The predication of the structure of preunderstanding upon a transcendental concept 
therefore does introduce relativism into one influential formulation of the hermeneutic 
circle, albeit at some remove from the unsuccessful charge discussed earlier. This problem 
also covertly entered the discussion of language in section five above, underlying the anti- 
humanist idea that it is the power of meaning (conceived as an analogy of the 
transcendental concept) that is made manifest in language, rather than particular 
meanings. 17 If human agency, experience and meaning are attributed to an ineffable 
source then the painstaking phenomenology of situation, engagement, and interpretation 
collapses towards a rather facile idealism. Although by no means clearly stated, this 
collapse is at least implied by the subordination of conceptual and empirical 
preunderstanding to a undefined and undefinable transcendental predicate ('Being'). 
Rosen's critique so reveals a third and more fundamental philosophical danger faced by 
hermeneutics, in addition to the excesses of anti-humanism and subjectivism discussed 
earlier. 
Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics, insofar as it concerns the `truth of Being' and 
the relation obtaining between human being and that postulated truth, rests on an 
unsustainable model of transcendental reasoning which is absent from Taylor's reflexive 
hermeneutics. 18 An adequate response to Rosen's analysis must however examine Taylor's 
work in search of formulations which indicate the unacknowledged presence of 
transcendental or ontological entities. The identification of such sources would in turn 
ask significant and possibly fatal questions of Taylor's project. 
Difficulties raised by the `doubling' of the circle are, in the first instance, easily 
countered by the simple expedient of not making the transcendental move to begin with. 
There is no need to resort to such explanatory strategies because the linguistic model of 
interpretation outlined in chapter four comprehends and relates processes of 
15 This is perhaps the principal philosophical underpinning Of post-modern metaphysics 
(the idea e. g. 
that there is nothing outside the 'text', that everything is a 'text', and that the meaning of the 
`text' is 
arbitrary) 
16 Rosen, `Squaring the Hermcneutical Circle', 713. Rosen's dense argument is accompanied by a rather 
overblown stylistic manner. At 719, 
for example, lie notes that 'Not all of Plato" accc)untS of perception are 
composed in a Derridean key. ' 
17 In this sense meaning, insofar is it 
is derived from the 'primordial knmýý inl; ' mentioned earlier, 
might be equated with the 
disclosure or uncon«'. tlment OI the truth of being. The idea of truth its un- 
concealment of the thing 
in itself is c<s. i cd luv Ernst Ttigeiulltat, 'Heide.. cr's Idea ()I Truth', in Chrisopher 'll 
Macann (cd. ), Critical Hrir! c,:, c (London, R0, utledge, 1996), 
227240. 
18 The distinction here hetwccn 'onto>Iogical' mid 'rcllCxiVC' 
(here i' largely .i matter of 
c. onvcnien(: e. lt sho uld perhaps 
he noted that T. t) NNW LKWS iiiýt u>c ilk' Libel 'reflexive h, ernieneutics' 
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interpretation intelligibly to the interdependent contexts within which they occur, an 
elementary but often overlooked observation that undermines hasty and unnecessary 
formulations of relativism. Despite their complexity, the meanings and understandings 
constituted in the reproduction of social practices and forms of life are not obviously 
transient, derivative or in any other way reliant upon a transcendent notion of `Being' in 
the manner implied by Heidegger. 
Taking account of Rosen's analysis, reflexive hermeneutics must acknowledge its 
explanatory limitations and resist the temptation to claim derivation from or access to 
modes of meaning and understanding beyond the limits of its constitutive vocabularies 
and practices. Taylor's project is positioned at this level and is devoid of ontological 
truth-claims. He does, however, insist on the `transcendental' condition... of our having a 
grasp on our own language' in the sense that `the fundamental dependence of our thought 
on language'19 makes such a relation a necessary but insufficient condition of successful 
thought, communication, deliberation, etc. In these passages Taylor carefully places 
quotation marks around the suspect adjective ('transcendental') which qualifies and 
moderates the consequences of that claim. This underlabouring explanation simply points 
to an unarguable or essential aspect of human experience (e. g. our physical embodiment 
in the world, and linguistic interpretation of that embodiment) and argues that the 
ubiquity of such features demonstrates their relation of necessity to experience. This 
scheme explains and justifies the constitutive status of (in the above example) language for 
human experience, but makes no stronger claim. 20 Most notably it does not establish 
metaphysical claims for any particular set of external or antecedent concepts2l which are 
held to somehow structure human experience in either a necessary or `world- 
constituting' manner. 
The rejection of transcendental predication means that the problem of 
philosophical grounding which appears to have motivated Heidegger's `bloating' of the 
circle is not addressed on the grounds that it is irrelevant to the theory of interpretation. 
For foundational philosophy in either an Anglo-American (Cartesian, Archimedean) or 
Continental (phenomenological, Heideggerian) mode this denial - of res cogitans or 
`Being' - makes certitude or `unconcealment' unattainable, and 
in turn indicates 
methodological error or, at best, incompleteness. From this standpoint Taylor's reflexive 
hermeneutic discusses the interpretation of experience and agency, but does not offer the 
19 Taylor, Sourrc ,ý of 1L)c 
Sc-1J, 38. Note that this il, tiin c(mccrns the expressive . ce unt of 
language and 
self-interpretation and is not 
directed to debates about the l. tnguage lunition ant0n1; st critical theorists and 
would be neuroscientists. 
20 This model of \vllat I have Libelled{ `\ve. tk tr, 1nscc'nclc'nt, ilism' 
is most clearly stated in Taylor, `The 
Validity of Transcenldental Arguments', 
156-7. 
e. g. Kant's categories, or 
Heidegger's existenti, tl. of Being'). See Rosen, 'Squaring the 
Hermencutical Circle', 711,71 ý. 
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requisite account of the determining ground of interpretation as reflexive activity. The 
avoidance of transcendental error so raises different questions, two of which are of 
particular relevance here. The first concerns whether unacknowledged assumptions of a 
strong rather than weak transcendental sense are in fact present within Taylor's 
methodology, which must be entirely purged of claims to `ontological truth. ' Secondly, 
in the absence of otherworldly dependencies, reflexive hermeneutics must explain and 
justify the privileged status accorded to interpretation as activity in its own terms. The 
ubiquity of language to human thought and understanding, etc., does not in itself validate 
the claim that all language use is actively reflexive to the extent demanded by `strong 
evaluation'. The questioning of the hermeneutic circle thus opens up a wider issue, 
concerning the justification of Taylor's project as a whole. 
If there is a predicating structure underlying the activity of interpretation then it is 
unavailable to language and must be presumed likely to remain so. Taylor acknowledges 
the possibility that `a deeper level explanation of the functioning of human beings might 
be based on quite other principles, ' but adds that `it is clear that there are certain 
ontological questions which lie beyond the scope of transcendental arguments. '22 The 
theory of interpretation is therefore well advised to pursue more modest aims. Rather 
than offering a conclusive account of the way of human existence or being-in-the-world, 
reflexive hermeneutics attempts to theoretically comprehend, through the study of their 
linguistic and phenomenological aspects, the processes and media of cognition and 
reflection which are accessible to human self-consciousness. 
The historical analysis of conceptions of human value, and the articulation of values 
as they relate to understandings of identity (both general and particular) necessarily 
involves the consideration of transcendental and ontological ideas which are entirely 
relevant to the interpretation and explanation of those identities, vocabularies and forms 
of life to which they bear a constitutive relation. They are not however integral to 
philosophical anthropology as such. That a particular identity is indivisible from the 
search for God, Being, Spirit, etc., does not make that postulated concept or category a 
part of the methodology through which it is formulated, and neither supports nor 
undermines the identity concerned. This distinction - between the interpretive approach 
and the material which actually gets interpreted - becomes particularly important in the 
closing sections of Sources of the Self, where ruminations about the epiphanic uncovering 
of meaning and the potential exhibited by religion as a `moral source' dominate Taylor's 
rather unfocused discussion of the `conflicts of modernity'. 
'' 
22 T, tv, lcºr, 'The Validity cal Transcciidcntal 
Argtºmcnts', 1ýS. 
23 i. r. hetwceii rtýn! 1 tiny; 
highcr ordcr ý; cºº, cis, inýtrunýc nt. tl mid c \pressive iººnicptivii cif action, and 
conflicting moral understandin;:. 
T. tvlor, Suurrc, < u/' tlu" Se-IJ, 390. An ix . irenc, ý: ()( Heidegger is present 
throughout Taylor's writings 
(e. g. He cl, 475,570n; P/'ilu uphical Papers 1,239,269-70). This interest has been 
more marked in liter writing: 
in a manner which is not always helpful. T, i\, Ioor'> discussion of aesthetics in 
128 
Taylor's comments on religion and aesthetics need to be qualified, related and 
distinguished from the anthropological project which is at issue in this essay. Sources of the 
Self is a book of (at least) three parts: a synoptic critique of modern analytical philosophy 
and outline of the relation obtaining between subjectivity, identity and the good; an 
extended historical discussion of formulations of self and goods which Taylor views as 
particularly important to contemporary ideas of identity; and thirdly, the diagnosis and 
discussion of the `modern moral predicament. '24 In Taylor's own estimation this third 
section contains `affirmations or hints of affirmations which go beyond what I made any 
systematic attempt to argue for, '25 which in exceeding argument speculate on the `hunch 
that there is a scale of affirmation of humanity of humanity by God which cannot be 
matched by humans rejecting God. '26 
The decision to play out his hunches in this manner does create interpretive 
difficulties, and it is by no means accidental that Taylor's subsequent publications27 have 
not pursued this intimated agenda with any great tenacity. Any methodological turn 
towards theology, epiphany or anything of a comparably dubious ontological provenance 
involves a departure from, and perhaps even repudiation of, the anthropology of human 
self-interpretation. The intrusion of god upon the proceedings in the closing sections of 
Sources of the Self does not however signal a deeper presence or philosophical dependence. 
In what can perhaps be best explained as a strategic error, Taylor's personal response to 
Sources of the Self, for example, treats the expressivist poetry of Hölderin (Ch. 21) and the `epiphanic 
modernism' of Rilke and T. S. Eliot (Ch. 24) as vehicles of disclosure of transcendental meaning: `[t]he 
epiphanic is genuinely mysterious, and it possibly contains the key -or a key- to what it is to be human' (481). 
Similarly, Taylor notes elsewhere that authentic expression might 'follow from a direction in being' (Taylor, 
`Connolly, Foucault and Truth', Political Theory 13 (1985), 385). 
These remarks recall Heidegger's baffling invocation of the 's, aving power' of poetry in a nihilistic world 
lost to the `forgetting of Being' (e. g. Heidegger, Basic Vlritine, s, cd. David Farrell Krell (New York, Harper 
and Row, 1977), Ch. 8. Even Within the Context Of ) discussion Of literature which I ani not competent to 
judge, these comments seem hasty and of questionable relevance to T. tylh)r': conccptinn Of the self or , more 
generally, to `the modern identity'. Rilke's celestial imagery discloses nothing more than his own 
overwrought sentiments in verse form. Although undoubtedly in influence over some areas of culture and 
literary studies, the importance of poets such as Rilke is unduly emphasised by Tai for here. The aesthetic 
speculations of Sources of the Self, which very indirectly intimate the possibility of <1 recovery of 
human 
meaning through artistic experience, manifest Heideggerian themes in a manner absent 
from, and arguably in 
tension with, the earlier 'civic hunmanist' works of philosophical anthropology which 
defined the trajectory 
which for the most part Taylor's though has follo>\w ed. Although the analysis of 
heim; -in-the-world of Being 
and Time is of cardinal philosophical importance to modern 
hermeneutics, it is the ideas it introduces - such 
as the notion of engages{ agency discussed in chapter four - rather than the relentlessly Opaque and prolix 
manner of their accomplishment which is significant. 
24 The division Of the text is quite clear. The philosophical 
discussion occupies Part 1 (pp. 3-107), and is 
followed by a potted history of philosophy which extends to p. 
390. The remainder of the book (Part 5) is 
devoted to the problems and possibilities of modernism, and is 
(by far) the least satisfying aspect of the work. 
25 Taylor, 'Reply to Commentators', Pl.. >ilocolr/ryand Ph(., nwncrwlo<<ical 
Research L1\/ (1994), 203. 
26 Taylor, 'Reply and Rearticulation, ' in Tully, Phih sopl>y in an Age of Pluralism, 226. 
27 i. e. other than contributions to 
journals. symposia, and other collections. T. a), Ior, The Ethics of 
Authenticity (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1991); Multiculturalism and the Politics of 
Recognition, expanded edition, cd. Ami, Gutmann 
(Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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modernity as a practising Roman Catholic receives articulation here with inadequate 
textual preparation - there is no explicit acknowledgement in the text of the movement 
from historical and philosophical interpretation to the realm of personal hunches - and 
with insufficient argument and engagement with opposing views. 28 The discussion here is 
not concerned with Taylor's religious viewpoint, nor in a direct manner with global 
diagnoses of modernity as a condition or philosophical problem. It has ascertained the 
independence of reflexive hermeneutics as developed by Taylor from the problems and 
excesses to which ontological formulations of interpretive theory have been prone, and 
has established that methodology as a viable alternative to the thin conception of the self 
presented by Rawls. Criticisms that Taylor's writings are `excessively grounded in the 
contingencies of one individual sensibility'29 may be relevant to discussions concerning 
the speculative conclusions of Sources of the Self, but have no impact upon the historical 
and methodological inquiries which dominate his work. 
Defusing the foundational challenge by denying the coherence of the search for 
opaque philosophical resources does not lessen the significance of interpretation, and the 
absence of `grounding arguments' makes neither the status claimed for hermeneutics 
arbitrary nor the circle viciously self-referential. Indeed, the very opposite is the case. 
Rather than denying the actuality of the world by predicating it upon entities beyond the 
bounds of experience, reflexive hermeneutics accepts the `givenness' of human 
engagement as the starting point of our interpretation, with others, of both self and 
world. Nothing underlies or constitutes the determining ground of interpretation, 
because nothing needs to or intelligibly can perform that task. As Rosen argues, `it is the 
living act of intelligence that proceeds the identification and application of canons and 
laws, not some ontological configuration of canons, laws, concepts or rules. '30 
That we can understand ourselves, each other and the world, however imperfectly 
or ambiguously, is an achievement which does not require (and is not susceptible to) any 
further explanation. Philosophical anthropology does not seek to predict or determine 
the outcome of interpretive agency, but offers an approach towards language and 
subjectivity which clarifies and refines our understanding of reflexivity, evaluation and 
interpretation. Insofar as the theory helps us to enter into these activities with greater 
awareness, questions surrounding the character of the hermeneutical circle are answered 
(insofar as answers are available) in everyday practices of understanding, deliberation, and 
28 An omission remedied in Taylor's exchanges with 
Qurntin Skinner and others, as discussed with 
regard to the question of pluralism in 
Ch. 4§2 above. 
29 John Dunn, Into preting, Political Responsibility (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990), 187. This rather odd 
locution implies a separation of philosophy and personality which 
is certainly not a constant feature of 
Dunn's own work. See c. g. 
Dunn, LVcstcrn Political Theo n- in the Fzce of the Future, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
30 Rosen, `Squaring, the Hermencutical Circle', 724. 
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intersubjectivity. The idea that these practices are in need of transcendental or 
`ontological' support emerges from the analysis as part of the unnecessary and mistaken 
but nevertheless recurring search for a foundational philosophy. 
[2] INTERPRETATION AND JUSTIFICATION 
THE REPUDIATION OF THE foundational enterprise reintroduces the question of 
justification. As with Rawls, for Taylor this is an especially difficult issue. Justification is 
typically integral to a theory, and as such inseparable from that which is being contested. 
A philosophical position justifies itself by eliciting agreement with its principal theses, 
and although additional justificatory arguments might confirm and sustain that agreement 
they are unlikely to generate it. The preceding discussion has established the formal 
coherence of reflexive hermeneutics whilst negotiating some of the central difficulties 
faced by interpretive methodology. This process refutes possible criticisms concerning, 
for example, possible contradictions, relativism and determinism but does not - and 
cannot - conclusively vindicate Taylor's philosophy approach or the various conceptions 
(e. g. of self, language and agency) that it supports. 
The phenomenological and weak transcendental explanations advanced by Taylor 
are not in themselves capable of constituting `proof' of his interpretive framework. 31 
Claims concerning the structure of evaluative frameworks, the relationships between self 
and good, and the role of language as a medium of deliberation and expression must 
rather demonstrate their adequacy in the areas which they contest. The first of these tasks 
is attained with some ease. The failure of the thin theory of the good, and Rawls's covert 
reliance upon a stronger conception within Theofyy, is part of a wider interpretation 
which shows the politics of neutral concern or rational choice to be entirely parasitic 
upon higher order conceptions of the good. More generally the historical analysis of 
Sources of the Self concerns the transformation and suppression of higher order goods, 
illustrating, for example, the tensions in the attempt of eighteenth century utilitarianism 
to maintain theist and, latterly, deist32 conceptions of universal benevolence and 
impartiality whilst -attempting to denature those ideas by explaining them in terms of 
31 As argued h) Melissa Lane, 'God or Orienteering? A Critical Stud of Taylor's Sources of the Self' 
Ratio (new series) 1 (1992) 46-56. The relevant analysis occurs on 48-52, but unfortunately Lane's conclusion 
`if we do not have God, we are hostage to the 
fortunes of inOr, l orienteering' (ý2) rests on in overly formal 
reading of Sourcc, of the Self such that any incongruity 
hetvveen historical articulations Of the good and 
philosophical theories of the standards established 
by historical is deemed suflirient to invalidate both the 
claim of structure and the role of the good on 
T, al bar's theor\ . 
This critique pro seeds from the mistaken 
claim that 'Taylor fashions a theory requiring 
God, or something %, rry like God, to he complete' (48) In 
addition Lane's concise 1n, 11 Dis floes not clearly tu 
stinguidh methodological, , tn, tlytical and 
historical aspects 
of the text, or relate it to the anthropological project as 
developed in Taylor's other writing;,. 
32 Disco involves t belief in the existence of God but not in t revealed religion. Followers instead 
ground their faith 
in the experience in n. iture of ,t prnýviclrntial )rder upon the e, irth. 
131 
utility function. 33 Taylor's critique of the `pragmatic 114 within modern 
philosophy is in turn supported by and complementary to this analysis. Alternative 
historical accounts and philosophical analyses are of course available. 3' The contest of 
such interpretations is bound up with the hermeneutic process, but falls outside the range 
of the present discussion. The examples noted above do however offer compelling 
evidence of the explanatory sufficiency of Taylor's approach, which supports a plausible 
account of the moral goods which underlie the most materialist of modern philosophies. 
Theories of value and philosophical perspectives inform and partly constitute 
identity and evaluation, but given the contingencies of situation and personality cannot 
do so in a complete or predictable manner. That a person identifies himself as a socialist, 
deontologist, Christian or atheist says something about his identity, but is only part of a 
complete articulation. Concerns about how goods shape understandings in particular 
cases and of how it can be demonstrated that the self - good relationship expounded by 
Taylor really holds in an inescapable manner obviously arise with the question of 
justification. 
Melissa Lane suggests that Taylor's argument is `helpless before reductionism', 
despite being framed in part as a response to it. Confronted by the argument that 
`morality is in fact explicable as the inescapability of a will to power'36 she avers that 
Taylor's response - that such a view would be demonstrably incorrect in defining `as 
normal or possible a human life which we would find incomprehensible and 
pathological'37 - amounts to an admission of the explanatory paucity of interpretive 
theory. This might be the case were Lane to offer an actual rather than hypothetical 
example of the `reductivist' before whom Taylor's methodology is `helpless. ' As the 
example cited is that of the will to power, Nietzsche might reasonably be expected to 
fulfil this role; but it was his thought and not his actions that repudiated morality as an 
institution, and it would be an innovative exercise in abstraction to argue that Nietzsche's 
33 Taylor, Sources oJ'tlhce Self, 321 ff. In an argument directed primarily at the French encyclopaedists, 
but also at Bentham, Taylor argues that (339) , 
`[c]lassical utilitarianism lives off moral insights which are 
widespread in the culture, but which it itself has given no justified pl. lcc to'. The point here is that 
utilitarianism enjoins the values of the preceding dominant social goods - to minimise suffering, maximise 
welfare, etc. - but cannot tell us 
in qualitative terms w/ºt' it matters to act in such a ýva . 
Even Lane, `God or 
Orienteering', 47 n4, acknowledges the strength of this interpretive critique. 
34 Taylor, Sources of the Scl ,, 88; see 
Ch. 4 §2 above. 
35 Michael Rosen, Must We Return to Moral Realism? ', Inquiry 34 (1991) cites Hans Blutnenberg's The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, MA., NI IT Pres", 1983) as an example of such a competing account. 
As noted in chapter one, it 
is not my intention to offer ºr support any particular analysis or diagnosis of 
`modernity' its either chronological era or a philosophical pri)hleº». 
36 Lane, 'God or Orienteering', 47. 
37 Taylor, Sources o/the Sc//, 3?. 
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identity was not intricately linked (in a reactive manner) to constitutive goods, a relation 
which was exposed in a unique act of self-interpretation and articulation, Ecce Hoino. 38 
Nietzsche simply does not offer a good example of identity either independent of 
morality or outwith the space described by the metaphor of the framework. 39 Similarly, 
the `extraordinary nature' of Hare's paradigmatic misanthrope `the really fanatical 
Nazi, "4° however repugnant and seemingly non-moral, remains a potential interlocutor 
whose position is susceptible to transformation precisely because the ideology of nation, 
blood and soil can be located as a erroneous development of concepts and values within 
the context of European history and thought. That this is the case may even be a 
condition of the reasoned eradication of that cast of mind, and part of an explanation of 
the recurring character of political forms claiming inspiration from National Socialism in 
contemporary Europe. As these cases indicate, the value of examples in the rebuttal and 
justification of theories is uncertain. Although such figures can support or undermine a 
conception or theory, they are not themselves arguments, and it is not obvious that the 
identification of a counterexample could meaningfully undermine Taylor's hermeneutic, 
unless perhaps the personality-type described thoroughly confuted Taylor's position and 
furnished a decisively preferable alternative. These limitations notwithstanding, the 
failure of Lane's hypothetical challenge does at least suggest that Taylor's position is 
philosophically robust. 
The failure of these objections is not insignificant, but leaves open the question of 
how reflexive hermeneutics relates to the less dramatic passage of everyday life. 41 The 
examples of strong evaluation in Taylor's works are sparse: a glutton seeks to overcome a 
passion for cream cakes after reflection leads him to `yearn to be free of this addiction, to 
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Ho»mro, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Lond(n, Penguin, 1992). For a persuasive 
interpretation suggesting that Nict . sche's personality was articulated 
in his works and is inseparable from 
theta see Alexander Nchenmas, Nietzsche: Life as Litcr. zture (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1985). 
lt is also worth noting that the overman like Zarathustra was and is imaginary. Nietzsche may have been able 
to imagine a transvaluaation Of v. ilucs, but w, is unable tee enact that vision, and contra Lane, hypothetical 
counter examples are not the stuff of practical refutations. 
39 Taylor suggests at Sources o. /the Self, 71 that modern followers of Nietzsche are overtly committed 
higher order goods, but notes that the hall of mirr(ýrs described by post-modern metaphysics `doesn't reduce 
the perplexity and uncertainty we feel here. ' 
40 Who would respond to evidence of his own Jewish ancestry 
by forfeiting the lives OI himself and his 
family. R. M. Hare, Freedom ind Rcason, (Oxford, CI, trendoýn Press, 1965), Ch. 9. Hare'. s point 
here is to make 
logical doctrines (the lanatic's request is not contradictory) distinct from (universalisable) neooral judgements. 
Although he believes that if the Nazi were able toi adopt I impartial standpoint 
he would find identify with 
Jews and c, \'erco>me his anti-semitism, Hare 
does not ()(I-(, rin argument against the Nazi's position, but in 
this instance points (172) to 'the Ioorttui. tte cOntIuigent 
fact that peOple \ h(o wmnld take this I()gically possible 
view... are extremely rare. 
' See al: () Bernard Williams, Etbrc_ý . iiul t/uc 
Lmuis o/ P/ri/osopbv, SO-Sb. 
everyday activity is not characterised b the visceral 41 But not je:: significant. That the narrative id 
. 
conflict of extreme or radical 
interpretive poosmoilS docý inn . alter the relevance of everyday, 
less sensational 
events to subjectivity. The 'af 
irmatiýon of (ordinary life' in th, )sc practices and social relations articulating our 
response to the moral axes 
(Ch. 4§ 4) of respect, value, and dignity is presented as a central aspect of the 
culture of modernity 
in Snurrc_<o. fibcSrl/, 14-16,70 f. 
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be the kind of person whose mere bodily appetites respond to his higher aspirations'; 42 
similarly a smoker might experience his addiction as a `fetter' and come to realise a 
personal gain in overcoming his tobacco fixation. ' Such cases exemplify the release of 
the self from a `desire that is not truly mine'` 4 towards a more authentic articulation of 
identity, 45 but, as noted earlier, are not explicitly political in content. 46 
The depiction of these personal achievements using a qualitative vocabulary of 
dignity and self command clarifies the distinction between strong evaluation and the 
flattened language of instrumental rationality, but leaves something of a message gap. It 
suggests that the adoption of a substantive disposition towards evaluative decision- 
making would enhance and clarify our lives both as individuals and collectively, but the 
character of the accomplishment is largely implicit. This is bound up with a wider 
disciplinary difficulty: that to pursue particular instances in detail risks turning 
philosophy and the philosophy of psychology into anecdote and case study 
respectively. 47 The practice of abstraction and generalisation precludes this eventuality 
and does afford a measure of justification, but as with Lane and Hare, Taylor's examples 
do not allow a complete or fully compelling validation. These difficulties are relevant 
throughout political philosophy, where the temptation to retreat into generality -a good 
example being Rawls's treatment of `goodness as rationality', 48 complete with that 
exemplary personality, the hypothetical grass counter - is a strong one. 49 
Taylor's alternative approach to justification seeks to integrate the hermeneutical 
method of the anthropological project with the reflexive experience of the situated 
subject in order that the approach is seen to yield the `Best Account' available to the self 
of his own identity. -50 Hermeneutics attains verification here as the most satisfactory 
methodology available rather than in absolute terms. Self-interpretation addresses the 
42 Taylor, Philosophical Papers 1,22. The same example occurs in Taylor, `Responsibility for Self', in 
A. O. Rorty (ed. ) The Identities of Persons (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1976), 
286. 
43 Taylor, Philosophical Papers //, 224. 
44 Taylor, Philosophical Papers 11,224. 
45 For example, liberated from the need to satisfy his nicotine addiction, the cx-smoker is better able to 
pursue, and possibly has a surer understanding of, himself and 
his c, mstitutive c'numitnlents and objectives 
which are no longer obscured by .t cloud of smoke. 
46 Ch. 454 above. 
47 This problem is far from being unique to T, ty-leor. Sandet, Liberalism and the 
Limits..., 181, offers a 
similarly vague example of deliberation, `Uncertain which path toi take, 
I consult a friend who knows me 
well, and together we deliberate, offering; and asscs 
ing by turns competing descripticcns of the person I am , 
and Of the alternatives I 
face as they bear can my identity. ' Frankfurt's paper 'Freedom of Will and the 
Concept of the Person' discusses the implications oI, second-c, rolcr 
desires using the example of a drug addict 
in a manner not dissimilar 
from Taylor's examples of gluttOii and nie )tine addictiý)n. 
48 Rawls, Theory, 
49 Rawis, Theory, Ch. 7; 432-3; Ch. 2 53 above. 
50 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 58 f., 72, '... our moral contology springs from the 
best account of the 
human domain we sail arrive at... this account must 
he in anthropocentric terms, terms which relate to the 
meanings things 
have for us. ' 
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psychological need for understanding of ourselves, our relations with others, and our 
place within the world. The Best Account looks upon this endeavour as a complex social 
process where `my community, my history, exceptional [i. e. role] models and my own 
reflection have combined to offer me a language in which I make sense of it all. '51 The 
terms of this account and the personal significances associated with them invoke concrete 
goods, values and the reality of lived experience in advance of abstract principles and 
procedures of reason. '-' Such an account is neither transparently obvious nor easily 
attained (being a process of unpredictable complexity), but does suggest that questions of 
self-knowledge and moral evaluation receive a less erroneous treatment when couched in 
hermeneutic terms rather than e. g. utilitarian, deontological or behaviourist ones. 
This being the case reflexive hermeneutics clearly emerges as the most appropriate 
approach to the question of identity, and hence of the relation between identity and 
constitutive goods, the status accorded to which is such that Taylor's account is directed 
(perhaps especially) towards those who would might reject even the terms of its 
formulation. 53 A model example (unfortunately but typically hypothetical) imagines a 
sceptic engaging with reflexive hermeneutics only to discover that the terms of his moral 
vocabulary do privilege a set of moral goods in a constitutive manner, and accepting the 
superiority of that interpretation of his identity over a utilitarian one. This ideal is 
unfortunately optimistic rather than exemplary. Because justification is integral to a 
theory the success of hermeneutical practice depends at least in part upon the good will of 
the participants, i. e. on their acceptance, at a minimum, of the explanatory potential 
afforded by interpretive methodology. Philosophical debates are however riven by 
dogmatism. One leading `naturalist' for example dismissed Taylor's philosophical critique 
out of hand, misinterpreting it as a suggestion that all analytical and empirical theorists 
51 Taylor, 'Reply and re-, articulation', 2? 7. 
52 Bernard Williarns Offers a helpful iilustration Of the priority Of the concrete liver the abstract in his 
comments on the following 'problem'. A hypothetical nl. ln conies upon two drowning persons under 
conditions where it is only possible for him to save one of them. One drowning person is a stranger, the 
other is his wife. We are to presume that the couple are on good terms. How is the rescuer to 
decide which of 
the two to save? After considering predictable analytical fallacies (e. g. the rescuer should 
flip a coin) Williams 
addresses the suggestion that the `principle of mutual 
love' represented by the marriage bond - which recalls 
Rawls's discussion of the morality of association - might motivate and 
justify the rescuer's preference of his 
partner over the stranger, with the comment that such in explanation 
'provides the agent with one thought 
too many: it might have been hoped by some 
(for instance, h), his wife) that his ini)tiv. tting thought, fully 
spelled out, would be that it was 
his wife, not that it was his wile and that in situations Of this kind it is 
permissible to save one's wife. ' Bernard 
\Villiams, 'f ersons, Character and M1Oralit_\ ', 213-215. 
73 Taylor does not use the cilntr0 \'ersi, il termino lo; \ Of uilcc)nsciotimic5', but such .t claim is I think 
implicit In the suggestion t11at 'Plenty of pcop1c swear 
by FRnuc, tult (ýr Derrid, t \-I1o> are plainly Operating in 
their moral or political lives Out of a Sense that all 
huiil, tn hehlp are equ, tllý worthy Of respect... they are 
responding to the suggestion that relations Of 
do, iliinatio n and inequality are im ire subtle and pervasive... [b]ut 
their goals are indistinguishable 
from the many generation: who preceded them in the 'llulnanist' Left. ' 
Taylor, `Reply and re-, trticulatio, n', 232. 
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were `victim to myths of monadic metaphysical egos. ''4 Such responses frustrate the 
possibility of open deliberation which is a prerequisite of successful interpretive practice. 
The resources available to theory in the issue of justification are ultimately inadequate to 
the questions posed, and in consequence the prospect of conclusive vindication recedes. 
The theoretical viability and explanatory plausibility of reflexive hermeneutics is 
established, albeit within these unavoidable limiting conditions, in the course of Taylor's 
philosophical and historical writings. 
An overall assessment of Rawls and Taylor on justification shows Taylor's situated 
approach to be coherent and consistent where Rawls's procedural concatenation of ill 
matched conceptions is not. Neither justice as Fairness nor reflexive hermeneutics 
provide really convincing particular examples in support of their arguments, but this 
absence is to be expected (if not excused) in philosophical argument. Taylor's historical 
discussions, and the instances which do arise in their course, nevertheless afford a measure 
of substantiation which is not matched by Rawls's arid and rather basic discussions of 
morality and psychology. The generality of Taylor's strategy and the congruence which 
it seeks to establish between self-understanding and the theory of interpretation does 
however invite the comparison of the Best Account principle with Rawls's notion of 
reflective equilibrium. 
The superficial similarity of ambition exhibited here should not be mistaken for a 
more thorough identity of means. Setting aside the minutiae of Rawls's 
contractual/constructivist apparatus, Taylor's interpretive stance is not hamstrung by the 
abstraction and irrealism of the original position. >? Rawls invites us to imagine a 
recursive movement of thought from presumed but unexamined fixed points of intuitive 
judgement (which are anything but that) through the veil of ignorance, into the 
bargaining game and back until (if) stability between principle, decision situation and 
pre-reflective judgement is established. Taylor's hermeneutic does not demand such 
dramatic shifts, as it locates ostensibly intuitive judgement in social and historical thought 
and practice, and theorises the significance to identity of values expressed in those 
54 Annette Baier, `Critical Notice of Taylor', 589-594. Baler's objection, that naturalism can he error 
reducing rather than rcductivist, is not entirely 
irrelevant but is made in a cane sided manner which 
effectively precluded .t balanced assessment of 
Taylor's methodology. Baicr's objection that Taylor's analysis 
paid insufficient attention to canonical 
figures (particularly Locke) in the history of ideas was subsequently 
satisfied, at length, by Sources of the 
Sc/f, Part 11. 
55 The phonetic coincidence of the terms 'reflective equilibrium' and 
'reflexive lhermeneutics' possibly 
contributes to the appearance of similarity 
here. It is nctev. "orthy that the problem of circularity affecting 
Rawls (see Ch. ? g2) is distinct fro)nm that addresscd by Taylor, 
in that where reflexive hermeneutics is 
concerned with the dialogical 
formation of identity in .. >cial context, Rawls is concerned with an abstract 
model for the justification of norms proýceduralI\ 
tener. ttecl using; intuition and Other prereflective 
judgements. The inability of reflective equilibrium to c. "tniinr these pro)visr(m, tl 
fixed point. independently 
from the principles \v'hicll the'. support creates t 
different pr, )hleni tO that , t<. ýir, ited with the metaphysical 
dependencies of what I Ih. tv'e Libelle{ 'ontologic. tl 
hermeneutic: '. 
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judgements. The methodology is more complex and nuanced than that of Rawls, but is 
not debilitated by the artificiality of Theory. Secondly Rawls, concerned with the 
determination and justification of a philosophically limited decision situation suitable for 
the generation of normative principles, and Taylor, concerned with the development of 
reflexive hermeneutics as a methodology for philosophical anthropology -a more general 
project of potential relevance across the human sciences - are addressing significantly 
different problems. That both put forward general explanatory arguments in justification 
of their views carries no deeper significance. 
Despite the pursuit of neutrality and impartiality in Theory Rawls eschews truth 
claims, allowing that because they are supposedly chosen principles of justice are 
ultimately to be considered 56 Taylor's avowed realism involves a different 
claim. As was seen in the examination of Heidegger's `doubling' of the hermeneutic 
circle, the importance of the distinction between ontological truth and anthropological 
interpretation is inestimable. Taylor offers the latter rather than former and his scheme 
can only be true insofar as it furthers the formulation of the most convincing explanation 
- the Best Account - of both the philosophy and experience of selfhood. Although these 
two aspects are complementary, they are not necessarily identical. Taylor's `weak' 
transcendental arguments concern the boundary conditions rather than the content of 
experience, and the claim that interpretive activity is linguistic leaves the vocabularies 
invoked in practices of interpretation undetermined. Taylor's sometimes awkward 
metaphors of space, his characterisation of the self-good relationship in terms of 
frameworks, etc., are open to redescription if a clearer (i. e. error reducing) account 
becomes available. The fundamental roles accorded to language and to higher order goods 
are however indubitable. The status of the former has already been established in the 
course of this discussion, but the nature of the reality claimed for the latter has not, 
inviting consideration of the character, availability and objectivity of goods for reflexive 
hermeneutics. 
The general problem of what `really exists' is not obviously a helpful one for 
political philosophy, '7 and is of no special relevance to this essay-58 The question of how 
56 Rawls, Theory, 578, Political Liberalism, 127. Rawls's reluctance to seriously question either his 
principles or methodology suggests, 
however, that the status of justice a. Fairness is never really placed in 
doubt, a suspicion supported by R. twls's comment 
(Theory, 578) that 'more likely candidates for necessary 
moral truths arc the c n({itions 
imposed on the , id) tiOn (df prin('iples' - 
i. e. the mechanisms of the original 
position. 
57 Quinr's introductory gloss on the prn)I, Iem' heing t case in point,. 'A curious thing' he 
notes, `is its simplirit\y. It Call 
he put in three Anglh)-S. txO n im o svIi. ihles: 'What i' there? ' lt can be 
answered, moreover, in a word - 'Everything'. 
\\'. \/. 0. Quine, 'On what there is', From a logical point of 
view, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge, 
MA., Harvard University Press, 19b4), I. This fommul. ttmn nicely contrasts with 
Heide ger's attempt to formulate the 'question of 
Beim; ', which perh, ips amounts to the same thing. 
5g Arguments concerning e. g. the status of m, tthcm. ttii. il Ohjrrts, the objectivity of t completed account 
of physics, or the reality of material objects are 
inordinately complex and interrelated, but do not obviously 
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non-material and ostensibly agent-centred concepts, values, signs etc., are to be 
understood as `real' is however important. An explanation of realism is required firstly to 
dispel any lingering suspicions that constitutive goods are nothing more than reified 
abstractions, subjective projections or accidents of language; and secondly in order to 
complete the account of deliberation within reflexive hermeneutics. The reality of 
concepts and meanings within a `speech community' endows practices of deliberation 
with a depth which would otherwise be lacking. It allows that debate and evaluation can 
produce right answers and better interpretations where there might otherwise be 
undecidable or relativistic conflict between different evaluative positions. External models 
of explanation are inadmissible on both philosophical and practical grounds, as the 
anthropological character of Taylor's theory rules out Platonic59 and intuitionist 
conceptions of an independent moral order, along with appeals to `Being' or other 
unredeemable predicates. These points appear to be compatible with the denial of realism 
and need to be reconciled with Taylor's commitment to and requirement for an account 
of the objectivity of moral concepts. 
The case for moral realism is bound up with the discussion of the Best Account 
principle in Sources of the Se/f. The structure of this argument is predictable from that of 
the wider philosophical critique: practices of evaluation, undertaken in and about 
situations, people, possibilities, etc., continually affirm the reality of goods in the course 
of everyday social life. 60 We do not regard values and standards of judgement as mere 
emotive preference, projections or manifestations of the will to power; they have for us 
an independence and density of meaning in virtue of which we affirm them as values in 
the first place. To deny this measure of reality is to oppose theory and experience in such 
a manner that the former can never adequately account for the latter. In consequence the 
vocabulary of the Best Account inust be one of realism. »1 Taylor's argument here is 
entail any particular position in ethical theory. A helpful discussion Of these d1Slli1ctions is Offered by Hilary 
Putnam, The Many Faces of'Realism (La Salle, Ill., Open Court, 1987), 3-21. The suggestion that 'One might 
he, say, an anti-realist in mathematics but not in respect tc, statements ah(nit m ateri. al Objects' 
is that of John 
Passmore, Recent Philosophers (La Salle, Ill., Open Court, 1985), 83. 
59 Taylor, Sources 01' the Self, 73, 'the Platonic `ynthesis... lies irrecOv-cr. ahly shattered'. Even this 
uncontroversial claim has been challenged by Stephen R. L. Clark, 'Taylor's Waking 
Dream: No One's 
Reply', Inquiry 34 (1991), 195-215, who bizarrely claims that T. ayleor's realism is t pale and inadequate 
shadow of Plato's. 
60 Taylor, Sources ref the Self, 59, `What you Can't help having recourse to 
in life is real, or as near to 
reality as you can get a grasp of at present. Your general metaphysical picture of 
'values' and their place in 
`reality' ought to be based on what you find real in this \va . 
lt couldn't conceivably he the basis of an 
objection to its reality'. 
61 Taylor, Sources of the Se/f 257, `the best account Of the worth Of things and 
lives as they are open to us 
to discern, may he a thoroughly realist one - 
indeed, that is the view I want to defend, \\'ithout wanting to 
make a claim about how things stand for the universe 
'in itself..... I re, tliktic view is perfectly compatible with 
the thesis that the boundaries of the good, is we can grasp 
it, are \et by that space which is opened in the fact 
that the world is there for us, with all the meanings 
it has Iý r us. ' 
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tautological -a concept has reality if it is invoked and treated as such' - and is advanced 
in refutation of an anti-realist position which is polemically identified as a characteristic 
element of anthropological naturalism. 
Directed in rather basic terms against emotivism and projectivism rather than 
within a detailed account of the philosophical status of moral goods, Taylor's comments 
here do not at first glance contradict more sophisticated models of anti-realism. 63 He and 
Richard Rorty (amongst other things a prominent anti-realist)64 can agree for example 
that `since truth is a property of sentences... and since vocabularies are made by human 
beings, so are truths. '65 Rorty's naive and strangely contextless theory of interpretive 
recontextualisation66 regards the choice and transformation of vocabularies as accidental 
and even arbitrary occurrences. It is at this point that his and Taylor's view diverge in a 
manner which helpfully occasions clarification of the form of realism at issue. 
Rorty's treatment of language as an adaptive, illuminating but ultimately superficial 
medium draws attention to the interplay of metaphor and rhetorical device by 
consciously remaining on the surface of language. Conversely, reflexive hermeneutics 
seeks to explore language in a manner which is edifying without being (necessarily) 
ironic, and which is attentive to rather than dismissive of constitutive aspects of meaning. 
Concurrence with the argument that goods and values are produced in discourse rather 
than discovered in nature does not undermine the status accorded to language by Taylor. 
62 This strateg appears ioiuciclcnt, tlly in the work of Williani James, whose 'natural realism, ' also 
involves a rejection of overly technical epistenlologics. As expounded by the Putn, inis', 'James's response is to 
take experience seriously, to say that whatever is experienced is real, and that since we unreflectingly 
experience a public world, it is indeed a public world in which we live. ' Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam, 
`What the spilled beans can spell: The difficult and deep realism of William James', Times Literary 
Supplement, June 21 1996,14-15. Taylor does not draw upon or require the support of the precedent set by 
James, but the example is all interesting one which illustrates the presence of broad thematic agreement 
between approaches which share little else in terms of nlethudolugical detail or common points of reference. 
63 For example Michael Rosen, 'Must We Return to Moral Realism? ', Inquiry 34 (1991), 190, suggests 
that `Taylor's position [is so close to] non-realism that it seems the dispute between them is merely a verbal 
one. ' 
64 James and John Dewey are regularly cited by Rorty, the most vivid, if not the most sophisticated, 
protagonist in the recent revival of pragmatism. Rorty tends to 
describe himself as a `Antirepresentationalist' 
(e. g. Radical Philosop/.. r 60,40-42) referring back to the position 
developed in Plulocopbv and the Mirror of 
Alatu re, Pt. 1. In expounding and rejecting (p. 12) the inctaphor 'of the mind is i mirror, 
[. and] the notion of 
knowledge as accuracy of representation' of reality upon that 'mirror' antirepresentatic, nalisln 
is clearly a 
form of anti-realism. 
65 Richard Rorty, Cºnlirt(, encv, Irony and Soli(Lurihv (Cambridge, 
Cambridge Universit)' Press, 1989), 
21. Although Taylor has challenged Rort)'s repudi. ttioun of t range of clistinctiý, ns 
(`chelne/contell t, 
spirit/nature, Iitcrature/science... ) this 
has no bearing tºpý, n the cliscussº(, n here, which ci)neerns similarities 
rather than differences between the two. 
See Rorty, 'T. i. \hin in Truth', In Tully, Pliilr,; upby in an ý, ye of 
Pluralism, 20-33-, Taylor, `Reply and re-. articulation'. 
66 For Rorty v()e, ibularies are transient and interchangeable within .a po, etieeisecd rather than politicised 
culture of irony, where the 
instability of meaning inherent in languaige is cut, , ttcci and practices of 
freedom and redescripti in are svno, ny moos. 
Rorty, Contin,; c"rtcv, Irony and Solid. arrity, 60-62,90-95. See esp. 
60: `an ideal liberal society is one which 
has no purpose except freedom... to m. ikr life easier for poets and 
rcvolutionarirs. ' 
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The idea that the world is available to agency (with all that entails) in such a way that it is 
independent from human action, use, and interpretation depends upon a separation of 
self and world which is bound up with the outmoded epistemological problematic 
considered in chapter four. This position is rejected rather than refuted by Rorty, whose 
response to epistemology is in effect to drop the question, not to answer or supplant it. 67 
Once it is appreciated that practices of interpretation and agency are inseparable from the 
contexts which make them intelligible, and that as a part of those activities contexts are 
also laden with meaning rather than being neutral in some obscure sense, `[t]he very idea 
of projectivism makes no sense. There is nothing further out there to project on. '68 
Because hermeneutics treats language as a constitutive rather than solely descriptive 
medium -a part of the world, rather than the means of its representation - the 
attribution of a realistic status to meanings made manifest within it need not be 
considered problematic. Engaged agency does not accept as canonical the subject-object 
dichotomy which is (often imperceptibly) ingrained within patterns of speech and 
cognition. 69 Liberation from the `imprisoning assumption' conveyed by this model, `the 
picture of the "subject" as the sole possible locus of meaning'70 makes possible a more 
nuanced conception of moral objectivity than that permitted by the customary epistemic 
polarisation. This formulation offers a modest account of moral concepts as mind- 
independent or supra-individual entities but does not reproduce the philosophical errors 
discussed earlier. 
Insofar as meanings are disclosed in the practices and conversations of speech 
communities they occur in public space and are (in situations of controversy and dispute 
as well as consensus) part of a repertory of common meanings. The interpretive 
formulation, articulation and recognition of identity (of both groups and individuals) are 
similarly public events. These activities are political, and as such are disputed at both 
67 
e. g. Rorty, Objecti'vi'ty, Relativism ind Truth: Philncopbical Paper: c Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 33: `... the traditional Western met. aphsico-epi. trmcolc>gicul w, i of firming up our 
habits simply isn't working anymore... tile pragmatist. suggestion that we substitute a "merely" ethical 
foundation... is put forward can practical grounds. It is not put IOrw, ard as a co ro llary Aa metaphysical 
claim... nor of an epistemological claim... nor of a semantic. tl claim. ' In using Roýrty quite narrowly as an 
example here I do not intent{ toi coffer or imply i properly devcl()ped a. ssessnlent of 
hi: work, or of the debates 
provoked by it. See Ir example the range of critical responses (including that of 
T. tylor) in Alan 
Malachowski (ed. ) Re. dlhng Rort)' (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
68 Taylor, 'Comments and replies', 247. 'PrijectIvian' here ciutld he replaced by 'anti-realism' without 
significantly altering the integrity of the phrase. 
69 Vincent Descomhes, Is there in objective spirit)', in Tull\-, Pbzlncopi v in an Age of Pluralism, 97, 
points out the difficulty involved 
in recovering the c onc-ept Of objectivity freien the 'cumbersome 
metaphysics' of the cpistemological tradition. 
The convention of treating everything in terms of 
subject/object oppositions is soy 
firmt entrenched in patterns of though and speech that employment of the 
term `objective constantly courts the possihilitY cif misunderstanding, and 
the risk (d slipping hack into the 
outmoded idiom which 
hermeneutics . aims to overcoýine. 
There is however noý ºhviouslý more suitable term 
of art available in the present 
instance. 
70 Taylor, 'Reply and re-articulation', 236. 
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theoretical and practical levels. » Goods and values also acquire significance for 
individuals in personal terms which may be unique, but particular resonances always 
remain in some measure dependent upon previously established meanings. Furthermore, 
intersubjective deliberation engages social concepts, contesting how they are to be defined 
and revised, how they are and ought to be realised in practices and institutions, etc. 72 
The concept of public space hence demands and presupposes the actuality of the meanings 
and contexts in which it occurs. This interpretive realism involves moral goods as they 
are available to participants within social environments, not with the way the ethical 
world is `in itself. '73 Without this implicit presumption, which is relevant to the range of 
theories incorporating conceptions of publicity, dialogue, deliberation, etc., there would 
be nothing concrete for deliberation to be about. 
These goods are, amongst other things, standards of judgement which are 
continuously iterated in the course of public dialogue, playing a focal role in the activities 
of speech communities. Because they are socially located and always open to 
transformation this realism in no way involves aprioristic or universalist ascriptions, and 
is also more than an exercise in subjective projection or imaginative redescription. 
`Ethics, ' Taylor claims `tries to define the shape of the human moral predicament, '74 
addressing in language the questions posed by the presence of the self, with others, in 
morally significant environments which defy complete understanding. Bearing a depth, 
persistance and significance consistent with the weight they assume in social practices, 
evaluative vocabularies are neither contingent nor arbitrary. They are rather both part of 
and a response to the engaged nature of subjectivity, and to treat them otherwise is to 
misunderstand language, morality and the relation of both to experience and cognition.? 
71 These issues have been deliberately anticipated and deferred thrcºughºnlt this chapter, one purpose of 
which has been to attempt to rentier anthropological and iOnal issue. 
distinct. \Vhcre the two overlap 
the reader may feel frustrated (ur Cheated) but tot elide the twVtº issues ww", >ul(l 
be to risk confusion and 
misinterpretation. Chapter six does directly address pI)1 tical dimensions Of intcrsuhjectivity, the ambiguity 
Of cO111111LInity, and the prahlen of common meaning. 
72 This claim may look contradictory, but it is not. In order to 
dispute or transform a definition or 
articulation one must first specify and challenge it, and to that extent a common meaning can 
be seen as 
simultaneously recognised and disputed without contradiction. 
73 A similar argument is advanced by Searle in an analytic vein: 
`Whenever we use a language... we 
commit ourselves to realism. The commitment 
is not a specific theory , 1s to 
how the world is, but rather that 
there is a way the world is... a public 
language presupposes a public world, and that presupposition is 
metaphysical realism. ' John R. Searle, 'Is there a crisis 
in American Higher Education, ' The Partisan Review 
60 (1993), 703-4. I take the use ºof 'nlctaphysical' here as a weak rather than strong claini. 
Notwithstanding 
Searle's appeal to 'public objects of reference' as with 
Willi, mi James ,1 pleasure of thematic agreement with 
Taylor's position is clearly discernible. 
Searle's position is formulated in more detail in his The Construction 
of Social Rea/it)' (London, Allen 
Lane, 1995), Ch. 7-S. 
74 Taylor, 'Comments and Replic\', 245. 
75 Although related, the terms 'public' and 'so 
ial' arc not identical: 'public' imvAcs the whole of a 
given speech community, 
discussed earlier as an ý, vcrl, tpping s ries ()f smaller language-games which are 
`social' (i. e. intersuhjective) without necessarily' 
heing available for recOgnltion and scrutiny In the larger 
`public' forum. Similarly 'practices', charitably 
defined as any complex purposive activity, can he discursive, 
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Sufficiently clarified to be more than just negative polemic but avoiding dogmatic 
or doctrinal formulation, this realism coincides with the theorisation of intersubjectivand 
engaged agency in order to fully account for the production and status of meanings 
within deliberative contexts. Their explicit theorisation is important because they shape 
the languages and practices in which identities and contexts are socially formulated, 
realised and reproduced. In the absence of such an account the methodological coherence 
of social concepts in political philosophy is called in to question. Rawls's account of 
`public reason', for example, presupposes the presence of the public culture of a 
democratic society and the meanings it manifests, but does not attend to either the 
content or character of that context in sufficient detail. Rawls is of course unable to 
undertake such an examination without further compromising the already uncertain 
commitments of contractualism and/or constructivism to abstraction, impartiality, 
deontology, and anti-realism; in consequence `public reason' is also a casualty of his self- 
imposed philosophical constraints. 
These arguments allow reflexive hermeneutics to intelligibly address the concepts of 
truth and reality without being drawn into unremitting abstract discussions of 
correspondence, warrant, reference, etc., /6 or towards the banal dismissal of truth as 
`whatever the upshot of [free and open] encounters turns out to be. '77 This discussion has 
established that for reflexive hermeneutics reality is constituted by and available to 
language, a way the world is, rather than the way the world is, and it so follows that a 
measure of truth78 comprising that reality is available to discourse. It is with regard to 
this model of realism that interpretations can be more or less accurate, informative and so 
on. The dynamic between language, reality and truth79 is such that understanding is 
never total or transparent, but can be more or less authentic, complete, defensible, etc., 
with regard to particular meanings, practices, and situations. `Truth' is in this sense a 
matter of understanding and articulation rather than representation or correspondence. 80 
i. e. explicitly linguistic and theorised as such, or non-discursive, in winch case a]tl Hugh potentially open to 
interpretation, and hence not Ltnguage-incicpendciit, they are tvvpically (as with the pretheoretical 
understandings briefly survcvcd carlicr in the discussion) not in neat of linguistic theorisation. The relation 
between undcrstanding and interpretation is considered in more detail beloow\w. 
76 For example. in his discussion of Davidson and his fOlI) wcrs Passinoýrc, Recent Pbilosuphers, 64, notes 
that `they write in a manner Which is alten 
Ien cin, usly techiiic, tl rocs alwa-\> 1 irinid ably ihstract, dcvi, id of 
concrete examples. ' 
77 Rortr, Contirt,; c 1lc- ,, 1r0n, ) and SoiuL IitV, 52. This seems toi nie i particul, irly shallow gloss on 
\Vittgenstci. n's suggestion tli; tt tue 'the 111C, 111111" of a word 
is its use in the language. ' Philosophical 
Invest 
i,. ztions, 
1, g 43. 
78 \X/hich in the light of the preceding cliscussinin is of course neither a 
foundational or ontological 
account of truth and objectivity. 
79 Taylor, 'Reply and rc-artic'ulation', 2"). 
80 Michael Martin, `T. ayfor on Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Michael Martin and Lee C. 
Mac! ntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of 
Social Science (Cambridge, MMA., MIT Press, 1994) 259-257, shows no 
awareness of Taylor's realism or 
its implications. Comments such as 'T. a\ylor rejects appeals to rational 
argument to decide conflicts 
in interpretation and in'te. id relies on intuition' (265), and 'he wants social 
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[3] THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION 
THE FINAL OBJECTIONS TO RECEIVE CONSIDERATION here are perhaps the most basic. 
Aimed not just at Taylor, but at the fundamental importance of reflexivity throughout 
contemporary political philosophy, James Tully advances the forceful claim that: 
`... the prevailing custom that the that the only free and rational way of thought and 
action is one governed by a canonical type of critical reflection... illustrates the irony of 
our situation: a misunderstanding of the very activity that is supposed to free us from the 
blind adherence to convention-namely, critical reflection-has itself become 
conventional. '81 
Tully develops this position against Taylor in four stages. Firstly, Taylor is `mistaken' in 
assigning a `foundational' role to interpretation, which in fact is neither essential nor 
inescapable to subjectivity. Secondly, this is the case because Taylor conflates the terms 
`understanding' and `interpretation'. To understand something is to grasp its meaning, to 
know how to use it in the course of a language game or social practice. This does not 
necessarily involve interpretation, which connotes activities of examining, questioning, 
transforming and so on which are unnecessary when meaning has been adequately 
understood. It follows, thirdly, that interpretation is subordinate to understanding; the 
very idea of interpretation need not arise if something has been understood correctly. 
Finally, Tully suggests that as well as confusing `interpretation' and `understanding' 
Taylor fails to distinguish the range of reflective practices which are not reducible to the 
single term `interpretation. '82 
Tully's argument is not a refutation of Taylor's position, 83 but does pose 
interesting questions. This relevance is underlined by the comment that the `thesis that 
the most fundamental ways in which humans understand themselves are interpretations is 
a mistake. As the result of discucsionc of an earlier draft of this article Taylor now agrees with 
meanings to have an objecti\'e ontological basis but at the sank time construes their epistemological 
basis as 
subjective' (272) asseºci, ite 'rational' with `(leductive', prCSupp(se the circularity of 
hermeneutics to be vicious 
without adequate examination or irgumcnt, and attempt toi present 
Taylor's argument in terms of an 
epistemological model which His been explicitly rejected. Although 
Martin'' article restricts its comments to 
Taylor's 1971 paper 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', given the 
date cif it. publication a more wide 
ranging discussion of the relevant 
literature might have prevented these misre; ulings, which undermine a 
potentially interesting comparison of 
interpretive and naturalist models of explanaticon. 
81 Tully, '\ýi/ittgcnstein and Political Philosoplh, : Understanding Praitºce\ of Critical Reflection', 
Politiczl Theory 17 (1989), 173. Tull- takes as his examples Ta l(r and Jürgen Hahermas, but offers his 
argument against the widespread acceptance of this cconvventloon 
82 Tully, `Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy... ', 192-198. These criticisms Occur in the course of a 
discussion of \X'ittgenstein's conmment on understanding as rule 
fºoIlººwing (roughly, Incsti0. iti)ns !, §5 185- 
210) which is of considerable 
interest but is beyond the range of the present discussion. 
83 Tully notes the extent to Which interpretation 
is a significant characteristic of liuman agency, and his 
appreciation of Taylor's work 
is fulsonme, at e. g. p. 192, and 204 n. 72 
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this conclusion. 84 This seems a significant concession, but under scrutiny is not so 
damaging as at first glance. Tully's criticism relies on the claim that when Taylor 
describes humans as `self-interpreting animals', 85 `he means that... being involved in the 
activity of interpretation is our basic way of being in the u, or/d. '8 This is certainly a 
permissible gloss of Taylor's approach, but is neither the most accurate nor plausible 
account available. As this discussion has made clear, strong evaluation is a necessary 
rather than sufficient condition of identity. The inescapability ascribed by Taylor is not 
`foundational' claim in the totalising sense suggested by Tully: not all activity is 
interpretive, and interpretation is partly, not wholly constitutive, of identity. 
As noted earlier, language and interpretation are used by Taylor in a broad manner 
encompassing the range of communicative media and intersubjective activities. 87 This is 
far from consistent with Tully's identification of the governance of `a canonical type of 
critical reflection. ' In addition the complexity of evaluative frameworks, which are 
explicitly accountable in terms of discursive regularity as well as indeterminacy, defies 
Tully's one-sided depiction of hermeneutics. The difference between an aspect of identity 
being incomplete and open to interpretation and it being actively in question is not 
acknowledged by Tully, an omission which leads him to overstate and invalidate his 
criticism. Whether or not the interpretive practice of strong evaluation really is 
inescapable is a different question that Tully does not pursue, but which will be addressed 
following consideration of his remaining criticisms. 
Tully's second and fourth points suggest that interpretation is both (ii) conflated 
with `understanding' and (iv) insufficiently distinguished from alternative reflective 
practices by Taylor. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Tully argues that `understanding must 
consist in the ability to "grasp" a sign manifested in actual praxis... understanding is 
accompanied by interpretation in some circumstances, but it cannot always be so, on pain 
of infinite regress. (Interpretations come to an end somewhere. )'88 It is not clear quite 
where this becomes a criticism of Taylor. Self-interpretation involves the evaluative 
response of the self to questions posed in the course of engagement in complex social 
environments. This does not make everything a question to be interpreted and nor does it 
deny that interpretations `come to an end. ' Taylor's realism is entirely congruent with 
84 Tully, Wittgenstein and Political PhiIo' phv... ', 196, cinph. lsis . iddcd. 
Unfortunately, to the best of 
my kno 'Iedgc neither Taylh)r nor Tull) 
have iOnlmLJlk(i can these discussions in their voluminous recent 
writings (which include the Fct. ic/)-iJ edited 
for T. l\ I()r b Tully). The IC flowing cc)Illinents offer the best 
response available toi reflexive 
ilernleneutics as deevel()ped in this dISCIIssion. and IS consistent with Taylor's 
writings both before and after the appearance of 
Tullv's article, but do not have l more explicit textual basis. 
85 
e. g. Taylor, Pbilncopi'ica/ 
Pacers 1, Ch. 2. 
86 Tully, \\ ittgenstein . 111d 
Political Plliloso>phy... ', 19?, cºllpll. l. '' added. The pejorative use of 
Heide geri, ln ternlinccl. mhy 
here is a mark of the direction icl Tull'. Critical eicllllllent, 
ö Ch. 4S above. 
88 Tulle, \Vittgen: tein and Po litk'. ll Pllilº»ccph\.... ', 195. 
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this distinction between understanding and interpretation, but emphasises the latter 
rather than the former because the contexts and questions discussed by hermeneutics 
manifestly do require interpretation as an aid to understanding. 
Although the charge that interpretation and understanding are conflated is 
unsustainable, Tully's related point that critical reflection occurs in a variety of forms 
which do not necessarily conform with the conceptions developed in Taylor's 
hermeneutics draws attention to the potential of any theory to exceed its own objectives 
or to overlook its limitations. The risk of lapsing into a comfortable vocabulary of text, 
context, understanding and interpretation which becomes inattentive to the reality it 
purports to explain is an ever present one. In this sense the suggestion that `we should 
carefully discriminate amongst the different forms of reflection'"9 is an apposite reminder 
that Taylor's theory offers a strategy of explanation rather than the strategy. Again, 
however, this is at best an indirect criticism of reflexive hermeneutics. 
Tully suggests that the use of interpretation as a general term offers further evidence 
of Taylor's `foundationalism'. 90 The point here seems to be that because he fails to 
conduct an exhaustive survey91 of possible forms of reflection, Taylor conceives of 
naturalism and his own favoured methodology as the only available options, and in 
vindicating the latter over the former necessarily claims a foundational role for that 
approach. This is of course not the case, and given the diverse range of Taylor's writings 
is a bewildering criticism. What is offered is a particular formulation of hermeneutics -a 
diverse tradition of thought - advanced against naturalism, itself identified as a tradition 
in virtue of a common epistemological commitment. To invoke Tully's own professed 
guide in these matters, traditions are complex and disparate, and are best thought of in 
terms of `family resemblance'92 rather than doctrinal homogeneity. Secondly, although 
aspects of Taylor's discussions (concerning, for example, realism and weak transcendental 
89 Tully, 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy... ', 198. 
90 Tully, 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy.... ', 198. 
91 Tully offers ten reflexive 5O aiding adjective: here (extending Innur deconstructi(in to verification) 
but this only begins to scratch the surface of mug{e: ()1 interpret. ttiH)n (historical, documentary, aesthetic, 
fictional... ). Pertaining particular cOnditiiins (material, idce)logic, al, geographical... ) would compound the 
difficulties here, making the ac{vant. tgcs of auch a tax<)ncllm' less than obvious. Tull': aim in his article is to 
liberate us from the foundational assumption that critical reflection must proceed according to a canonical 
model of interpretation. Since that assumption is not present in T, aylor's work, the liberation on offer is 
rather hollow. Despite this, Tully's article 
has much toi commend it; an interesting; thesis developed using 
Wittgenstein in a novel way, Which is verb effective against Hahermas (for whom legitimacy is dependent 
upon a presupposed universal standard of undistorted communicatiVC rationality 
in a manncr which arguably 
is `canonical' in the required sense), less so when deployed , 1g. 11na 
Taylor. 
92 Wittgenstein, Philosophical 1)zvcsti, ýatinn5 /, §§ 66-7. Witt:; cnstein'" point here iý that no identifiable 
criterion can isolate the meaning OI game 
independent ()f its occurrence is `g. ime' in speech situations. 
Because the language game i: the unit of meaning there 
i: nog essenti. il 'g. mnene': ' to he identified. Rather (§ 
66) we see a complicated network ()I similarities. 
B\ anal , t4ß , there 
i: nO c, scntial (Ii)undatif)nal) method of 
interpretation which is conveyed by the term `hermeneutic', only a variet, \ Of mcth(kis exhibiting general 
and particular similarities and 
differences. 
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argument) extend beyond the human sciences strictly conceived, his anthropology is at 
no point advanced in the form of a general philosophical foundational ism. Its claims are 
significant but make no claim to overall explanatory sufficiency or totality. Furthermore, 
in the following chapter a range of non-naturalist arguments (adopting a general stance 
that encourages the label `post-structuralist') receive consideration which challenge and 
refine reflexive hermeneutics through the analysis of power and subjectivity. Tully 
reminds us of the need to be aware of the diversity of critical strategies available to 
theory, but is incorrect in attributing to Taylor the view that interpretation `can play the 
mythical role of founding patriarch of our political lifc. '9' 
The evaporation of Tully's `foundationalist' charge makes the last of his criticisms, 
that activities of understanding are prior to those of interpretation, less dramatic. This is 
particularly so given that Tully affirms the importance of interpretation as `a feature of 
our identity as moderns', and agrees that identity `belongs to the language game of self- 
interpretation. '9`t Whilst it is logically correct that when something is adequately 
understood it is not in need of interpretation, this does not undermine the privileged 
status accorded to strong evaluation by Taylor. Interpretive practices are important to the 
subject because under conditions of late modernity identity is problematic, and 
consciousness reflexive. As Bernard Williams forcefully puts it, `there is no route back 
from reflectiveness. '95 Once questions of morality and identity arise and take root they- 
can undergo reformulation or temporary suppression, but cannot be eradicated. 96 
Taylor's discussion captures this inevitability with a force that is unimpeached by Tully's 
analysis. 
Because the methodological defence of reflexive hermeneutics depends partly upon 
its status as the `Best Account' if Tully's inconclusive logical claim that interpretation is 
subordinate to understanding can be supported by a plausible competing account where 
evaluation is optional rather than inescapable for identity, the explanatory superiority 
claimed by Taylor over the range of reductive approaches subsumed under the 
portmanteau term `naturalist' would be seriously challenged. Reduced to merely one 
amongst many approaches reflexive hermeneutics would forego any special claim of 
relevance even to those anthropological questions which it explicitly attempts to address. 
93 Tully, 'Wittgenstein and Political PhilosophN'... ', 199. 
94 Tully, 'Wittgenstein and Political 199. 
95 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Pbilnsuphy, 163. 
96 \ ý1hcn and where reflexivity was irrevocably established 
is a question more suited to a parlour game 
than a historical enquiry. 
\a illiams, Etbicc and the Limits, 163, suggests '1914, the Industrial Rev(dution, 
Galileo, the Reformation, or some yet earlier item. 
' T. i lo>r'ý account of the modern identity hinges upon the 
introduction by Augustine Of the idea that religious truth 
is manifest internally its well as externally of man. 
Sec e. g., Taylor, Sources rý/ tLre 
Sel/, 130: 'Augustine shills the I'cuiu: from the fiele{ of objects known to the 
activity of knowing; 
God is to he feline{ here ... 
To look tow, trLiý this activity is to IO()k to the self, to take up a 
reflexive stance. 
' See Also T, i, lo, r, 'Inwardness and the 
Culture )f \I,, dernit\'. 
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Such a case is presented by Owen Flanagan, who like Tully acknowledges the force and 
plausibility of Taylor's methodology but argues that `... it is not a truth of philosophical 
psychology that all persons, even all ethical persons, are reflectiýve. '97 Flanagan broadly 
concurs with Taylor's theorisation of engaged agency and intersubjectivity98 but claims 
that intersubjectivity and strong evaluation are both logically and psychologically 
unrelated. 
That humans are self-interpreting animals, he suggests, does not require that the 
interpretation be especially reflective. Subjectivity can proceed with others in a rich 
environment of intersubjective practices without being reflective or articulate about the 
activities concerned. Identity precedes evaluation for Flanagan just as understanding 
precedes interpretation for Tully's Wittgenstein. Psychological sophisticates might pity 
the `dim and inchoate' sense of self maintained by such people, characterised (following 
Taylor's terminology) as `weak' rather than `strong' evaluators. It is undeniable, however, 
that those concerned have identities, and that those identities, although not directed 
towards explicitly articulated constitutive goods, can be ethically coherent. 99 The 
constitutive relation between self and good is in these terms optional, and although 
perhaps desirable is certainly not inescapable. 
Flanagan's analysis is compatible with Tulle's, but is advanced in a more moderate 
and focused form. As was the case with Lane, it requires practical support (conclusive 
justification being unavailable) via the provision of supporting examples consistent with a 
character type recognisably prevalent within complex modern societies. Flanagan offers 
several examples, all more keenly observed than the hypothetical nihilists and fascists 
considered earlier. Each presents evidence for the claim that identity is not interpretive in 
its entirety, but that is not a claim which Taylor makes in the first place. They do, 
however, elaborate non-evaluative aspects of identity (implied but not explored by Tully) 
which helpfully illustrate the explanatory limits of Taylor's hermeneutics. 
Flanagan initially attempts to show that `normal persons often lack a deep reflective 
appreciation of who they are. '10° Whilst it may be correct that infants as young as two 
years, and psychiatric patients undergoing identity crisesl01 manifest 
in their observable 
behaviour a minimal self-conception such that they `experience themselves as the 
locus of 
97 Owen Flanagan, 'Identity 111ci Strong , ºnd \\'c. tk 
Ev. ºlu, ttion', in O%vcn Flanagan mid Amn lic 
Oksenberg Rorty (cds. ) Identity, CLr. ar. rclcr . rnri 't'lý, r, rlitýý: 
Eýý. rý: ý iit : tlnr-, rl PsVC O/0,, )v (Cambridge, MA., MIT 
Press, 1990), b22-'. 
98 It is t fundamental truth of philo: ()phii, º1 ps cIi)l()g tlh, tt we arc intcrsuhjceuvc sdyes. 
' Flanagan, 
`Identity and Strong and \\ c, ºk 
Ev. tlu, ºtit n'. 44. 
99 In FI. ºn, tl;. ºnterms 'not nccc"s. ºriI countcrcthwhich . tnth, unts tO tI1 >, tmc thing. 
Flanagan, 
'lc{entity and Strong and \V'cak 
Ev, tlu, ttion', 49. 
I 00 Farn, t aii. 'Icicntiiv and 
Strong and \Vcak Evaluatic, u', 44. 
101 Defined by Erik Erikson as a 'lack of personal saincne' and 
histý, riiýtl contintutv', cited h} 
Flanagan, 'IdClltity ind Strong and 
\X'cak Evaluation', 4S. 
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a set of subjectively linked events, '102 these cases have little impact upon Taylor's 
argument for strong evaluation. The conceptions of identity and agency at issue for 
reflexive hermeneutics are rich and embodied in a manner which is barely even implied 
by the formal self-awareness identified by Flanagan. The use of `normal' in these 
examples is associated with the individuation of personality rather than with the effective 
agency103 in which context Taylor uses the term. 
Flanagan's second example concerns identities which lack interpretive articulation 
in the public and expressive fashion developed by Taylor, as he argues that in Tolstoy's 
short stories the dignity of the Russian peasantry is characterised, rather than betrayed, 
by the absence of articulation. This allows that the peasants do comprehend themselves 
within a contrastive space of questions, for example, `between a Christian life of love and 
its alternatives... but Tolstoy's peasants cannot be very articulate about this contrast. ' 
Flanagan here concedes a considerable amount of Taylor's position, but the movement in 
his analysis from evaluation to articulation calls into question the expressive role 
accorded to language, which is undeniably central (without being in any sense 
foundational) for Taylor's theory. 
Setting to one side issues arising from the use of fictional examples104 the argument 
that identity can be psychologically deep and morally coherent without requiring 
introspective self-interpretation and concomitant articulation does seem plausible. 
Undemonstrative and inexpressive figures are (as with Tolstoy's peasants) are often 
accorded a measure of dignity commensurate with their apparent reserve which is not 
equated with any lack of reflectiveness. Articulation (in word and/or deed) may be a 
102 Flanagan, `ldcntit\, and Strong and Weak EVAILIAtioll., 48. 
103 As conceded by Flanagan, `Identity and Strong and W"eak Ev, aluºatioii', 49, who nevertheless 
maintains that since a self is in some sense there' so is an identity. 
104 The question of how the depiction of a possible (rather than actual) identity might convincingly 
undermine a developed philosophical position is complicated by the use of examples drawn froh fiction, but 
not in an excessive manner. Although `thicker' than hypothetical cases (which are little more than extensions 
of the propositions they are designed to 'justify') fiction introduces interpretive concerns at some remove 
from the meta-theoretical focus of philosophical anthropolOg''. 
Tolstoy's peasants may not be depicted engaging in practices of articulation, but this does not undermine 
Taylor's position any more than examples of strong evaluation drawn 
from literature could be said to 
constitute a justification of it. The imaginative identification which fiction 
invites SO occurs at some remove 
from the reality of the general anthropological questions - the world 
being more than a text - with which 
reflexive hermeneutics is concerned at a general methodological 
level. Fictional meditations on character and 
Judgement can help us think, 
but are complicated by issues concerning literary method, authorial style and 
intent, the mediation and transfiguration of meaning, etc. 
Literature offers explorations of dimensions of 
character, which can (but 
dog not always) engage questions of judgelllent, goods and evaluation. Imaginative 
identification with fictional situations and personalities can 
infoýrºn and provoke reflection, but the effect of 
fiction should not be ('Oilfused with the activity of rellectimn, part of the º»o)re general response of 
subjectivity to human situation and engagement which 
harm nýutic\ , lttrºnptý to coºnprch kid and theorise. 
These comments are 
directed towards the u"c of per' ILh" draw ii troni fiction, and are not intended to 
encroach upon 
issues i nv 1 ving literary and icsthetic the"rv w\which (as wit Ii Taylor': di. Cusiun of the 
epiphanic potential of nmo 
dernist poýetr\-) extend far beyond the purview of this C.:. 1\ 
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desirable quality, particularly in an expressive, post-romantic literary culture, but its lack 
does not indicate the absence of identity. 
Flanagan's final example of inarticulacy is that of athletes who as coaches are unable 
to communicate their knowledge to others. The `acquisition of athletic know-how and 
savvy by way of continuous practice'105 involves understanding (of techniques and 
modes of conduct), evaluation (of tactical and/or competitive situations), and perhaps a 
range of personal qualities (self-discipline, competitiveness, a sense of fair play). Such 
activities and aptitudes (although perhaps naively stated here) are amongst the integral 
goods of sporting practices, and presumably occur with considerable intensity and depth 
in the case of `great athletes'. But, as Flanagan points out, the knowledge acquired in the 
course of sporting endeavour need not be linguistically formulated, and more importantly 
may not be susceptible to such formulation. 106 
Flanagan agrees with Taylor that human experience is never independent from 
language, but maintains that this does not demand that all experience be `linguistically 
corralled. '107 Although the theorisation of engaged agency called attention to the 
`prethematised understanding'108 requisite for intelligible agency, the tightly linked 
concepts of evaluation, articulation, and identity in Taylor's work are dominated by their 
linguistic aspects. Flanagan's claim that Taylor's discussion of prearticulate understanding 
is in conflict with the role accorded to articulation is unfounded. The relevant issue here 
which could undermine the linguistic focus of Taylor's methodology is not that of 
compatibility, but of the importance for identity of inarticulate understanding and 
implicit evaluation in practices associated with normal agency. 
Flanagan's arguments against the primacy of reflection are more carefully developed 
than Tully's, but the substance of both critiques suggest that understanding and identity 
occur in the course of practices which are best characterised in terminology other than 
that of linguistic reflexivity. Flanagan's examples, however persuasive, only offer partial 
accounts of aspects of character. They do not touch on the complexity of identity as 
formulated in the range of overlapping discourses and practices with which Taylor is 
concerned. The inarticulacy of an athlete with regard to `sporting know-how' might be 
complemented by a high level of linguistic awareness in other aspects of identity; and 
whilst the characters inhabiting Tolstoy's short stories might 
be denied reflexivity, other 
examples from his oeuvre (such as the protagonists of Anna 
Karenina) offer striking 
105 Flanagan, 'Identity and Strong; and \Veak Evalu. ttion', 52-3. As with Toýlstuv's peasants, this 
example could he countered 
by inSt. tnces of 'spurting ;; mats' Wilt) have suiCrsatilly articulated their `know- 
how' as coaches and/car pundit:. LittIc wmilcl 
he gained by : uth a pri ce',,, pother thin to) point out again ,, It 
an example can support an argument, 
but is itueiI neither argunnent iwr pro , )I. 
106 i It i: nut the .. Ise that the eo). icli has a (IJILAent v()iahul, trv, rather that 
language is tnadequate to 
the knowledge concerned. 
107 Flanagan, `Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluatini', 52. 
108 Taylor, 'Engaged Agency and B. irkgrcýuncl', 329; Ch. 4 §. 1 ahoy. 
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examples of self-interpretation. In order to decisively undermine interpretive theory it 
must be shown not only that dominant activities of identity and identification need not be 
reflexive, but that they actually are not so. 
As a question of political philosophy109 this invites consideration of the 
relationship obtaining between theories and practices of reflection. Both Tully and 
Flanagan suggest that understanding occurs in the course of customary and habitual 
activities rather than critical reflection, 110 an argument for the primacy of the practical 
over the theoretical appealing to practices which supposedly manifest an irreducible ethos. 
As with `sporting know-how' ethos is not automatically available to language, 111 and in 
the context of a form of life is perhaps one way of naming the thing Wittgenstein suggests 
is `grasped' in an act of understanding. Following this argument from understanding, 
ethical knowledge originates in activity, not contemplation. Where these understandings 
are secure (or pretheoretical) reflection and interpretation are unnecessary and the 
contribution of theory to practice is likely to be minimal. It is here that the apparent 
tension between theory and practice emerges, as conventions, practices, standards of 
judgement, established behaviour, etc., - in short, the ethos of a society - which are 
acquired and internalised by the subject through participation in established practices, are 
called into question, irrespective of their efficacy, by the unrelenting critical gaze of 
modern culture. 
Although reflection must at some juncture begin with information manifested in 
practices, from its point of origin with Plato political theory has concerned the critical 
examination of conventional understandings which masquerade as forms of wisdom. 
Once challenged, however, understandings which were once held as certainties can never 
stand in quite the same relation to identity)'2 Modernity enjoins reflexivity with an 
urgency which proliferates irrespective of the status of that which falls within its purview, 
and can hence undermine forms of belief which manifest the ethos of a society; yet 
simultaneously the ethos of modernity contains, and is arguably dominated by, an ideal of 
109 Where a cognitive psychologist, for example, might attempt to test the hypothesis through the 
quantitative measurement of levels cif reflexivity in experimental subjects. 
110 Ronald Beiner, 'Do we need i Philosophical Ethics? Theory, Practice and the Primacy of Ethos', 
The Phi/osophica! Forum XX (1989), 230-243. 
111 i. e. as humans are linguistic beings it is not 
language independent, but our understanding of it is not 
predicated upon the ability to articulate 
it in language. 
112 Matthew Arnolds Do;, c-r Beach is the canonical, and much quoted, formulation of the crisis of faith 
provoked by Darwinism and 
is not in need of repetition here. For Taylor can Arnold see 'Modcrnity and the 
Rise of the Public Sphere' 
in Grethe. B. Peterson (cd. ), The Tinner Lectures on Hmian Values 14 (Salt Lake 
City, University of Utah Press, 1993), 208 
If., and T, tylor, S, urcc: c uf'the Sell, 408 I. Re. pnn: es to this crisis of 
course van, but the sceptical moment 
is ineradicable from relit ion in the late twentieth century whether 
one's response is atheism, ýtgnosticisni, affirmation as in , 
tct (, ( f, titIi or inductiOOll lilt() i 'reborn' sect; this last 
option implies 
its ("wn peculiar psychopathology, 
hilt i, undleni, thly t respomc tO the 1 rnl of unbelief 
characteristic of science-oriented cultures. 
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critical awareness. 113 When unhelpfully formulated as a contradiction, this paradox 
eventuates in a rather stale and inaccurate opposition between tradition and 
modernity. 114 
This misconception obscures the relation between ethos and reflection, and 
precludes the identification of a position which does not pose the question of tradition 
and modernity in terms of bivalence. It is not the case that either reflexivity or 
habituation need be accorded some unassailable philosophical priority. 115 Taylor's 
discussion of engaged agency fully acknowledges the importance to subjectivity of a 
multiplicity of contexts and practices, but justifiably privileges the conflicts and debates of 
history, culture and value which arise in the process of that ever expanding pluralism. 
The interpretive structure of the theory is not attributable to a whimsical or arbitrary 
philosophical preference; it is rather an attempt to capture and respond to the complexity 
of human engagement within pluralistic, literate and (to a greater rather than lesser 
degree) reflexive environments. It is this complexity, and the questions thereby presented 
to the subject, which makes the question of identity, and the forms of politics implicated 
and constituted by that problematic, a pressing one of both theory and practice in 
modern societies. 
The argument that the critical examination of established forms of life destroys the 
ethical knowledge which philosophy purports to validate is so predicated on the 
bifurcation of theory and practice. Modernity and pluralism are to a large extent co- 
extensive, and ideas of critical reflection are of considerable weight for both terms. In 
consequence many contemporary practices either have a reflexive component or are a 
product of reflection, an elementary observation which alone renders the convenient 
opposition of tradition and modernity inconveniently unsustainable. When practices are 
reflective no such opposition occurs because theory and practice coincide in reflexivity, 
and when practices are unproblematic the need to interpret them is absent, and again no 
such opposition occurs. The argument against reflection seems in these terms a curious 
113 Which is bound up with the idea of `inwardness' discussed earlier; something (a belief, 
understanding, etc. ) is not authentic until I have examined, justified and affirmed 
it. This observation is 
similar to that of Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 163-164, who acknowledges that although 
reflection can destroy ethical knowledge, this is both unavoidable and potentially 
beneficial insofar as `in 
losing ethical knowledge wie m. tv gain knowledge of other 
kinds, about hum, in nature, history, what the 
world is actually like. ' 
114 The clearest recent statement of this supposed oppO5It10n 
being that 00f Al. tsdair Maclntvre, After 
Virtue, Ch. 9, whose overheated assessment of the presently 
A)tainin~ cri. i. Al im)r, tlity claims that the only 
available choice is that 
between 'Nietzsche Or Aristotle)' Madntvre goes un however toi explore the resources 
of Aristotelianism . it : Onne 
length, de\velo, ping an , te<<, unt ()(traditi(, n5 is 
dyn, tntic, deliher, ttive movements of 
thought, rather than unreflective canons Of 
belief. Despite being by I', tr the harshest critique of modernity and 
liberalism an10nPst the "o-called communit, trian:, then, c'en 
M1, tc1ntyre's aclvýýi, týý of tradition (presently 
that of Thomism) 
is far from being uncritical. 
115 \C'liiih Tully seeks to establish for 'understanding' and 
(although more im derately stated) Beiner 
for ethos in their respecti\'e anal\'scý. 
151 
one, which needs to show that unnecessary reflection occurs to the detriment of ethical 
practices. As the occurrence of reflection is itself an indication of the insufficiency of an 
established belief, practice, etc., it is difficult to see how such a case could be made, since 
the occurrence of critical reflection demonstrates or creates its own inexorability. 
Furthermore, as a practice reflection is itself always context-dependent. Arbitrary 
problematisation at the hands of theory can potentially destroy established meanings and 
practices, but need not always do so: critical examination of everyday practices can refine 
and strengthen as well as undermine them. Alternately, theoretical presuppositions can be 
questioned and methodologies undermined by the response of practice to theory; a 
community might, for example, simply disregard the verdict of theory when its 
irrelevance is self-evident. This is perhaps more often the case than most social scientists 
would care to acknowledge. 116 
Taylor can concur with Beiner's judgement that ethical judgement is practical 
rather than theoretical117 without being drawn into unsustainable claims about the 
primacy of either. Recalling Williams's point that there is no route back from 
reflectiveness, it is apparent that any such distinction has already been blurred beyond 
measure. Beiner rightly argues that 'no philosopher can legislate a new ethos'118 but that 
does not preclude theory from abetting activities of interpretation in order to sustain and 
innovate understandings and responses to unfolding ethical dilemmas. Indeed, Taylor's 
claim for the inescapability of strong evaluation is compatible with Williams's 
observation. Evaluation is inescapable because frameworks are both plural and 
problematic in modern societies. 119 Where competing goods and forms of life co-exist, 
overlap, obscure, conflict and co-operate with one another reflection and decision 
between and within the range of options available to the self is indeed necessary, firstly in 
order to recover and clarify goods and meanings, and secondly if social identities, and the 
relations they express, are to receive coherent formulation and articulation. 
If Taylor's theory was either foundational or inattentive to pluralism, then the 
argument from understanding would have more force. Beiner's argument, following 
Gadamer, for the `primacy of ethos' is directed against the foundationalist claims of 
critical theory '0 rather than critical reflection per se, but overlooks the interdependent 
and, as outlined above, unpredictable relation between theory and practice. 
The analyses 
of Tully and Flanagan also depend upon the attribution of a 
false antimony to Taylor, 
116 1º1 1111' limited experience, 
for example, n, ttur, il srirntiSts typically d not recognise themselves 
witllin, and in consequence pay 
little Or no attention toi, the , ºn, tIySCS OI their activities ad anced 
by Kuhn and 
Feyerabend. 
117 Beincr, `Dig \\'e need l Philosophical Ethics?... ', 
118 Beincr, 'Do we need a Philosophical Ethics?... ', 240. 
119 Taylor, Souicc /'the Self, 17 f., Ch. 25. 
Brºnrr, 'D() we nccd a 120 
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but nevertheless ask perceptive questions of interpretive theory. Flanagan's critique 
points to the limits of reflexive hermeneutics: that evaluations can be more implicit than 
Taylor suggests, and need not be articulated with the clarity to which he aspires. Neither 
of these observations undermines Taylor's arguments, but they remind again us that 
identity is as ambiguous as its contexts, can be more or less successfully formulated, and 
similarly variable in the character and opacity of its articulation. 
THE PROCESS OF PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION is a painstaking and prolonged but 
valuable one. In negotiating the most pressing objections to hermeneutics as a 
philosophical methodology, a range of issues - the role of examples in explanation, 
language and realism, the Best Account and Reflective Equilibrium, interpretation and 
understanding, and the limits of reflection - came to light in such a way as to clarify and 
at times moderate the claims of reflexive hermeneutics. In so doing the relationship 
between language, self and social context which emerged further undermined Rawls's 
individuated self and its supporting methodology. The critique of justice as Fairness 
remains incomplete, however, until the resources of Ta\ýlor's philosophical anthropology 
are brought to bear upon issues of pluralism, identity, language and value conflict in an 
explicitly political manner. 
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C II A 1' '1' I: KSIX 
POLITICAL THEORY AND COMMUNITY 
[1] ANTHROPOLOGY TO ADVOCACY 
THE MOVEMENT OF THEORY FROM ANTHROPOLOGY to political advocacy is both 
unclear and underdetermined. Ideal-type correspondences between self and society or the 
parts thereof are neither sustainable nor plausible. The original equilibrium established 
by Plato in Republic, l as with that offered by Rawls in Theory, is achieved through the 
domination by reason of more worldly aspects of character (for Plato our spirit and 
desires, for Rawls our conceptions of the good). The neatness of such theoretical schemes 
depends on either misconception or suppression and in either case is fated to prove 
inadequate when faced with the complexity of human affairs. 
The examination of their respective conceptions of subjectivity demonstrated how 
Taylor's interpretive methodology consistently challenges Rawls's analytic approach. In 
matters of political judgement this disparity can initially appear less transparent, as 
although the manner of their formulation may be very different, the positions supported 
by hermeneutic and constructivist analyses need not be diametrically opposed. On many 
issues (distribution, equality, opposition to discrimination and intolerance, etc. ) they are 
even likely to be in (very) general agreement. Michael Sandel's critique of Rawls does not 
dispute the egalitarian implications which are typically associated with the difference 
principle. His objection is rather that the robust formulation and 
defence of such a 
position requires much stronger conceptions of self and community than those offered 
by 
Rawls. " Similarly, Sandel defends sexual freedom by appeal to the goods, for example of 
I Pl, ltc,, Rcpuhlic, 434d. 445. 
Tic imp. triyvn 4 Phu, . imi Rjwl, 
is Il"t I, nC upOII Whüh I \V(, uld \\ isl1 to 
placc any \\CiLIit 
but it is of p. t'\ing intcrest t11.11 IIW p( ihilitv SCI h, atli Phu)', 'City 
in SpccJi' and Rawls's 
`\V lI-Ordered Sl)l'ICI\' 1s Ciepeiid'nt liF)CC11 tlll' Stlllicicnc ' )f their re\4''\ tI\c 'OIlll'plIC ms 1d1 rc 1 il. 
2 SanciA Lihcnali5rr! mcl lbc Lmttlý..., 141). 
love, intimacy, friendship and mutual support, which are characteristically associated 
with and (ideally) attained in human relationships irrespective of the gender of the 
participants. Rather than invoking the vocabulary of privatised individual rights and a 
model of toleration which aspires to neutrality concerning the moral status of values and 
practices, Sandel argues that sexual and reproductive liberties realise goods which are 
already affirmed in the public, legal and political discourses common throughout western 
societies. By exploring the beliefs and practices of participants in the dispute, a level of 
understanding of what is actually at issue between the parties is made possible which 
potentially enables debate to take place in more expansive terms than those afforded by 
incompatible deontic claims. Although Sandel's justification draws upon goods rather 
than rights, the outcome of his discussion is - at least superficially - compatible with that 
of Rawls. 3 
This apparent concurrence does not undermine the extent and significance of the 
debates outlined in the course of this essay, which are indispensable to coherent and 
sustainable political analysis. Consideration of methodological and anthropological issues 
contributes towards the resolution of concepts and categories, in order that they can be 
intelligibly used as tools of political understanding. Without such clarification the 
possibility of thorough and consistent reflection, in both general and particular contexts, 
is correspondingly diminished. The theoretical issues worked out in the preceding 
chapters are (part of) the constitutive background of interpretive theory, informing 
conceptions of politics and of political philosophy quite distinct from the Rawlsian 
normative model. This contrast emerges with particular clarity in the treatment of 
pluralism, multiculturalism and community, areas which are explored further in this 
chapter. 
Some initial remarks on interpretation and judgement may be helpful here, 
clarifying the location and context of hermeneutic political theory. As with the situated 
subject, interpretation can only occur in media res. 4 A theorist may aspire to a level of 
even-handedness in considering alternate claims, arguments, and interpretations, but any 
critical distance will always be insecure and cannot be equated with impartial or 
3 S, tncirl, 'Moral Argument , ind 
Liberal Tclcrati( n: A rti, )n . 111(1 
California Law 
Rcview77 (1989), 521-538. Political L1hr)r. r/is»l, ? 43 n. ýý. 
4f 4ich, tcl \\'alr. er, Tbc Comp. Dtv' u/'C-ttic. i (Lontio n, 
Pcicr H. 1Iktn, 1989), Cu. 1, t"xplOrC' thr hiswr', 
IoC, 1tion and role A the 's<u'1,11 critic' is i 
figure \V"I1() 1iIk'r. , un 
i itern. iI interprct, tti, )n anci critique of his Own 
society. Walrcr'< '>o-ial criticism mid \v 
It, tt this clL ptcr I, thcl 'applied intýrprrt, ttiare similar, if not 
identical, genres. \\ here \\`<ilier's studies concern piVOt. 1l 
figures such as Buller, Gr, inn: i i, Orwell, Camas and 
Foucault, the st, itus of . ipplied interpretation and 
its practitioners - imperfectly represented below by Sandei 
and Kymlicka - 
is perhaps less drai», ýtic and portentous, although 
it need not be tnýv less significant or 
effective in virtue Of 
its modestY.. 
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Archimedean judgement. As has been established at some length, linguistic 
understanding5 depends on prethematised or pre-articulate awareness which (however 
implicitly) influences activities of judgement and interpretation. It furthermore follows 
from the repudiation of excessive methodological abstraction that devices such as the 
original position are to be viewed as unnecessary flights of imagination. The heuristic 
value of even trivial hypothetical examples is limited, and when compounded by the level 
of artifice sought by Rawls constructivism is ruled out as a compelling methodology (of 
either deduction or interpretation). This is not to say that prevailing social and political 
values and institutions6 are presupposed or accepted as natural, inescapable or defensible. 
It is instead to claim that the norms and concepts brought to bear in the examination of 
such institutions acquire their relevance as critical standards due to their presence within 
ongoing practices of reflection and evaluation. The question (to the extent that it is 
intelligible) of whether and how they might acquire significance under original-position- 
type hypothetical conditions is irrelevant to the application of critical concepts in 
determinate situations. 
Rather than attempting to define and legitimate principles and institutional 
structures according to abstract models of reason and justification, interpretive political 
theory seeks to articulate and interpret the range of pertinent goods, the meanings which 
they manifest, and the institutions and relationships through which they attain expression 
in, and with reference to, the circumstances in which they become problematic. In 
addressing issues of sexual freedom Sandel is able to refocus debate around concepts of 
value likely to be shared, and hence available to dialogue, between those prepared to 
constructively engage in public deliberation and decision-making. Such discourse is far 
removed from that shaped by assertions of right (to either `life' or `choice', for example) 
which organises argument around indefatigable claims in a manner which frustrates 
rather than facilitates dialogue. 
[2] INTERPRETING POLITICAL CONFLICT 
A MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION places in relief the resources brought to bear by an 
interpretive approach to the understanding of political disputes. The support of a 
language - Taylor offers the case of 
French in the controversy over Quebec? - is 
5 Which cioc" uncontrovvcrsi, illy mconmmpolisc wtdcrst, inding within politic. tl tho rv as .t 
discursive 
discipline. 
6 Roughly in `bite-modern' Societies, the centralised bureaucratic tatc.. tnd the public and private 
institutions and , tpp. trattuýs of c. lpit. tlist economy and majf, rit. tri, tn represent. lti\ve gnýv'critntcnt. 
7 See in particular, 'Altern; ttiv-c Futures: Legitim. tc\, Identity and Alienation 
in L, tte-Twcntieth- 
Century Canada', sind 'Shared tncl Divergent \'. tlucc. 
' re: peetively ilt. tpter. 4 and 8 OI T. ty liar, Reconciling the 
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defended on the grounds that language is required and presupposed by the cultures, forms 
of life and values which are associated with it by Quebeckers. This defence does not rely 
upon formal rights of independence or autonomy, appealing instead to phenomena which 
are realised in language and linguistic practices which, insofar as they underlie and are 
hence required by these forms of life, are themselves goods. Framed in terms of the 
relationships between languages - on a continuum encompassing compatibility, 
competition and conflict - the possibility of negotiation and co-existence arises in a 
sense which is unavailable to a model of politics dependent upon assumptions of 
individuation, instrumentality and deontology. 
In the case of Quebec the language question, which is prior and not reducible to 
individual or majoritiarian preferences, properly concerns the terms of co-existence 
between French and English speakers, not the supremacy of one at the expense of the 
other. The formulation of the debate in terms of linguistic, national and/or cultural 
autonomy obscures this interdependence and plurality, in consequence obstructing the 
dialogue from which a satisfactory resolution might eventuate. The diffuse relationship 
between the two languages requires that they be recognised as social resources underlying 
an array of activities, customs and beliefs. These goods and practices articulate 
identifications and differences of and between persons and groups at levels which 
incorporate, but also transgress and transcend, boundaries between English and French. 
The vocabulary of rights, where ostensibly incompatible claims are typically formulated 
in terms of opposition rather than interdependence, is unable to theorise context and 
complexity in a sufficiently nuanced fashion, and emerges severely diminished from a 
comparison with interpretive methods of theorising political debate 
This weakness is clearly illustrated in Will Kvmlicka's attempt to fashion a liberal 
theory capable of addressing relations within and between diverse cultural formations. 
Kymlicka agrees that Rawls pays insufficient attention to the background conditions 
required by an intelligible anthropology, which he labels `the cultural context of 
choice. '8 The omission is taken to be an oversight rather than a deep-seated 
methodological flaw, which Kymlicka attempts to correct by the formulation of a 
concept of cultural membership which is introduced into Rawls's scheme of concepts and 
endowed with the status of a primary good. This supplement to justice as Fairness defines 
as a right the provision of a secure environment in which the individual might exercise 
Solitudes: Essays on Canadian F(Y/(')"dllS)1) a)td 
Natinnalicn), ed. Guy L, tFo re\L (Montreal and Kingston, McGill- 
Queens University Press, 1993). See also Taylor, 'Reply and rc-, irticul, 'ition', 253-7. 
8 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Conimunily and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), 177. Despite 
drawing heavily on Rawls, Ky nnlicka passes over the Llci il (, 
I, ind pn)hlCm: surrounding, the Original 
Position in general and primary goods 
in p, trtiitil, tr. 
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his potential for autonomous choice, and sanctions the allocation of special rights and 
privileges by the state9 in order to establish and maintain conditions of equality within 
minority groups (Kymlicka's main concern is with aboriginal peoples in Canada) 
otherwise disadvantaged by principles and policies which presuppose the presence of a 
universalised and undifferentiated citizen identity. 
The attempt to theorise and reconcile collective rights with a philosophy premised 
upon individual inviolability is perhaps laudable, but is fated by its presuppositions to be 
at best incomplete and at worst incoherent. Kymlicka's concern with `secure cultural 
membership' is not a concern with culture (or, more charitably, is only indirectly so 
concerned) as special rights for endangered and/or minority groups are intended only to 
`remove inequalities in the context of choice which arise before people even make their 
choices. '10 The differentiated status established for particular cultural formations is not 
directly associated with languages, territories, or institutions independently of the 
individuals for whom those rights are sanctioned, and to whom they devolve when their 
legitimacy is queried. 11 Rights remain wholly dependent upon the presumed autonomy 
of those deemed disadvantaged in their absence, not on the importance of contexts as 
goods or as constituent parts of a distinct form of life. Cultures are in other words means 
rather than ends, even when privileged as the target of special rights. 
Minority rights are vulnerable to strong objections from supporters of the broad 
liberal position which Kymlicka attempts to refine. Classical individualists (and atomists) 
view the very concept of minority rights as a contradiction of basic liberal principles 
which fails to respect or protect the individuality which it purports to advance. 
12 More 
importantly in the 'context of the present discussion, Kymlicka's attempt to revise the 
Rawlsian scheme remains blind to the constitutive dimension of goods. Kymlicka's 
fundamental commitment to the methodologies of rights based individualism produces 
9 It is noteworthy that `cultures' are static entities within Kynilick, i's theory. Powers of agency are 
limited to the State (issuing and guaranteeing rights which create equality 
between cultures) and individuals 
exercising their preferences in cultural contexts. The constitutive role of anthropological contexts 
is 
unremarked, as is the dynamic character of 
languages and practices insofar as they are constituted in 
discourse. 
10 Kynilicka, Lihcra/isrrl, Cornmunttr.. 1nl/ Culture , 190. 
11 'Groups have no amoral claim to well-heirs; indepýnd ntly of their members. ' Kynilicka, Liberalism, 
community andd Cu/iurc, 241-2. 
12 Chandran Kukathas, 'Are there any cultural rights)' Political Tlcw-)' 20 (1992), 105-139 argues these 
points (amongst others) 
in t discussion aimed prii»arily at Kvvniliika, whose response, 
`The Rights of 
Minority Cultures' Political Tbeur 20 (1992), 140-146, t' to rotate 
his claim that unequal rights can be 
justified in order to produce equality of opportunity 
for persons Within and hct\wccn unequally situated 
groups. Although 
Kukathas's argument that the principles (if cla.: i.. tl Liberalism (oaf L,, ccke 
in particular) are 
adequate to the need: of all 
individuals and Lest. thli: h the limit, 01 le iiiiiate chilli: i. 0) in\, mind wholly 
unpersuasive, 
it i` d, tnm. tgtng tu K\ in)icka, who presents 
his the r\ (df right' is in c\Fýlicitl\ liberal one and 
attempts to position 
it within the tradition extending rcnuglil\ 
from Hoýhhe, it, Rawls. 
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conflict and contradiction in the concept of the person, and remains bereft of an adequate 
grasp of either culture, pluralism or their conjunction. 
Kymlicka is consequently unable to advance debates such as that in Quebec beyond 
the crude oppositions of linguistic and national autonomy. Speakers of both tongues fear 
that their language, and ways of life, will become dominated by the other in the absence 
of a new constitutional settlement or the secession of French Quebec, but Kymlicka 
claims that neither group is actually disadvantaged because of the language issue. The 
tension between and fears of both groups are, he suggests, a manifestation of paranoia 
rather than a response to a genuine threat. Neither has cause to worry about `the fate of 
their cultural structure' or the `secure cultural membership'13 which provides the 
requisite environment for individual choice: regardless of the ongoing dispute, a context 
of choice will indubitably remain available to both English and French Canadians. 
Kymlicka's theory ensures that cultural membership is available to present and future 
generations, but is unconcerned with the form of that culture. 14 According to his analysis 
the immediate survival of neither context is at issue, and because the two groups are 
equally positioned - in that neither is formally discriminated against or subordinated to 
the other - Kymlicka's liberalism simply has nothing to say to the debate. 15 This 
cultural silence reveals it to be no more adept than the Rawisian model from which it 
developed. 
The presentation of the Quebec situation in terms of contextual equality and as an 
instance of mass paranoia is unconvincing. If, as seems to be the case, the presently 
enforced bilingualism is unsustainable in the long term (i. e. over decades rather than 
electoral cycles), and the settlement which replaces it emerges from conflicting claims of 
independence and autonomy rather than an effective process of consultation and 
deliberation, then contra Kymlicka the fate of the cultural structure is at issue. 16 
Advocates of secession are not preoccupied with the formal equality of choice supposedly 
available to all Canadians, but with the enduring presence of the language (be it French or 
English), and the practices and meanings which it manifests. Kymlicka's emphasis on 
13 Kvlnlirka, Lthcra/t$nl, C»r»turtiltv. ind Cu/<urc, 190. 
14 Kvmlicka does not make the distinction hetw1. eeºi the sur' ival of the 'cultural ýtrui tore' and the form 
in which that survival occurs. 
15 Taylor aclcirc>scs the inadequacy of K\ º»llck, l'\, tltc, >rv rcg, trcli i, cultural survival 
in Taylor, `The 
Politics cal Recognition', ,I 
iu/ticrr/lrrr.. r/i rrt: E. tarrttrtrrr;; 1/, c I Iiiic s r. / Rcrr, `rrruu. rt, expanded edn, ed. Amy 
Gutmann (1994, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press), 40 n. 16. He <<)mnli llts that `Kymlicka's 
reasoning is valid (perhaps) 
hr rxrs1rrt, t pecºplC who lind theºn`el c'ý trapped within a Culture under pressure, 
and can flourish within 
it or not at all. ' It is not clear that even this 
i: the case, however, given that any group 
deemed to satisfy K. vmlüka's criteria pof 'cultural 
insecurity' would almost iertainl\ il1dic-. ate a culture 
whose survival is under threat 
irrespective oI the prelerenie< if tliýýse 'tr, apped within it'. 
16 e. g. T, t, \-loºr, 'The Politics of 
Recognition, ' 57-60. 
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equality at the expense of identity prevents the appreciation of culture and language as 
goods which may be in need of assistance and protection for reasons other than those of 
choice. 
Kymlicka's recent Multicultural Citizenship offers a more detailed account which 
attempts to refine and entrench his theory of minority rights. 17 The treatment there of 
questions raised by multiculturalism for political theory engages with issues of identity 
and citizenship in far greater detail than Liberalism, Community and Culture, but does not 
disclose the conceptual resources required for a more satisfactory response to the `fact of 
pluralism. ' Multicultural Citizenship remains overwhelmingly focused on the issue of 
choice, 18 and as before the position of French-Canadians is not in his view sufficient to 
command the attention of the anglophone majority or its state. Kymlicka now classifies 
the issue (in a manner comparable with Rawls's revised doctrine) as one of social 
coherence rather than paranoia. Multicultural Citizenship does not repeat or review the 
trenchant but inaccurate criticisms levelled at Taylor (and Sandel) in Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, making the precise relationship between the two works difficult 
to specify. 19 Employing a great deal of historical and political material Kymlicka 
develops arguments from the earlier book but rarely refers to them in detail, and his 
appreciation of Taylor's contribution to the Canadian debate in Multicultural Citizenship 
is arguably inconsistent with his earlier critical analysis. This incongruence is however 
minor; much more significant is that although Kymlicka concedes much to Taylor's 
approach in the case of Canada, he does not acknowledge the wider negative implications 
entailed by that judgement for the Rawlsian project and its attendant methodologies. 
`The health and stability of a modern democracy', Kymlicka claims, `depends not 
only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its 
citizens. '2° Passing over the question of whether the theory and practice of liberal 
individualism is adequate to engender and sustain the requisite civic identity even in a 
monocultural context, Kymlicka argues persuasively that many minority rights 
17 Will Ky nilic: ka, -fiji/licullural 
CilticnSIip.. 1 Lihc v.. rl ThcHrv Hf . 
tlinvrtty Rights (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1995). 
18 For cxanlple, 'Iiheralisnl is Iundanncnt, 
lll cllllcernell, not with the fite "f a. lt", but with the 
freedom and well 
heilig o inndividuu, 1ls'. Ký'Illlick, l, iýIrfllrcullh7". lI 
Cztzicnsbzp, 186, p. liR)n. 
19 Chapter 3g3 above. Taylor's brief iunlll)enu on : 14ul11rullural Citilmsbip ire laudatory' rather than 
critical, and make no mention of the relationship 
between his thought. and Kvn»lick; i':. , -1rncriczn Political 
Science Review 90 (1996), p. 408. 
20 Kynllick, t, Multicultural Citzzcn5hip, 175. Kvnnlick. l proceeds to (4Icr a Il. t of such qualities and 
atllllll es, 
laying p. lrtlclil, lr emphasis on u 
leratioii, partlcipatIt n, sell-restratni, resp 'iisih1Ii1ý, justice and 
distributive I, 1irncs . 
This modcl o cilii. ensliip is perhaps mcn))1inlistR - Lultures. Ire lit )t 1l\v, i. 11 as open and 
progressive, especially " 
hen lacing a perceived threat by the presence 0 mother at the hýnnndarics of identity, 
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(exemptions, differential treatment, positive discrimination) "I serve to integrate 
previously excluded groups and individuals within an existing predominant identity. The 
specification of such rights is expansive rather than divisive in a manner consistent with 
an ideal of civic solidarity. This model is however severely limited by its theoretical and 
empirical requirements. In addition to a concept of autonomous subjectivity, the scheme 
relies upon (i) the presence of a clearly explicable dominant culture into which minority 
groups can integrate, which (ii) is `authoritative', i. e. legitimate in accordance with the 
norms and principles of contemporary liberal theory, and (iii) has a basic structure of 
institutions which are readily `adapted to reflect the increasing cultural diversity of the 
population they serve. '22 Kymlicka describes a process of immigration, assimilation and 
integration, where a dominant open and tolerant culture absorbs and adapts as it expands. 
This model is undoubtedly significant as an ideal type (particularly in the instance of the 
United States), but is unduly narrow both in terms of application (few if any societies 
clearly converge on all three criteria), and in its ability to address the range of questions 
posed to groups and identities, of either a dominant or subordinate culture, by 
multiculturalism in late modernity. 
Such is the case in Quebec, where the unease of French-Canadians suggests that the 
dominant (Anglo-Canadian) social context fails to satisfy two of Kymlicka's three 
criteria. It does not obviously function as an authoritative dominant culture (ii) into 
which integration is desirable, perhaps because (either partly or wholly) the political and 
economic institutions of that culture are at present insufficiently open to the 
transformation (iii) that full-blooded integration might demand. This restricted 
perspective creates, and is reproduced in, the presupposed availability of an authoritative, 
adaptable, dominant political culture. The narrow relevance of this view is rapidly 
exposed by any culture or minority group which dig-erg es from Kymlicka's model, which 
envisages the creation of citizen solidarity through assimilation. Minority rights perform 
a function which, at the level of public citizenship, is levelling rather than differentiating. 
Kymlicka is sensitive to some of the consequences of this flattening of public identity: he 
recognises, for example, that `imposing common citizenship on minorities... is likely to 
increase conflict', 23 but offers little guidance in the matter of negotiating conflicting 
21 Kymlick. i cites the (-ascs ý)l Sikhs , ind Jews who respectivcI) wished tt) 
jt)in the Canadian Mounted 
Police and US Military, but required 
dispensations allowing them to wear turbans and yarmulkes on religious 
grounds. In both instance the special right which was requested 
'c-111d (), fly he 'ccn as promoting not 
discouraging their integration' \vithin the national culture and Identity. Mu/ticu/turz/ 
Citizenship, 177. 
ý? Kvmlic: ka, ýMM1(Il1C"11111O"ýI Citize? ýhip, 181. 
The numhcriný; of the claim. (lo)e" not (occur in the text, but 
their introduction here 
does not ilicr the suhstancc )I Kvnnlicck, i'" argument. 
23 Kvºnlicka, : 11!! 
/Ia11/1U)". l/ C111Lensliip, 184. 
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citizen identities, 24 treating Quebeckers as bearers of prediscursively formed and opposed 
national identities in a manner which can only be resolved by incorporation or secession. 
The logic of liberal rights is unable to theorise the relation between identity and 
citizenship other than in terms of integration or division. This limitation of the political 
imagination applies as much to Kymlicka's expansive theory - where the principle 
concern remains that of stability rather than identity - as it does to more limited 
conceptions of rights, although Kymlicka's keen appreciation of the difficulties posed by 
multiculturalism certainly marks an advance in the discussion of liberalism and pluralism. 
Noting that the convergence of political opinion in Quebec has not diminished the 
intensity of debates surrounding culture and language, Kvmlicka concedes that common 
political values are often insufficient to sustain the level of solidarity required by a stable 
liberal regime. In Rawlsian terms'' an overlapping consensus of citizens on the regulative 
principles of political liberalism, even if attainable, may well prove inadequate to secure 
the stability of the well-ordered society. This impasse can only be overcome through the 
development of more cohesive forms of cultural and political identification, but because 
Kymlicka has already defined and opposed identities in Quebec (and places like it) as 
products of `history, language, and maybe religion... precisely the things which are not 
shared in a multination state'26 the analysis is unable to proceed to consider how 
effective citizen solidarities might be fostered and consolidated. 
If multicultural states are marked by a plurality of identities and identity claims, and 
if, as Kymlicka's theory insists, stability requires a dominant identity which is 
simultaneously homogenous and expansive, the prospects for either multiculturalism or 
liberal individualism are bleak. Given that the former is, as Rawls proclaims, a `fact', and 
the latter a normative theory, it is safe to propose that rights-based individualism faces 
greater difficulties than cultural pluralism. Perhaps unwittingly Kymlicka implies as much 
when he briefly but favourably evaluates Taylor's discussion of the Quebec situation. 
Rejecting the definition of a narrow socio-historical-linguistic construct as the model of 
Canadian identity, Taylor offers an interpretation of Canada as an `experiment in deep 
diversity'27 to which a number of ways of allegiance and belonging are possible. Rather 
24 Kymlºcka, Multicultural Citizenship, 185-6. `claims to self-government are here to stay, we have no 
choice but to try to accommodate theºn... 
[htºt] it is difficult to see why liberal: should automatically oppose 
peaceful, liberal secession .... ecessio., n need not 
harm individual rights. ' 
25 To which Kymlicka does not. as (I ten in : 491110cullur. dI 
Ciiin'nsl'ip, rc% ert here. 
26 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 189. 
27 The emplia' k on diversit\" is explicit thrnnugho, ut 
Ta\ It)r': writing: (r Over a quarter of a century. 
See e. g. Tbc Pattern c, / 
Polities (1970), Ch. 6; 'Wh\ dO natinm> beet me statt. ' (1979); 'Shored and Divergent 
Values' (1991), and 'li»pedinICnt: to .t Canadian 
Future' (199'). All reprinted in Tad ,, r, Rcocºnci/in the 
Solitudes. 
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than opposing minority groups, or viewing them as a threatening presence, a model of 
diverse but complementary identifications pluralises the concept of citizenship in a 
manner appropriate to a genuinely multicultural society. Recognising and valuing 
diversity as a good bound up with the idea of Canada does not solve at a stroke problems 
such as that in Quebec. It does however offer a platform for deliberation which draws 
upon the pluralistic and inclusive aspects of identity in Quebec and greater Canada, 
avoiding from the outset the false dichotomy of assimilation or secession. 28 
The concept of diversity which Taylor invokes is more profound than a `belated 
acceptance of difference'. 29 Tolerant indifference is not sufficient to generate or sustain 
the identifications and sense of belonging which contribute to a viable (multi)national 
identity. The task presented by Canada and addressed by the project of `deep diversity' is 
a paradigm instance of the multicultural problematic: the need to simultaneously identify 
and differentiate citizens in a manner which recognises and incorporates difference as a 
substantive element within a reflexive and coherent identity. A flourishing multicultural 
society must negotiate the ostensibly incompatible demands of commonality and 
difference, avoiding the extremes of unsustainable uniformity associated with 
individualism and universalism, without succumbing to the cultural particularism and 
epistemic parochialism which can accompany the excessive valorisation of `otherness' as a 
philosophical category, rather than a practical aspect of identity. 
Philosophical analysis and interpretation can identify and articulate the resources of 
a viable pluralist culture, but cannot create them. The bases of a successful 
multiculturalism are present, albeit perhaps latently, in Taylor's Canada. That the 
arguments over national identity are so intense and protracted offers evidence, he 
suggests, of persistent loyalties and sentiments of belonging. The idea of Canada, and the 
identity coextensive with that concept, is `no longer linked a priori to a certain vision' but 
national unity remains the `hub of controve rsy. ''O If it were otherwise then the break-up 
countenanced by Kymlicka would not only have already occurred, but would have done 
so without the protracted and extreme debates surrounding recent ballots. 31 
28 The extent of the diversity and multiculturalism (rather than 
hicultur, alism) in Quebec is emphasised 
by Louis Balthazar, `Identity and Nationalism in Quebe(-', in Jame. Littleton (cd. ) Clad) of identities: media, 
manipulation, and politics of thy' r/, /'(E. tglcxx, o (l 
Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1996). I . 1111 
indebted to Mark 
Passera for this reference. 
29 Taylor, 'A Canadian Future', In R(on1clIin theSoIrur(Ic: ý, '6. 
30 Taylor, 'Institutwii in Nat n naI Liic', Rccuncihn(, j/; ' S"lituclcs, 1 29-30. 
31 The result of the October 1995 referendum, when 50.5'% (d 
Quehe kor. v', tCLl to remain within 
Canada, niste well attest the strcngth of feeling Iles ribecl 
lb\ Tal r, but perhaps calls question his 
contention that unity is the 'huh of controversy'. 
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Furthermore, whilst the breakaway of Quebec might, in the short term at least, resolve 
some of the issues surrounding the survival and flourishing of Quebec as a French- 
speaking society, in adopting a territorial model of national sovereignty and unity such a 
move would not actually address the question of pluralism. The institution of a 
independent Quebecois polity might delay the issue, but it would in time inevitably face 
the difficulties posed by multiculturalism, and find itself no more able to engage with 
them positively than the Canadian federation is at present. 
This inability is at least in part attributable to the conventional (broadly liberal) 
conception of nation and citizenship, which operates according to a model, labelled `first 
level' by Taylor, where diversity is tolerated within the boundaries of an identity defined 
in terms of universal citizenship. Under the conditions prevalent in Canada (and either 
present or developing elsewhere) what is required instead is a form of equality without 
homogeneity, accommodating - but not narrowly assimilating - deep (`second-level') 
diversity and allowing that `a plurality of ways of belonging would also be acknowledged 
and respected... a Quebecois or a Cree or a Dene might belong in a different way. '32 The 
idea of different but equally legitimate modes of identification involves a transformation 
of the `first-level' conception of unity as uniformity. In its place Taylor advances an 
`asymmetrical form of federalism'-- which responds to the claims of deep diversity by 
effecting the recognition and affirmation of personal and group identities (not only of 
aboriginal and French-speaking peoples, but also those of, e. g., European and South Asian 
extraction) as part of Canada, however varied those identities and cultures might be, 
within an expansive ('mosaic') conception of citizenship. 
For Taylor, the concept of recognition is imbued with a semantic depth far 
exceeding its formal usage in procedural and legal-constitutional theories. `We may be 
"recognized", ' argues Taylor `as equal citizens, or rights bearers, or as being entitled to 
this or that service - and still be unrecognized in our identit-,,... what is important to us 
may be quite unacknowledged, may even be condemned in the public life of a society, 
even though all our citizen rights are fully guaranteed. '34 Although the existing federal 
structure accords Quebec equal constitutional status amongst the ten states which 
constitute Canada, the cultural silence identified in Kymlicka's theory, but by no means 
limited to his formulation of liberalism, precludes a thoroughgoing appreciation and 
32 Taylor, 'Shared and Divergent Values', 182-3. The dex-A)pment of is mctry 
in the granting of self- 
government priviliges to n. itiVC people. IS 
discussed by Michael lgnatirff, Blo d . roc! 
Rclont; ing: Journeys into 
the. \'c^: ; \'aticýn. ýliýnr (BBC/Ch. uu and 
\\'incltis, London, 1993) 16I. 
33 Taylor, 'Reply and re-. 1rticul, ition', 253-4. 
34 Taylor, 'Impediments to . C, un. tcli, in 
future', 190. 
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validation of the differences as well as the similarities obtaining between it and 
mainstream Canada. 
Claims for the recognition and affirmation of differences which transgress 
established but often outmoded models of uniform citizenship explicitly engage aspects of 
multiculturalism beyond the scope of conventional liberal constitutionalism. Although 
well placed to accommodate the claims of moderate, reasonable individuals, liberalism is 
conceptually unable to coherently comprehend - much less respond to - the needs of 
group, culture, national and ethnic identities which conflict, coexist and overlap within 
modern societies. Taylor argues that a vocabulary of rights typically enframes appeals for 
recognition in terms of protest and denial, for example against discrimination, exclusion, 
and inequality. The language of liberalism is however complicit in the problem of 
pluralism and does not (as the case of Kymlicka demonstrates) readily afford the means 
for its resolution. In representing the claim for recognition as a protest against 
discrimination, 35 or (in the case of Quebec) a demand for a right of self-determination, 
articulation in the idiom of individualism can distort or even suppress the animating 
concerns of political claims to the extent that their basis in recognition is no longer 
apparent. 
Demands for recognition manifest politically aspects of the dialogical conception of 
the self outlined in chapter four. An adequate response requires more than a formal or 
juridical equality of treatment, and more than the granting of exceptional minority rights 
which upon examination remain firmly located within the tradition of individualism. 
Were that not the case then the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms would, as hoped, 
have satisfied the demands of all Canadians and defused the present constitutional crisis in 
its early stages. 36 Rather than being satisfied, the claim of cultural recognition is 
submerged in a discourse of equal treatment and rights. This discourse, although arguably 
indispensable in areas of jurisprudence where equality of treatment is genuinely at issue, is 
insufficient to cope with the political needs of groups and persons whose identity does not 
33 Taylc, r, `linpediinrnts to t Canadian future', 193-5. Ta\-I, tr identiliL". three c, m urrent discourses in 
the arguments over sep, tr, itisni: the power: BAI juri`dicti()n required to preserve 
QtuehcL at 'distinct society' 
(i); the dangers posed toi the 'distinct society' h' the exiting federal structures (ii); the 'perception of 
recognition denied, the sense thait one's t; rotip counts for ii )tltint;..., t 
Quebec inclepc"ndenti. t night he defined 
as one who hals utterly given up on seeking recognition 
fron] the Canadian partner' (195). 
36 'By granting a schedule of linguistic rights in a symmetrical 
fashion 
... 
[Trudrau] sought to foster a 
greater and unmediated allegiance to 
Canada as t political community, over and above provincial and 
regional commitments. ' Guy Lalorest, 'Philosophy 
in a nnultinational federation', in Tull-, Phi/usoplry in an 
Age of'Alur. rli in, 196-197. Alone amongst the province., 
Quebec has to thi: da failed to ratify the Charter. 
Although Quebec did accede to the Merrh Lake Accord, wherein 
it was ac oorded a right of existence as a 
distinct society, Meech Lake also 
failed due to ratification dillicttlties. 
165 
coincide, and hence feels threatened, by attempts to establish and impose a uniformity 
which is perceived to be `incompatible with a recognition of a distinct society%'37 
The reinterpretation of (some) rights claims as demands for recognition is bound up 
with the theorisation of a deliberative conception of politics emphasising the formation, 
articulation and recognition of cultures and identities in multicultural contexts. 
Developing the idea of politics as a public and intersubjective activity, this conception - 
although by no means `antiliberal' in any pejorative sense of the term - is able to discern 
as political forms of agency regarded by the narrow cultural scope of normative 
individualism as germane only to private or, following Rawls, `nonpublic' spheres. 
Kymlicka and Taylor concur in the judgement that an enduring democratic society 
requires a strong measure of citizen solidarity, 38 but Kymlicka's scheme of concepts and 
categories is unable to account for even the possibility of rapprochement in a situation of 
cultural antagonism such as that in Quebec. In contrast a hermeneutic approach attempts, 
through deliberative engagement, to reinterpret citizenship in an inclusive manner which 
accounts for and values difference, rather than privatising or alienating the beliefs and 
practices of plural and minority groups. 
This reinterpretation addresses the possibility of an asymmetric federalism noted 
above. The formulation of a social identity with sufficient resources to differentiate and 
recognise multiple constitutive elements, and simultaneously capable of relating those 
elements coherently within a recognisable and relevant account (or set of compatible 
accounts) of selfhood, is a challenging but inescapable undertaking. In challenging 
conventional understandings of universal citizenship, it also challenges and reframes the 
idea of the political. Taylor suggests that the pluralism at the root of the Canadian 
impasse can be transformed into the basis of a renewed conception of citizen identity. 
`Canada is a natural locus for the experiment in the dialogue society', 39 he argues, where 
the negotiation of goods and identities (as well as rights and obligations) furthers the 
recognition of commonality and difference in the course of a pluralist and democratic 
politics which neither imposes nor prefigures the outcome of public deliberation. 
The possibility of a multicultural identity itself presupposes a commitment to 
diversity on the part of its holders, in order to foster and reproduce `... the common 
understanding... that there was more than one formula for citizenship and where we could 
live with the fact that different people related to different formulae. '40 The production 
37 TavIor, Iºnpedinvents wa Canadian Future', 194 
38 Taylor, C. dn, ldi. in Futur''. 197, ', 1 ; Iýºýºýýýr. ºtiý . ýýiýtý 11"1: ,t ww of common 
Citizenship. 
39 T, ivlor, A C, tn, di. nn Future', _27 
40 Taylor, Injpediifll nts 10 .1C, tn. u{i. tn 
Future, 197-9. 
166 
and reproduction of this, as with all identities, is in large measure circular. As such it is 
clearly more demanding than schemes of either modus vivendi or overlapping consensus, 
but given the inadequacy of those doctrines the significance of such a comment as critique 
is negligible; explanatory circularity is not only inescapable, but can be virtuous rather 
than vicious. 
The strength of the claim that a commitment to 'deep diversity' and 
multiculturalism can itself become a source of identity is a difficult one to assess. Given 
that the absence of such commitment in part defines the situation in Quebec, the 
resonances which Taylor attaches to the concept of diversity are difficult to identify `on 
the ground'. However, some measure of identification with the project of diversity is 
clearly a requirement of any successful pluralist society, and although by no means 
overwhelming, recent developments in Quebec attest to the immanent presence of 
tendencies indicating that the concept of asymmetry is a response which is certainly 
plausible, and in the long term perhaps the only practical solution to the constitutional 
crisis. Rather than discussing secession in terms of total independence, in the aftermath 
the 1995 referendum the Parti Quebecois leader Lucien Brouchard has broached the 
possibility of a sovereign Quebec - i. e. a `distinct society' - `within the framework of a 
continued political and economic association with Canada. '41 Such suggestions are 
controversial but, although oblique, do advance the possibility of a transformation of 
existing structures in accord with Taylor's proposal of a differentiated multicultural 
federalism. 
Kymlicka agrees that in emphasising diversity `Taylor is pointing in the right 
direction. '` 2 He makes the passing critical comment that a commitment to diversity is 
the product of solidarity rather than a basis for it, but - as with the question of circularity 
- the critical force of this claim is elusive once the 
liberal model of identification with a 
dominant culture is discarded. More important is the extent to which Kymlicka's 
conclusion - that liberal theory has 
failed to identify the sources of unity in a democratic 
multination state43 - bears out the veracity of the hermeneutic critique of contemporary 
liberal individualism and its supporting methodologies. The Canadian example helpfully 
documents these limitations as a pressing practical as well as philosophical matter. 
41 `Quebec separatists Icr. tth tcý follow the leder', Tbc Guardian, f anu, try 
27 1997. The Parti Quebecois 
is reported to he divided 
het" een hardline sccessWnistS, anal thcýsr I()cºkin ; tu redefine: the relation obtaining 
between Quebec and the ººther provinces as a continuing p. irtnership. 
Moreover, the formation of an 
agreement acceptable to all the provinces 
is - as the failure cif Meech 
lake deº»u+nstr, ated -a further 
complicating factor. 
42 Kymlickýt, : ý1ýýIlict+luýral Ci[ixcný/up, 191. 
43 Kvvmlicka, Mull icullural Ciltzc'n$i'lp, 192. 
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As noted earlier, the substantive, goods-oriented characterisation of the Quebec 
situation does not establish a clear resolution in the form of, e. g., a legislative programme, 
final judgement, or system of institutions. The actin It ý" of interpretation is more likely to 
reveal the complexity of political disputes than to neatly define appropriate outcomes. 
The problems which beset Kymlicka's attempt to reconcile multiculturalism with a 
theory of rights underscores the previously established `limits of liberalism', and makes 
clear the requirement for an approach which is able to comprehend dimensions of 
contemporary experience which Kymlicka acknowledges, but 'which overwhelm his 
theory of multicultural citizenship. The immediate extent of the progress made by the 
interpretation advanced here should not be overstated, but neither should its limited 
efficacy be considered a weakness. To expect theory to define or impose a `solution' to 
the `problem' is to ask for more than can be plausibly delivered. A philosophically 
informed approach theorises conflict less reductively, and may offer a more secure 
starting point for constructive deliberation, but can and should not predetermine the 
outcome of democratic political processes. The contingencies and particularities of 
context and identity which Rawls fails to overcome by methods of abstraction and 
avoidance render the results of political deliberation and action unpredictable. 
The practical implications of this critique are however by no means purely 
negative. The chastening of the claims of normative liberalism opens up the possibility of 
a politics consistent with the philosophical anthropolog developed previously, which in 
turn demands the political theorisation of (salient aspects of) interpretive contexts. This 
approach proceeds with an idea of the self as an inherently complex entity, a critical and 
reflexive agent situated, but not simply determined, within a range of social and cultural 
practices, institutions and meanings. Within and against these contexts the deliberation, 
agency and evolving self-understanding of the subject, conceived as a participant with 
others in the construction of his own identity, becomes intelligible on a level unavailable 
to normative theory. 
Consideration of conceptions of the good before the principles of right which they 
motivate is bound up with a substantive conception of politics. The focal role accorded to 
goods allows the proliferation of potentially incongruent conceptions of the good - 
involving language, tradition, class, belief, and interest, as well as more elevated higher 
order goods - and forms of 
life as (part of) that which is articulated and examined in the 
course of interpretive practice. As the instance of Quebec 
illustrates, however, 
hermeneutics cannot transcend conflict by submerging pluralism under principles of 
rationality, impartiality, or reasonableness. 
Derived from the priority of right, such 
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strategies evade the arguments which they purport to address: the conception of `rights as 
trumps'44 traded upon a poor metaphor from the outset, and as a mode of addressing the 
complexities of multiculturalism it is eminently unsuited to its subject matter. The 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to the identification and elaboration of key concepts 
which further the development of hermeneutics as political theory, and which 
demonstrate the advantages of an interpretive approach to questions concerning identity, 
pluralism and democracy. 
[3] THEORISING `COMMUNITY' 
THE EXAMPLE OF CANADA ILLUSTRATES the extent to which the so-called `liberal- 
communitarian debate' is misunderstood when treated as a brute clash of political 
standpoints. The opposition of individuated and situated subjectiv-ities, or of 
constructivist and interpretive methods, does not support a simple distinction between 
`liberalism' and `communitarianism' as positions of political advocacy. Issues of policy are 
of course at stake, but not in the form of an either/or choice between liberal and non- 
liberal political systems. This is not to deny that aspects of the works of Taylor and 
Sandel (amongst others) are intensely political, but does draw attention to the fact that 
the revival of communitarian thought perceived in their writings has not included a 
systematic formulation of hermeneutics as political theory. In the vague sense in which the 
term is commonly invoked, `communitarianism' is more accurately identified as a critical 
stance towards the claims of normative liberal individualism as theory and in practice, 
occurring in the works of authors who can be identified in terms of family resemblance 
but not as advocates of a common philosophical or political view. Attempts to treat 
`communitarianism' as a fully formed philosophy standing in direct contradiction to 
established liberal doctrines are, as was seen earlier, neither accurate nor coherent. 
As Alan Ryan amongst others45 has observed, liberty and community are 
consistent and often compatible preoccupations throughout modern political thought. 
44 More fully, 'rights ire political trumps held by incdiviciu, ils (when] ,t collective goal is not a sufficient 
justification for denying them \viL, Ut thrv wish'. Ronald D-, wwoorkin, Talon,, Rif) bts Scrwu5ly (2nd cd., London, 
Duckworth, 1978), xi. The siog. ln is possibly germ; tnc as a defence of personal liberty against crude utilitarian 
cost/benefit calculations, but the Bentllanlite 
dragon was long slain before Dweorkin's supposedly fatal blow 
was struck. 
45 Alan Ryan, `The Liberal Collltllttnity' in John \\' Chapman and Ian Shapiro (eds. ) Nomos XXXV : 
Democratic Community (New York, New York University Press, 1993), 91-114. Simon Caney, `Liberalism 
and Cornmunitarianisnl: A misconcekvecd 
debate', Political Studies XL (1992), 273-289 assembles a variety of 
quotations from canonical 
figures toi this effect. Furtlicriii )re, in 'Cross Purpo: c:... ', 159, T, ivvlor identifies 
Sandel, Maclnt\ rc" and \\ a1'er, but '101 himself, IS cý, ºnmunit, ýri. tn:, 
bei re c, mimenting at 163 that the labels 
"liberal" lud ccoºllnlunit, lri. tn" will prnºb, 1bl\ 
h, iV(' o) he : crappcd bý"Ii)rý w t. -. m ct ºº,,, cr' this 
misunderstanding o the 
debate. 
169 
Paradigmatic liberals such as J. S. Mill, for example, exhibit considerable concern with the 
relation of community, and his idealist contemporaries Green and Bradley accorded 
similar weight to the claims of personal liberty. Furthermore, despite lacking the 
conceptual resources to deal with it adequately both in part three of Theory and 
subsequent writings, John Rawls undeniably acknowledges the importance of community 
to any viable political theory. Ryan goes so far as to describe Sources of the Self as `an 
ornament of communitarian liberalism, '46 and setting aside the decorative value of 
Taylor's work this comment is certainly correct in that it would be wholly inaccurate to 
associate him with any form of reactionary or illiberal politics. These observations defuse 
the tendency to regard `liberty' and `community' as antonyms, and undermine the 
temptation to view communitarianism as a systematic scheme of concepts, institutions 
and policies which might simply substitute for a discredited liberalism. 
Taylor explicitly states that the outcomes of political interpretation and analysis are 
underdetermined by any particular anthropological view. Reflexive hermeneutics 
enframes political phenomena within an integrated and coherent methodology which 
serves to `structure the field of possibilities'47 but does not establish the conditions or 
results of political discourse prior to its commencement. Practices of interpretation 
consistent with this approach occur along a continuum described bvv, two exemplary 
types, comparable with the distinction of anthropologyy, from advocacy,. The first, and the 
primary focus of this discussion, involves the working out of a lrnetatheoretical outline of 
political concepts, structures and practices consistent with the realisation of the self as a 
situated, engaged, and intersubjective entity. The generality of this outline is entirely 
appropriate to its role as part of the constitutive background to instances of the second 
model, that of applied or concrete interpretation, which might involve a level of 
particularity and detail comparable with that of documentary or reportage. 
The boundary between the two models is difficult (if not impossible) to establish 
with precision. After the rejection of Archimedean ambitions the question of how much 
or little detail is either required or desirable in any particular instance itself becomes part 
of that interpretation. The absence of detailed consideration of particular traditions, 
practices and identities within the recent `communitarian' literature - which insistently 
calls attention to the embodied, contextual character of human experience - is however 
noteworthy. Almost all of the works considered in this essay can 
be uncontroversially 
identified as metatheoretical: a distinctive facet of the debates has been the 
46 Ryan, 'Thc Liberal Communit, \v', 100. 
47 Taylor, 'Cross Purpo''s... ', 161. 
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overwhelmingly ahistorical quality of the literature involved. 48 This is unsurprising 
given that in challenging a firmly established body of theory, the critics of rights-based 
individualism were required on pain of relevance to advance their concerns in a style 
appropriate to the philosophy which they sought to undermine. The `communitarian 
critique' is hence not susceptible to criticism on account of its metatheoretical character, 
as the relationship between abstract and concrete aspects of the interpretive enterprise 
only appears incongruent from a perspective which presumes that a satisfactory theory 
should assume (or be amenable to statement in) the form of a normative treatise. 
At both abstract and applied levels an interpretive approach is unlikely to eventuate 
in such a theory. Metatheoretical concepts and methods can only inform political 
deliberation and action, which are the critical focus of the applied level of investigation. 
This indeterminacy accounts at least in part for the absence of a definitive statement of 
hermeneutics as either philosophical `grand theory' or at the detailed level of applied 
interpretation. In the first instance a theory prescribing unimpeachable principles of 
reason and morality, and the form of their systemic and institutional realisation, seems 
certain to either confuse or transgress the boundary between anthropology and advocacy. 
At the second level the particularity involved entails that, although indebted to the 
theory of interpretation at a methodological level, no single instance of applied analysis 
can be canonical. Interpretations can of course be more or less compelling, offering better 
and worse examples of their genre. However, the intrinsically situated character of 
interpretation rules out the possibility of simply transplanting the results of one analysis 
upon a different culture or context. To do so would inescapable and erroneously 
dissociate interpretation from context. 49 
A further possibility is that of a `communitarian' theory %vhich is not informed by 
interpretive methodology. Amitai Etzioni's sociological discussion is a case in point, 
supporting an advocacy position which might be labelled `communitarian' but which 
48 Most spectacularly, Alasdair Maclntvrc provides a dense and capti\', tting account. of the virtues 
from 
the presocratics to Aquinas in four chapters (10-14) of A/iur Virtue, an analysis which 
is almost wholly 
conceptual in form and content. Michael \X/, 
il'/. er's illustrates his Spheres u/ /1151icc by means of a series of 
historical and anthropological vignettes, but these are not clc, trl\ 
integrates{ \\-ith the theoretical body of the 
text. Sources of the Sell, as with much of Taylor's earlier \ riting oilers a resoluter philosophical account of 
key aspects of modern identity. See 
in particular Ch. 12, where Taylor cxplaiii that rather than offering an 
explanation of traditions of thought, conceptions of Rlentit\, etc., 
Sources 0. /. the Sc! /' is a historical 
investigation of ideas which are embedded 
in pr, Kcticcs, and exist in complex relations toi them, rather than a 
direct account of the development of practices tlie1mseIvc. 
49 Tariq N10do od highlights this danger 
in hk reg iew If . 
11ulticullur. l/ Citirun l'ip, writing that 
`Kymlicka's achievement is in putting culture, n, ttin, nality and iiinoritie\ at the centre of 
liberal theory... I 
fear, however, that it will he enthusiastically taken up 
by British tlieoýri: t. whip lack all understanding of 
British multiculItit ralisnm. 
By discussing our c n)s. epts in C, tn, idiani`ed term: tlte\ will then offer us 
inappropriate concepts and policies. 
' The PO/t[1Lil Qr. cruc rrly 6' (1996), 'S. 
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cannot be accurately identified as a hermeneutic theory. Etzioni's Spirit of Coniiniini y5° 
makes a series of inchoate proposals which promise to regenerate American civic life 
through the fostering of `community' in families, schools and organisations such as 
`community policing... local churches [and] museums... Communities congeal around such 
institutions. '51 Most remarkable is the apparently straight-faced suggestion that `[a] year 
of national service after high school could be the capstone of a student's educational 
experiences. '52 Etzioni's sociological critique and transiently fashionable populist 
political platform-cum-movement offers a position which is undoubtedly a form of 
`applied communitarianism. ' However, the air of compulsion surrounding his 
programme - which bears an extremely tenuous connection to the methodological issues 
which are the major concern of this essay - seems more likely to engender resentment 
than solidarity, further damaging the sources of value which it purports to regenerate. 
Examples of interpretation which, although fleeting and provisional, are more 
helpful in illustrating the differences between abstract and applied levels, are present in 
the works of Taylor, Sandei, and perhaps surprisingly, Will Kvmlicka. Multicultural 
Citizenship is not concerned with the philosophical detail of either anthropology or 
interpretation, and is - perhaps in consequence - unsuccessful in its attempt to refine and 
defend the theory of minority rights. These difficulties notwithstanding, Kymlicka's 
discussion deploys a wealth of detailed information in a telling manner which 
demonstrates the possibility of an interpretation which does successfully integrate the 
concerns of theory and method with the particularities of history, language and culture. 
In a related fashion some of Taylor's contributions to debates in Canada, although less 
detailed than Kymlicka's book, address quite specific political issues through a perspective 
informed by both philosophical sophistication and personal experience. 53 It should 
however be emphasised that these contributions amount to a fraction of Taylor's 
extensive writings. 
The third and initially most promising author tinder consideration here is Michael 
Sandel. Towards the end of Liberalism and the Limits..., Sandel's discussion of the 
constitutive role occupied by community in the formulation of identity intimates the 
50 Amitai Etziuni, Tbc Spirit rj/ ComruunztV, (Leýncio)n, Fontanm, 1995) 
51 Et ioni, The Spirit o/'Cofrt»rurtity, sic, 135. 
52 Etzioni, The Spirit nf'Comnrunit}', 11 ). 
53 This is particularly, so in the case of `Altcrn. uive Futures: Legitiiuac} Identit, \, and Alienation 
in 
Late-Twcntietl1-Century Canada', and `Shared and Divergent Values', respecti'vIv chapters 4 and 8 of 
Reconciling the Solitudes. It is Aso notahlr that almost all the pieces collected 
in that hook were originally 
addressed to public fora 
(business councils, commissions of inquire and popular media) as %vell as to a more 
narrowly academic audience. 
The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambric{ge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1991) is 
an amended transcript of public talks original1'. transmitted 
nationally by the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation. 
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possibility of a political theory which encompasses the insights of philosophical 
anthropology and also articulates an alternative social order to that envisaged by 
contemporary liberalism. 54 These unguarded comments anticipate a developed political 
philosophy which extends beyond the remit of Liberalism and the Limits..., but 
undoubtedly implies that such a theory is possible (if not imminent). Sandel's subsequent 
minor writings" did not discourage such a reading, but - as the subtitle makes clear - his 
recent Democracy's Discontent56 does not fulfil that promise, describing an America `In 
Search of a Public Philosophy' where one might instead hope to discover a compelling 
statement of that philosophy. Democracy's Discontent extends and reinforces the critique 
of Liberalism and the Limits... through detailed readings of constitutional and economic 
history which contend that the development of America as a `procedural republic' marks 
a comparatively recent and aberrant transformation of political discourses which, during 
the period of the `national republic''7 were organised around collective goods and citizen 
virtues, seeking `a public good beyond the play of interests on terms consistent with the 
heightened democratic expectations of their day. ''s 
Formally structured around deontic rights and individual self-interest, 
contemporary American political life clearly stands at some remove from this early ideal. 
Sandel's examination of the role of constitutional and economic discourses in the 
production and erosion of the institutions and practices of public life is consistently 
54 Sandel, Liberalism and the Lirnits..., 17? ff. Sec esp c i, tllý p. 173, w here S, tndel writes of l society 
`ordered in a certain way, such that community descrihes it" basic Surtlcturce and n(ýt merely the dispositions 
of persons within the struc'turý.. <<>nlnlunity must he c(, n: tittimc of the >ll, lred self-understandings of the 
particiP, lnts and enlh(Oied in their institutic, n, ll , lrr, ingc1li nt:. 
' 
5-' In particular 'The Procedural Republic and the Unenculllhcrecl Sell', Political Ac"o)y 12 (1984), 81-96, 
which restates the critique of Rawls in the form of an analysis of the 'procedural republic' and its alleged 
consequences, the erosion of democracy and community in the United States, and `Democrats and 
Community', The New Republic, February 22 1988,20-23, which concluded with the prophecy that `A public 
philosophy of self-government and com munity" would reclaim [the most potent resources of American 
politics] and enable Democrats to resume their career as the party of moral and p0litical progress. ' 
56 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search ofa Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA., 
Harvard University Press, 1996). 
57 Extending roughly from the time of Jefferson's presidency (1800) to the era of the New Deal (1932- 
68) during which the principles and practices of procec{ur, llisnl gradually gained a hold which, according to 
Sandel, became donli11ant Is l 111(rde of Politic` with the devel pnlent of ni dern lical policies (symbolically 
identified in America \vitll Keenneed\'\ tax policies) which, rattler than pr(mn, tting particular (or collective 
goods, viewed ecollo 111c pOlicv as an in. strulllent (d1 c uutr(d which w, t: 
(a)d i: ) appealing; due t() its `neutrality 
with respect tu i(, Illpetillý; political ends. 
' S, lnciel, Dcmorr. vi Dtsconient, 265. This perspicacious 
interpretation is, I think, very helpful as l means Of unclcr\tanding the c(, nv rgenc (d (, pillion throughout 
industrialised econoillies on the appropriate ends (, 
l nl, lcrotecon(nlic policy. It 1s widely Observed, for 
example, that there is 
little if any difference in the primary cc'tn()mllic , lnlhitiOn: od the nl, ljOr parties 
in the 
UK, which converge on a preference-neutral Illodef ()f per\(rll, tl cll(, icc, Opp(rtunit\ and c' nsunlption. 
Issues 
of investment, enlploylnent and narrowing 
inegtl, llity n( hanger function , 1, lý, ýllp tin; 
dý)nlinant ends in 
economic debates, which are 
inlp,, verishecl by the ci, 'nlin, lllic of the neutral iiinict, rr1,, I paradigm. 
58 Sandcl, Dcnlocr. u- y'c Disco, ttcnt, 166. 
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diverting and, as a philosophically informed historical study of liberalism and democracy 
in America, of considerable importance. Unfortunately, his critical interpretation 
terminates at the point where its political significance becomes most acute, at the end of 
the era defined by the formative ambitions of Roosevelt's New Deal. 09 Constructively, 
Democracy's Discontent merely offers a restatement of familiar criticisms weakly 
augmented by the claim that a `recrudescence of virtue'60 is discernible in the popular 
rhetoric bemoaning the decline of community and civic life in America. 61 Sandel further 
identifies a supposed `revolt against the procedural republic'6' evidenced by piecemeal 
instances of a revival in the `political economy of citizenship'63 which are generalised to 
constitute evidence of civic renewal in a manner more closely aligned with the 
sociological tradition represented by Etzioni64 than with a coherent philosophical 
position (be it anthropological or otherwise). 
Sandel's republican ideal envisages the `space between persons' occupied by public 
institutions including `townships, schools, religions, and virtue-sustaining occupations, ' 
where freedom finds `democratic, pluralist expression. '65 The historical detail deployed 
in support of this interpretation of America as the procedural republic is entirely 
appropriate, but in the absence of further development Sandel's proposals remain in a 
historical and conceptual limbo - in thrall to the philosophy which they repudiate - and 
in consequence the significance of his suggestions and their role within the public 
philosophy he anticipates is extremely obscure. To take the above example, ideas of 
community, public space, pluralism and democracy receive no critical consideration 
outside the historical narrative. Exploration of these ideas which deliberates their 
59 Although pp. 305-15 discuss Carter and Reagan, they do scc in corder tc> c{ei nitrite (305) that `their 
presidencies did little to change the conditions unc{crlviiig the c{isc(nnteiits the\ tapped as candidates' 
(dissatisfaction with the perceived extent and incompcmncc )i g 'ernment and its in>titutic, ns). The brevity 
and superficiality of Sandel's ccnuinents here sharply ccontrast with his c{iscu' Hnis of figures such as 
Hamilton, Je ferson, Roosevelt and Brandeis. 
60 Sandel, Derrwcr, rqc Dt. ýcontcnt, 324. 
61 Widely d ccumentec{ in, for example, Etricni, The Spirit of C mmim tv, \ liieli draws heavily on 
reports from press and popular media in the US. See also Bret Stephen:, 'America h, t: ks in the glow of virtue 
redisc'overed', The Tirnc, 5 September 1994, and Melissa He, ils', New money, old v. alues', The Guardian, 8 
January 1997. 
6j Sandel, Democrzc-l; :c Discontent, 337. 
63 Sandet, Demytocricy c Discontent, 333-7. Sandel mentions Community Development Corporations, 
opponents of commercial developments (such as shopping ni, alIs) which umidercnine 
local infrastructures, a 
town planning movement caller{ 'New Urbanism', and an umbrella group, 
Communities Organised for 
Public Service. Although doubtless laudable in their own right, these slight ex, tnlple\ offer scant support of 
either a revival or revolution 
in the fortunes of repuhlic. anisin. 
64 A populist tradition which i, in 
he traced hack u Ferdiiiand Tünnieeý, C»>rntmity and Society, trans. 
Charles P. Loomis, (New York, Harper and Row, 1957), but which originates nnccýt Clearly 
in American 
academia with Robert Nisbet, 
The Quest fier Cont»tunity: A Stud), in the Ethic: ý 0/ Ofclc ra rc! Freedom (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1953). 
65 Sandel, DemocracY c Discontent, 320-21. 
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contemporary meanings and uses, their relevance to ongoing debates, and the political 
possibilities which they connote, is required if Sandel's proposals are to acquire a force 
beyond that conferred by history and rhetoric. In the absence of this undertaking the 
exhortation that American republicanism can best find democratic and pluralistic 
expression through the renewed cultivation of federalism finds its clearest philosophical 
basis in de Tocqueville, and the priority which Sandel accords Democrat-i in America is 
telling. Democracy's Discontent ultimately offers an elegy for a lost republic, rather than a 
meaningful statement of a political philosophy addressing the inadequacies so powerfully 
illuminated by Sandel's critique of deontology and its consequences. 
Because Sandel's analysis does not develop the conceptual resources required to 
extend the insights of history and philosophy in a politically compelling manner, his 
concluding proposals are only able to `gesture... toward the kind of political debate that 
would accord greater attention to republican themes. '66 These weaknesses demonstrate 
the need to formulate political concepts in a manner consistent with the interpretive 
methodology elaborated earlier in the discussion. This involves the clarification of themes 
and concepts which recur throughout debates concerning (amongst other issues) 
democracy, deliberation and identity. The first concept to be considered here is that of 
`community', most clearly identified with speech and language by Taylor, but also 
amenable to association with a wide range of attributes engaging aspects of time, space 
and culture. The selection of `community' as a starting point is not strictly necessary and 
does not involve the attribution of philosophical privilege or lexical priority, but in the 
context of this essay the choice is far from being arbitrary. The dearth of detailed 
investigation of the term is a consistent feature of both 'communitarian' writings and of 
theorists such as Rawls and Kymlicka - respectively the major focus of and respondent to 
the critique of liberalism - for whom the concept is only marginally less significant. This 
general lacuna more than warrants the placing of emphasis upon the term here. 
The discussion briefly examines historical and conceptual issues in order to 
distinguish some helpful and relevant aspects of `community', and proceeds to develop a 
metatheoretical outline of related themes and concepts in a manner consistent with the 
insights and limitations of philosophical anthropology. As such it seeks to establish a 
coherent position for community within the debates in which it features prominently, 
and is explicitly not a statement of `communitarianism' as political theory in the 
comprehensive (or totalising) sense implied, but not realised, 
by Sandel. 
A 1955 survey cited by Raymond Plant identified ninety-four definitions of 
`community' and claimed that `the only feature they had in common was that they all 
66 32 S, tndel, Dcý»trrracýt's 
Di<cun[crtt, ý_4. 
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dealt with people! '67 Rather than being conceptually dominant, 'community' typically 
functions as a recurrent theme rather than a coherently formulated solution to perceived 
social and political problems. It is complex and densely packed with meaning, and as such 
must be questioned and investigated as a contested concept which is also a site of ongoing 
public political debate. The contestation and negotiation of meaning is a central aspect of 
political thought and action, and a stable or definitive account of `community' is neither 
to be expected nor desired. Historical and conceptual investigation can however clarify 
the range of indeterminacy involved, aiding in turn the formulation and evaluation of 
political possibilities. 
The connection advanced in Democracy's Discontent between civic republicanism 
and communitarianism is far from accidental; the two are often regarded as coextensive. 68 
In particular the historical significance of Rousseau and Hegel to modern usage of the 
term is decisive. Inspired by Hellenic ideals of poll's and koinoniai, both recognised that 
the time of Athens and Sparta had irretrievably passed and developed in their stead forms 
of social relation which largely enframe modern understandings of community. 
Motivated by his thorough critique of and alienation from the inauthentic culture of 
ancien regime, enlightenment and encyclopaedia, the society depicted by Rousseau in On 
Social Contract intricately links ideas , iwhich are central to modern conceptions of 
community. Personal liberty is established as a social condition marked by mutual 
interdependence exercised in collective but impersonal assemblies, where the 
reconciliation of individual and collective famously predicates the freedom of each upon 
the freedom of all. The sense of interdependence and common purpose so created 
consolidates a social bond which is manifested and reaffirmed by the `civil religion' of the 
polity, a creed which expresses the common identifications of the citizenry - professing 
virtues of justice and patriotism, the sanctity of the contract and laws, the value of 
tolerance - and reinforces the sense of social unity which 
Rousseau sought to establish 
under the general will. 69 
Rousseau exerted a profound influence on the thought of Immanuel Kant, 70 and 
also upon his greatest commentator. 71 Hegel's critique of Kant's conception of autonomy 
67 R tvi, ionci Plant, -Ccmnmunity: Concept, 
COnecpticon and ldeuk);; p ', PH/ittcý and Sucic'ty 8 (1978), 79- 
107. 
68 
e. g. Adrian Oldficld, 




(London, Rcutle(ige, 1990), Ch. 7. 
69 jean-jacques Ronisse. nu, The Soci. i/ Contract cnd Di<c-ulcr: sc5, tr, ins. 
G. D. H. CAc, rev. J. H. Brumfitt 
anti John C. Kill (Lo, ndoýn, 
j. M. Dent, 1971), op. 1-226,17; -175,47-278. 
70 The categorkcal iniperati\L, can 
he viewed , IS a univers, ali: ed anti >Y: tcnn. atii 
hwinulatiun of Rousseau's 
insight th at freedom and morality can 
he reconciled consistent only II, -lhen undertaking moral obligations, 
persons act in accordance with their 
authentic will. Hans Reiss notes to his introduction to Kant, 
Political 
Wr, itin, gs, p. 4., that 'Rou"se. tti 
had taught hing to respect the innnioýn m, in; he was 1'()r 
him the Newton of the 
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as inadequate and one-dimensional is central to the theorisation of community in the 
Philosophy of Right. 72 Setting aside methodological issues involving speculative logic and 
dialectical necessity, Hegel's unarguable political significance resides in his anticipation of 
the emergent problems faced by developing industrialised mass society - of subjectivism, 
alienation, and the creation and satisfaction of proliferating needs73 - which he 
systematically addressed in a political philosophy which sought to identify and reconcile 
potentially antagonistic social and economic forces. 
Hegel's unfolding logic tracks the development of free self-consciousness through 
Abstract Right, the dialectical process of intersubjective recognition, and the legal 
framework of Nloralität. 74 These function as essential but incomplete determinations of 
the concept of freedom, which are preserved but superseded in the theorisation of 
Sittlichkeit, ('Ethical Life') the concrete morality of a rational social order. The 
composition of Sittlichkeit presents the family, civil society and political state as core 
social and institutional forms, which differentiate and relate a range of roles in which self- 
consciousness attains realisation in processes of identification and participation. The 
s categories and division' distinguished by Hegel are largely irrelevant to modern 
societies, but the structural outline contributes significantly to the idea of community. 
Identity is realised through the willing identification of the individual with interests and 
values associated with positions (e. g. of family, class, profession and citizen), which are 
distinct moments within the state, conceived as an integrated social entity rather than an 
amorphous aggregation of individuals or a bureaucratic-administrative construct. 
Freedom and ethics so emerge as an achievement of agency, manifested for example in 
membership of `circles of association in civil society [which] are already communities'76 
rather than a happy accident of heteronomous impulse, or of procedural conformity to a 
model of practical reason. 
This brief and uncritical outline is intended only to indicate conceptual themes of 
scale, locality, identification, membership, integration and differentiation in the works of 
moral realm. Rousseau's portrait was the only adornment permittcd in his llmiKc, ind when reading 
Emile he 
even forgot to take his customary , il. ternoon walk... '. See also 
Taylor, 'Kant's Tlicrv of Freedomn', 
Philosophical Papers 11,3211. 
71 e. g. H. S. Harris, 'Hegel's Intellectual 
dcvelopnicnt to 1807', in Frederick C. Beiser (ed. ) The 
Cambridge Companion to He<<rl (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5-28. 
72 G. W. F. Hegel, Pit/ocophyo/'Rr; ht, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952), §§133-137. 
73 Shlomo Avineri, Hct. cl i T, ery c, / ihr A'lo'! crn State, (Camhridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972), 
esp. 148-154. 
71 Hegel, Philo. ophy of RzLht, §S133-17; Hegel, Pbrn,,, ucnnlo'. y o/'S/)t)it, trans. A. 
V. Miller. (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1971), ýQ430-419. 
73 Of Corporations, bureaucracy and landlhIder:. Hegel, Rr; hi, §ýU02-205,99250-256. 
76 Hegel M710 p/1 ., / Ri; l't, 13038. 
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Rousseau and Hegel, which are a constant presence in later discussions of community 
within political theory and cognate disciplines. 77 In the sociological literature noted 
earlier, for example, Tönnies's characterisation of Gemeinschaft invokes a similar set of 
considerations in order to distinguish the community of natural will from the 
(Gesellschaft) rational society of universal competition and bourgeois commodification. In 
turn Nisbet's Quest for Community argued that principal locations of `community' - in 
family, locality, religious and voluntary organisations - were undermined in the 
development of modern individualism and the centralised state. 78 Similar ideas 
reverberate throughout modern variants of this sociological analysis (evidenced by the 
case of Etzioni) and are also significant for modern republican political theory. 79 
Democracy's Discontent, in which Sandel largely follows the sociological model, is another 
example of this deployment. Taylor's more sophisticated approach is sensitive to the 
insights of history and social theory - particularly so in the case of Hegel - integrated 
with methodologies of interpretation and addressing questions of identity and agency 
through the investigation of linguistic and social practices. The detail and nuance of 
hermeneutic method is highly significant at this point, resisting the temptation to 
uncritically invoke or presuppose the coherence of `community', and neither 
presupposing nor guaranteeing the resolution of the concept. 
[4] LOCATING `COMMUNITY' 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF CENTRAL THEMES in the history of political thought leaves 
important concerns regarding the evaluation and location of `community' unattended. As 
Raymond Plant notes, 8° to describe a social relation as one of community is typically to 
offer a favourable assessment of it. The concept resonates with positive sentiments 
suggestive of shared interests and identifications, interpersonal attachments and solidarity, 
immediate and direct social membership. It is not a simple antonym of 'state' or `society' 
77 The usage of 'community' can of course diverge 
from the analysis presented here in disciplines with a 
different focus. Archaeologists and demographers, for example, might consistently maintain a much narrower 
interpretation of the term. The detailed investigation of such variaticºns, altli( ugIl und(ºuhMlly of 
interest as 
another means of exploring the 
heterogeneity Of langtºage-games, would add littl1» to the discussion of 
`community' within the political and philo. cmphic, ºI contexts of the present dli. ctnsºon. 
78 T$iinies, Comniunitya01r1 Society, 31-64; Nisbet, 
Tyr Quest /ror- Conwiu)ly. c-: p. pp. 41-65. 
79 For example, Sheldon 
Pol tics and VlPml: Cr))111111: ilt" . 111(1 
/mm : -. 111"m In tVcctern Political 
Thought (London, George Allen and Un-, in 1961), 3521. OHCr> all 
intcrprct. ºti, Hn ý)I Lily )i)litit. tl theory of the 
last two centuries is an attempt to restate the 
human need for c<>nlnltºnºty ºn ýn ;c . "I Organisation'. 
80 plant, 'Coýmºnnunit, \ : Concept, Conception and IdL,, )I,,;;, \', 81. Tlii, point 
is reiterated by Raymond 
Williams, Kcl :: %ýºrrýc, rcv. Cd. (London, 
Fontana, 1976), 76. 
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but is clearly distinguishable from the formal, abstract or instrumental connotations of 
such larger social forms, and free from the negative valences carried by those descriptions. 
This nexus of sense and meaning discloses the loose normative structure of the 
term, i. e. the criteria which, present in various configurations appropriate to the 
circumstances in which they arise, manifest normative judgements - regarding what a 
`community' is, or ought, or is generally accepted to be - which are embodied in the 
concept and expressed in its use, in the sense (or otherwise) it assumes as an instance of 
language for a particular audience in a particular situation. These judgements are in turn 
shared (and disputed) by speakers as they formulate and debate the meanings which 
`community' holds for them, assess the veracity of its application in particular cases, and 
so on. 81 The precise content of this structure and the weight it carries in any particular 
discourse cannot be anticipated by theory, but the positive sense attached to `community' 
can be readily observed when the concept is invoked as a critical standard in order to 
legitimate, promote or otherwise commend social and institutional policies and forms. 82 
Theoretical investigation cannot exhaustively account for meaning, which is 
continually reproduced and modulated in dialogue. Unpacking this normative structure 
does however clarify the range of issues which are opened up when `community' is 
problematised, that is when the agreements and understandings which secure the 
intelligibility of the concept in conventional discourse are called into question. The scope 
of the emergent problematic indicates why a satisfactory response to the question of 
`community' requires more than a hasty and convenient definition accompanied by ill- 
considered policy recommendations. Recognition that the opaque dependencies of 
language, history and practice which constitute the `inescapable frame-"works' of identity 
and agency are also engaged by the question of community and its attendant conceptual 
81 These comments draw upon Connolly The Terms o/POIZ*L cil Dtsw ur e, 27-31, and Stanley Cavell, The 
Claim of Reason (Oxford, Oxl'corci University Press, 1979), Chs. 1-3. Cavell is especially helpful here in 
clarifying the significance of shared languages and concepts in the course of a commentary on Wittgenstein's 
comment that `If language is to he a form Of comnnunicaticon there must be agreement not (, nly in definitions 
but also in judgements' (Irtveslt; ý. rliort , 
§241): `The establishing ,d criteri. t makes the process of judging more 
convenient, more open, less private or arbitrary. One might say: 
here establishing criteria allows us to settle 
judgements publicly... \\'ittgcn. týiappeal to criteria is meant... rx, "IctlV to call to consciousness the 
astonishing fact Of the astonishing; extent to which we 
do tgre in public; elicitin criteria goes to show 
therefore that our judgements are public, that 
is, , hare(i. ' Cavel!, The C/.. rint o/ Rc". lsan, 30-31. 
82 Consider, Ir example, the followin}; example Innil thk' 1997 Lahur Parts General Election 
Manifesto, which attempts to relate the outcome: , )f weIlare reh rnu -I pn, 'pcc-t 
likely t,, be viewed with 
extreme concern by those reliant on CX Ktin" puhlin 
cCncfit\ and insurance ýchciiics - with positive 
connotations involving 'c mit munit\': 
'\\'e will al: ( ex. ai»ine thee interacctin the tax and benefits 
systems so is to Iullil mir (objectives ()f... strent; thenin;; nnniunitý 
and 1'. 111111V lift ". ' E\tcrptcd from the on- 
line text at htk/. 
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structure reiterates the centrality of public dialogue to the formation and expression of 
identity, 83 and directs discussion of the term to its use in political discourses. 
The formation and recognition of identity is in the first instance an intersubjective 
and participatory process. Conjoined with the interpretive anthropology developed 
previously, the decisive significance of `community' - the environments where 
engagement within and reflection upon social practices and goods takes place - becomes 
irresistible. Neither identity nor society are conceivable without community, 84 i. e. 
independent of the meanings, practices, understandings and relationships conveyed by the 
concept. The absence or diminution of community correspondingly undermines the 
bases of identity, and risks engendering conditions of alienation and disenchantment 
where subjectivity, in the absence the resources which make self-interpretation possible 
and meaningful, can find itself in radical crisis. 85 Once the affective ties and solidarities 
associated with community are appreciated as a positive social and psychological good, 
the theorisation and recognition of a plurality of communities assumes considerable 
political significance. Pursuit of the implications of this analysis does not proceed with 
the ambition of wholly replacing alternative understandings of politics, but does 
challenge, moderate and supplement the agenda of contemporary liberal individualism in 
a process which reframes the domain of the political, integrating at a range of levels a 
broad but determinate conception of community. 
Community is hence both necessary, and necessarily plural. The range of factors 
according to which communities might be identified, complicated by the membership of 
most people in multiple social groups and relationships, is irreducibly complex. Political 
theory can however be robust in its approach to community whilst remaining sensitive to 
the intricacies which lend the concept much of relevance in the first place. As Iris Marion 
Young points out, potential characteristics according to which groupings can be identified 
(e. g. sex, height, shoe size, favourite colour) are inexhaustible. Such `arbitrary 
classifications'86 describe aggregates of persons, but do so through the categorisation of 
attributes which are treated as accidental or external to the identity of those concerned, 
interests of rather than in the self. 87 This `methodologically individualist'88 notion of 
83 See Ch4ý5ahc\"c. 
84 \X! hich will Ilcncclorth not he (list inguishcd h\ quot, tti, )n imirk. s. This I,, not 
been dc-prohlct». ttiscd r, ºthcr flirt t : II! IICnt \i. I1' A' it. \Lruc'turc, rc'gul, ºritic. mid ai»higuitics, both 
conceptual and historical, I)a, ý been est, ihlished 
(()r the term toi he u: ed with t nica: urc o)( rý li, thilitý . 
85 
e. g. Taylor, Saur«c, ý a/'the 
Sc//, 27,531. 
86 Iris Marion YullIlt, /uslice . artel the 
A, /iltc. c of Di/%c'renc (Prineet*)n, iN'J., Princeton University 
Press, 1990), 44. 
87 S, jndcl, Liher.. iliP1l . nu/ the' 
Ll)ýlllý..., 161-4. See Ch. , ºhýýý"r. 
88 Young. /1. r5ltcc'and i/'e Poltltc> of*Dijf'rc'ucc, 45. 
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contingent grouping cannot grasp the constitutive role of goods for identities (individual 
and collective) and so has no place within a considered taxonomy of community and its 
forms. 
A less extreme individualist model of social relations is captured by Young under 
the term association. This `recognises that groups are defined by specific practices and 
forms of association'89 but remains committed to an ideal of individuation where, as 
Young puts it, the person is prior to the association. This archetype, familiar from part 
three of A Theory of Justice, reduces action to mere preference-satisfaction which carries no 
implications for the antecedently established self. Although Young criticises this model 
and the conception of self which it maintains, she appears to accept its empirical accuracy 
as a description of voluntary association90 and does not pursue the full implications of its 
enervated grasp of agency. Following the individuated model of voluntary association, the 
effect of membership and involvement within, say, an interest group or political 
movement is always transient. Situated and theori, ed within an interpretive framework, 
however, social movements, interest groups, labour organisations and similar forms of 
social relation need not be so underestimated. They can provide sites of deliberation, 
action and expression which, under appropriate conditions, are of potentially definitive 
significance to the self. Associative identification can of course be passive as well as active. 
A person's role within a group may not extend, for example, beyond the postal 
remittance of an annual subscription fee, and where this is the case Young's somewhat 
pessimistic assessment is likely to be accurate. Despite this the experience of social 
membership can also involve profound and enduring commitments, indelibly impacting 
upon identity and self-understanding in a manner which clearly falls - at least at times - 
within the conceptual boundaries of community. 
The third form addressed by Young is that of the fully conceived `social group', 
characterised in terms strongly reminiscent of constitutive communities and higher-order 
goods in the works of Sandel and Taylor. Developing a model of identification and 
differentiation as `multiple, cross-cutting, fluid and shiftin '91 Young's poststructuralist 
analysis agrees with Taylor that such identifications constitute individuals in a manner 
which does not crudely determine identity, but which captures the deep affinities which 
structure and constitute human experience of and reflection on both self and world. 
Rather than being chosen in accordance with a principle of autonomy, groups for Young 
89 Young, justice and the Politics of Difference, 44. 
90 Young, Justice anc/ the Politics of Di//crence, 46, 'A pi'rsoýn joins .ni, ttion, and seven if membership 
in it fundamenuIlY' alfrcll one's Zile, one ciocs not t, ikr th. it nirinhership to 
dehne ime'' \cr\' identity. ' 
91 Young, Justice am! the Politics ol'Di%/c"rencc, 48. 
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(following Heidegger) manifest the `thrownness' of human being-in-the-world, 922 and 
are locations where identity is discovered rather than chosen. 
Although Young draws upon radical feminist and poststructuralist sources which 
are for the most part untouched by Taylor both address questions of identity and 
intersubjectivity in a reflexive manner, in the light of which the outcomes of their 
analyses are - perhaps surprisingly - complementary. 93 In particular, Young's vivid grasp 
of the plural and evolving character of groups and identities advances the political 
development of Taylor's philosophical insights into language and subjectivity. Extending 
the Saussurian94 picture of language as a system of interdependent differences, it becomes 
clear that because groups are differentiated according to specific goods and qualities, `a 
group exists only in relation to at least one other group... identification arises... in the 
encounter and interaction between social collectivities that experience some differences in 
their way of life and forms of association. '95 Communities (or `social groups' in Young's 
terminology) emerge in encounters between cultural forms which provoke the 
articulation of aspects of identity previously experienced either latently or 
unproblematically. The omnipresence of modern secularism, for example, can intensify 
to the point of fundamentalism the identification of the religiously devout with their 
faith; similarly, the language movements in Quebec (and also, for example, in Wales and 
Eire) express strong identifications which developed in response to (anglocentric) cultures 
experienced as a threat to established forms of life. 
Identity and difference are not articulated solely in reaction to the presence of the 
`other'; they are also deftly and thoroughly inscribed in the vocabularies and practices of 
everyday social life. A community - such as the Francophone Quebecois - united in 
92 Young, Just1Ce. 11(11/1C PO/ItiC: l (1/ Dl/jc1"cfl(', 46. AIt hi>li ll I tfi) 11O1 lli ciil Iri, nl Ymuni., " analysis 
here, 
it is worth noting that her use of Heidegger is extrlnllly limited and des n()t engage the wider 
methodological problems raised by Being and Ti111c as discussed In Cll. 5. 
91 At Sources of the Sel/, 490, Taylor' dismisses the works of L\'ot, lrll and Derrida as `charters for 
subjectivism', an assesºnent which is also addressed w the 'inc nnp, irahly weightier' Foucault, whose case 
is 
considered in a little more detail below. Also, although T, i IOr and Young concur in their analysis of 
c'omnllulities/slýiial groups, this is not the rase in other irc. i.. In particular, the aesthetiiist temper of 
Young's 
comments on group politics . 111d city 
life later in /usticc alul thc: Pr1/itic: s c11'D1f/erence llivl"rges frone the less 
fanciful considerations of pluralism, federalism and reclognitioýn presented 
in, for cxanlple, Taylor's writings 
on Canada. 
94 Young does not rite Ferdinand dc Saussure, Ce)ursc in General Lin, ýuistic: s (La Salle, IN., Open Court, 
1986), 118-119, 'Everything we have said so far conics do n to this. In the 
lan, c lisc'll, there are only 
differences... Ina language, is in H1\' c)thrr senlilol( giral system, what distinguishes I sign i' what constitutes it, 
nothing more. Difference 
is what makes characteristics, just as it ºnakes values and units [cif meaning]', but 
her conception of the relationships obtaining 
between groups is clearly com1 istent with his analysis. Taylor 
mentions Sausstlre 
briefly in relation to the philosophy cif language, but unsurprisingly given that context 
does not discuss the relevance of structural 
linguistics tcý processes cif social differentiation. Taylor, 
Philosophical papers /, 40, 
95 Young, Justice and the Politics of Di%/c-rcnrc , 41. 
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defence of a strongly defined cultural identity will also differentiate a wide range of other 
social relationships. These identifications, and the solidarities and groupings which they 
embody, do not in and of themselves undermine the coherence of the Quebecois 
community, or challenge the significance of French language and culture as its dominant 
good. Their presence does indicate something of the complexity and fluidity of identity, 
and illustrates how self-understandings develop over time. Resolution of the language 
issue will not settle or complete the Quebecois identity. Issues of class, status, authority, 
gender and race, for example, might supplant the debate concerning language and inspire 
previously unexpressed identity claims within the culture. The Quebec identity will also 
inevitably evolve in relation to other cultural forms whether independence, a renewed 
federalism, or continuing tension prevails within the province. The character of and 
relationships pertaining between cultures, and the communities and identities which they 
generate and sustain, thus relate interdependent contexts in a model of overlapping 
dialogue, deliberation and agency which extends throughout social and political life. 
Complementing the historical and conceptual discussion of community, Young's 
analysis develops the political relevance of the term - and equally significantly, the 
irrelevance of ill-considered aggregations - in a form consistent with the interpretive 
theorisation of subjectivity which explains how collective identities arise and relate in 
multiple conjunctions of language and culture. This multiplicity raises a further concern 
relevant to the understanding of community. Observation of the range of potentially 
germane characteristics96 (which must initially include those which upon examination 
are deemed absurd or irrelevant) highlights the imaginary dimension of community, 
which is also relevant to the identification of politically significant groups and 
movements might be identified amidst the proliferating confusion of multicultural 
societies. 
Questions concerning the identification and political relevance of groups and 
communities are more closely related than they at first appear. Benedict Anderson's 
incomplete analysis of the nation as an imagined entity, where persons with no direct 
experience of one another nevertheless `in the minds of each lives the image of their 
96 young offers five criteria (exploitation, marginalir. ltion, powerlrssnC\\, cultural imperialism, 
violence) according to which oppressed social groups might 
he identified. These are interpreted to encompass 
an astonishingly wide 
demographic, including `. z»tnnyst othcrc womrn, Blacks, Chicall()s, Puerto Ricans and 
other Spanish-speaking Americans, 
American Indians, Jews, lesbians, g, i\- men, Arabs, Asians, old people, 
working class people, and the physically and menially 
disabled. ' This list is saved from banality by the 
recognition that `the above named groups are n(, t ()ppressccl 
to the sank' extent ()r in the same ways', an 
observation which calls attention again toi the nCed 
I()r ipp)icd interprct, ltio)il appro prlate to particular 
identities and cont"' OI "6011 and oppression. 
)'ung, /1 'ttcc . >>td the 
Polittc. c u/ Di//c rc »cc , 40, emphasis 
added. 
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communion'97 remains relevant to communities of less magnitude. In mass societies the 
relation of community is unlikely to be wholly characterised by features of territory or 
locality, and even when that is the case persons will rarely, if ever, be fully conversant 
with all of their contemporaries. Common identities and self-understandings can be 
expressed and consolidated in friendship with - and estrangement from - others, but the 
meanings and identifications thus conveyed are more fundamentally borne, reproduced 
and transformed in the wider contexts of language, culture and now community. This 
does not undermine the centrality of interpersonal deliberation Within practices of 
evaluation and self interpretation, but is an important reminder that particular instances 
of dialogue always occur within these more general environments. 
Like Young, Anderson suggests in language compatible with Taylor's constitutive 
vocabulary that communities are primarily distinguished by the `style' and `depth's of 
the identifications which they embody. In particular Anderson's use of the term imagined 
complements the foregoing analysis by emphasising the 17M-natural status of identity and 
difference. Distinctions of, for example, hair colour or shoe size are biological and hence 
in one sense `natural'99 but in themselves are of use only as criteria of aggregation in the 
service of the statistician or, perhaps, the market researcher. 
Elaborating these rather obvious examples, it is through social processes that 
distinctions of gender, race and ethnicity are established, inscribed and become 
meaningful to human identities and relationships in a constitutive manner. This non- 
natural status does not undermine the reality of the social experience of identity and 
differentiation, but does militate against the tendency to naturalise the distinctions - and 
hence the identities - involved. Where the antecedently individuated model identifies 
fundamental elements of identity as contingent attributes of the self 'which it proceeds to 
ignore or transcend, its essentialist variant distinguishes these elements and defines the 
meanings and identities which they imply in a rigid, prescriptive form. The assumption 
that identities are unchanging and homogenous is a convenientl0° but wholly false one 
97 Benedict Anderson, lrnas; ined Cornnauniiic: c: Rcfleciwns on the Ortsgin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Revised edition (London, Verso, 1991), 6. Anderson concentrates uun nation as O)mmunity in a manner which 
elides most of the linguistic and cultural complexity 
discusses{ in the preceding analY'is, and lacks a strong 
conception of the hearers of identity as social actors. 
98 Anderson, Imagined Coinmunitk'c, 6-7. 
99 Following the Concept of nahirr and natural science con\'cved in ordinary language use. No 
epistemological claim or argument concerning; the \veracit\' cal the iiattrral/ý ýcial 
distinction i; intended here. 
Although it could certainly he objected that suche in cliscu'>ioýii i< either 
implied or required, in the context of 
the present discussion the argument 
is not u, I decisive impo, rtamc. 
100 And also potentiaII\' "scions or oppres: i\'e. Movements tpinsi r, ac 
i, il, : cxual and other forms of 
discrimination are, at least in part, against the instituti(ýn, tlIN'lilOfl Of II'll 
iýed identity ascriptions, and the 
jtttcndaant gr, 't»in, tr and reif 
firms which irr thereby ccmrenihe'd. The hclm\-I pur OI imperialist and 
totalitarian reginnes towards C( 
Ionised car subjeC frei pO, PIe\ , td 
licr,,: tO i Si iuilar essentiali: iiu Igü. 
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which simplifies identity by screening out its plural and reflexive aspects. By ignoring the 
dynamic and fluid features established by Young, any analysis or policy recommendation 
eventuating from such false premises gains its clarity, and perhaps its appeal, at the cost of 
relevance in the face of a more complicated and problematical pluralist world. 
The reflexive and plural theorisation of identity and community presented by 
Taylor and Young is neither dogmatic nor prescriptive in its approach and so appears to 
be invulnerable to charges of political essentialism. The question of essences - their 
presence, absence and implications - has however been asked of Young in a more 
convoluted manner. According to Chantal Mouffe essentialism ineluctably leads to a 
position at odds with a democratic and pluralist politics due to its inability to 
comprehend the `contingent and precarious'101 status of identity. Young, she claims, `has 
an ultimately essentialist notion of `group'... their interests and identities already given' 
and conceives politics as a matter of dealing with these prediscursive interests rather than 
one concerned with the radical `transformation of existing subject positions. '102 Given 
Young's emphasis on the multiplicity and fluidity of identities (of both individuals and 
groups) the source of this essentialism is difficult to discern. Although the criticism could 
be developed in relation to the rather weak theorisation of associations in Justice and the 
Politics of Difference (noted above) Mouffe's discussion lacks the detail required to make 
such a judgement anything more than speculative. Indeed, her objection is directed as 
much at the very idea of `group' insofar as the term implies the presence of a stable and 
enduring identity, as it is at the interpretation of the concept in the works of Young and 
(less clearly) Taylor. 103 
Mouffe's conception of radical democratic citizenship accepts the critique of the 
liberal subject in full, 104 but in the absence of a vocabulary emphasising the contingent 
and unstable aspects of that critique her advocacy of a hegemonic identity articulating 
`liberty and equality for all... allowing for a plurality of specific allegiances and for the 
respect of individual liberty'105 could be viewed as surprisingly conventional in its 
political implications. The issue separating her and Young, revealed by their contrasting 
vocabularies, does not directly concern either `essences, ' the theorisation of `group, ' or 
the characteristics of group identity - which for both are contingent, plural and 
101 Chantal Mouffc, The Return of the PoIitic. tl (London, A7crso, 1993), 77. 
102 Mottfle, The Return of'the Political, 85. 
103 Insofar is the : anal y"is of groups and communitie' . th , vc shc, wý the w()rk\ of 
Young and Taylor or 
be compatible, however, it 
is reasonable to suppose that Mmif w()ul(i regard T. º. \, 
lur 
. º, susceptible to the 
`essentialist' charge. 
104 Moýu11e s relerence to) Ta lh)r 
in The Return u/ the Polur.., /, art, nºt)\tlV incIJcnt. ºI; \\-here he is 
! l. 
quoted dircctly 
(on p. 4t and p. b4) it is only with regard to) th e eriticlue (d(. itnniaim 
in Pbilic, rl? ical Papers 
105 Motif fc, Tbc Return n/ the Rolitic.. tl, 83-4. 
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imaginary. The basis of Mouffe's criticism is rather to be found in the characterisation of 
difference and its implications. Her discussion, like Young's, carries echoes of Saussure106 
but presents difference in terms of `antagonism, division and conflict, '107 establishing the 
boundaries of discursive space which the project of radical democracy ineluctably seeks to 
challenge and expand. 108 Although this theorisation of identity and difference admits the 
possibility of transient `nodal points'109 of discursive regularity, it insists that the 
experience of democratic citizenship is a fundamentally agonal one. From this standpoint 
deliberative processes which recognise and accommodate difference, mutual 
understanding or consensus seek to `arrest the flow of differences'110 establishing a fixity 
of meaning which essentialises identity by denying its necessarily relational and 
indeterminate character. 
The examination of Young and Taylor paid particular attention to the porous 
character of identity in their works, and to how identity is open to transformation in 
processes of recognition, deliberation and articulation. This theorisation is insufficient in 
Mouffe's view because the understanding that language (pace Saussure) is an open rather 
than closed structure entails that all meaning is indeterminate, not merely unsettled. 
`Nodal points' notwithstanding, attempts to interpret and establish meaning necessarily 
stand in need of discursive unmasking; to suggest otherwise is to fall into an essentialist 
mode which is `inescapably deficient when it comes to the construction of a democratic 
alternative'111 to traditional liberal (and Marxist) political theories. This polarising 
analysis is deaf to the nuances of language use, meaning and identity, which for Mouffe is 
either antiessentialist and radical, plural and democratic or essentialist and irredeemably 
deficient. 
The use of Wittgenstein as a thinker who 'insisted on the impossibility of fixing 
ultimate meanings'] I-' in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy demonstrates the debilitating 
limitations attendant upon this approach. This unsupported assertion is not incorrect of 
Wittgenstein, but overlooks the shape, content, and myriad purposes of the Philosophical 
Investigations, which - amongst other things - locates and explores the continuity and 
106 e Njouffe, The Retut'n of. the Political, 85; `There will always 
he , `constitutive outside', an exterior 
to the community that i` the verb' co, nditiün Of 
its existence... all forms of clýnscnsu:. ire necessarily based on 
acts of exclusion. ' 
li[ic z/, 86. 107 Mou f fe, Tbc Return co/ talc P() 
108 This position receives it, clearest lormtilatin 
in Ernest, ) L. Kl, ttl an. l Ch, int, tl M1(nilIc, He emonyand 
Soci. I/Iýt Sll'alC`1' 
ýL11111ýý, ll, ý`ý'rý ý, 
I98 ). 105-1 4, 'Mllllli. 1rl, cd at 155,1ý lllc Iýýlý'lllle , llllI Iiidetermi lacy of 
the social, wIlllll 91\'l\ .l prllll, 
lry and lý4111lllllg character ui nc . itivity and , IIIL, ItitiI i in . 
109 Laclau and M()ullc, Hc',: c'»tuýt1'. ýttcl 
Suctaltý! Str.. zie i', 112. 
110 Laclau and Moulfi-', Hc'; cnwnyand 
Snct. alt5[ Slr_11c; 1', 112. 
111 Moýufle', The Return n/ t/. I' Po/tlica/, S5. 
112 Licht' and Mou(le, Hcgc"mmiyand 
Sccialii! Sv'. ilc';: ý'" 11l. 
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embeddedness of grammar and meaning in language use and forms of life. The 
uncontroversial observation that meaning is contingent (in the sense that it is never 
`ultimate') does not support either a claim of radical indeterminacy, or the exclusive 
correlation of identity and difference with power and resistance> > which forms the basis 
of Laclau and Mouffe's characterisation of the `radical antagonistic character of 
democratic struggles. '114 
Mouffe's unsuccessful criticisms are directly addressed to Young, but similar 
concerns have been formulated in a manner which explicitly engages Taylor's 
hermeneutic approach. Responding to Taylor's argument that Michel Foucault's ethic of 
resistance and liberation is compromised by an epistemology which conceives truth 
relativistically as an effect of power, 115 William Connolly 116 suggests that Taylor and 
Foucault share many positions at an archaeological level. 'Archaeology' is a labile 
Foucauldian concept embracing amongst other things the critique of traditional theories 
of language and epistemology, the category of the subject, the situated character of 
knowledge, and more generally the irregular - but not indeterminate>» - conditions 
which constitute, order and limit areas of discourse. 118 `Within these broad 
commonalities, ' Connolly claims, `reside fundamental differences'> 19 between Taylor 
and Foucault, arising from their respective use of hermeneutic and genealogical models of 
explanation. 
`Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting, '120 proclaimed 
Foucault. The distinction between archaeology and genealogy is a somewhat opaque one, 
but (in general) where archaeology reveals and opens to question the philosophical 
assumptions and cultural conditions underlying claims to and domains of knowledge, 
genealogy aims `not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its 
dissipation. '121 Developing a Nietzschean ontology of disorder, 1'-' genealogy repudiates 
113 La lau and Mouffe, Hc, crrlnrl>> rnýd Soci rliý! Slr.. llrý1,143. 
114 L, u'1<tu and Moulie, H('''(7/ )/ '. d)1(1 Socialist 
S[r. aecY, , 
133. 
115 Taylor, 'Foucault can freedom and truth', P/.; iIt)s )hier/ Papc rs //, 152-184. 
116 Connolly, 'Taylor, Foýuc, tult and Otherne>. ', Pr)ltlic. rl Tlic-n)vv 13 (1935), 3b5-377. 
117 A point Whirh ({isti iguislie' Foucault 
from Muufic'ý ICss : ul)tlL, antics'cnti. ilism. The elusiveness of 
Foucaattlt's thought mikes it. iateg ris, ttion prehleinatii 
(, tnd prch. thly pointless). Best und Kellner helpfully 
describe hihi is a 'pro fo undly rcýnilirtrci thinker ... who combines premodern, modern and postmodern 
pcrspectivc>'. Stephen Best and 
Dongl, t.. Kcllncr Pnitmod( )-)1 Tluv)r)-. Cricic.. r/ /)71c rr(),,, acin)1s (New York, 
Guilford Press, 1991), 3b, see also 6 n?. 
118 The clearest short elaboration of the scope of the ircimcologiial, and of the imprecision of 
the term, 
occurs in Michel Foucault, 
The Arc/ideology Of` /(nn-, /(''4(,, c . 1nc! 
Tik Dtccnursc on trans. A. M. 
Sheridan Smith (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1993), 
206-208. 
119 Connolly, 'Taylor, Fc)ttcault and Otherness', 366-7. 
120 Foucault, 'Niet"rsche, Gene., ]( g. \v, History', in Paul R, thino)W, (cd. 
) Tbc Fo, rccalclt Rear/er (London, 
Penguin, 1984), 95- 
121 Foucault, 'Niet/sclhe, Gene. al, ýt; v, Hikti, ry', 88. 
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not only the liberal fiction of an autonomous, sovereign, choosing self, but extends to 
challenge the anthropological basis of the human sciences, -'j decentering the subject and 
focusing upon the determining role of discourses (of e. g. 11 edicin , punishment, and 
sexuality) in the production of identities (the lunatic, criminal, pervert, etc. ) Discourse 
functions on this account to `impose form over that which was not designed to receive 
it, '124 creating and hypostasising identity in patterns of stability and normativity, 
involving a subjectification of being which genealogical investigation aims to unmask, 
disrupt and undermine. 
Taking up a genealogical standpoint Connolly refashions the question of identity 
and difference - of whether the recognition of difference also commits theory to the 
rejection of subject-centred concepts and modes of thought - in a more sophisticated 
manner than either Mouffe's antiessentialist critique, or Melissa Lane's distantly related 
but similarly unsuccessful `reductionist' objections - which also claimed Nietzschean 
provenance - to Taylor's theorisation of interpretive frameworks. )": ) Engaging issues of 
both political advocacy and philosophical anthropology, Connolly has latterly conceded 
the inaccuracy of his intemperate political criticisms of Taylor as a `civic liberal' 
supposedly committed to a rather bizarre teleological principle of communal harmony 
and self-realisation. 126 At the level of anthropology or `social ontologýy, '127 however, his 
discussion of Taylor is more refined and effective. 
122 The understanding Of the term 'disorder' here I()ll()ws that 4 Connolly, but is ºn(. )st clearly stated 
by Michael. J. Shapiro, 'Charles Ta\'lr's M()ral Subject' Po/i(tcal T/, c(, º-t, 14 (1946), 318, 'T, tv l(ºr presupposes 
an Ontology of order and a notion of discourse as something t( be attuned with and thu, expressive of that 
order, Nietzsche offers in 0nt0le, gy of disorder and a n(ºti(, n of discmurse IS c )I1 titLit ivr... as an imposition of 
an order. ' 
123 e. g. Foucault, The A)-chac(. doyy 0f' Knower e, 16, \\'Ihere the h()()k is described as ', in attempt to 
formulate, in general terms ... a method of analysis purged of all anthrop(Iogisin. 
' The extent to which this 
wholesale rejection of anthrcýp(, lº>gy as subjectivism is c(ºnsisicnt throughout F(nic, tult's wOrk is debatable but 
beyond the scope of the present discussion, but sec in particular his comments oil techniques of care and 
mastery of the self in `On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress' in Rahinow, The 
Foucault Reader, 359, which sketches out models of ancient, chri. tian, and modern conceptions of subjectivity 
in a manner superficially similar to the structure deployed by T, iylor in Sources ref the Se/f. 
124 Connolly, 'Taylor, Foucault and Otherness', 366. 
125 Ch. 5 52, above. 
126 Connolly's barely coherent claim in full states that Taylor 'proceeds from a rhetoric of self- 
realisation within c(mmunity, through t rhetoric of c(n)i nnn. il rc, ilis, ttinn tlir(>ugh harmc, niration of the 
diverse parts of an ongoing culture, to a rhetoric of progressive ittuncinent toi t harmonious direction in 
being' C(lnnoll1', I! /cnlll' /Di%/ercncc: Dc')) ocratlc . 
\c;; (, 1t. itio1-ý H, /*PHliltca/ P. o-Jclr, x (lill. w. i, C,, rncll University 
Press, 1991), 89. A f1)Otimt. ' appended tO the intrduCti(, n of tli>. h>)()k (p'2'1-4, n. 7) notes that 
Identity/DiJ/crcnce w. t: 'in prucluCti>, n' wliCn S(, 1: ) "' / th( 
S( // 
, º1)P>. ', ired, and that the critique of 
Taylor's 
'civic liberalism' is rendered irrelccv, tnt by that www, )rk. 
127 In Poºlilici and Anibl uity (Madison, University )f \\'isct>ii iºi Pre,,, 1987), C> nnolly offers an 
unusually precise . iiiOunt 01 ýýnt(ýIcýt; ý . 15 
'. t set of Itºni. l. iinent, il under-; t, tnding:. tbo it ill,,, relations of humans 
to themselves, toi others, and to the world', p. 
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Connolly characterises Taylor's project as a `quest for attunement and self- 
realization'128 reliant upon a vocabulary of consensus, dialogue and mediation which is 
`designed to carry us through interpretation to a closer harmony with the world. '129 This 
description underplays Taylor's awareness of the plural and evolving and potentially 
incompatible character of goods, practices and indentifications, 130 in the light of which 
the desire to directly oppose a hermeneutic of attunement with a genealogy of discord 
appears misconceived. Connolly's comments are however forceful in so far as a 
genealogical perspective disturbs and undermines any sense of stability or completion 
which might accrue over time as identity becomes more secure and less attentive to the 
fluidity of contexts and differences. Although Taylor's understanding of modernity is 
organised around the incompatible copresence of romantic and instrumental cultural 
forces, commitments to multiple goods can involve a greater degree of conflict for and 
fragmentation within identity than he acknowledges, and in particular instances his 
confidence in the availability of sufficiently resourceful higher order-goods might be 
misplaced. 
The impact of Connolly's comments upon the interpretive position developed in 
this essay is constrained by the fact that although power is undoubtedly present in all 
social environments and relationships it is only one aspect of discourse, with a range of 
possible effects which need not be repressive or malignant. Not all social relations and 
processes are available to a vocabulary of discipline, domination and resentment. 
Foucault himself acknowledged the partial character of his studies, and Connolly's 
concession that his theory of power `may be exaggerated'132 implies sohle appreciation of 
the limited explanatory power of genealogy. Unfortunately, the consequences of this 
judgement are unexplored and the hegemony accorded by Connolly to discourses of 
subjectification and domination occurs at the expense not only of consensus, but also of 
recognition, equality, freedom, solidarity, friendship, and so on. 
In the evaluation of competing accounts it must be remembered that `ontologies are 
not directly demonstrable; they are pragmatically established. '] 
33 Every anthropology is 
itself an interpretation, and is not susceptible to strict philosophical proof. Validation and 
128 Connolly, 'Taylor, Foucault and Otlicrnc'. ', 367. 
129 Connolly, Politic: c and Amhiguihv, 131. 
130 A point which CcnnOlly \V Ould prOh, thl\ i(-km vlcdgc 
in the Ii;; ht (4 Iii: omiments can Sources of 
the Sclf noted <Ihovc. 
131 'OI course, there irr con. rn. ual 
di: ciplinc'>... the , 1n, ºIý>ý: call ºn n() \\', ito to mind, 
he equated 
with a general <tn, tlý tic Of e"ver)' poSSihle 
power rclmio n, ' Fmuwaalt, To litiý: mid Ethic,: -Ali 
Interview, ' in 
Rabinow, Tbc Foucault AM, 380. 
132 Con110ll\, 'Tavh, r, Foucault and OtI1ernc: >', 371. 
133 Mieh. iel., I. Shapiro, 'CIi«irles 
T, ºv Ivr': M'l, )r, il Suhjce-t' ! '-, 1iii,. i1 To ný- 14 (19$6), 117. 
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critique occurs - as seen in the detailed examination of Rawls and Taylor - in a 
combination of coherence, plausibility, explanatory adequacy, and so on, assessed in the 
light of experience and reflection. When questioning the form and order (or otherwise) of 
understanding and subjectivity there is no decisive reason to favour in advance an 
ontology either of genealogical disorder or hermeneutic self-interpretation. The absence 
of such grounds, when combined with the explanatory force of the philosophical 
anthropology established in the preceding chapters, suggests that the challenge proffered 
by genealogy is not as corrosive as it at first appears. One particularly relevant difficulty 
concerns the impersonal theorisation of discourse and the impoverished relation of power 
and agency which ensues. 134 The decentering of the subject practised by Foucault and 
embraced by Connolly conflates anthropology with athropocentrism and in consequence 
lacks a sense of the self as a participant, with others, in the development of its own 
identity. To deal appropriately with the erroneous presuppositions of liberal 
individualism - the sovereign self possessed of a universalised rationality - requires the 
situation of the subject, not its eradication. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, genealogy does address a serious weakness within 
Taylor's work, which effectively overlooks the role of power in the formation of sites of 
identification, social contexts and communities. Although it is not compelling as a 
wholesale critique of philosophical anthropology and is, as Connolly concedes, 
`insufficient to political theory, '135 genealogy is helpful as a complementary analysis 
which shows how forms of identity can be manipulated, suppressed, excluded and 
marginalised136 - that frameworks and deliberative spaces are not domains of 
unconstrained communicative and expressive freedom. This is not to propose a synthesis 
between hermeneutic and genealogical approaches - which despite archaelogical 
`similarities' is not conceptually available due to the `ontological' incompatibility of the 
two positions. The issue of power does not present itself as a 'question' to be `answered' 
by theory, but is insinuated in interpretive practices and as such is an inescapable element 
of any satisfactory formulation of the politics of community. Within this context the 
limited but significant contribution of genealogy is to illuminate the role of power in the 
formation and recognition of communities and social groups as sites of identity and 
intersubjectivity. 
In summary, the examination above reveals a complex structure of associated 
meanings and methodological concerns -which impose themselves on any attempt to 
134 e. g. Best and Kellner, Post modcrn 
Tbcö v, 69 (. 
135 Connolly, Politicc.. rn(i, -1 mbigutly. 159. 
136 This point is advanced wit lh relcrenec to T, ty, lt)r rather than YM un9, \Vll- e sip of the `five 
faces 
of oppression' is more explicitly s'llsItive to the role of pt wer within 
dicmirL% 
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define, or discriminate between, communities in the course of political analysis and 
interpretation. An appreciation of the need to coherently relate and separate communities 
within physical and discursive space is a prerequisite of a viable political theorisation, 
which must proceed in a manner which is sensitive both to the complexity of pluralism 
and difference, and to the discursive regularities and points of convergence which are of 
equal importance in the constitution and reproduction of identities and their supporting 
cultural contexts. 
Any failure to appreciate these competing forces incurs the possibility of an 
understanding prey to excesses of heterogeneity and homogenisation. On one hand lies 
the danger that a restrictive comprehension of the term recognises and legitimates a 
narrow range of social forms, marginalising innovative social and cultural groupings or 
imposing an understanding of community which undermines the plurality and diversity 
inherent in the ideal of complex social differentiation. On the other hand, in an extreme 
form pluralism carries the possibility of radical conflict where a cacophony of 
incompatible claims advanced by groups, interests and individuals - untrammelled 
pluralism being ultimately solipsistic - pays insufficient heed to the cultural and linguistic 
environments within which micrological analyses of difference, power and their impact 
upon identities are located. 
COMPLEMENTED BY A GENEALOGICAL A\VARENESS of power, the hermeneutic analysis 
of community makes possible, in terms consistent with the anthropological discussion of 
language and identity, the delineation of a deliberative model of politics conceived under 
conditions of enduring multiculturalism. Relevant communities groups and identities, and 
the issues which differentiate and politicise them, cannot be precisely or antecedently 
specified because they arise within and between cultures and ways of life. It is in these 
spaces of cultural contact and dialogue that a politics of deliberation occurs. 
Complementing recent interest in citizenship, participatory democracy and discursive 
legitimation, the account of situated subjectivity in Taylor's writings readily extends into 
a wider account of political and social engagement. This involves a theorisation of public 
space, extending themes and concepts introduced in Taylor's philosophical anthropology, 
which relates ideas of agency, language, 
deliberation and identity to democratic processes 
of political participation with a 
depth and coherence far exceeding that offered by the 
normative liberalism of Rawls and 
his contemporaries. 
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CHA pp -r º. li SIVEN 
DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY AND 
SUBJECTIVITY 
[1] DELIBERATION AND CONTESTATION 
CHAPTER SIX OFFERED AN ACCOUNT of the relationship between anthropology and 
advocacy that extended the dialogical, intersubjective conception of the self, and the 
intimate connection between identity and ideas of the good central to it, in order to 
address matters involving both direct political conflict such as the clash of ostensibly 
incompatible identities in Quebec, and contested political concepts such as `community', 
which upon examination was found to engage a dense set of meanings and associations 
awaiting clarification in the course of public debate. In each instance the substantive 
approach adopted did not provide a conclusive resolution detailing, for example, the 
terms of an agreement between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, or a stable and 
complete definition of the meanings of 'community'. The interpretations advanced set 
out the issues at stake in a (hopefully) perspicuous manner, but do not presume to 
establish the results of debates concerning either Quebec or community. Such encounters 
properly receive their form and outcome in the actions of their participants which, 
occurring more or less unpredictably under conditions which exceed the knowledge and 
control of theory, are not susceptible to its determination. 
The resolution (or otherwise) of contested concepts, conflicting identities and 
similar antagonisms are properly matters of common or public concern; they 
become 
fully or explicitly political only when articulated as such 
in public spaces. Such spaces are 
fundamentally linguistic in character, and the agency and processes that constitute 
politics are therefore 
best understood : is attempts to impose, define, create, negotiate, etc., 
the meanings maintained 
by a lin uistic community and the social relations thereby 
expressed. These processes need not 
be democratic: to take an obvious example, Orwell's 
Newspeakl dramatically demonstrated the extent to which the control exerted by 
totalitarian regimes simply is the control of a language and the understandings and 
practices that it informs. In addressing the slightly less pessimistic conditions faced by 
liberal democratic societies in late-modernity, however, the possibilities opened up by a 
substantive and interpretive approach to the political can be viewed with more 
equanimity. 
The following remarks in no way attempt to comprehensively survey or analyse 
the diverse and voluminous contemporary literature linking the concepts of democracy 
and deliberation. 2 In highlighting some key aspects of a conception of politics involving 
the public articulation and interpretation of contested goods, identities and meanings, it is 
instead my intention to indicate the possibility of a model of deliberation consistent with 
Taylor's philosophical anthropology, and in so doing to offer some idea of the extent to 
which hermeneutics can significantly contribute to debates in contemporary political 
theory concerning deliberation, democracy and identity. 
Processes of deliberation and contestation are both social and linguistic in form. As 
the discussions of chapter four and chapter six established, ] language is a complex and 
expressive resource that is created and sustained in the ongoing, overlapping interchanges 
of discursive communities. The parts of speech are however plural, complex and 
uncertain; regularities of use and meaning persist alongside ambiguities, equivocations, 
conflicts, etc., that are also produced in the course of communicative action. Agreements 
and disputes involving shared and divergent understandings are not just matters of 
intellectual curiosity. Debates about the meanings and identities affirmed by a language 
(and the goods and forms of life that it makes manifest) engage understandings that are 
common not in the sense that they are contingently convergent, where a particular set of 
people have similar preferences and dispositions, or temporarily agree to co-operate in 
some manner for instrumental reasons. The idea of a shared understanding involves a 
more profound identification. In order to effectively realise social relations of freedom 
and equality, for example, it is not sufficient (although it is perhaps necessary) that laws 
proscribing certain forms of discriminatory treatment be enacted. The success of such 
legislation will also depend on the extent to which there exists a common sense amongst 
1 George Or\w'ell, Ainctc'cn Eivbiy-Fwir (Loiid n, Penguin, 1989). 
2 The most prolific exponent, undcr the t; ui\c of 'd course ethics' 
heim; Jürgen Habermas; see in 
particular Ju5tificatiur7 and 
Application: Ran1v-ks on Discow-R, Eibic: c. Other prcmmient examples of the genre 
include John Dr\! r. ek, Discursi: 'c' DCnWCY-. icl'. Politics, Policy, _inrl 
Politier/ Stl('r1C(' (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), Amy Guunann and Dennis Th, )nip: c)n, 
D('))ltkc'rdc)' and Dts. igr-cement (Cambridge, 
MA., Harvard Umvcrsit, \ Pres:, 1996), and Janie: B,, 
Ilntmi, Public Dclibcv. ition: P/rcralism, Complexity and 
Derrtocr. Jc-)' (C. ainbridge, 
M1A., MIT Press, 1996). 
3 in particular sec Ch. 4, j1 5. 
193 
those concerned that they actually are equal, a recognition of identity and difference that 
implies the presence of a language and culture `which makes actions, feelings, ways of life 
which are of value conceptually feasible. '4 
That successful dialogical encounters are not only possible but unexceptional - 
even in the most complex of plural societies - indicates the presence of a range of 
implicitly shared understandings, judgements and conventions underpinning the 
institutions and practices of everyday social life. The apparent depth of these agreements 
does not however make a unity of language, because although particular linguistic acts 
(Saussure's parole) cannot be isolated from the contexts (langue) which their intelligibility 
presupposes, any language as a whole is always incapable of being fully comprehended or 
articulated. This public and holistic theorisation is particularly well suited to the 
interpretation of political debate, as it demands that the analysis and negotiation of 
antagonistic identities and contested meanings be understood as public and linguistic in 
form. The very presence of such conflicts indicates a breakdown in, or absence of, shared 
understandings which might ordinarily go unnoticed in the life of a speech community. 
Taylor's emphasis on the location of goods and meanings in languages which are by 
definition commonly held thus extends the insights of the expressive conception of 
language within an account of the purposes and processes of political debate. 
The organisation of social and economic life in late-modern societies according to 
ideals of independence, mobility and instrumental rationality predictably extends to the 
practices of politics, where the freedoms accorded to the individual as a bearer of 
preferences and consumer of goods come at a considerable cost. The enervation of the 
social bonds and relationships that were identified as part of the concept of community 
has a similar impact upon the quality of the culture of democracy. In a polity of 
aggregated, dissociated individuals, the experience of politics increasingly becomes a 
private, fragmented and ineffectual one. The United States, where public life is 
undeniably vigorous and voluminous but is dominated by the judicial retrieval of rights 
against both individuals and the state, and by the production of legislative gridlock at the 
behest of professionalised sectarian interest groups and lobbying organisations, offers 
perhaps the clearest illustration of the political consequences of excessive individualism. 
5 
1 Taylor, 'Irreducibly Social Gcocads', in G. Brennan , 1n({ C. \Vilsh, 
(e({s. ) Rationality, Individualism and 
PublicPolic)' (Canberra, Australian National University fire's, 1990), 58. 
5 See for example Sam{cl, `The Procedural Republic mid the 
Unencumbered Self', 91-95; Taylor, The 
Ethics cif Autl. ýcnticity 
109-121; and Taylor, 'Liberal P(, litirs . inhl the 
Public Sphere', in Ami tai Etzioni (ed. ) 
New Co»tnrtunit. rrian Tbinking: 
PcrSc, ns, Vzr tnc: c, lnstituti"ns and Co, ninruoritirs (Charlottesville, University 
Press of \tirgini. ', 
1995), 207-215. 
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As the steady decline in electoral participation in America attests, a form of politics 
that is comprehensively dominated by competing claims of right and interest is neither 
empowering nor democratically effective. Indeed, the entrenchment of a narrowly 
procedural conception of politics and public reason is likely to explicitly undermine the 
cultural bases of democratic politics, which as Joshua Cohen succinctly argues `[w]hen 
properly conducted... involves public deliberation focused on the common good, requires 
some form of manifest equality among citizens, and shapes the identity and interests of 
citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of [that] 
common good. '6 According to Taylor, such an effect is clearly discernible in North 
America, where the displacement of politics by jurisprudence entails that `energy is 
channelled into interest or advocacy politics'7 in a manner which isolates individuals as 
political actors, setting them against one another and in so doing rendering them `less and 
less capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out. '8 
The process of fragmentation described by Taylor involves a self-feeding failure of 
democratic politics, where the absence of common purposes, and of effective deliberation 
addressing that lack, effectively undermines political initiative and the possibility of 
democratic renewal. Furthermore, because the culture of democracy is indivisible from 
the vocabularies and public life that are fundamental to the reproduction in speech of 
identity and community, fragmentation brings with it the danger of a flattening of 
differences and the development of cultural homogenisation9 where, deprived of 
meaningful cultural encounters, identities and differences no longer receive articulation 
`to the extent that people no longer identify with their political community, ' a loss that is 
both produced and reinforced by `the experience of political powerlessness. '10 The 
implications of this analysis need not be overstated: language and culture do not face the 
imminent threat of total collapse. The erosion of the bases of community and identity is 
6 Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberatic)n and Deirnc)cratic Legitimacy', in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (eds. ) The 
Good Polity (Oxford, Basil Black, cll, 1989), 19. Although Coýhen's attempt to develop an ideal deliberative 
procedure, which draws heavily upon Rawls and identifies autonomy as the privileged 
democratic good, 
departs significantly from the position indebted to Taylor that is discussed 
below, it is significant that from a 
normative perspective he formulates the democratic 
deficit, and the task of securing legitimacy in modern 
societies, using concepts of publicity, 
deliberation and democratic procedure in a much less restrictive 
manner than Rawls. See also Joshua 
Cohen and Joel R(-)r, ers, A5snciations and Dc? nocracy, ed. Erik Olin 
Wright, (London, Verso, 1995), and Cohlen, `Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', in 
Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 95-119. 
7 Taylor, 'Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere', 212. 
8 Taylor, `Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere', 211. 
9 That is arguably evident in the spread of 'McCulturc' and the scar-lic;; ci nom exercised 
by American 
film and entert. iinnient 
industric . 
For a dig u\sion of gh b. tl Mid I(-C, tl Culture in late-ino)dernity see Lash and 
Urry, Ec() 0mic; 0/ 'SN"and Sp., O , 
125-111,305-31 i. 
10 Taylor, 'Liberal Politics and the Public Splierk. ", 214. 
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instead a less dramatic but more insidious phenomenon, and the critical view of the 
culture of individual rights and its effects is best viewed as an explanation of some of the 
transformations that contribute to the problems of legitimacy, accountability and 
alienation faced by contemporary democratic regimes. In addition, the interpretation is 
consistent with and supported by the concepts and categories of philosophical 
anthropology, and in the development of public space it also contains one potentially 
promising means of addressing those difficulties. 
Practices involving the deliberation of goods and identities undertaken within and 
between communities, movements, civic associations and other vehicles of social 
relationship make possible, according to Taylor, the emergence out of apathy of `a 
politics of democratic will formation. '" This ideally (and perhaps over-optimistically) 
envisages that as a result of engagement in public spaces directed towards the formation 
of shared meanings and purposes - such as the realisation of 'deep diversity' in Canada - 
`successful common action can bring a sense of empowerment and also strengthen 
identification with the political community. '12 
[2] SITES OF ENGAGEMENT 
THE DEBATING CHAMBERS AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS of the late-modern state are 
undeniably to some extent deliberative in form. As part of a representative system of 
government that embodies a universalised and undifferentiated model of citizenship, 
however, such dialogical spaces are manifestly inadequate to the plurality of identities 
and conceptions of the good that they purport to represent. The centre of gravity of a 
thoroughly plural and differentiated model of democratic culture and practices is instead 
to be found in civil society, `the host of free associations, existing outside of any official 
sponsorship... [where] society can he said to act, or to generate or sustain a certain 
condition, without the agency of government. '13 
Although it cannot be claimed that any of the relationships that constitute civil 
society are entirely free of the influence, regulation or disciplinary presence of the 
modern state and its bure-aucracies, 
14 for the purposes of deliberation it is sufficient that 
neither the aims nor outcomes of public 
dialogue are determined by the state or any 
other external force or interest. Indeed, the 
defining characteristics of civil society are its 
11 Ti Ior, Tbc Eibit: < u/. 1 rl11ý(')7LICI[ý', 118. 
12 T. tvlor, 'Lihcr. tl 
Politics and the Public Splicre', 214. 
13 Taylor, 'Liberal politics and the Public Sphere', 185. 
14 A condition Ol 
independence implied in T, tyhw's depictiuin of public space aý c()nt. tining `a discourse 
of reason outside power' 
(Liberal Politics mid the Public Sphere', 192-3) that is perhaps ideally desirable, but 
is not in accurate or realistic expectation 
given the si/c and : c, )pe o4the modern state. 
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independence and radical plurality. As Michael Walzer argues, civil society functions as 
the `setting of setting s'1' where goods, languages, identities, associations, and the social 
and economic relations they express find public - and hence political - realisation. It 
follows from this that civil society is also the primary host of the public spaces of 
recognition, deliberation and democratic will-formation indicated by Taylor. 
The exploration of historical and philosophical aspects of the concept of civil 
society in, for example, the theorisation of the competitive market economy, is beyond 
the scope of the current discussion, 16 which is principally concerned with ideas 
involving deliberation and democratic culture. Created in the more or less unpredictable 
activities of bodies that are variously formal, informal and spontaneous in stature, public 
spaces are not conceived as a replacement for, or an immediate solution to, the problems 
of the modern state. The relationship between the state and civil society is however a 
complex one, in which the public sphere as a whole (i. e. The plurality of public spaces 
collected and discursively related to one another) fulfils a crucial but indirect democratic 
function in shaping, authorising and legitimating (or otherwise) the structure and actions 
of governmental power. 
This relationship to power arises because of the composition of the public sphere as 
a `locus of discussion potentially engaging everyone... as a consequence it has a normative 
status: government ought to listen to it. '» Where democratic legitimacy is correlated 
with notions of public accountability and representation, the effectiveness of those 
processes is significantly dependent on the presence of an effective civil society which 
forms, where possible, a common mind `without the mediation of the political sphere'18 
that articulates, as the outcome of rational public discussion, views which accountable 
and responsive government should take heed of, and with regard to which the democratic 
legitimation of power in part occurs. The connection between civil society and the state 
is therefore an indirect but reflexive one, where in a `maximally porous'19 relationship 
the public sphere is `listened to by power, but is not itself an exercise of power. '20 
The 
presence of a culture that is coherent, plural and discursive - rather than 
fragmented, 
privatised and alienating - emerges from this account as 
indispensable part of the 
practices and justification of democratic government. 
15 NIicch; acl \\%, ilicr, 'Thc Civ I So icty Argimmit' in NI ii1fc, Di»>cnswn. ý of 
Radical Democrzcy, 98. 
16 For I cmprrliCil \'c stn-\'c\ from a hrwdly iritic, il-the )retie perspective see 
Jean L. Cohen, and 
Andrew Ar to, Civil Socicty. "Id Political T con, (Cainhric{,; e, VIA., MIT 
Press, 1992). 
17 T, tv lor, Liberal Politics ; tnd the Public Sphere', 190, cnipli, t. 
i: added. 
18 T, i\ Ior, Liberal Politic, , end the 
Public Sphere', 19'-?. 
19 Taylor, Liberal Politic and the Public Sphere', 
20 T, t\ lor, Liberal Politics and the Public Splhere', 191. 
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The public sphere performs two major functions. It is firstly? a collective body that 
limits power and holds it accountable, and secondly is host to a plurality of dialogues 
constituting a deliberative process that is a form of democratic politics in its own right. 21 
The indirect and diverse constitution of the public sphere makes the precise theoretical 
specification of its operation problematic. As part of a substantive and situated 
methodology, questions concerning the structure and content of public spaces are 
properly a matter of applied interpretation undertaken with regard to specific issues and 
contexts. It is however possible to schematically convey some sense of how activities 
undertaken in the discursive spaces of the public sphere can - albeit in an ideal form"' - 
be seen to involve the negotiation of a political viewpoint that is both reasoned and 
public in status. 
Given the scale and complexity of contemporary society, a conception of the 
public sphere containing a conversational or direct account of deliberation - where all 
members of a society are required to participate in discourse with the aim of reaching 
consensus, a majority view, or satisfying some other criterion of agreement - is neither 
realistic nor desirable. A formal or overly institutional model of deliberation also runs 
the risk of establishing a subordinate rather than reflexive role for civil society, a 
dislocation likely to compound rather than address the democratic deficit in 
representative regimes. As the `setting of settings' for social discourse, the role of the 
public sphere is rather to relate and integrate the multiple `common spaces' that arise in 
civil society in a form that is singular but not necessarily unified. Debate does not always 
produce clear, reasoned and decisive outcomes, and where opinion is divided, unresolved, 
indifferent, etc., the relevant issues stand equally in need of public articulation. In 
performing this function the public sphere `knits together a plurality of spaces' into what 
Taylor labels a `metatopical common space''' where although they might never meet, 
the members of a society are brought together through the cultural exchanges occurring 
in media that are `deemed to be in principle intercommunicating. '24 
The most obvious manifestation of this metasocial deliberative exchange occurs in 
the activities of the mass media, where in processes of reportage, response, advocacy and 
debate the formation of a public opinion becomes possible through the interaction of a 
21 T, wlor, Lihc'r, il PJitic's tnd the 
Public- Sphere', 216. 
Taylor, Liberal Pý)litics . iiid the 
Public Sphere', 194, trknowIedgcs that the ideal-type he depicts is 
unlikely to be re, dised. In my particular 
instance, the public sphere will iimnt. iin actors (including but not 
limited to the state) seeking to distort, m, inipulate ur otherwise 
inlluenie the ciehate at hi. ind. The presence of 
such forces, although doubtless undesirable, need I'M undtmly 
affect the deliberations of a robust and self- 
conscious polity. 
23 Taylor, `Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere', 190. 
24 Taylor, Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere', 185-6, emphasis added. 
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wide range of communicative forms. The editorial pages of broadsheet newspapers, for 
example, are often explicitly presented in a manner that seeks to elicit a response from 
the readership in the form of correspondence, which might induce further editorial 
comment, and so on, over time constituting a process in which issues are raised, discussed 
and evaluated not just by journalists and correspondents, but also by the general 
readership, whose discussions of the issue at hand with colleagues and friends also 
contribute less discernibly - but no less importantly - to the development of public 
debate. Television and radio programmes structured around the idea of audience 
participation are similar in purpose (if less thoughtful in execution)25 whilst the 
exponential expansion of new media technologies has created electronic public spaces (i. e. 
discussion groups, mailing lists, and internet pa es) that over time are becoming 
increasingly accessible and diverse. 
As part of an industry that is mature and strongly embedded in the public culture 
of liberal societies, the broadsheet newspaper used as an example above helpfully 
illustrates some principal features and difficulties of deliberation as a democratic and 
cultural concept. Print media - along with other forms of public communication - does 
not present a distortion-free domain of debate. Publications are typically, and with 
varying degrees of explicitness, guided by ideological biases, valuations and preferences 
that target the judgements and beliefs of their readership, and in so doing can attempt to 
shape the course of debate in ways that fall short of ideally free and open exchanges 
aimed at producing a considered public opinion. 26 The various perspectives adopted by 
the popular press certainly have a valid role within a flourishing pluralist culture of 
public contestation, but the availability of that culture cannot be guaranteed or 
presupposed by theory. Where the public sphere is undemanding or otherwise lacking in 
deliberative vitality, that condition is likely to be reflected in the quality of the media as 
well as in more overt democratic failings. Possible symptoms of this cultural malaise 
include the domination of a limited political agenda, the toleration of monopolistic 
25 In an intcrvirw at the tiº11c of his appOllltment as contrcºIlcr of BBC], Michael 
f ackson tellingly 
acknowledged the aims of the Corporation in the 
following terms: 'There are times when we want to reflect 
the fractured, splintered nature of our times. People want toi express their 
individuality, their difference from 
each other. And then I think also that people are searching; - perhaps now more than ever 
because of that 
splintering effect - 
for things that they can share. ' Richard Williams, `Adjusting your sets', The Guardian, 
November 29 1996. 
26 In addressing these question. Taylor offers three 'democratic aspirations' that 
function as criteria in 
the qualitative assessment of 
deliberative process's, the "ecOn(l and third of which are directly relevant to the 
activities of the press: 
(i) that people should have ,1 voice receiving 
dui recognition and consideration in the 
formulation of rules and decisions which govern their lives; (ii) that this voice he genuinely theirs, 
i. e. not 
manipulated by propaganda, misinformation, 
irrational fears; (iii) that it be the outcome of mature reflection 
and not based can uºnex, aºnined 
instinct or prejudice. Ta lor'Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere', 201. 
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patterns of ownership that arguably undermine the range of opinion considered in public 
debates, and the manipulation of editorial content býproprietors suffering from 
delusions of megalomania. It is perhaps unsurprising that all three are prominently 
evident in the national print culture of the United Kingdom. 27 
If the deliberative paucity displayed by the English press in particular contributes - 
in part at least - an implicit explanation of and commentary on the wider failings of the 
deliberative process, the renewal of that democratic culture must find its basis in the 
microsocial public spaces that culminate in the `metatopical' public sphere. A `top down' 
argument that seeks to define or impose the content or outcome of discursive encounters 
would of course be neither deliberative nor democratic. Taylor is however able to 
outline an interpretive approach according to which a plurality of public spaces can be 
seen to compose a coherent and differentiated set of public debates undertaken in pursuit 
of democratic purposes. Rejecting a homogenous model of democratic culture, a 
`nested'28 understanding of public spaces is instead proposed, Where the goods, identities 
and issues that are contested and negotiated in local and particular contexts are seen to 
feed into and impact upon the wider public sphere, rather than being derivative of or 
subordinate to the prevailing agenda of a centralised and unresponsive culture. The 
schematic features of this plural and substantive account of deliberation and democracy 
in the public sphere are readily identified and philosophically undemanding. The 
extension and assessment of this theoretical model as a guide to democratic practice also 
requires consideration of the importance of deliberation for the identity and agency of 
the self - an area that poses particular difficulties for contemporary liberal political 
theory in general, and for Justice as Fairness in particular. 
[3] AGENCY AND IDENTITY 
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENCE attributed to public space by 
Taylor is closely connected with its creation in the intersubjective practices undertaken 
in the public sphere, `which is constituted by nothing outside of the common action we 
carry out in it. Its existence as an association is just our acting together in this way. '29 
27 Where the London based press is prednniinanti' ri;; lit-win ; in (wientaticýn; ownership is 
concentrates{ in I small number of n, iti(nn, tl and tr, tnsn. tti, )nal o)rp(r, ttiun\ 
(n()t. i)l\ News C( rp., The Mirror 
Group, Unites{ Newspapers and Pearson Holdings); and the edit()ri. al 
influeince ý)I figures such as Rupert 
Murdoch and Conrad Black 
i: wielded to serve the interests ()(capital rather than public debate. 
28 Taylor, `Liberal Politics and the PuNic Sphere', 208. Debates arising within political parties or social 
movements (such ts environmental, 
anti-r. tci't and environmental campaigns) that ime to engage the 
concerns of a Wider constituency 
and contribute to the reshaping of (1l'h, it(» in the public sphere 
are noted{ as exam ples thi: 
proces:. 
19 Tav lor, 'Liberal Polibis and the Public Sphhere', 194-s. 
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The efficacy of the public sphere as a constraint on power and a mode of democratic 
politics is intimately related to the engagement of citizens in collective deliberation. As 
before, the success or failure of the public sphere in particular circumstances cannot be 
essayed by theory alone, but drawing upon the resources of philosophical anthropology 
it is possible to elaborate an account linking deliberative engagement, identity and the 
culture of democracy in order to illustrate Taylor's account of the public sphere as a 
plausible and valuable addition to democratic theory. 
As a domain of self-rule conceiving citizen participation in deliberative processes as 
a good in itself, 30 the activities that constitute and reproduce the public sphere do not 
solely concern democratic opinion formation. A pluralist understanding of the public 
sphere allows that deliberative engagement can occur, under appropriate circumstances, 
in a wide variety of forms31 and just as there is no canonical way of belonging in a 
thoroughly multicultural society, so there is no definitive or compulsory mechanism of 
democratic participation. Although the idea of democratic self-rule assumes that `the 
people who are sovereign form some kind of unit', 32 the mode of politics envisaged by 
deliberative theory is a differentiated and multifaceted one, and does not involve the 
prescription of a universal or general political will. Within this complex whole, successful 
democratic agency occurs not just in the satisfaction of individual preferences and 
interests but in the realisation through the deliberative engagement and contestation of 
the goods and meanings (of identity, difference, recognition, solidarity, freedom, equality, 
etc. ) that are variously associated with the concept of community and realised in its 
relationships. 33 
The conception of deliberation emerging from this analysis, which attends in detail 
to the public, practical, democratic and cultural aspects of political engagement is clearly 
superior to the empty and inadequately contextualised ordering of rational interests and 
preferences proposed by Rawls. 34 Because decision and action follows 
unproblematically from the deliberation of an inviolable, prediscursively established self, 
30 In that partii ip, itic)fl is ti()t the nme, ans tO 111 Cnc1 -)C iceptic, n (d justice, or , autonomy, 
for example - 
but is instead hound up with the \'cry idea of cleu'ruo r, itic citizenship. As Taylor notes (`Irreducibly Social 
Goods', 59. ) this understanding is clcosel)' associated with the 'civic humanist' tradition. As part of a reflexive, 
pluralist and interpretiv( account of 
deliberative processes, liO vc"vvcr, participation does not function as a 
monistic good or su»tmunt 
bonuni :a democratic public sphere realises a plurality of g)){s and identities that 
includes that of the active Citizen, 
but is not unduly dOminate(l by it. 
31 
e. g. in membership ., 
I p( 1ideal parties. 51) i, tl nil veiliýnl\ and Other public 1-)I dies; in dialogical 
encounters, be the 
h riii, tl, iiihIrni, tl or spouiIandi)u:; inclireel participatin 
in mediated public debates, and 
SO Oil. 
32 Taylor, 'Liberal Politic: and the Public Sphere', 204. 
33 Ta lor, 'Liberal Politics , ti-id the 
Public- Sphere', 205. 
34 See CIi ;9? above. 
201 
the methodologies of justice as Fairness present the achievement of agency as a fait 
accompli, and fail to acknowledge the possibility that actions constitute and reconstitute 
as well as simply reflect identity. As Bowles and Gintis argue, the insight of 
contemporary liberalism in this area is effectively limited to the banal observation `that 
people make decisions' a paucity indicating that `the liberal conception of action must be 
reconstructed to recognize that decisions also make people. '35 
This reconstruction develops an understanding of action as a socially grounded 
phenomenon in a form that is in large part consistent with Taylor's approach. 36 Rather 
than taking preferences as given, Bowles and Gintis emphasise the formative and 
transformative37 nature of action in relation to the self, and their `postliberal' democratic 
theory corrects the myth that the rational interests of the self are straightforward 
extensions of an already complete, epistemologically and psychologically unified entity. 
As a social being `in continual need of definition, validation and recognition through 
action'38 their interpretation breaks down the liberal boundary between the public and 
private (or, for Rawls, `nonpublic') spheres by emphasising the extent to which identity 
is simultaneously `socially conditioned and susceptible to development through 
individual choice. Individuals affect their own becoming, as well as that of others, 
through their actions. '39 
As its title suggests, Democracy and Capitalisrrr offers a political and economic 
critique of liberal theory and its consequences rather than an explicitly philosophical 
analysis and reconstruction. The extent to which the conception of agency they advance 
is compatible with Taylor's approach is notable and far from coincidental. The 
advantages of an anthropologically informed approach to questions of identity, action, 
deliberation and pluralism over both traditional (contractarian, utilitarian and 
deontological) and contemporary (constructivist and procedural) formulations of 
liberalism are readily apparent. In addressing public and political contexts, 
Taylor's 
conceptions of reflexivity and dialogue conceive deliberation as an open rather than 
closed process, involving a negotiation rather than a simple clash of 
identities. The 
availability and quality of a deliberative process is of decisive political 
importance in the 
35 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy, . and 
Capilalimt: Property, community and the 
Contradictions of Modern Social Thought, 211d. ed. (New York, Basic Books, 1987) 123, emphasis added. 
36 Bowles and Gintis do not directly discuss Tayhºr's work, but 
do acknowledge the importance of 
Sandel's critique. Democracy and capitalism, 214 n. 13,228 n. 7,? 
30 n. 29. 
37 For a summary statement of the `self-transformation thesis, where the privatised 
liberal self ideally 
becomes `more broadly enipcm, ered{... more public-spirited, more tolerant, more 
knowledgeable [and] more 
attentive to the 
interests of others' see Mark \\', trrrn, 'Democratic Theory- and Self-Transformation', 
Americ n Political Science Re zc, w $6(1992) , 8-13. 
38 Bowlcý and Gintis, Democracy. rucl Crpitalts»r, 130. 
39 Bowles and Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism, 151, cºnpl tsi, sided. 
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control and accountability of power, and the democratic formulation (where possible) of 
common political purposes, and is also significant in providing the cultural domains 
where the identities of communities, social groups and the individuals that comprise 
them are constituted and articulated through agency in the public sphere. 
[4] INTERPRETATION, PLURALISM AND POWER 
THE CRITICAL CHALLENGE PRESENTED by deliberative conceptions of democracy to 
rights based liberalism is considerable, and they have predictably attracted considerable 
critical attention from theorists whose positions are threatened by the emergence of a 
new philosophical paradigm. Some major objections are briefly noted and addressed 
below in order to highlight the explanatory and justificatory- resources available to a 
hermeneutic and anthropological account of deliberation. 
The first of these criticisms argues that a principle of deliberation is both irrelevant 
and unrealistic: ` 0 it fails to attend to the scale, complexity and irretrievably institutional 
character of modern politics which is systemic and technocratic in structure, and beyond 
the control deliberative processes. Regardless of its desirability as an ideal, a deliberative 
approach is an unworkable ideal that marks a retreat by, theory from serious engagement 
with the structural issues facing modern representative regimes. As Benhabib argues, this 
critical approach is based on a fundamental and unimaginative pessimism regarding the 
possibilities of politics. The question, she argues, `is not whether discursive democracy 
can become the practice of complex societies but whether complex societies are still 
capable of democratic rule, ' and although deliberation does not provide an instant 
panacea for the problems of democracy, it undeniably offers an approach that is both 
plausible and politically effective. 
The concepts of deliberation and democracy- in the public sphere outlined above 
are not totalising in form; they are not intended to comprehensively replace existing 
political structures and practices, but instead contribute to the development of the public 
sphere as a domain of negotiation and opinion formation - rather than merely 
consumption and preference satisfaction - where otherwise silenced or marginalised 
identities, aspirations and values can receive public articulation in a cultural process that 
is neither formal nor institutionalised, 
but is undeniably political. The dismissal of 
deliberative engagement fails to appreciate the 
importance of the indirectly reflexive 
relationship obtaining between state and societN, 
41 and of the role performed by the 
40 The objections in this vein O svstcnis theorist 
Nikl, ts Luhm. tnn are noted by Seyla Benhabib, 
`Toward a Delihcrative Model oil Democrttic 
Lcgitim, wv, ' in her Democracy anti Di fc"rence, 84-5. 
41 See §2 above. 
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public sphere as a political form in its own right. Social and economic activities that 
constitute civil society manifest relationships involving not just equality and identity, but 
also power, status, domination, interest, class, and so forth. The constitution through 
agency of a democratic and plural public sphere is therefore intensely political. As 
Hegel's dialectic of lordship and bondage memorably demonstrated, 42 the intersubjective 
recognition of free self-consciousness is a discourse of power and equality, and the 
significance for democratic politics of the dialogical formulation, recognition and 
articulation of identities should not be underestimated. 
The second objection to receive consideration is the more carefully formulated 
claim that deliberative democracy is unworkable because it requires from the members of 
the public sphere a strong degree of commonality and communicative rationality, 
without which `bitterness and hostility will continue to fester, and policy initiatives will 
remain uncoordinated and vulnerable. ' On this account the fragmentation and citizen 
alienation that makes the development of effective public spaces so attractive as a position 
of advocacy ironically undermines the concept of deliberation at the point of inception, 
as the disorder of democracy `prevent [it] from responding to the "cure. "'43 Femia's 
criticism of the standards, constraints and levels of communicative competence required 
by legitimate deliberative activity is aimed at theorists - such as Dryzek - engaged in the 
formulation of models indebted to critical theory rather than hermeneutics, and is not 
directly relevant to Taylor's account of the public sphere. The avoidance by a 
hermeneutic theorisation of pitfalls encountered by normative approaches to the public 
sphere is not without significance, however, and the emphasis on intersubjective practices 
of reflection, evaluation and interpretation also permits an answer - insofar as one is 
available to theory - to the claim that deliberative arguments are undermined in advance 
by the fragmentation they seek to alleviate. 
Fernia is correct in his observation that if discourse involves nothing more than the 
articulation of established antagonisms, identities, or conflicts of goods, the public sphere 
will not function in an effective or democratic manner. The scenario envisaged -a public 
sphere that is adversarial, but not deliberative - has little to commend it, but does not 
follow automatically from a failure to realise idealised conditions of public discourse. 
Taylor's reflexive theorisation of identity and public space avoids strong assumptions 
concerning the content or contexts of 
identity, offering a normatively undemanding 
conception of public space. Constituted 
in the course of intersubjective activity, the 
quality and responsiveness of the public sphere cannot 
be guaranteed, but the 
42 Hegel. //rýý7uýrt(ýtn/rýtý'rý/Spirit. 951 178-19b. 
43 joscph Fcmi. l, 'Coýi»pIcxit) Inkl Dclitx'r, uivc Dciii"cr. i ' Inr, trtry. 1) (1997),.; 97. 
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interpretation of the concept presented here is clearly not invalidated by its own 
preconditions. Reflexive hermeneutics does require that the participants in a dialogue are 
willing to recognise the identities of others as social equals, and to respond to them in 
kind in the course of collective debate, but these `conditions' are both underlabouring 
and fully consistent with the philosophical anthropology developed in chapters four and 
five. 
The satisfactory resolution of questions concerning the content and quality of 
public spaces can only properly occur in the course of applied interpretation in particular 
cases, but the ideal of a pluralist, accessible and democratic public sphere, created in 
dialogues of civil society where identities are formed and negotiated in discourse, is 
undoubtedly coherent and plausible in both theory and practice. It is the extent to 
which it can actually be realised in late-modern societies that remains to be established. 
[5] VOCABULARIES AND SUBJECTIVITIES 
THE ADVOCACY OF A SUBSTANTIVE, DELIBERATIVE CONCEPTION of political 
engagement and the development of the reflexive, interpretive methodology that 
supports it does not purport to overturn in their entirety either the practices or the 
values of liberalism, which are deeply and undeniably embedded in the vocabularies, 
understandings and forms of life that endure even within increasingly fragmented and 
atomised polities. A hermeneutic approach does not provide a blueprint for immediate 
institutional or systemic transformation either, but in offering a critique of the hegemony 
of deontic and procedural formulations of liberalism it presents a compelling analysis of 
the problems confronting the prevailing rights based model, and demonstrates the 
immanent possibility of a more reflexive, responsive and effective relationship between 
the structures of state and civil society. Guided by the fundamental role played by 
language and interpretation in human affairs, conceptions of identity, agency, 
community, deliberation and democracy are coherently linked and politicised in order to 
pluralise, and ideally precipitate a revival of, the public vocabularies and practices 
required to sustain processes of democratic will-formation and collective decision 
making. 
The shared meanings and understandings that make communication and social life 
possible are constantly, and ordinarily imperceptibly, sustained and reproduced 
in the 
practices and conversations of social 
life. The dependent relationship that obtains 
between use and meaning entails that language is always unfinished, its meanings 
incomplete and available to deliberative contestation when their clarity or commonality 
ceases to be experienced unproblematically. 
In increasingly complex and multicultural 
late-modern societies the proliferation of goods, identities and meanings, compounded by 
the reflexivity that 
is fundamental to the culture of modernity as well as to hermeneutic 
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methodologies, entails that the occurrence of contested meanings and conflicting 
identities is an increasingly common one. Of course, not all human goods are compatible 
or identities reconcilable. A democratic public culture that embodies a commitment to 
diversity and deliberation can however allow conflicts to be peaceably addressed in 
political dialogue, rather than privatising or suppressing the multiplicity of the political 
domain. Where political viewpoints and identities are found to be genuinely 
incommensurable that condition too might ideally receive productive articulation in the 
dialogues of the public sphere. 
CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF, no less than the identities they theorise, are shaped in both 
form and content by the vocabularies in which they are constituted. The language of 
individual rights and liberties underwrites a different ideal of self and politics to that 
sustained by conceptions of goods and virtues; an approach for which conceptions of 
power and domination are constitutive offers a third alternative, and so on. Philosophical 
argument can assess the various strengths and weaknesses of these vocabularies in the 
course of interrogation and critique, but it cannot be expected or wished for any single 
language or theory to dominate or refute alternative viewpoints. Pluralism is as 
important to the discourses of political theory as it is in the wider public sphere, and in 
the course of this discussion the methodological advantages of a anthropologically based, 
reflexive and explicitly pluralist understanding of language and politics have clearly 
emerged. 
A hermeneutic approach offers a situated, intersubjective and expressive conception 
of the self that avoids the unsustainable attributions and assumptions of procedural and 
constructivist methodologies. The language-based conception of human relations it 
conveys does not directly determine political principles or outcomes, instead supporting 
an expansive account of the contexts and practices of democratic politics which is 
culturally located, rather than being systematically or institutionally specified. The 
deliberative ideal outlined in the discussion does not claim to exhaust the concept of the 
political, but does seek to disrupt the unthinking identification of 
liberalism, 
individualism and democracy that prevails in much contemporary political theory and 
practice. Within this account the orthodoxies of contemporary 
liberalism can receive 
clear and substantive articulation, 
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